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The present volume Explorations in Augustine’s Anthropology is the out-
come of a long and comprehensive cooperation between scholars from 
Brazil and Europe� The editors of this volume received a grant from the 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support cooperation between three 
institutions, Aarhus University, Federal University of Juiz de Fora, and 
Federal Institute of Science and Technology of Southern Minas Gerais� The 
theme of the cooperation was Augustine’s anthropology� One of the results 
of this was two workshops� The first workshop was hosted by the Núcleo 
de Estudos Agostinianos (NEA- UFJF) and took place in March 2017 at the 
Federal University of Juiz de Fora, Brazil� This workshop brought Brazilian 
and Danish scholars together� The second workshop took place at Aarhus 
University in March 2018� This workshop was organized in cooperation 
with the research project The History of Human Freedom and Dignity in 
Western Civilization and included once again researchers from Brazil and 
several European countries� We wish to express our gratitude towards The 
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Commission (Marie 
Skłodowska- Curie programme) who funded the network activities and the 
workshops�
The workshops had a broad approach to Augustine’s anthropology� The 
volume therefore includes contributions which address a wide range of top-




Augustine of Hippo’s views are entirely embedded in the domains of anthro-
pology� In relation to his personal pursuit of truth, as poignantly described 
in the Confessiones, the meaning of the human existence is examined 
throughout his writings under a variety of perspectives� Thus, anyone will-
ing to grasp the features of his anthropological thoughts needs to be pre-
pared to track a winding path� A path that is simultaneously devious and 
marvelous in its manifold expressions�
Generally, it can be said that such a multifaceted anthropology is the out-
come of both Augustine’s distinctive biography and the philosophical and 
theological conflicts in which he was involved from youth to old age� Such 
concrete events profoundly shaped his understanding and his experience of 
what it means to be human�
Even with the definitive episode of his conversion into Christianity, 
the pursuit for the most fundamental questions on human being did not 
diminish� Quite the opposite, it only amplified his eagerness towards under-
standing the human existence as deeply as possible, under impression of 
the Christian faith� Henceforth, he would come to deal with the foremost 
themes of Christianity at that time, such as creation, incarnation, Trinity, 
resurrection, the free will, original sin, so as to uncover these themes’ signif-
icance for the comprehension of the human being�
Thus, the task of reflecting on Augustine’s anthropology demands a 
relentless effort� In fact, the complexity and the manifoldness of its expres-
sions bring about almost insurmountable difficulties to anyone who intends 
to attain a systematic account of it� The divergences which result both from 
the maturation of his thoughts and from the different theological themes and 
conflicts he had to handle cannot be set aside� It is the breeding ground of 
his anthropology� Therefore, in order to unveil the intersecting point which 
allows us to connect the several faces of such an anthropology, one needs to 
embrace the richness of its manifold expressions�
Not surprisingly, this diversity is mirrored in the wide range of themes 
brought to the table by the authors in this volume�
First, Fabio Dalpra investigates the Platonic influence on one of the cor-
nerstones of Early Christian anthropology, i�e�, the concept of participation 
as it is expressed by Origen of Alexandria and Augustine of Hippo�
In sequence, shedding light on the anthropology in Augustine’s early 
works, Ivan Bilheiro reflects on the effect of the skeptical doubt on human 
existence according to Augustine’s first extant work, Contra academicos; 
Lenka Karfikova investigates the meaning and function of the soul in the 
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dialogue De quantitate animae; and Humberto Quaglio discusses Christ’s 
role as in De magistro� These articles all show how intensively Augustine in 
the first years after his conversion and baptism strives to formulate Christian 
theology including theological anthropology by use of philosophical tradi-
tions especially Platonism�
Moving into a reflection on free will and human freedom, Morten 
Møller argues for the influence of Origen’s Commentary on the Epistle to 
the Romans on Augustine through the analysis of themes such as baptism, 
free will, and original sin; Anders- Christian Jacobsen studies Augustine’s 
understanding of human freedom and free will and the significance of these 
for his theological anthropology; and Eva Elisabeth Vrangbæk examines 
Augustine’s account of the will of human beings before and after the fall 
according to De civitate Dei� The question of human freedom and free will 
occupied Augustine from the beginning to the end of his career as philosoph-
ical and theological author�
The next three articles focus on Augustine’s late writings� Fabio Dalpra 
analyses the anthropology in De Trinitate by using the theory of human beings 
as images of God as a unifying theme in the treatise� Monnica Klöckener 
analyses the human relationship with God in Tractatus in Iohannem 15, 
where Augustine interprets the Johanine story about the woman at the 
well in the Gospel of John 4:1– 42� Margrethe Kamille Birkler and Anders- 
Christian Jacobsen deal with the issue of the resurrection of the human 
body, while having in mind two major works of Augustine: Enchiridion and 
De Civitate Dei�
At last, concluding the volume, Antonio Henrique Campolina debates 




The Reception of the Concept of Participation 
in Early Christianity: Origen’s On First 
Principles and Augustine’s On the Trinity.1
Abstract: By attending to the main features of Plato’s concept of participation, this work 
aims to shed light on its reception in Early Christianity via Origen’s On First Principles 
and Augustine’s On the Trinity�
1.  Introduction
The first and fundamental reference to the concept of “participation” is found 
in Plato� Generally speaking, he makes use of this concept to explain the rela-
tion between the Forms/ Ideas and the sensible things� As such, it is a theoretical 
cornerstone of so- called Platonic dualism� According to Brochard, “la théo-
rie de la participation est, comme celle de la démonstration de l’existence des 
Idées, et autant qu’elle, la partie essentielle du système de Platon�”2
Plato conveys the idea of participation by way of two verbs: μεταλαμβάνειν 
and μετε ́χειν�3 Inasmuch as sensible things receive reality from Ideas by par-
taking in them, there exists a qualitative difference between the domain of 
the Ideas, eternal and unchangeable, and the domain of the sensible things, 
finite and changeable� As Plato writes, “consider then, he said, whether you 
share my opinion as to what follows, for I think that, if there is anything 
beautiful besides the Beautiful itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than 
that it shares in [scil� μετέχει] that Beautiful, and I say so with everything�”4 
 1 This paper and the research behind it would not have been possible without the 
support of IFSULDEMINAS through the concession of a work leave� I also express 
my gratitude to Aarhus University for having hosted me during the process�
 2 V� Brochard, Études de philosophie ancienne et de philosophie moderne, Paris 
1912, 113�
 3 P� Cardinali, La participación y la mística en las Enéadas de Plotino, in: Epimeleia 
7 (1995), 58– 59� According to her, Plato does not offer a clear distinction between 
the terms though, cf� Cardinali, 1995, 58� The nouns μετάληψις, μ́εθεξις and 
μετουσία derive from the two verbs� It is also worth emphasizing their semantic 
resonance with the concepts of κοινωνία (cf� Pl�, Cri� 119c, Pl�, Symp� 188c, Pl�, 
Phd� 100d, Pl�, Prm� 152a) and συμπλοκή (cf� Pl�, Soph� 262c, Plt� 281a)�
 4 Pl�, Phd� 100c: Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης, ὡς διδόντος σοι οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις περαίνων� 
Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, τὰ ἑξῆς ἐκείνοις ἐάν σοι συνδοκῇ ὥσπερ ἐμοί� φαίνεται γάρ μοι, εἴ τί 












On the one hand, there is Beauty itself: the single, fundamental idea of 
Beauty� On the other hand, there are beautiful things, which receive their 
beauty from the Idea� Just as beautiful things participate in Beauty, sensible 
things take part in the full range of seminal Ideas� So, participation is a 
principle that undergirds the constitution of reality as such� This conception 
expresses what can be called the common grammar of Plato’s theory of Ideas 
and participation� We find it expounded across several dialogues: Cratylus, 
Symposium, Republic, Phaedrus, Phaedo, Timaeus.
It is reasonable to suppose that such a “grammar,” like any other, demands 
logical regulation� And, indeed, in the Phaedo, one encounters a foundational 
principle of this logic� After a long debate concerning the relation between 
opposite Ideas, e�g�, oneness and twoness, smallness and bigness, hot and cold, 
Plato argues, “not only does the opposite not admit its opposite, but that which 
brings along some opposite into that which it occupies, that which brings this 
along will not admit the opposite to that which it brings along�”5 Here we find 
the famous principle of non- contradiction�
So far, then, the formal logic of the common grammar of participation com-
prises the union of three basic principles:
 a) the uniqueness and separateness of the Ideas in relation to the sensible things
 b) the qualitative difference between the absoluteness of the Ideas and the 
relativity of the sensible things which partake in them
 c) the non- contradictory relation between opposite Ideas�6
Be this as it may, Plato’s reflection on the theory of Ideas and participation 
constitutes an unfolding dialectical process that is not so straightforward as 
it might first appear� In fact, his own theory would become the object of crit-
ical scrutiny in the dialogues Parmenides and Sophist�
In the Parmenides, Plato subjects his own theory to piercing interro-
gation� In this work, he acknowledges the urgent demand for a more in- 
depth understanding of the connection between the linked concepts of Idea 
and participation� The character Parmenides, while confronting a Socrates 
depicted as immature,7 posits several apparent contradictions related to the 
ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ· καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτως λέγω� (J� Burnet, Platonis opera, vol� 1, 
Oxford, 1900, retrieved from TLG)� Here and henceforth, the English transla-
tions of Plato’s works are taken from J� M� Cooper (ed�), Plato, Complete Works, 
Indianapolis 1997�
 5 Pl�, Phd� 105a: ὃ ἂν ἐπιφέρῃ τι ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ’ ὅτι ἂν αὐτὸ ἴῃ, αὐτὸ τὸ ἐπιφέρον 
τὴν τοῦ ἐπιφερομένου ἐναντιότητα μηδέποτε δέξασθαι� (Burnet, 1900)�
 6 Such precepts make up, to a great extent, the so- called classical definition of 
Theory of Ideas, cf� Brochard, 1912, 167�
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participation of the many sensible things in their corresponding Ideas�8 As 
a result, the second part of the dialogue is full of aporias which, according 
to Parmenides, reveal the fragility of the theory of Ideas and the concept of 
participation�
The debate extends into the Sophist, where Plato reflects upon the con-
tradictions exposed in the Parmenides� In order to address the problem of 
incoherence, he smooths out the contradictions between one and many, 
and being and non- being, by working out a conception of reality as a com-
plex intersection of Ideas no longer taken as opposite, but different�9 From 
this point on, he appends an additional logical layer to the basic Idea of 
participation�
In order to clarify the Sophist’s theoretical purpose, it is worth citing the 
passage where the “visitor,” proposes to enact a metaphorical parricide, 
explaining: “in order to defend ourselves we’re going to have to subject 
father Parmenides’ saying to further examination, and insist by brute force 
both that that which is not somehow is, and then again that that which is 
somehow is not�”10 Here, we can see Plato rethinking the binary opposition 
between two foundational concepts of his philosophy, i�e�, being and non- 
being� The ensuing dialogical sequence shows the vulnerability of the con-
cept of participation to the idea of change� According to Plato,
so it has to be possible for that which is not to be, in the case of change and also as 
applied to all the kinds� That’s because as applied to all of them the nature of the 
different makes each of them not be, by making it different from that which is� And 
we’re going to be right if we say that all of them are not in this same way� And on 
 8 It is possible to see this when Parmenides, in taking account of how hard it had 
been for Socrates to explain whether an Idea is wholly or partially present in its 
partaker, asks: “Socrates, in what way, then, will the other things get a share of 
your forms, if they can do so neither by getting parts nor by getting wholes?” Pl�, 
Prm� 131e: Τίνα οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, 
μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα� (J� Burnet, Platonis opera, 
vol� 2, Oxford, 1901, retrieved from TLG)� Socrates will henceforth acknowledge 
the incapacity of defending participation without abandoning a fixed dualism 
between the Ideas and the sensible things, cf� Pl�, Prm� 135c- d�
 9 The replacement of opposition with difference is important in the Sophist; cf� “it 
seems that when we say that which is not, we don’t say something contrary to that 
which is, but only something different from it” Pl�, Soph� 257b: Ὁπόταν τὸ μὴ ὂν 
λέγωμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος ἀλλ’ ἕτερον μόνον� (Burnet, 
1900)� Cf� also I� Bocayuva, Entre o Parmênides e o Sofista de Platão, in: Anais 
de filosofia clássica 16 (2014), 62– 72 (67 f)�
 10 Pl�, Soph� 241d: Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις 
ἔσται βασανίζειν, καὶ βιάζεσθαι τό τε μὴ ὂν ὡς ἔστι κατά τι καὶ τὸ ὂν αὖ πάλιν ὡς οὐκ 








the other hand we’re also going to be right if we call them beings, because they have 
a share [scil� μετέχει] in that which is�11
From here on, he will assume that participation should be able to bring 
about a unity between Ideas previously seen as opposite� So, through an 
analysis of the most fundamental oppositional Ideas, that is, being and non- 
being, same and different, rest and change, Plato comes to defend the possi-
bility of a union without confusion�12 In other words, he demonstrates how 
opposing Ideas can remain themselves while, at the same time, cohering both 
in each other and in their sensible correlates, by surpassing the limits of non- 
contradiction� The logical basis of the idea of participation is expanded in 
order to resolve the aporia that seemed to arise from the encounter of two 
opposite Ideas existing in a single reality�13
Taking this development into account, it is reasonable to surmise that 
the grammar of Plato’s concept of participation is not bound by univocal 
logic� The Parmenides and the Sophist expand this grammar by appending 
an additional logical layer� It is not so much a negation of the prior mode of 
reasoning, but rather a novel combination of two logical insights to make 
the concept of participation more capable of dealing with an increasingly 
demanding ontology�
Thanks to the amendment of its logical structure, the idea of participa-
tion would now be able to encompass relations which surmount, on the 
one hand, qualitative and hierarchical differences between partaker and par-
taken, and, on the other hand, the principle of non- contradiction� In this 
manner, the constant and simultaneous co- inherence of Ideas in themselves, 
as well as the participation of sensible things therein, suggest a conception 
of reality as a tangled junction of differences�
 11 Pl�, Soph� 256d- e: Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπί τε κινήσεως εἶναι καὶ κατὰ πάντα 
τὰ γένη· κατὰ πάντα γὰρ ἡ θατέρου φύσις ἕτερον ἀπεργαζομένη τοῦ ὄντος ἕκαστον 
οὐκ ὂν ποιεῖ, καὶ σύμπαντα δὴ κατὰ ταὐτὰ οὕτως οὐκ ὄντα ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν, καὶ πάλιν, 
ὅτι μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναί τε καὶ ὄντα� (Burnet, 1900)� The same can be seen in 
other passages, such as, Soph� 241d; 249d; 257a; 258d- e�
 12 Cf� Pl�, Soph� 255e� Notwithstanding, he admits that the Ideas of rest and change 
are especially challenging� On this difficulty in the Sophist, cf� Brochard, 1912, 
143– 144�
 13 To some extent, it can be said that this solution had already been foreseen by Plato 
at the end of the Parmenides: “let us then say this - and also that, as it seems, 
whether one is or is not, it and the others both are and are not, and both appear 
and do not appear all things in all ways, both in relation to themselves and in 
relation to each other” Pl�, Prm� 166c: Εἰρήσθω τοίνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς ἔοικεν, 
ἓν εἴτ’ ἔστιν εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τἆλλα καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα πάντα 







Concept of Participation in Early Christianity 15
This is the theoretical ground from which the concept of participation was 
transplanted into the thought world of Early Christianity� Indeed, as I argue 
below, in order to understand the role of the concept of participation in Origen 
and Augustine, one must pay attention to the slippery and multivalent logic set 
up by Plato, mainly in the Parmenides and the Sophist� As a matter of fact, it is 
rather in the logical syntax than the conceptual layer that the concept exerted 
a lasting influence�14
2.  The Concept of Participation in Origen’s On First 
Principles
In its basic formulation, the concept of participation in Origen is connected 
to the idea of a hierarchy of beings�15 It can be detected in several passages of 
On First Principles� For instance, in Book 1, Origen argues
 14 Surely, a study of the Plotinian mediation would also be relevant to the reception 
of the concept in Early Christianity� Cardinali argues that Plotinus makes use of 
the verbs μεταλαμβάνειν and μετε ́χειν in a more precise way than Plato� According 
to her argument, he relates them with the movements of procession and return 
to the One� Thus, μεταλαμβάνειν refers to the way that the reality of the One is 
downwardly received by the beings that take part in it� In turn, μετε ́χειν desig-
nates the upward participation of the beings in their return to the One� However, 
regarding the extension of the influence of Plotinus on Origen and Augustine, two 
remarks should be made� Firstly, the Christian conceptions of God and creation 
would demand some crucial changes to the core of Plotinus’ philosophy, that is, 
the movement of procession and return to the One� Secondly, with regard to the 
Latin Fathers, the distinction between μεταλαμβάνειν and μετε ́χειν would be shorn 
off by the translation into Latin as a single word, participare� This only strengthens 
our argument that the logical structure of participation is more relevant than a 
conceptual analysis when it comes to its reception in Early Christianity� For this 
debate, cf� Cardinali, 1995, 61 f�
 15 The concept of hierarchy of beings was articulated by Balas in his classical article 
on participation in Origen’s thought: “thus, as in the Platonic tradition, in Origen’s 
works, too, participation expresses the relationship of a lower degree within the 
hierarchy of beings to the higher�” D� Balas, The Idea of Participation in the 
Structure of Origen’s Thought, in: Origeniana. Premier colloque international 
des études origéniennes (Montserrat, 18– 21 Septembre 1973), Bari 1975, 261. 
Even the more recent study by Dimitri Biriukov, with its defense of the possible 
influence of Aristotle on Origen’s conception of participation, does not break 
away from the interpretative model of Balas and its one- sided commitment 
to the logic which underlies the idea of a hierarchy of beings, cf� D� Biriukov, 
Paradigms of Participation in Origen, in: Scrinium 13 (2017), 277– 290� It only 
gives support to the argument that the perspective presented by the dialogues 
Parmenides and Sophist has not been sufficiently considered� On the hierarchy of 







that the work of the Father and the Son is both in saints and sinners is clear from 
this, that all who are rational beings are partakers of the Word of God, that is, 
Reason, and in this way, as it were, bear certain seeds, implanted within them, of 
Wisdom and Justice, which is Christ� And in him who truly exists, who said by 
Moses, I am who I am, all things that are have participation, which participation in 
the God and Father extends to all, the righteous and sinners, rational and irrational 
beings, and absolutely everything that exists�16
This argument is complemented by the idea that human sanctification is 
derived from participation in the absolute sanctity of the Holy Spirit�17 For 
Origen, the Father’s activity provides being to partakers; the Son’s activity 
provides reason; and the Holy Spirit’s activity provides sanctity� In each case, 
the partakers are allowed to possess, in a relative way, what the Father, the 
Son, and the Holy Spirit possess absolutely�18 Despite the trinitarian vocab-
ulary, this conception bears evident traces of the Platonic hierarchy between 
the ideas and the sensible things�
Quelques observations sur le rapport christianisme- platonisme, in: B� Bruning 
/ M� Lamberigts / J� Van Houtem (eds�), Collectanea Augustiniana. Mélanges 
T. J. van Bavel, Leuven 1990, 335�
 16 Or�, De princ� 1�3,6: Quia autem operatio patris et filii et in sactis et in peccatoribus 
sit, manifestatur ex eo quod omnes, qui rationabiles sunt, uerbi dei, id est rationis, 
participes sunt et per hoc uelut semina quaedam insita sibi gerunt sapientiae et 
iustitiae, quod est Christus. Ex eo autem, qui uere est, qui dixit per Moysen: Ego 
sum qui sum, omnia quae sunt participium trahunt; quae participatio dei patris 
peruenit in omnes tam iustos quam peccatores et rationabiles atque irrationabiles 
et in omnia omnino quae sunt� The discussion extends into De princ� 1�3,7– 8� Here 
and henceforth, the Latin texts and the English translation of On First Principles 
are taken from Origen, On First Principles, edited and translated by John Behr, 
Oxford 2017�
 17 Cf� “and although many saints participate in the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit cannot 
on that account be thought of as a kind of body that, divided into bodily parts, is 
partaken of by each one of the saints; but he is rather a sanctifying power, in which 
all, who have deserved to be sanctified by his grace, are said to have a share” Or�, 
De princ� 1�1,3: Sed et cum de spiritu sancto multi sancti participant, non utique 
corpus aliquod intellegi potest spiritus sanctus, quod diuisum in partes corporales 
percipiat unusquisque sanctorum; sed uirtus profecto sanctificans est, cuius par-
ticipium habere dicuntur omnes, qui per eius gratiam sanctificari meruerint�
 18 The hierarchy of the participation finds different expressions in On First Principles� 
For example, in De princ� 1�3,8, Origen refers to participation as paulatim et per 
parte; in De princ� 1�6,2, as diversos ordines pro merito which are established pro 
mentis ac propositi motibus; in De princ� 2�6,3, in reference to the participation 
in Christ, he mentions gradual degrees dependent on the amor or dilectio given 
to him� All of them reproduce the idea according to which the partaker receives 







Concept of Participation in Early Christianity 17
Even so, it is worth noting that Origen offers a new perspective by adding 
to the debate the modifying grammar of essence (substance) and accident� 
As he says, “for in this Trinity alone, which is the author of all things, does 
goodness exist essentially; others possess it as an accident and something 
that can be lost; and only then are they in blessedness, when they participate 
in holiness and wisdom and in divinity itself�”19 In this case, the relation 
between partaken and partaker implies a “substantial” possession in the 
former and “accidental” possession in the latter� Thus, despite a partial devi-
ation from the Platonic lexicon in favor of the Christian one, the inherited 
logic of the hierarchy of beings remains�
The structure of the participation of creatures in the trinitarian persons, 
each one providing a specific attribute to their partakers (being, reason, 
and sanctity), also prevails in the theme by direct participation (by diverse 
degrees) in God,20 and the participation of the λο ́γοι in the λόγος�21 
Nonetheless, while such a logical scheme is undeniably relevant to Origen’s 
conception of participation, it does not exhaust his use of the term� He plays 
a different tune when describing the mutual inner participation of the three 
divine persons, and the incarnation of the Word�
Concerning the trinitarian issue, Origen affirms that “nothing in the 
Trinity can be called greater or less, for one fount of divinity upholds the 
universe by his Word or Reason and by the Spirit of his mouth [���]� This 
is most clearly pointed out by the Apostle Paul when explaining that the 
power of the Trinity is one and the same�”22 If, when it comes to the Trinity, 
no person can be said to be greater or less, and if divine power is one and 
the same, then the mutual participation between the Father, Son, and Spirit 
would cast off the hierarchy of its terms� Reinforcing the particularity of the 
logic required to ground trinitarian participation, Origen makes clear that 
the inner relation of the Trinity neither modifies substantially any one of 
the persons, nor adds or cuts off accidentally any of their inherent posses-
sions� This results in an intriguing situation wherein the trinitarian persons, 
 19 Or�, De princ� 1�6,2: In hac enim sola trinitate, quae est auctor omnium, bonitas 
substantialiter inest; ceteri uero accidentem eam ac decidentem habent, et tunc 
sunt in beatitudine, cum de sanctitate et sapientia ac de ipsa deitate participant� 
Cf� also De princ� 1�5,5; 1�8,3�
 20 Cf� Or�, De princ� 4�4,9�
 21 Cf� Or�, De princ� 1�3,6� Cf� also Biriukov, 2017, 281 f�
 22 Or�, De princ� 1�3,7: Porro autem nihil in trinitate maius minusue dicendum est, 
cum unus deitatis fons uerbo ac ratione sua teneat uniuersa, spiritu uero oris sui 










in partaking of each other, participate in a different reality without any sub-
stantial or accidental change�
Participation in the sanctity of the Holy Spirit displays even more clearly 
how the concept demands a complex relation between apparent opposites� 
According to Origen, “although many saints participate in the Holy Spirit, 
the Holy Spirit cannot on that account be thought as a kind of body that, 
divided into bodily parties, is partaken of by each one of the saints�”23 Even 
though the “sanctity” of the Holy Spirit is present in many saints, it cannot 
be materially divided among them� Thus, Origen concludes that, inasmuch 
as it is one and many at one time, “the Holy Spirit is an intellectual being 
and subsists and exists distinctly�”24 The use of the term distinctly (proprie) 
reveals a fundamental feature of the question� Distinctive beings require dis-
tinctive logical expressions� Therefore, the idea of participation requires a 
theoretical basis which is broad enough to cope with genuine distinction�
The logical demand of such distinctive beings becomes still more evi-
dent when Origen, relying on Paul (1 Cor 12:4– 7 and 1 Cor 12:11), claims 
that the specific activities of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit exist without 
excluding the unitary action of God� As he says, “this is most clearly pointed 
out by the apostle Paul, when explaining that the power of the Trinity is 
one and the same, in the passage where he says, there are varieties of gifts, 
but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of ministries, but the same Lord; 
and there are varieties of workings, but it is the same God who works all in 
all.”25 Here, participation needs to bring together the ideas of variety and 
 23 Or�, De princ� 1�1,3: Sed et cum de spiritu sancto multi sancti participant, non 
utique corpus aliquod intelligi potest spiritus sanctus, quod diuisum in partes 
corporales percipiat unusquisque sanctorum�
 24 Or�, De princ� 1�1,3: (���) quod sanctus spiritus subsistentia est intellectualis et prop-
rie subsistit et extat� It would be impossible to disregard the similarity between this 
discussion and the passage in the Parmenides where Plato questions whether the 
ideas would be wholly or partially present in their partakers, cf� 131a- e� However, 
even more striking is the likeness between the answers offered to the problem� 
In order to face the difficulties imposed by participation, Origen emphasizes the 
non- materiality of the partaken, a subsistentia intellectualis; Plato does the same� 
Through the character Socrates, he affirms, “maybe each of these forms is a 
thought [���] ‘and properly occurs only in minds’ ”, Pl�, Prm� 132b: Ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ 
Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ᾖ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ 
προσήκῃ ἐγγί γνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς�
 25 Or�, De princ� 1�3,7: Quod manifestissime indicat apostulus Paulus, unam ean-
demque uirtutem trinitatis exponens in eo cum dicit: Diuisiones autem sunt dono-
rum, idem autem spiritus; et diuisiones sunt ministeriorum, idem autem dominus; 
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sameness� The distinct actions pertaining to each of the three persons cannot 
not be incongruous with the uniqueness of God’s unified action�
A similar structure is also present in Origen’s Christology� In a debate con-
cerning the presence of the Word of God in those who partake in it— through 
attributes such as Truth, Righteousness, Life, Redemption, Wisdom— he con-
cludes that it “[���] is confined to no place, in no place, on the other hand, is 
it understood to be absent�”26 What is at stake is the need to reconcile the 
presence of a singular Truth, Life, Wisdom, and so on, in many partakers� 
Participation in the Word of God is a challenging phenomenon to explain inas-
much as it cannot be confined to any single place or body� After all, the Word 
is wholly present in each one without being absent from the others�27
The matter becomes even more complex, when Origen discusses the incar-
nation of the Word of God� As he says, “it is shown that the son of God was 
both wholly present in the body and also present everywhere�”28 It is here nec-
essary to harmonize the majesty of his divinity (deitatis eius maiestas) with the 
tininess of his body (corporis brevitatem)� Origen will not accept a restraining 
of the Word’s divinity as a consequence of its participation in one body� Rather, 
the Word’s incarnation can be said to be, at one and the same time, in a single 
body, and also in all others�
Given these examples, it is possible to argue that, while Origen makes use 
of the concept of participation vis- a- vis the logic of hierarchy between the 
partaker and the partaken, this logic does not exhaust the use of ‘participa-
tion’ in his thought� As we have seen, the distinctiveness of the Trinitarian and 
Christological issues demanded a specific grammar and logic suitable to their 
profound complexities� With theses issues, the way Origen makes use of the 
concept of participation to encompass different forms of participation— some 
of them completely engulfed in the mists of aporia— parallels the manifold log-
ical framework founded by Plato�
3.  The Concept of Participation in Augustine’s On the Trinity
Considering the well- documented influence of Platonism on Augustine of 
Hippo, both through direct influence and via Middle and (Neo)Platonism, it 
is natural to expect that one of its most important concepts— participation— 
should play a leading role in his thought� And, indeed, even a brief look 
 26 Or�, De princ� 4�4,2: a nullo loco concludatur, in nullo rursum deesse intelligitur�
 27 Cf� Or�, De princ� 4�4,1– 2�










at his writings confirms this hypothesis�29 It is therefore intriguing that the 
theme has drawn so little attention from scholars�30 When it has received 
attention, it has, for the most part, been marginally addressed in works 
dedicated to adjacent themes, such as God’s creation,31 the image of God 
in human beings,32 and the Trinity�33 With respect to the presence of par-
ticipation in Augustine’s early works, the sole article by David Mecone is 
a solid and encouraging contribution� More than simply raising the ques-
tion, he also identifies the basic conceptual vocabulary and theoretical 
premises associated with participation� He claims that, in the early period 
of Augustine’s thought, the concept influenced two major categories; first, 
ontology, regarding the participation of creatures in their Creator; second, 
anthropology, in reference to the theory of illumination and ‘deification,’ 
i�e� participation in the life of God�34 As with the lack of attention paid to 
participation in Augustine’s early writings, so too has his mature work been 
neglected� For this reason, an analysis of On the Trinity, which I provide 
below, will help to fill in an academic lacuna�35
So, arguing in favor of the relevance of participation for On the Trinity, 
it can be pointed out that the concept is technically present in eleven of the 
fifteen books of the treatise— absent only from books 2, 9, 11, and 12� As 
one would expect, the significance of these varies according to context� It is 
 29 Juan Pegueroles argues that “la participación platónica es el alma de la filosofía de 
San Agustín, el centro unificador de donde salen y adonde convergen las grandes 
líneas del sistema�”, cf� J� Pegueroles, La participación en la filosofía de San 
Agustín, in: Espíritu 31 (1982), 47– 66 (47)�
 30 For a comprehensive picture of that lack of balance, cf� D�V� Meconi, St. Augustine’s 
Early Theory of Participation, in: Augustin� Stud� 27 (1996), 79– 96 (79– 81)� Cf� 
also V�J� Bourke, Augustine’s View of Reality, Villanova 1964, 117�
 31 Cf� Bourke, 1964, 24– 25�
 32 Cf� for example A�- G� Hamman, L’homme, image de Dieu. Essai d’une anthro-
pologie chrétienne dans l’Eglise des cinq premiers siècles, Paris 1987, 238– 277; 
R� Teske, The Image and Likeness of God in St. Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram 
liber imperfectus, in: Augustinianum 30 (1990), 441– 451�
 33 Cf� for example L� Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, Cambridge 2010, 166– 170�
 34 Cf� Meconi, 1996, 79– 81� Such an interpretation has been upheld in the few works 
published after Meconi’s� For instance, Juan Pegueroles’ article, while covering 
a wider timespan than Meconi’s, is restricted to the ontological dimension, cf� 
Pegueroles, 1982�
 35 Smalbrugge provides some valuable remarks on the Christological content of 
books 4 and 14 of On the Trinity in his work on the concept of participation 
in Augustine� Nonetheless, it is almost exclusively focused on a claimed trans-
formation of the concept carried out by Augustine vis- a- vis Neoplatonism, cf� 
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worth noting that certain features attached to the concept in the early works 
are still present in On the Trinity� This persistence is evident in two impor-
tant topics: deification, and the relation between creatures and Creator� With 
respect to deification, Augustine sets up its basic expression in Book 1:
for life everlasting can scarcely be mortal and subject to change, and thus the Son of 
God, being life everlasting, must also be meant with the Father by the words who 
alone has immortality� After all, it is by becoming partakers in his life everlasting 
that we in our little measure have been made immortal, though the life everlasting 
we have been made partakers of is one thing, and we who shall live forever by par-
taking of it are another�36
In this passage, he ties the Son to the Father� If the Son is eternal life (uita 
aeterna) and the Scriptures refer to the Father as the one possessor of immor-
tality,37 then the Son must be with the Father; that is, they must be together 
in the same essence� The passage is also relevant insofar as it makes clear 
the function of participation in the process of deification� Human beings are 
made immortal by partaking in the immortality of the Son� Howbeit, the 
difference between eternal life per se, that is, God, and eternal life attained 
by participation, cannot be disregarded�
In considering the qualitative difference between the immortality of the 
Son and the immortality available to creatures, we can begin to discern 
one of the core features of Augustine’s theology: God’s attributes must be 
assumed essentially� As such, they are absolutely different from creaturely 
attributes, which result from the participation in another (higher) reality� In 
Book 5, Augustine sheds light on this idea by way of reflecting on the Trinity:
just as we do not say three beings, neither do we say three greatness or three great 
ones� In things that are great by partaking of greatness, things where being one is 
one thing and being great another, like a great house and a great mountain and a 
great heart, in such things greatness is one thing and that which is great with this 
greatness is another [���]� God however is not great with a greatness which he is not 
himself, as though God were to participate in it to be great� [���] he is great with a 
 36 Aug�, Trin� 1�6,10: Neque enim ipsa uita aeterna mortalis est secundum aliquam 
mutabilitatem; ac per hoc filius dei, quia uita aeterna est, cum patre etiam ipse 
intellegitur ubi dictum est: Solus habet immortalitatem. Eius enim uitae aeternae 
et nos participes facti pro modulo nostro immortales efficimur. Sed aliud est ipsa 
cuius participes efficimur uita aeterna, aliud nos qui eius participatione uiuemus 
in aeternum� (CCSL 50, 39)� Here and henceforth, the English translation of De 
trinitate is taken from Saint Augustine, The Trinity, translated by Edmund Hill, 
New York 2017�






greatness by which he is himself this same greatness� [���] for God it is the same thing 
to be as to be great�38
On the one hand, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, “keep unity of the spirit in 
the bond of peace (Eph 4:3), not in virtue of participation of their own very 
being�”39 On the other hand, creatures can only exist, be wise, or be good, 
by participating in being, wisdom, and goodness themselves� Consequently, 
Augustine thinks of the mutability of creatures as a consequence of their 
status as partakers� After all, by weakening or breaking off their participa-
tion they can diminish or lose their beneficial acquisitions� From the opposite 
perspective, the immutability and simplicity of God derive from the absence 
of participation in a reality which could be said to be distinct from itself�40
In these passages, it is possible to notice a hierarchy and opposition 
between a relative partaker and an absolute partaken� Nevertheless, this log-
ical structure does not exhaust the use of participation by Augustine�41 In 
Book 4, he brings new elements into the discussion� In an extended reflection 
on the incarnation of the Word and its salvific power, participation is taken 
as the cornerstone of his argument�
First, Augustine connects the theory of illumination to participation: “our 
enlightenment is to participate in the Word, that is, in that life which is the 
 38 Aug�, Trin� 5�10,11: Sicut ergo non dicimus tres essentias, ita non dicimus tres 
magnitudines neque tres magnos. In rebus enim quae participatione magnitudinis 
magnae sunt quibus aliud est esse, aliud magnas esse sicut magna domus et magnus 
mons et magnus animus, in his ergo rebus aliud est magnitudo, aliud quod ab ea 
magnitudine magnum est, [...]. Deus autem quia non ea magnitudine magnus est 
quae non est quod ipse ut quasi particeps eius sit deus cum magnus est. [...] ea 
igitur magnitudine magnus est qua ipse est eadem magnitudo. [...] hoc est enim 
deo esse quod est magnum esse� (CCSL 50, 217– 218)� On the equality of truth 
with greatness in the Trinity, cf� Trin� 8�1,12 (CCSL 50, 269– 270)�
 39 Aug�, Trin� 6�5,7: Sintque non participatione sed essentia [...] seruantes unitatem 
spiritus in uinculo pacis (CCSL 50, 235)�
 40 Cf� “But wisdom is both wise and is wise in itself� Every soul becomes wise by a 
participation in wisdom; and if it again becomes foolish, still the wisdom remains 
itself, nor does it undergo a change when the soul has been changed into folly� [���] 
because there indeed is the highest simple essence, and consequently there, to be 
and to be wise is one and the same” Aug�, Trin� 7�1,2: Sapientia uero et sapiens 
est et se ipsa sapiens est. Et quoniam quaecumque anima participatione sapientiae 
fit sapiens, si rursus desipiat, manet tamen in se sapientia; nec cum fuerit anima in 
stultitiam commutata, illa mutatur. [...] quia uere ibi est summe simplex essentia; 
hoc ergo est ibi esse quod sapere� (CCSL 50, 248– 249)�
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light of men (Jn 1:4)�”42 This means that illumination, which enlightens the 
darkness of the human mind, is absolutely necessary� For, on our own, “we 
were utterly incapable of such participation and quite unfit for it, so unclean 
were we through sin, so we had to be cleansed�”43 According to Augustine, 
sin endarkens human beings, preventing them from partaking in the Word 
of God� Consequently, they need the divine brightness of the Word to infuse 
them with light� Such purifying illumination, in turn, lays the foundation for 
the assimilation of another logical framework into the idea of participation� 
As Augustine affirms:
to contemplate God, which by nature we are not, we would have to be cleansed by 
him who became what by nature we are and what by sin we are not� By nature we 
are not God; by nature we are men; by sin we are not just� So God became a just 
man to intercede with God for sinful man� The sinner did not match the just, but 
man did match man� So he applied to us the similarity of his humanity to take away 
the dissimilarity of our iniquity, and becoming a partaker of our mortality he made 
us partakers of his divinity�44
The Word assumed human nature, but not human sin, so as to purify human 
beings, making possible the contemplation of God� Above all, this event 
allowed humans to participate in God’s divinity while God participated in 
their mortality�
At first glance, it would seem that both forms of participation are 
equivalent, but further investigation reveals their fundamental unlikeness� 
Regarding the participation of human beings in the Word of God, the hier-
archy between partaker and partaken is maintained� As mentioned above, 
there is a great distance between immortality, wisdom, and goodness them-
selves, and the approximations of these that come from participation�45
By contrast, the participation of the Word of God in humanity super-
sedes the hierarchy between divinity and humanity insofar as both are joined 
 42 Aug�, Trin� 4�2,4� Inluminatio quippe nostra participatio uerbi est, illius scilicet 
uitae quae lux est hominum (CCSL 50, 163)�
 43 Aug�, Trin� 4�2,4: Huic autem participationi prorsus inhabiles et minus idonei era-
mus propter immunditiam peccatorum; mundandi ergo eramus (CCSL 50, 163)�
 44 Aug�, Trin� 4�2,4: Ut ad contemplandum deum quod natura non sumus per eum 
mundaremur factum quod natura sumus et quod peccato non sumus. Deus enim 
natura non sumus; homines natura sumus; iusti peccato non sumus. Deus itaque 
factus homo iustus intercessit deo pro homine peccatore. Non enim congruit 
peccator iusto, sed congruit homini homo. Adiungens ergo nobis similitudinem 
humanitatis suae abstulit dissimilitudinem iniquitatis nostrae, et factus particeps 
mortalitatis nostrae fecit participes diuinitatis suae� (CCSL 50, 164)�
 45 On the participation in the Wise, cf� Trin� 3�2,8 (CCSL 50, 133– 135) and 7�1,2 










together in the incarnation� Consequently, a specific logical apparatus is 
required to encompass the singularity of this event�
Firstly, there is an incongruence between the simplicity of God and the two-
foldness of human being� The participation of the Word in humanity sets up a 
relation in which simplicity does not dissolve human twofoldness, nor human 
twofoldness simplicity�46 Rather, the simple matches (congruit) the double, 
according to Augustine�
Still in reference to Christ, Augustine stresses another difficulty� After 
addressing a reprimand to proud men, he adds, “they are not prepared to con-
sider how it can be that the Word of God abides totally unchanged in himself 
and yet by taking on a lower nature can suffer what is proper to that nature, 
which an impure demon cannot suffer because he does not have an earthy 
body�”47 The Word of God, by taking part in a lower nature, has experienced 
all the changes that afflict corporeal beings, but without incurring harm to his 
immutability�
So, the participation of Christ in humanity requires a conciliation between 
discrepant ideas like mortality and immortality, humanity and divinity, sim-
plicity and duplicity (twofoldness), mutability and immutability� Only by 
stretching out the logical basis of the idea of participation— i�e�, assuming it as 
a principle of conciliation between opposite attributes, such as Plato articulated 
in the Parmenides and the Sophist— is it possible to deal with the complexity of 
the incarnation of the Word of God�48
To conclude, it is worth mentioning the synthesis carried out by Augustine 
in Book 14, wherein he ties together the different aspects of participation scat-
tered across On the Trinity� In order to sum up the argument of the treatise, he 
reveals how the diversity of relations expressed by the term participation cor-
responds with the diversity of perspectives on the fulfillment of a single unique 
 46 Cf� “as for our present concern, what has to be explained as far as God permits 
is how the single of our Lord matches our double, and in some fashion enters 
into a harmony of salvation with it” Trin� 4�3,5: Verum quod instat in praesentia 
quantum donat deus edisserendum est, quemadmodum simplum domini et salu-
atoris nostri Iesu Christi duplo nostro congruat et quodam modo concinat ad 
salutem, (CCSL 50, 165)� Such a debate extends afterwards into the theme of the 
single death of Christ and the double death of the human being�
 47 Aug�, Trin� 4�13,18: Nec sic uolunt considerare quam fieri potuerit ut in se manens 
nec per se ipsum ex ulla parte mutabile uerum dei per inferioris tamen naturae 
susceptionem aliquid inferius pati posset quod immundus daemon quia terrenum 
corpus no non habet, pati non possit� (CCSL 50, 185)�
 48 On how the idea of complexity overlaps the theological concept of mystery, 
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divine activity�49 The difficulty of framing these into a unified picture is due to 
the fact that human beings look at them from a perspective narrowed by their 
limited capacity� Thus, the participation of God in his creation through the 
likeness borne by his creatures, and its interruption by human sin; the restored 
participation of the Word of God in humanity; and lastly, the participation 
of humanity in the life of God as a result of the process of deification; all are 
unified in the overarching work of a God who creates, maintains, and saves� 
In order to express this manifold act, one must have an equally manifold prin-
ciple� Augustine found just such a principle in the concept of participation�
4.  Conclusion
We began by arguing for the non- univocality of the logical framework sup-
porting the grammar of participation in Plato’s thought� In this respect, the 
dialogues Parmenides and Sophist were shown to represent a turning- point 
in his theory� Across their pages, Plato expands the logic underlying the 
concept of participation in order to address the contradictions which arise 
from the relation of the Ideas to sensible things, and to one another� Even 
so, the historical reception of the concept has prioritized the logic based 
on the hierarchy between partaker and partaken, and the supposed non- 
contradictoriness of ideas, creating the paradigmatic expression of Platonic 
participation� Unfortunately, such a flat and one- sided perspective does not 
do justice to its mature formulation�
In sequence, we argued that Origen’s On First Principles and Augustine’s 
On the Trinity provide adequate evidence of the fact that their use of the 
concept of participation parallels the flexibility that can be found in Plato’s 
works� It was argued that such a reception does not take place on the con-
ceptual plane, but in the logical layer� As a matter of fact, both carry out 
a comprehensive use of the concept, squaring its manifold logical bases 
with the requirements of the theological issues at hand� If, on the one hand, 
human beings and other mortal creatures can be fit into a concept of partic-
ipation based on plain logical precepts; on the other, God, the Trinity, and 
the incarnation of the Word, demand a logic of participation that can cope 
with a nexus of seemingly opposite ideas in one and the same reality�
Based on the evidence, it is possible to see how Plato’s modification of the 
concept of participation, primarily in the Parmenides and Sophist, granted 
it extraordinary logical flexibility� As the writings of Origen and Augustine 
attest, further modifications of this fundamental concept made it possible to 
resolve many of the most difficult (theo)logical aporias of Early Christianity�







A Man Victimized by Doubt: Skepticism as an  
Antropological Problem for Augustin in   
Contra Academicos
Abstract: The article deals with Augustine’s efforts to overcome the challenge posed 
by Skepticism, namely, that truth as such is unattainable� By analyzing the work 
Contra academicos, we will discuss Augustine’s personal relationship with skepti-
cism, his understanding of the main skeptical arguments, and lastly, the contours of 
his response�
1.  Introduction
The intention of this essay is to analyze Augustine of Hippo’s overcoming 
of the skeptical challenge in order to understand (1) his perspective on the 
problem— here taken as a matter of anthropology— and (2) the expected 
results of such overcoming� It is first of all necessary to stress the impor-
tance of reason in the Augustinian path, i�e� the path he proposes for human 
flourishing� This involves, among other things, a battle against that which 
threatens to undermine the rationality of Christian faith (and indeed reason 
as such)� For Augustine, one such threat was academic skepticism� This then 
is the issue under scrutiny: how does the skeptical challenge affect human 
beings according to Augustine, and why must it be overcome? How does he 
frame skepticism as an anthropological problem?
During the philosophical- spiritual retreat at Verecundus’ Villa in 
Cassiciacum, dedicated to the debates recorded in Contra academicos, 
Augustine announced his intention to defend the possibility of apprehending 
truth� To this end, he argues that philosophy is the only way by which truth 
can be reached� As I will demonstrate, insofar as overcoming the skeptical 
challenge opens the possibility of knowing truth, it also opens the possibility 
of knowing God� For Augustine, this possibility is confirmed by Christianity� 
Indeed, it is from a Christian perspective, and from personal faith, that he 
confronts the thesis posed by the skeptics— namely, that truth is unreach-
able� The lasting importance of this theme is assured by the fact that the 
struggle against skepticism is present even in Augustine’s late works�1






In order to fill out Augustine’s thinking on the issue, one must take into 
account the richness of his oldest remaining writing, Contra academicos� 
It is essential for understanding the role of Christianity at the beginning of 
his path� The period of Augustine’s life that dates from his disillusion with 
Manichaeism and culminates in his conversion to Christianity is pervaded 
by a relation with Skepticism� Even after his conversion to Christianity— 
during his otium philosophandi (philosophical idleness)2 or christianae vitae 
otium (christian life idleness) in Cassiciacum3— the arguments of the skeptics 
leave a vivid impression on Augustine’s mind, in such a measure that he feels 
compelled to refute them using his already solid religious background�4 As a 
matter of fact, the so- called Cassiciacum retreat refers to an episode whose 
apprehension is crucial to grasping the first steps of his thought� According 
to the division of the Augustinian corpus, it corresponds with the frame of 
the early writings or philosophical period.5 The themes of that period mostly 
encompass the struggle against the challenge posed by Skepticism: “[���] 
truth, happiness, order, the immortality and magnitude of the soul, the exis-
tence of God, the freedom of the human being, the problem of evil, among 
others�”6 Consequently, it is important to gain a thorough understanding of 
the challenge faced by Augustine at this stage in his career�
2.  The Historical and Philosophical Context of Skepticism
Generally, Skepticism is understood as a philosophical position menacing 
the attempts by several alternative philosophies to attain knowledge/ truth�7
Skepticism has had a long and complex history since its inception in 
Ancient Greece via Pyrrho of Elis (c� 360 – 270 BC)� Indeed, the skeptical 
challenge has been present since the first Pyrrhonic reflections, in both its 
epistemological and moral aspects� Danilo Marcondes Souza Filho has 
displayed a synthetic scheme of the historical trajectory: firstly, a general 
outline of skeptical ideas can be found implicitly in the thought of several 
pre- Socratic philosophers in 6th- 5th century BC� Secondly, it is it explicitly 
 2 S� Agostinho, Contra os acadêmicos, A ordem, A grandeza da alma, O mestre, 
São Paulo 2008, 10�
 3 Aug�, Retract� 1�1,1� In Ord. 1�2,4, Augustine uses the expression liberali otio to 
describe the retreat�
 4 P� Brown, Augustine of Hippo: a biography, Los Angeles 2010, 70– 71�
 5 Cf� Agostinho, 2008, 9; G� Catapano, Il concetto di filosofia nei primi scritti 
Agostino: analisi dei passi metafilosofici dal Contra academicos al De uera reli-
gione, Roma 2001, 9�
 6 Cf� Agostinho, 2008, 9�
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formulated in the thought of Pyrrho of Elis� Next, the skeptical period of 
Plato’s Academy (also known as Academic Skepticism) is ushered in and 
advanced by Arcesilaus (316/ 5 – 241/ 0 BC) from 270 BC until the period 
of his successor Carneades (219 – 129 BC)� Lastly, Pyrrhonic Skepticism 
is revived by Aenesidemus in the first century BC, culminating in the elab-
oration of one of the main sources of the Pyrrhonic Skepticism: Sextus 
Empiricus’ Hypotyposis Pyrrhonicorum in the second century AD�8 The 
dawn of Skepticism begins from this point onward� Souza Filho also hypoth-
esizes that Augustine’s influence was responsible for the surprising lack of 
interest in Skepticism during the Middle Ages� The definitive refutation of 
Skepticism in Contra Academicos was, in his opinion, responsible for the fact 
that “references to the Ancient Skepticism and discussions on skeptical ques-
tions are absent, with very few exceptions, from the Medieval Philosophy�”9
Skepticism does not constitute a philosophical school per se, since it lacks 
a theoretical corpus of its own� It is more appropriate to approach the skep-
tical position as a philosophical problem or, to use my preferred rendition, 
a philosophical challenge� The Latin word for challenge is disfidare: a jux-
taposition of dis- , meaning departure, to put a distance between, and fides, 
the word for faith, trust or belief� Therefore, disfidare means a movement 
of putting a distance between something and the trust in it� Thus, to under-
stand Skepticism as a challenge is to understand it as an element causing dis-
turbance in the human being, an estrangement from certainty demanding a 
rational effort to be defeated� In summary, the challenge relates to its poten-
tial to unhinge prior certainty or willingness to search for truth�
It is essential to notice that Skepticism conveys this aspect of challenge from 
its very origins� In a broader perspective, Paul Tillich speaks of Skepticism 
as the negative end of Greek philosophy.10 With this diagnosis, he indicates 
the feature of the Skeptical challenge that Augustine would have faced: “the 
heroic Greek attempt to build a world on the basis of philosophical reason 
came to a catastrophic end in Skepticism� The attempt to create a new world 
in terms of a doctrine of essences ended in Skepticism�”11 Therefore, accord-
ing to Tillich, Skepticism steered ancient philosophy towards a kind of epi-
logue� This is the legacy of the philosophical tradition with which Augustine 
would deal at the beginning of his writing career, leading him toward a 
 8 D�M�S� Filho, O ceticismo antigo: pirronismo e nova academia, in: RCH 85 
(1994), 85– 95 (87– 88)�
 9 Filho, 1994, 99�
 10 P� Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, London 1968, 108– 109�










confrontation with the Skeptical challenge� In short, such a tremendous 
clash is the background of Contra academicos�
Considering Skepticism’s wide- ranging history, one should also make 
explicit the specific variety of Skepticism against which Augustine took his 
stand� According to Victor Brochard12 and Jean- Paul Dumont,13 Augustine’s 
portrait of Skepticism is quite distinctive and appears to overlap, for the most 
part, with the thought of the Roman philosopher Marcus Tullius Cicero� For 
the purposes of this investigation, it is assumed that Augustine had in mind 
the Academic Skepticism when he referred to Skepticism, an assumption 
that is justified by the text of Contra academicos�
3.  Augustine and Skepticism
As argued above, Skepticism is ultimately a challenge— it disturbs reason’s 
aspirations to reach, and adhere to, the truth� This challenge reaches the gates 
of the Medieval world and Christian philosophy through Augustine� But, if 
Skepticism is a challenge, why is it specifically challenging for Augustine? 
Why is it an anthropological problem?
Two perspectives must be taken into consideration regarding this 
problem� First of all, Augustine’s personal experience with Skepticism; here, 
it is worth discussing the features of his contact with Skepticism, including 
the question of whether he really considered himself a skeptic� Secondly, one 
must analyze how Skepticism is depicted in his writings; in other words, how 
he understood the skeptical challenge�
In order to grasp the import of the skeptical challenge for Augustine, one 
needs to consider part of his history� As a young man, he made acquain-
tance with Cicero’s Hortensius, which was responsible for inspiring his turn 
toward philosophical investigation� However, according to Confessiones, 
Augustine eventually came to regret the lack of Christ in the thought of 
the Roman philosopher� To fix this lack he began to read the Christian 
Scriptures for the first time� However, Augustine was also disappointed with 
the Scriptures14 due to their ungainly style, and their unsatisfying answers 
to his rational desire for truth�15 At this point in time, he would embrace 
Manichaeism� Such adherence would last until his own doubts made him 
cut ties with that sect� The advertised possibility of finding a purely rational 
 12 V� Brochard, Les sceptiques grecs, Paris 1923, 115– 116�
 13 J�- P� Dumont, Ceticismo, [s�l�] 2013, 5� Available on <http:// conte�prof�ufsc�br/ 
txt- dumont�pdf>�
 14 P� Boehner / E� Gilson, História da filosofia cristã, Petrópolis 2012, 143�
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truth had not been fulfilled by Manichaeism� Augustine’s frustrations here 
moved him closer to Skepticism�
But would he in fact have embraced the title of Skeptic? Misiara provides 
us with a doubly- rich resource, asking and answering this question� First, he 
evaluates opposing stances toward the question, enumerating, for analytical 
purposes, some Augustinian passages that engage with Skepticism�16 Judging 
by fragments from Confessiones and Retractaciones, among other writings, 
Misiara comes to the conclusion that Augustine was never a Skeptic� He 
argues that Augustine always kept his faith in truth, making it impossible 
for him to adhere to any doctrine other than Christianity�17 Nonetheless, he 
also draws our attention toward the psychological condition identified by 
Augustine as desperatio inveniendi veritatis, the despair to find the truth� 
Misiara interprets this as a stage of dismay caused by Augustine’s disap-
pointment with the Manichaean sect� This allows us to surmise that the 
allure of Skepticism was felt strongly by Augustine, even if he stopped short 
of embracing the skeptical philosophy�18
Boehner, Gilson,19 and Maurice Testard,20 all agree that, during this 
period, Augustine took certain assertions as true, a stand incompatible with 
Skepticism� However, as with Misiara, these authors also recognize this 
period as a phase of increased association with Skepticism� The latter argues 
that Augustine resigned himself to skeptical argumentation, allowing for an 
interpretation that admits an adherence, even if provisory, to the skeptical 
position�
Anthony Kenny,21 for his part, holds a subtler position� According to him, 
Augustine’s conversion to Christianity was facilitated by his attraction to 
skeptical argumentation�22 This perspective aligns with the interpretation of, 
for example, Jean- Paul Dumont,23 who maintains that Skepticism pushed 
Augustine towards the acceptance of Christian truth� In short, both are 
inclined to deny a skeptical ‘phase’ in Augustine’s life— such as would make 
of him a professing Skeptic— while still acknowledging academic interest in 
Skepticism�
 16 A�P� Misiara, As “Confissões”, in: Atualidades de Santo Agostinho, Sorocaba 
1955, 12 f�
 17 Id�, 1955, 13�
 18 Id�, 1955, 14– 15�
 19 Cf� P� Boehner / E� Gilson, 2012, 147 f�
 20 M� Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron: Cicéron dans la formation et dans l’œuvre 
de Saint Augustin, Paris 1958, 93 f�
 21 A� Kenny, Medieval Philosophy, vol� 2, Oxford 2005, 156 f�
 22 Id�, 2008, 183�

















Victorino Capánaga24 claims, in accordance with a common view, that 
Augustine abandoned his academic doubt following his Christian con-
version� He denies the presence of academic doubt from conversion until 
Augustine’s ordination in 391� Even so, Capánaga does not take a direct 
position regarding a possible adherence to Skepticism prior to conversion� 
He does, however, acknowledge the psychological suffering that contact 
with the Skeptical challenge afflicted upon the philosopher� Capánaga’s 
focus is mainly on Augustine’s evident rupture with academic doubt (regard-
less whether he would have adhered to Skepticism or simply experienced 
psychological suffering because of it) from his conversion in 386 onwards�
Peter Brown25 rejects Augustine’s adherence to Skepticism� According to 
him, “the Academics had seemed to him to deny that the human mind could 
ever reach the truth� Augustine never adopted this radical view wholeheart-
edly�”26 For Brown, there was only a period of doubts spurred by disap-
pointment with Manichaeism, a time in which the Skepticism presented by 
Cicero offered some “intellectual respectability” to Augustine� He highlights 
the need to understand this tenure; while it is one of the less known periods 
of Augustine’s life it is, at the same time, of fundamental importance for 
comprehending his intellectual evolution�
Gareth Matthews27 likewise denies the existence of an effective skeptical 
phase in Augustine’s personal trajectory, claiming that the evidence suggests, 
at most, a hesitant interest�
Lastly, Pereira Júnior speaks of Augustine as a “former adept of 
Skepticism�”28 Indeed, he asserts that disappointment with Manichaeism 
pushed Augustine toward Academic thought wherefrom he was “pervaded 
by the skeptical spirit�”29 Pelayo Palacios30 does not go so far as to claim that 
Augustine was ever a genuine skeptical philosopher� However, he does speak 
of an “overcoming of Skepticism”, suggesting some sort of liaison�31 Edilezia 
Simões32 adopts a clearer posture by categorically denying that Augustine 
 24 S� Agustín, Contra los académicos, Madrid 2009, 10 f�
 25 Cf� P� Brown, 2010, 70 f�
 26 Id�, 2010, 70�
 27 Cf� Matthews, 2005, 15�
 28 A�P� Júnior, Agostinho e o ceticismo: um estudo da crítica agostiniana ao ceticismo 
em Contra academicos, Natal 2012, 111�
 29 Id�, 2012, 65�
 30 P�M� Palacios, O estamento da Verdade no Contra academicos de Agostinho, São 
Paulo 2006�
 31 Id�, 2006, 159�
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ever embraced Skepticism� She quotes passages from the Confessiones in 
which a mistrust of Academicians is clearly articulated by Augustine�33
This survey of scholars who have worked on the theme— or have at least 
faced it to some extent— allows us to see that most claim that Augustine never 
actually adhered to Skepticism, while there is a consensus that the skeptical 
challenge did affect him during a certain stage of his life� Scholars also empha-
size the persistence of Augustine’s commitment to the attainability of truth(s),34 
and note that, in his writings, he never identifies himself as a former Skeptic, 
but only as a man victimized by skeptical doubt� Apparently, Augustine’s con-
tact with Skepticism put him in an anxious situation of hopelessness� If he 
would have turned into a Skeptic, he would have expressed satisfaction with 
the state of mind provided by epokhé, which seems not to be true�
The preview analysis allows us to reach the following conclu-
sion: Skepticism is a challenge with which Augustine grappled during a cer-
tain span of his career, without becoming an adherent thereof� As a matter of 
fact, the skeptical interpellation put him into an anxious state of desperation 
of truth.
Thus, we must inquire further� As a philosophical position in the orbit of 
Hellenism, Skepticism claims to offer a way of reaching happiness (eudai-
monia) and tranquility of soul (ataraxia)� However, Augustine’s descriptions 
indicate a state of suffering and disturbance of the soul resulting from his 
contact with Skepticism� How should one understand this discrepancy?
Sextus Empiricus affirms, in his Hypotyposis Pyrrhonicorum, that, by 
suspending judgment, the skeptic achieves tranquility of the soul— ataraxia� 
Nonetheless, Renata Krempel35 raises the following question: would it not 
be possible to imagine other consequences stemming from the suspension of 
judgment than tranquility of the soul? In her opinion it is entirely possible 
to hold the opposite hypothesis; namely, that suspension causes disturbance 
rather than tranquility.
Such a debate supposes an existential reckoning with Skepticism rather 
than treating it as a mere topic in the field of epistemology� As soon as the 
impossibility of adherence to truth is discerned, and the suspension of judg-
ment is embraced, a profound uneasiness may arise from the impossibility 
of finding criteria for action, even for the simplest practical decisions� It is 
undeniably possible that, when faced with the skeptical challenge, philoso-
phers, as ‘lovers of truth,’ might become desperate, anguished, desolated, 
 33 Cf� id�, 2012, 26�
 34 Cf� Misiara, 1955; P� Boehner / E� Gilson, 2012; Matthews, 2005�
 35 R�A� Krempel, Equipolência, suspensão de juízo e tranquilidade no ceticismo pir-








and lost, having been diverted from that which was previously the goal of 
their life’s quest�
For Augustine, Skepticism is framed precisely as such a disturbing experi-
ence� From the moment he entered into contact with Skepticism, he was embit-
tered, as Palacios describes�36 He was intimately unsettled and inhibited— still 
earnest in his questioning, but profoundly discouraged�
Besides illuminating his personal experience, Augustine’s evaluation of 
Skepticism has considerable relevance for a proper understanding of Contra 
Academicos� Jean- Paul Dumont37 draws attention to this feature, claiming that 
Augustine’s experience with Skepticism, and his late reflections upon it, reveal 
a new way of thinking about the despair of truth� At first, Dumont says, doubt 
is experienced existentially, which gives Skepticism its power over ordinary life� 
Such doubt can open the gate to a despair that is truly anguishing� On the other 
hand, as a mode of experience, skeptical anxiety can be understood as a despair 
that eventually strengthens the value of one’s encounter with truth, which, in 
turn, acquires an aspect of salvation vis- a- vis one’s previous situation.38
So Augustine’s understanding of Skepticism as an experience putting the 
human being into a mode of despair of finding truth, is what allows us to 
see it as an anthropological problem. For Augustine, it is necessary to fight 
Skepticism in order to clear the way towards truth� As Gilson39 says:
It is well worth noting that the refutation of skepticism was this new Christian’s 
first preoccupation� The "despair of finding truth," which he had just conquered 
in himself, is also the first enemy he would overcome in others� At last, Augustine 
possessed truths that were certain: certitude, therefore, was possible: by saving the 
mind from despair, the Contra Academicos cleared the threshold of philosophy and 
set its door ajar�
Surely, before one can reach the truth, one must first believe that there is such 
a thing, and that it is possible to access, contrary to the Academicians’�40 In 
two passages from Contra academicos’ book 2, Augustine clarifies the rela-
tion between the search for the truth and the need to fight against Skepticism:
“Therefore,” I continued, “don’t you know that up to now there is nothing I per-
ceive to be certain? I’m prevented from searching for it by the arguments and debates 
of the Academicians� [���] Accordingly, I had become lazy and utterly inactive, not 
daring to search for what the most ingenious and learned men weren’t permitted to 
 36 Cf� Palacios, 2006, 35�
 37 Cf� Dumont, 2013, 15�
 38 Cf� Dumont, 2013, 16�
 39 E� Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, New York 1967, 38�
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find� Unless, therefore, I first become as convinced that the truth can be found as the 
Academicians are convinced that it cannot, I shall not dare to search for it� I don’t 
have anything to defend�41
It is worth noting the apathy to which Augustine seems to have resigned 
himself after acknowledging that truth cannot be found� He did not believe 
that truth was accessible� Academic Skepticism, for Augustine, not only 
made truth difficult to access; it completely prevented it�
Another important passage reveals the same impulse towards confron-
tation with Skepticism� When questioned about the Skeptical position, 
Augustine affirms that life itself is at stake, the constitution of the soul will-
ing to know truth so as to facilitate the return to God�42
After all, his Skeptical experience had driven him to confront the despair of 
truth� Since Skepticism was experienced as suffering, he decided to overcome 
it and convince others of its falsehood� So, his goal in Contra Academicos is 
salvation from the skeptical doubt— escape from the despair it yields� Pelayo 
Palacios defines the focus of the work considering a double sense:
[���] Contra Academicos seems to have a twofold goal: besides fighting against the 
arguments of the Academicians in order to take them away from his soul, it takes 
into account and mentions explicitly those which remain captives of arguments that 
withdraw the hope of finding the truth� Such double preoccupation could be called 
respectively individual and personal, and collective and common� It will be also 
displayed, throughout the book, by two great movements: an interior one, towards 
himself, and an exterior one, towards the others� The movement towards the others 
will lead him out but not away from himself� It aims to evoke in others an encounter 
with themselves� In practice, Augustine is proposing a philosophical exercise: to 
connect with himself so as to find the truth that inhabits the interior of the human 
being� That is the road taken by his soul; a route and a discovery which he wants 
somehow to make engraved forever�43
So with Contra academicos, Augustine seeks to propagate the possibility of 
escaping from the disturbance of the skeptical challenge and, in turn, to be 
saved from doubt:
Indeed, the discussion about academicians’ doubt is not a mere scholastic exercise; 
on the contrary, it takes into consideration the attraction that Skepticism had exer-
cised, at a certain point, over Augustine� One can notice that it was a serious and 
truly capital matter, both for faith and philosophy, and Augustine is right when he 
says that, concerning this theme, happiness is involved�44
 41 Aug�, C� acad� 2�9,23� English edition: Augustine, Against the Academicians and 
the Teacher, translated by Peter King, Indianapolis 1995�
 42 Aug�, C� acad� 2�9,22�
 43 Cf� Palacios, 2006, 10�










4.  The Discussion on Skepticism in Contra Academicos
As noted above, Contra academicos is key to the study of Augustine’s rela-
tion with Skepticism� The dialogues and prologues that constitute its three 
parts are not only an impetus toward philosophy but also outline his under-
standing of Skepticism and his prescribed way of fighting against it�
4.1  The Skeptical Challenge in Book 1 of Contra 
Academicos: Happiness at Stake
From the previous analysis, it is possible to understand how the question 
dates back to the earliest of Augustine’s writings� In Book 1 of Contra aca-
demicos, the debate between two young men— Trigetius and Licentius— 
takes place with brief interventions by Augustine� The debate begins with 
a proposition from Augustine: “do you have any doubt that we ought to 
know the truth?”45 In face of the negative answer given by his interlocu-
tors, Augustine asks again with a different orientation: “[���] if we can be 
happy while not apprehending the truth, do you consider the apprehension 
of the truth to be necessary?”46 Such a twist sets the tone of the discussion 
in book 1�
The problem posed concerns the possibility of reaching the truth and its 
necessity for human happiness� If the truth is dispensable to the attainment 
of happiness, Augustine wants to know why we nevertheless continue to 
search for it� However, as we will see, the debaters do in fact regard truth as 
indispensable to human happiness� They do disagree, however, about how 
best to conceive the relation between human being and truth regarding the 
assurance of happiness�
The discussion goes on, in summary, as follows� The young Trigetius, 
using a Ciceronian axiom, asserts that everybody wants to be happy; if 
happiness were possible without truth, the question would be meaningless� 
Augustine, however, asks again whether happiness is in fact possible without 
truth� Licentius, for his part, answers in the affirmative� This prompts 
Trigetius to request a definition of the happy life, drawing an answer from 
Augustine: the happy life is lived in accordance with that than which nothing 
in the human being is better; namely, that part of the soul which all the other 
parts must obey— mind or reason�47
Reaffirming the legitimacy of his question, Augustine urges the debaters to 
take a stand on the problem� For Trigetius, happiness is not possible without 
 45 Aug�, C� acad� 1�2,5�
 46 Aug�, C� acad� 1�2,5�
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the possession of truth� Licentius, in turn, admits it must be possible to 
obtain insofar as one searches for it� This controversy is important and must 
be well understood� Trigetius assumes that the possession of truth grants 
happiness and that without it human beings cannot be happy; Licentius says 
that it is not the possession of truth that brings happiness— and his argument 
will be clarified during the discussion— but the quest to find it�
Licentius’ first contribution is to question why one who searches for truth 
cannot be happy, even when failing to obtain it� Trigetius replies by arguing 
that only the wise and perfect human is happy, and that wisdom is incon-
ceivable without the possession of truth� His opponent recalls a passage by 
Cicero in which the Roman philosopher claims that the wise must search for 
truth, but cannot know anything for sure; their happiness consists in dili-
gently searching the truth without giving assent to anything less� Only so are 
the wise free from error, since everything is uncertain�48
The discussion continues until the end of book 1 without explicit mention 
of Skepticism� It is nevertheless adumbrated by Licentius’ speech when he 
says that the role of the wise, for the Skeptics, is to avoid accepting theories 
that may be false, suspending judgment without suspending investigation� 
That is the skeptical definition of tranquility: to deny what is probably false 
and to keep the search alive�
Trigetius holds his ground, pressing Licentius to admit that the one who 
is still in search for the truth lacks perfection� Since his interlocutor refuses 
to do so, he demands justifications� According to Licentius, only God knows 
the truth or, perhaps, the soul once freed from the body� While it seems like 
one who has not yet obtained truth cannot be perfect, one must take into 
consideration the incompleteness of human beings and understand that their 
purpose is the pursuit, not the possession, of truth� This is the only possible 
perfection for humanity� Trigetius interposes: if one does not reach what is 
so ardently desired, it is not possible to be happy� For him, human beings 
can be happy if they live in accordance with reason� Licentius, in turn, reit-
erates that those who diligently search for the truth, living in a way that is 
suitable to the human purpose, are happy� To deny this would be madness, 
he adds�49
At this point, the challenging orientation of Skepticism begins to show its 
disturbing face in Licentius’ defense� The young man claims that the power 
to reach the truth is not given to human beings; they are naturally prevented 
from doing so� Human purpose is summed up in the tireless search for what 
is, in principle, inaccessible� Trigetius points out a dilemma: according to 
 48 Aug�, C� acad� 1�3,7�






his opponent, it appears that the one who is in error is happy since he who 
does not find truth is in error� In his answer, Licentius indicates that he who 
searches is not in error, because he searches precisely in order to avoid err-
ing� Trigetius insists again that he who does not find what he searches for is 
in error�
Here Augustine intervenes, requesting a definition of error� Trigetius says 
that error is to search without finding� Licentius remains pensive and the first 
discussion is suspended�50
When the controversy resumes, another day, Licentius defines error as 
holding falsehood as truth� So, the one who pursues truth without asserting 
the veracity of his results may be happy� By not giving assent to anything, 
one avoids the risk of confusing truth with its opposite� Consequently, the 
one who acts this way cannot be considered erroneous� This reflects a skep-
tical position since the suspension of judgment ensures happiness according 
to Skepticism�
Taking a different approach, Trigetius introduces the question of wisdom� 
He asks if his interlocutor would acknowledge the definition of wisdom as 
a straight path of life� His opponent agrees, but soon retreats, claiming that 
there are straight paths that are not wise�51 Trigetius reconfigures his def-
inition, claiming that wisdom is the straight path that leads to truth� At 
first, Licentius questions the definition, but realizes that such a definition 
is favorable to his own cause� If wisdom is the straight path that leads to 
truth, the one who seeks the truth takes this path (wisdom), and the one who 
makes use of wisdom is wise� If no wise person is unhappy (as per Licentius’ 
axiom), whoever seeks the truth is happy even if he does not find it�52 At this 
point, the discussion is suspended again�
Augustine resumes the debate by presenting a definition of wisdom 
(likely borrowed from Cicero) as the science of human and divine things�53 
Afterward, Trigetius amends the science of human and divine things, but 
only vis- a- vis the happy life� Licentius seems to agree but observes that 
wisdom is not only the science of, but also the diligent search for, human 
and divine things concerning the happy life� He associates the science with 
God and the search with human beings, asserting that each is happy in its 
own wisdom� With this, Licentius equates wisdom with the diligent search 
for truth, reaffirming that science— true knowledge— belongs to God alone�
 50 Aug�, C� acad� 1�4,11�
 51 Aug�, C� acad� 1�4,13�
 52 Aug�, C� acad� 1�5,14









A Man Victimized by Doubt: Skepticism 39
The dispute circulates back to the point at which Trigetius wonders 
whether the wise man, in the definition proposed by Licentius, works in 
vain, since he does not find what he seeks� Licentius insists that he is wise 
precisely because he seeks and attends to the very goal of human being, 
ensuring happiness� In this search, the wise one disconnects himself from the 
body, as much as humanly possible, and connects himself to God, enjoying 
present happiness and preparing to achieve divine happiness at the last day 
of his life�54
In this fashion, the discussion portrayed in book 1 of Contra academicos 
comes to an end� Augustine summarizes the debate, setting up the discussion 
which will take place the following day� He underlines Licentius’ definition 
of human wisdom as the search for the truth, which gives birth to happiness 
and tranquility of soul�55 Augustine notes that it is an Academic Skeptic’s 
argument� He intends to debate it and prompt Licentius to prepare his case 
again�56
In short, all the discussions in book 1 of Contra academicos revolve 
around the human relation to truth and the connected possibility of happi-
ness� On the one hand, there is a denial of the possibility of obtaining truth� 
On the other, there is an assertion that only such possession can assure hap-
piness� This picture is not removed at all from the dilemmas that disturbed 
Augustine upon coming into contact with Skepticism� Were the skeptics 
right, truth would not be accessible to human beings� However, Augustine 
did not accept that a diligent quest for the truth, paired with the suspension 
of judgment, could assure tranquility of soul— this, we should note, rein-
forces the argument that he never truly embraced Skepticism�
4.2  The Challenging Conception of Skepticism in Book 2 of 
Contra Academicos: Understanding the Skepticism’s Doctrine
When the debate resumes in Book 2, Licentius asks Augustine to contradict 
the whole doctrine of the Academicians�57 From this point on, he offers a 
proper analysis of Skepticism, maintaining that the discussion in book 1 
was bound up with the discussion of the pursuit of happiness� Augustine’s 
personal journey resonates with this movement from the happiness ques-
tion to the facing of Skepticism as such� Initially, he was taken by skeptical 
doubt and experienced desperation inasmuch as he felt his longing to grasp 
the truth and live happily being shaken up� Only after this disturbance did 
 54 Aug�, C� acad� 1�8,23�
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he dedicate himself to an in- depth understanding of Skepticism, in a concen-
trated effort to know, and thus overcome, it�
Augustine argues, following Carneades, that, from a skeptical perspec-
tive, human beings cannot achieve perfect knowledge in philosophy; they 
can, however, achieve relative wisdom as long as they seek the truth without 
ultimately assenting to anything, thereby avoiding the risk of believing some-
thing that is false�
The Skeptics’ position, adds Augustine, also seems to derive from the def-
inition of truth given by the Stoic philosopher Zeno, since the Academicians 
claim that signs of truth are unidentifiable�58 For Zeno, only that which yields 
a representation beyond the reach of falsehood can be considered true�59
The Academicians, by denying the possibility of recognizing the truth, 
were, Augustine tells us, accused of advancing a sort of apraxia� Nevertheless, 
he acknowledges that they maintained the existence of a guiding rule, a cri-
terion for action— i�e�, the rule of verisimilitude (similarity) or probability— 
which allowed for wise action�60 If this criterion were valid, the skeptics 
could act� Even if they admitted that they could not reach the truth, they still 
had a compass: verisimilitude. In other words, if the skeptical criterion for 
action is connected to the concept of probability or similarity, then there is, 
despite their protests, a reference to the truth in their philosophy�
With this in mind, Augustine asks Licentius whether the Academicians 
seem to speak the truth� Licentius is initially hesitant, but responds “prob-
ably yes�”61 From then on, Licentius is replaced by Alipius in the discussion 
as a defender of the Academics’ position�62 Next, Augustine suggests that the 
Academicians are ridiculous insofar as they claim to be following the truth 
of similarity without knowing the truth�63
At this point, Alipius questions Augustine’s mode of confronting the 
skeptical challenge� He implies that the problem is a mere matter of words� 
Accordingly, the criticism addressed to the use of similarity as a truth- 
reference is unfruitful because it only concerns a semantic issue� That said, 
Augustine, perceptibly inflamed, denies that the problem can be reduced to 
a mere matter of words:
 58 Aug�, C� acad� 2�5,11�
 59 G� Real / D� Antiseri, História da filosofia: Antiguidade e Idade Média, São Paulo 
2012, 254 f�
 60 Aug�, C� acad� 2�5,12�
 61 Aug�, C� acad� 2�7,16�
 62 Aug�, C� acad� 2�7,17– 18�
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The matter at hand concerns our life, morality, and spirit� The spirit will return 
more safely to Heaven since it supposes that it will overcome the dangers of all fal-
lacious arguments; triumph over the passions in returning to the region of its origin, 
so to speak, once truth has been apprehended; and exercise its rule once it has been 
wedded to moderation in this fashion�64
With this answer, Augustine implies that the doctrine of the Academicians 
can do to others what it did to him; that is, to instill despair and discourage-
ment of finding the truth� Augustine, rejecting their arguments, claims that it 
is, in fact, possible to find the truth�65
So, in Book 2, Augustine provides a portrait of Skepticism and considers 
its doctrines, mainly, the negation of the possibility of accessing the truth 
and the criterion of probability or similarity� It is worth concluding by reaf-
firming that such an idea was drawn by Augustine from Cicero�
5.  Conclusion
In this article we have exposed some elements that allow to glimpse the way 
that Academic Skepticism influenced Augustine’s life and thought, resulting 
in the image of a man victimized by doubt�
Our first question related to the historical context of Skepticism, under-
standing how Ancient Greek philosophy ended with skeptical questionings 
and deterrents against the rational development of knowledge� Augustine 
inherited this dilemma� However, his approach to the issue, bringing out a 
Christian feature, gave a new breath to philosophy as an organ of truth� His 
confrontation with Skepticism took place during a retreat at Verecundus’ 
estate in Cassiciacum� At that time, Augustine, already a convert to 
Christianity, tried, and made use of, the philosophical tools available to him, 
especially those of the Platonic schools, in order to rationally comprehend 
that which faith had already revealed to him�
In Cassiciacum Augustine composed the three books of Contra 
Academicos, wherein he detailed his understanding of Skepticism� This 
understanding has much in common with Cicero� In the first of the three 
books, he displays how Skepticism is in fact an existential challenge to hap-
piness� After all, if the possibility of reaching the truth is denied, Skepticism 
becomes an obstacle to happiness, which can only be experienced via truth� 
In Contra Academicos’ Book 2, he exposes the doctrine of the Academicians, 
mocking them for accepting as a criterion of action the similitude to truth, 
even while this very truth remains unknown�
 64 Aug�, C� acad� 2�9,22�







In summary, Skepticism is, for Augustine, the negation of the possibility 
of the apprehension of truth� Therefore, inasmuch as Augustine’s thought 
is directed toward the truth, Skepticism represents, above all, a strong chal-
lenge� The human being victimized by doubt becomes lost, disturbed, and 
desperate� In face of this existential crisis, it is anthropologically necessary 
to overcome the skeptical challenge so as to unblock the path towards truth, 
happiness, and God�
Lenka Karfíková
The Soul in Augustine’s Dialogue   
De quantitate animae
Abstract: Augustine’s early dialogue De quantitate animae deals with six questions related 
to the human soul: (i) where the soul originates, (ii) what it is like in its quality, (iii) 
what it is like in its quantity, (iv) why it was given to the body, (v) what it becomes like 
after entering the body, and (vi) what it becomes like after leaving it� The most part of 
the dialogue is concerned with the “quantity” of the soul, which allows for three mean-
ings: local extension, the capacity of the soul, and the “number” of souls� Following the 
Neoplatonists, Augustine denies that the soul is both extended and localised in space� 
To demonstrate his idea of the soul not being localised even in the body it animates, 
Augustine analyses sense perception, i�e� “bodily experience which of itself does not 
escape the soul”, according to his definition� The capacity of the soul is divided into seven 
degrees or activities: vegetative, perceptive, and rational faculties, as well as “virtue”, 
“tranquillity”, “ingression”, and “contemplation”� Finally, as far as the number of souls 
is concerned, Augustine prefers, again with the Neoplatonists, the idea of the soul being 
both one and many� In conclusion, Augustine’s interest in the Socratic question of care 
for the soul is mentioned�
1.  Introduction
Augustine’s dialogue De quantitate animae was composed in Rome circa 
388, placing it among his earlier writings�1 Chronologically, and develop-
mentally, it marks a transition between Augustine’s philosophical dialogues 
from Cassiciacum in 386 (Contra Academicos, De beata vita, De ordine, 
Soliloquia), and his later dialogues from Rome/ Africa (De libero arbitrio, De 
musica, De magistro), written prior to his ordination as a priest in 391�2 The 
form of the philosophical dialogue was known to Augustine chiefly through 
 1 Aug�, Retract. 1�8,1 (CCL 57, 21)�
 2 On the difference in genre between both groups, see H�- I� Marrou, Saint Augustin 
et la fin de la culture antique, Paris 1938, 309– 311; B� R� Voss, Der Dialog in 
der frühchristlichen Literatur, München 1970, 197– 199� 277– 281; T� Fuhrer, 
Augustinus, Darmstadt 2004, 66– 68; G� Catapano, The Epistemological 
Background of Augustine’s Dialogues, in: S� Föllinger / G� M� Müller (eds�), 
Der Dialog in der Antike. Formen und Funktionen einer literarischen Gattung 









the works of Cicero, and the topics of his early writings seem, at least in 
part, to follow Cicero’s example�3
Augustine’s unfinished draft De immortalitate animae from 387, intended 
as the third book of his Soliloquia, comes very close to De quantitate animae 
in its articulation of the soul� Here he describes the soul as both participating 
in Ratio,4 and sustaining the body, without being localised therein�5 In many 
respects, De quantitate animae is also connected to Augustine’s later dialogue 
De libero arbitrio� In both works he strives to discern the origins of the soul, 
albeit from two different angles� In De quantitate animae, Augustine exam-
ines the origin of the soul (unde) under two aspects: first, viz� its country of 
origin; and second, viz� the parts or elements of which it is composed�6 In 
De libero arbitrio, by way of contrast, he focuses on the origin of individual 
souls, seeking to uncover whether they are (i) transmitted from parents; (ii) 
created together with individual bodies; (iii) sent as preexistent into bodies 
by God; or (iv) entering bodies spontaneously�7 Up until the end of his life, 
Augustine never arrived at a definitive answer to this question, going so far 
as to declare the answer impossible to find� He was, however, able to limit 
the alternatives to two: traducianism and creationism, i�e� (i) and (ii) above�8
The connection between De quantitate animae and De libero arbitrio 
is further accentuated by the fact that they share a common collocutor, 
Augustine’s compatriot Evodius�9 This young man, a member of Augustine’s 
 3 On Augustine’s place in the genre of philosophical dialogue, see V� Hösle, Der phi-
losophische Dialog. Eine Poetik und Hermeneutik, München 2006; N� Cipriani, 
I dialogi di Agostino: Guida alla lettura, Roma 2013, 65– 76� On Augustine’s 
inspiration from Cicero and his reactions and replies to Cicero’s writings, see 
M� Foley, Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum 
Dialogues, in: REAug 45 (1999), 51– 77 (62– 76); J� Trelenberg, Augustins Schrift 
De ordine: Einführung, Kommentar, Ergebnisse, Tübingen 2009, 3 f� 16� 21– 23�
 4 Aug�, Imm. 6�10– 11 (CESL 89, 110– 112)�
 5 Aug�, Imm. 16�25 (CESL 89, 127 f�)�
 6 Aug., Quant. an� 1�2 (CSEL 89, 133)�
 7 Aug�, Lib� 3�20,56,188–58,199: (i) una anima facta est, ex qua omnium hominum 
animae trahuntur nascentium; (ii) singillatim fiunt in unoquoque nascentium; (iii) 
in Dei aliquo secreto iam existentes animae mittuntur ad inspiranda et regenda 
corpora singulorum quorumque nascentium; (iv) alibi animae constitutae non 
mittuntur a Domino Deo, sed sua sponte ad inhabitanda corpora veniunt. (CCL 
29, 307– 309)�
 8 On this topic, see my book Grace and the Will according to Augustine, Leiden 
2012, 214– 224�
 9 The names of the partners in the dialogue are different in different manuscripts; 
see G� Catapano, Agostino, Sull’anima� L’immortalità dell’anima; La grandezza 
dell’anima, Milano 2003, 349, n� 1� However, in his letter Ep. 162�2, Augustine 
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community of friends in Milan,10 would later enter his “monastery of phi-
losophers”11 in Thagaste, and eventually share his theological combat as 
bishop in Africa�12 From his surviving correspondence with Augustine13 we 
can surmise that, even as a bishop in Uzali, Evodius preserved a keen interest 
in the soul and its relation to the body� In De quantitate animae, Evodius 
asks six questions about the soul, remarkably similar in form and content to 
those of his pagan and Christian predecessors�
2.  Evodius’ Questions
Catalogues of questions pertaining to the soul were widespread in Late 
Antiquity, as we can judge, for example, from Seneca’s Letter to Lucilius:
There are countless questions concerning the soul alone: whence it comes, what is 
its nature, when it begins to exist, and how long it exists; whether it passes from one 
place to another and changes its habitation, being transferred successively from one 
animal shape to another, or whether it is a slave but once, roaming the universe after 
it is set free; whether it is corporeal or not; what will become of it when it ceases to 
use us as its medium; how it will employ its freedom when it has escaped from this 
present prison; whether it will forget all its past, and at that moment begin to know 
itself when, released from the body, it has withdrawn to the skies�14
Augustine’s Christian predecessor Origen provides a similar list� In his com-
mentary on the Song of Songs, he wonders whether the soul is corporeal 
or incorporeal, simple or compound, and, if the latter, of how many parts� 
 10 Aug�, Conf. 9�8,17 (CCL 27, 142 f�)�
 11 Marrou, 1938, 167�
 12 M� A� McNamara, Friendship in Saint Augustine, Fribourg 1958, 112– 117; 
A� Mandouze, Prosopographie de l’Afrique Chrétienne (303– 533), I, Paris 1982, 
366– 373�
 13 Evod�, Ep. 158� 160� 161� 163; Aug�, Ep. 159� 162� 164� 169 (CSEL 44, 488– 541 
and 611– 622)� See V� Zangara, Exeuntes de corpore. Discussioni sulle apparizioni 
dei morti in epoca agostiniana, Firenze 1990; B� Bakhouche, Évodius d’Uzalis et la 
« question » de l’âme, in: C� Bernard- Valette et alii (eds�), Nihil veritas erubescit. 
Mélanges offerts à Paul Mattei par ses élèves, collègues et amis, Turnhout 2017, 
159– 184 (171– 184)�
 14 Sen�, Ep. 88�34: Innumerabiles quaestiones sunt de animo tantum: unde sit, qualis 
sit, quando esse incipiat, quamdiu sit, aliunde alio transeat et domicilia mutet in 
alias animalium formas aliasque coniectus, an non amplius quam semel serviat et 
emissus vagetur in toto; utrum corpus sit an non sit; quid sit facturus cum per nos 
aliquid facere desierit, quomodo libertate sua usurus cum ex hac effugerit cavea; 
an obliviscatur priorum et illinc nosse se incipiat unde corpori abductus in sub-
lime secessit. (ed� L� D� Reynolds, Ad Lucilium epistulae morales, I, Oxford 1965, 













Moreover, Origen raises the question of whether the soul is created� If so, 
how? Is its substance contained in corporeal seed and transmitted in prin-
ciple with the germ of the body; or does it enter the body, prepared in the 
pregnant womb, as an external perfection? If the last of these, one is faced 
with the question of whether each soul is created at the moment its assigned 
body is prepared to receive it— created, as it were, for the sake of vivifying 
its host— or whether, on the other hand, it was created long before� If long 
before, it remains unclear why souls should ever become incarnate at all� 
Again, it can be asked whether each soul puts on a body once, or several 
times; and, after taking the body off, whether (and how) it will obtain 
another�15 Finally, we would have to consider the existence of other rational 
or irrational spirits, which might very well share the same substance as the 
soul�16
In this catalogue we find questions that come very near to Augustine’s 
respecting the nature and origin of souls� As early as his Cassiciacum dia-
logue De ordine, Augustine raises comparable questions about the soul: “(1) 
where the soul originates; (2) what it does here; (3) how much it differs from 
God; (4) what its property is that enables it to alternate both natures; (5) to 
what extent it dies; and (6) how its immortality can be demonstrated�”17
In De quantitate animae we find a slightly modified version of this 
catalogue, likewise divided into six questions� Here, the question of the soul’s 
likeness to God becomes a question of its quality as such, and the fact of its 
immortality is presupposed� Furthermore, the question of the double char-
acter of the soul is no longer addressed; it seems probable that this concern 
evolved into a query pertaining to what the soul becomes upon entering a 
body� The rather unclear question “what does the soul do here?” is replaced 
by an inquiry into the reason behind its incarnation per se� Additionally, 
a question concerning “quantity” makes an appearance, marking a major 
development�18 The new catalogue listed at the beginning of De quantitate 
animae by Evodius stacks up against its predecessor as follows:
 15 Or�, comm� in Cant. 2�5,24 (SC 375, 368).
 16 Or�, comm� in Cant. 2�5,18– 26 (SC 375, 364– 370)�
 17 Aug�, Ord. 2�5,17: Anima vero unde originem ducat quidve hic agat, quantum 
distet a Deo, quid habeat proprium, quod alternat in utramque naturam, quatenus 
moriatur et quomodo immortalis probetur… (BA 4/ 2, 210). If not otherwise indi-
cated, the translation is my own�
 18 Aug�, Quant. an� 1�1: Quaero igitur, unde sit anima, qualis sit, quanta sit, cur 
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De quantitae animae De ordine
(i) Where the soul originates, (1) Where the soul originates,
(ii) what it is like in its quality, (3) how much it differs from God,
(iii) what it is like in its quantity,
(iv) why it was given to the body, (2) what it does here,
(v)  what it becomes like after 
entering the body,
(4)  what property it has that enables it to 
alternate both natures,
(vi)  what it becomes like after leaving 
the body
(5) to what extent it dies,
(6) how its immortality can be demonstrated
In the first chapters of De quantitate animae we encounter Augustine’s short 
responses to the questions of origin and quality, (i) and (ii) respectively� Let 
us proceed to examine them�
Concerning the soul’s origin (unde) (i), Augustine provides two answers, 
correspondent with two possible meanings of the word� If by origin is meant 
homeland, then the answer is God, who is responsible for the creation of 
souls� If by origin is meant constituent parts or elements, one must answer 
that the soul does not consist of parts or elements at all, but has rather its 
own simple (i�e� indivisible) substance which is not a compound of corporeal 
elements (earth, water, air, fire)�19 This two- pronged question of the soul’s 
origin (origo) was also familiar to Cicero, as can be seen in his Tusculanae 
disputationes.20
Augustine answers the question of the soul’s quality (ii) by emphasizing its 
similarity to God, particularly its likeness to God’s immortality� However, 
similarity (“image”, cf� Gen 1,26 f) is not, for Augustine, equal to identity� 
 19 Aug�, Quant. an� 1�2 (CSEL 89, 132 f�); 13�22 (CSEL 89, 157 f�)�
 20 Cic�, Tusc. 1�27,66 “No earthly origin can be found for souls; for there is in souls 
nothing that is mixed or compounded, or that seems to be of earthly birth or fab-
rication, nor indeed anything that partakes of the nature of water, or of air, or of 
fire� ��� The soul, then, has a certain nature and power of its own, distinct from 
these natures within our familiar knowledge�” Animorum nulla in terris origo 
inveniri potest; nihil enim est in animis mixtum atque concretum, aut quod ex 
terra natum atque fictum esse videatur, nihil ne aut umidum quidem aut flabile aut 
igneum. … Singularis est igitur quaedam natura atque vis animi, seiuncta ab his 






The soul must be seen as created, not as having the ability to create immortal 
things by itself�21 In De quantitate animae we thus encounter Augustine’s first 
explicit description of the soul as created, signaling his gradual departure 
from Neoplatonic ideas�22 That said, he may very well have been engaging 
polemically with Cicero, who, in Tusculanes disputations, presents the soul 
not only as immortal, but even eternal (aeternum) and divine (divinum), 
describing the human mind as though it were of the same nature (eadem e 
natura) as God�23 Engaging with Evodius, Augustine takes rather a sceptical 
opinion concerning the soul’s “eternity,” although he does not elaborate his 
position in great detail�24
The major part of the dialogue is devoted to the quantity of the soul (iii), from 
which the work takes its name� The English translations “The Magnitude of 
the Soul”25 or “The Greatness of the Soul”26 do not capture the full meaning 
of the Latin De quantitate animae,27 which connotes not only local extension 
by A� P� Peabody, Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations, Boston 1886 (digitised by the 
Internet Archive in 2007)�
 21 Aug�, Quant. an. 2�3 (CSEL 89, 133 f�)�
 22 Cf� R� Ferri, Agostino di Ippona, La grandezza dell’anima. De quantitate animae, 
Palermo 2004, 167, n� 2�
 23 Cic�, Tusc. 1�27,66�
 24 Aug�, Quant. an� 20�34: ... aeternitatem autem eius, si ulla est. (CSEL 89, 174)�
 25 St� Augustine, The Magnitude of the Soul, translated by John J� McMahon in: L� 
Schopp et alii (eds�) The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, Washington 
1947 (reprinted 1977)�
 26 St� Augustine, The Greatness of the Soul, translated by Joseph M� Colleran in: J� 
Quasten et alii (eds�), Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in 
Translation, New York 1950 (reprinted 1978)�
 27 Aug�, Retract. 1�8,1� On the title of the dialogue, Augustine makes a remark 
in his “Revisions”: “In the same city [i�e� Rome], I wrote a dialogue in which 
many questions are raised and discussed about the soul – namely, where the soul 
originates, what it is like in its quality, what it is like in its quantity, why it was 
given to the body, what it becomes like after entering the body, what it becomes 
like when it leaves the body� But because its quantity was discussed very carefully 
and in very great detail, with the result that we showed, as much as we could, 
that it had no bodily quantity and was still something great, the entire book took 
its title from this one investigation, so that it is called On the Quantity of the 
Soul�” (In eadem urbe scripsi dialogum, in quo de anima multa quaeruntur ac 
disseruntur, id est „unde sit, qualis sit, quanta sit, cur corpori fuerit data, cum 
ad corpus venerit qualis efficiatur, qualis cum abscesserit“. Sed quoniam quanta 
sit diligentissime ac subtilissime disputatum est, ut eam, si possemus, ostender-
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(spatium) and “greatness” in the sense of admirable traits (quantum valeat),28 
but also “number”: the singularity and/ or multiplicity of the soul� Augustine 
addresses the question of number (also included in Aristotle’s category of 
quantity)29 only briefly, although (or perhaps because) it seems far less clear 
than the previous features of quantity he expounds�30 Nevertheless, from the 
answer he sketches we can see that Augustine has a Neoplatonic doctrine in 
mind, insofar as he presupposes that soul(s) are, at the same time, one and 
many�31
Following the Neoplatonists, Augustine also denies both that the soul 
has local extension (caret spatio) and that it is localised in space (non 
loco animam contineri)�32 As we will see below, Augustine goes so far 
as to argue that the soul is not localised in the body it animates� He has 
to refute two objections raised by Evodius against this non- intuitive 
doctrine: first, that the soul seems to grow with age; and second, that 
because it is capable of sensing through any part of the body, the soul can 
be said to exhibit localisation�33 In his answer Augustine emphasizes that, 
with age, the soul does not grow, but rather comes gradually to perfec-
tion; it manifests more fully as itself to the degree that it attains virtue34 
or learns language and other skills�35 Not even the increase of stature 
and force in the body demonstrate the growth of the soul� As determined 
by the seminal structure of the body36 and exercise37 respectively, these 
(stature and force) are simply tools, controlled by the soul via nerves/ 
inquisitione totus liber nomen accepit, ut appellaretur „De animae quantitate“ 
(CCL 57, 21 f�)�
 28 Aug�, Quant. an� 3�4 (CSEL 89, 134); 32�69 (CSEL 89, 216 f�)�
 29 Arist�, Cat. 6�4b20– 5a1�
 30 Aug�, Quant. an� 5�7 (CSEL 89 139 f�); 32�69 (CSEL 89, 217)�
 31 See below, n� 120�
 32 Aug�, Quant. an� 31�64 (CSEL 89, 212); 14�23 (CSEL 89, 159)� In his polemic 
against Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotle, too, denies that the soul has any quantity; cf� 
de An� 407a3 (ed� D� Ross, Oxford 1956, reprinted 1986, 13): τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν 
μέγεθος εἶναι� On the Neoplatonic doctrine of the soul as not localised in space, 
see below, the chapter “The Soul not Localised in the Body”�
 33 Aug�, Quant. an� 15�26 (CSEL 89, 162 f�)�
 34 Aug�, Quant. an� 16�27– 28 (CSEL 89, 163– 165)�
 35 Aug�, Quant. an� 18�31– 32 (CSEL 89, 168– 171)�
 36 Aug�, Quant. an� 17�29 (CSEL 89, 166)�





















sinews�38 Consequently, size and growth can only be attributed to the soul 
metaphorically�39
We shall return below to Augustine’s fascinating analysis of sense per-
ception�40 In the context of the whole dialogue, this excursus underlines 
Augustine’s position that the soul is not localised in the body because it also 
perceives there where the body is not located (e�g� seeing is only possible in 
the case of objects that are not directly in contact with the eye)�41
Evodius’ last three questions receive only a very brief reply at the end of the 
dialogue� As to why the soul was given to the body (iv), Augustine responds 
that it was “to rule and administer it, because the magnificent and divine order 
of things could not have been better linked together”�42 He probably means 
that, in the order of the universe, the soul holds an intermediary position 
between God— to whom it is subordinated— and the body, which it is expected 
to rule�43 According to Augustine’s definition, the soul is “a substance shar-
ing in reason (rationis particeps), adapted to rule the body” (regendo corpori 
adcommodata)�44 As such, it mediates between the divine Ratio and the body�
 38 Aug�, Quant. an� 22�38– 40 (CSEL 89, 178– 181)� The expression nervi allows for 
translations both as “nerves” (see P� de Labriolle, BA 5, Paris 1939, 305� Catapano, 
2003, 211) and as “sinews” (see C� J� Perl, Aurelius Augustinus, Die Grösse der 
Seele, Schöningh, Paderborn 1960, 56; McMahon, 1947, 101� Colleran, 1950, 59)� 
Ferri, 2004, 99, even translates it as “muscles”, though not very convincingly� In the 
sense of “sinew”, the term νεῦρον is to be found in, e�g�, Pl�, Ti. 74a7– b7; 74d2– e1; 
75c8– d5; 77d6– e6; 82c7– d5; 84a1– b2; 84e2– 7; Plotinus, Ennead 3�2(47),7,10� 
However, Plotinus also knows it as the “motor nerve”, e�g�, Ennead 4�3(27),23,9– 
14; probably also Ennead 4�4(28),34,32 (on the ambiguous usage of the expression 
νεῦρον in Plotinus, see J� H� Sleeman / G� Pollet (eds�), Lexicon Plotinianum, Leiden 
1980, 676)� The motor nerves had been known since the 3rd century BC thanks to 
Herophilus and Erasistratus, cf� F� Solmsen, Greek Philosophy and the Discovery 
of the Nerves, in: F� Solmsen, Kleine Schriften, I, Hildesheim 1968, 536– 582 (569– 
575)� Augustine might have drawn his medical knowledge from the famous physi-
cian Vindicianus, of whom he speaks in Conf. 4�3,5 (CCL 27, 42) and 7�6,8 (CCL 
27, 97); see also G� Bardy, Saint Augustin et les médecins, in: Année théologique 
augustinienne 13 (1953), 327– 346 (329– 331)� He could also have used the encyclo-
paedic works by Varro, Cornelius Celsus, and others; see Marrou, 1938, 141– 143; 
P� Agaësse / A� Solignac, Notes, in: BA 48, Paris 1972, 710– 714�
 39 Aug�, Quant. an� 17�30 (CSEL 89, 166 f�); 19�33 (CSEL 89, 172 f�)�
 40 Aug�, Quant. an� 23�41– 30�58 (CSEL 89, 181– 205)�
 41 Aug�, Quant. an� 30�59– 60 (CSEL 89, 206 f�)�
 42 Aug�, Quant. an� 36�81: ... quod agendo atque administrando corpori anima data 
sit, cum tantus et tam divinus rerum ordo connecti melius non possit� (CSEL 
89, 230)�
 43 Aug�, Quant. an� 36�81 (CSEL 89, 229)�
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In their formulation, Evodius’ questions seem to presuppose the pre- 
existence of the soul as articulated in the Platonic tradition� Platonic phi-
losophy, however, finds no easy answer to the question of why souls should 
incarnate at all� The discrepancies in Plato’s statements on this issue45 have 
been pointed out by, e�g�, Plotinus,46 who, in his treatise Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ σώματα 
καθόδου τῆς ψυχῆς (“On the Descent of the Soul into Bodies”, Ennead IV,8 
[6] ) considers several possibilities� The soul can incarnate willingly (ἑκοῦσα), 
under compulsion (ἀναγκασθεῖσα), or in any other way�47 Augustine also 
admits his uncertainty regarding this question in his early dialogue De beata 
vita: “For God, nature, necessity, our will, or some of them jointly, or even 
all of them – it is namely a very unclear question ��� – cast us out casually and 
at random, as it were, into this world, as if in the tempestuous open sea …”48 
In his dialogue De quantitate animae, Augustine seems to answer this “very 
unclear question” in a sense of the third hypothesis from De libero arbitrio 
mentioned above: “having existed at a secret place of God, souls are sent to 
animate and lead the bodies of every individual coming to be born�”49
Evodius’ fifth question (v) is also concerned with the incarnation of 
the soul: “what does it become like, after entering the body?” Augustine 
answers as follows: “Who will think it to be worth doubting what the soul 
becomes like in this mortal and frail body, since it is thrust together into 
death deservedly as a result of sin, but virtue enables it to raise itself up even 
in this life?”50 This formulation allows for different interpretations� One is 
that the soul is “thrust together into death” (in mortem ... contrusa) by its 
incarnation into the mortal body� In this case, Augustine would appear to 
view the sin of the soul as a prelude to incarnation, the assignment of flesh 
 45 Cf� Pl�, Phd. 62b3– 6; 67c6– d2; Cra. 400c1– 9; Phdr. 246b6– c6; 248c5– 8; R. 
514a2– b6; 619d1– 7; Ti. 34a8– 35a1�
 46 Plotinus, Ennead 4�8(6),1,23– 50� Here and elsewhere, Plotinus’ Enneads are quoted 
according to the Editio minor (ed� P� Henry – H� R� Schwyzer, Plotini Opera, I- III, 
Oxford 1964– 1982, reprint 1991– 1992) referring to the treatise, chapter and line(s)�
 47 Plotinus, Ennead 4�8(6),2,5– 6� Cf� A�- J� Festugière, La révélation d’Hermès 
Treismégiste, III, Paris 1953, 63– 96; E� Bréhier, La philosophie de Plotin, Paris 
1928, 78– 82�
 48 Aug�, Beat� 1�1: Cum enim in hunc mundum, sive deus sive natura sive necessitas 
sive voluntas nostra sive coniuncta horum aliqua sive simul omnia – res enim 
multum obscura est ... – velut in quoddam procellosum salum nos quasi temere 
passimque proiecerit... (CCL 29, 65)�
 49 Aug�, Lib. 3�20,57,193: ... in dei aliquo secreto iam existentes animae mittuntur ad 
inspiranda et regenda corpora singulorum quorumque nascentium. (CCL 29, 308)�
 50 Aug�, Quant� an. 36�81 [Quis] quaerendum putet, qualis in hoc mortali et fragili 
corpore [anima] efficiatur, cum et in mortem propter peccatum iure contrusa sit 














being a form of punishment� Another interpretation is that souls are not 
merely assigned flesh, but moreover, because of their own sin, thrust into 
mortal punishment (without losing their immortality)51 insofar as they fall 
short of virtue� Or, finally, the idea of the soul thrust together into death 
“deservedly as a result of sin” (propter peccatum iure) may refer to the sin 
of Adam, by which every (human) soul is punished;52 at least to the extent 
that these souls fail to mitigate the penalty through virtue proved in this life 
(or by a “consecration” in the case of infants)�53 Augustine’s later theological 
reflections will develop along this last line�54 However, in our dialogue, and 
in other of Augustine’s early works, the idea that all humans are included in 
Adam’s transgression finds no support� Rather, Augustine’s double emphasis 
on the freedom of will, and the reward or punishment of souls in accordance 
with their behaviour,55 would seem to point toward the first or second alter-
natives above�
Augustine’s reply to the last query (vi) posed by Evodius— “what the soul 
becomes like after leaving the body”— is also unclear: “[Who will think it to 
be worth doubting] what the soul becomes like after leaving the body, since 
the penalty of death must necessarily remain if sin remains, while for virtue 
and piety God Himself, that is, Truth itself, is the reward?”56 In his wording, 
Augustine emphasizes the penalty for sin and the reward for virtue, without 
addressing the issue of duration: how long sin, and its concomitant penalty, 
lasts; whether eternally— as Augustine’s later eschatology will presuppose, 
 51 On the death of the soul left by God and the death of the body left by the soul, 
see Aug�, Ciu�, 8�2 (CCL 48, 385 f�)� Ciu� 8�12 (CCL 48, 394 f�)� For this idea, 
Augustine refers to the biblical testimonies Matt 10:28; Rev 2:11� 21:8� See 
Catapano, 2003, 380, n� 283�
 52 In this sense, Colleran, 1950, 220, n� 124�
 53 Aug�, Quant� an. 36�80: puerorum infantium consecrationes (CSEL 89, 230)� 
As P� de Labriolle (1939, 394, n� 1) observes, the question concerning the ben-
efit of infant baptism appears rather abruptly in Augustine’s dialogue� In Lib. 
3�23,67,227 (CCL 29, 314), Augustine assures his readers that small children who 
die shortly after their baptism cannot profit in their knowledge from this sacra-
ment, but they do profit from the faith of the adults who have them baptized�
 54 According to Augustine’s later doctrine of grace, the baptism removes the guilt, 
not the consequences of the hereditary sin� I dealt with this issue in my book Grace 
and the Will; see esp� 176– 178� 204– 207� 217� 221 f�
 55 Aug�, Quant� an. 36�80 (CSEL 89, 229)�
 56 Aug�, Quant� an. 36�81: ... qualis post hoc corpus futura sit, cum et poena mortis 
necessario manere debeat manente peccato et virtuti pietatique sit deus ipse, id est 
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referring to Matth 25:31– 4657— or just a very long time, as e�g� his prede-
cessor Origen maintained, interpreting 1Cor 15:28�58 The question, asked by 
Tertullian, and of interest to Evodius, concerning whether the soul will keep 
its present shape after leaving the body59 receives no answer in De quantitate 
animae� Evodius (not to mention, the reader of the dialogue) should prob-
ably have understood that the soul is incapable of possessing a corporeal 
shape� The question might rather have been articulated as the problem of the 
resurrected body and its transformation; but, then again, neither is this issue 
addressed�60 In another passage of the dialogue Augustine states that, while 
the resurrection of the body is at first difficult to accept, it is in fact possible 
to become certain of it� Just as we are certain that the sun, which sets before 
our eyes each night, will rise again in the morning, so too might we become 
certain that human body will rise again�61
3.  The soul not localised in the body
The technical framework of Augustine’s dialogue can make it difficult to 
access the important and stimulating ideas contained therein� Like Evodius 
himself, readers are liable to find themselves confounded by Augustine’s 
long and drawn- out exhortations concerning the soul, which, in his under-
standing, has no spatial extension, and is not localised in the body�
 57 Cf� Aug�, Ciu�, 21 (CCL 48, 758– 805)� On Augustine’s eschatology, see B� E� 
Daley, The Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology, 
Cambridge 1991, 131– 150�
 58 Cf� Or�, princ. 1�6,1– 2 (SC 252, 194– 196)� 3�6,5 (SC 268, 244); Jo. 1�32,234– 235 
(SC 120bis, 176)� 6�57,295– 296 (SC 157, 352– 354)� 10�39,267 (SC 157, 546)� 
13�8,49 (SC 222, 58)� 20�7,48 (SC 290, 180)� 32�3,26– 39 (SC 385, 198– 204); 
comm� in Rom. 5�10,12 (SC 539, 518– 520)� 9�41,7 (SC 555, 234)� On Origen’s 
idea of apocatastasis, see H� Crouzel, L’Apocatastase chez Origène, in: L� Lies 
(ed�), Origeniana Quarta. Die Referate des 4. Internationalen Origeneskongresses 
(Innsbruck, 2.– 6. September 1985), Innsbruck / Wien 1987, 282– 290; I� Ramelli, 
The Christian Doctrine of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New 
Testament to Eriugena, Leiden 2013, 137– 215�
 59 Aug�, Quant� an. 5�7 (CSEL 89, 139)� According to Tertullian, the soul shares the 
shape of the body, which it is connected to, and it even keeps this shape after leav-
ing the body, cf� de An. 9�7– 8 (CCL 2, 793 f�)� Plotinus also mentions this idea, 
together with that of the soul possessing a spherical shape, Ennead 4�4(28),5,13– 
20� See G� Catapano, 2003, 353 f�, n� 37�
 60 In his later eschatology, Augustine presupposes that resurrected bodies will grow 
to reach their full measure, not according to the corporeal mass they had in this 
life, but according to the seminal structure they are endowed with (in ratione, non 
mole); see Aug�, Ciu� 2�14 (CCL 48, 833 f�)�













As we know from his Confessiones, the young Augustine— like Evodius— 
had supposed the soul to be corporeal�62 Besides Stoic philosophy, he would 
have found auxiliary support for this idea in the work of his Christian pre-
decessor Tertullian (and, less convincingly, in the African Manichees, whose 
community Augustine joined for nine years)�63 Indeed, it was Augustine’s explo-
ration of the “books of the Platonists”64 that exposed him to the idea of an 
incorporeal and non- extended soul� This idea, however, is not easy to follow; 
not least of all because it eludes our imagination, which is better acquainted 
with corporeal objects�
In order to teach Evodius, and the readers of his dialogue, to think without 
corporeal support, Augustine includes a very long excursus dealing with geo-
metrical objects� If the soul is able to think of a surface without height; a line 
without width; and a point without length— none of which can be seen with 
the corporeal eye— it will presumably be more willing to concede the existence 
of things that are not only incorporeal, but also not- extended (even if geomet-
rical objects, excepting a point, are extended)� In the same vein, Plotinus, fol-
lowing Plato, speaks about the mathematical training which enables the soul to 
deal with incorporeal objects�65
In his exposition, Augustine proceeds by two steps�66 First, he brings 
Evodius to accept the reality of things without any spatial extension, such as 
 62 Aug�, Conf. 3�7,12 (CCL 27, 33)� 4�15,24 (CCL 27, 52)� 5�10,20 (CCL 27, 69)�
 63 On Tertullian’s idea of a corporeal soul drawing from Stoicism, see Tert�, An. 
5�5– 6 (CCL 2, 787)� Alex� Aphr�, De anima mantissa (ed� I� Bruns, CAG sup-
plementum II/ 1, Berlin 1887, 117,9– 11)� Cf� H� Karpp, Probleme altchristlicher 
Anthropologie. Biblische Anthropologie und philosophische Psychologie bei den 
Kirchenvätern des dritten Jahrhunderts, Gütersloh 1950, 41– 91; P� Kitzler, Nihil 
enim anima si non corpus. Tertullian und die Körperlichkeit der Seele, in: Wiener 
Studien 122 (2009), 145– 169� On the Manichean doctrine of the soul as lumi-
nous nature close to the divine substance, see C� G� Scibona, The Doctrine of the 
Soul in Manichaeism and Augustine, in: J� A� van den Berg et alii (eds�), In Search 
of Truth. Augustine, Manichaeism and other Gnosticism: Studies for Johannes 
van Oort at Sixty, Leiden 2010, 377– 418, here 383 and 391� The accusation of 
materialism against the African Manichees does not seem to be fair, cf� F� Decret, 
L’Afrique manichéenne (IVe- Ve siècles): Étude historique et doctrinale, Paris 1978, 
I, 305– 322� II, 246– 257�
 64 Aug�, Conf. 7�9,13 (CCL 27, 101); 8�2,3 (CCL 27, 114)�
 65 Plotinus, Ennead 1�3(20),2,5– 7; cf� Pl�, R� 525a- 527c�
 66 Aug�, Quant� an. 3�4: “First of all, then��� I shall show you that there are many 
things which you cannot call nothing, although you cannot find in them any 
such extension as you are looking for in the soul� ��� In the next place, we shall 
see whether it [i�e� the soul] really has none of these properties�” Prius ergo... 
ostendam tibi multas esse res, quas non possis dicere nihil esse, nec tamen in eis 
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righteousness�67 Then he attempts to demonstrate that the soul is best under-
stood in this category of being� It cannot be corporeal, because it is able to 
know incorporeal things�68 Nor is it extended; not even in the body it vivi-
fies� To support this last statement, Augustine provides three reasons: by its 
memory or imagination the soul is able to contain things much bigger than 
the body it vivifies;69 the soul is capable of abstracting dimensions from geo-
metrical objects;70 the soul is able to know itself as non- extended, and even 
is this self- knowledge�71
The idea of the soul as non- extended and non- localised in the body came 
to Augustine by way of his Neoplatonic predecessors, referred to as “very 
learned men” throughout his discussion with Evodius�72 Porphyry— whose 
lost treatise on the connection of the soul to the body is supposed to be 
a direct inspiration for Augustine’s dialogue73— also emphasizes that only 
corporeal things are localised in space,74 while incorporeal things transcend 
spatial categorization, being rather omnipresent�75 Furthermore, incorporeal 
things are not present in corporeal things locally, but rather by relation, will, 
or inclination�76 In this way, the soul is present to the body without spa-
tially “descending” into it� It is difficult to imagine such a connection, and 
Porphyry, according to his own testimony, spent three whole days discussing 
it with his master Plotinus�77
It was almost certainly Plotinus who first introduced the idea of the soul 
as incorporeal and non- localised78 into the history of philosophy� In so 
nihil horum [anima] habeat, videbimus. (CSEL 135 f�)� English translation by 
Colleran, 1950, 17�
 67 Aug�, Quant� an. 4�5 (CSEL 136 f�)�
 68 Aug�, Quant� an. 13�22 (CSEL 89, 157 f�)�
 69 Aug�, Quant� an. 5�8– 9 (CSEL 89, 140– 142)�
 70 Aug�, Quant� an. 6�10– 13�22 (CSEL 89, 142– 157)�
 71 Aug�, Quant� an. 14�24 (CSEL 160 f�)�
 72 Aug�, Quant� an. 32�68: doctissimi viri (CSEL 89, 216)�
 73 Cf� J� Pépin, Une nouvelle source de saint Augustin: Le ζήτημα de Porphyre sur 
l’union de l’âme et du corps, in: Revue des études anciennes 66 (1964), 53– 107 
(reprinted in: J� Pépin, « Ex Platonicorum persona ». Études sur les lectures philos-
ophiques de saint Augustin, Amsterdam 1977, 213– 267, here 56– 70 (= 216– 230)� 
84– 86 (= 244– 246)� 89– 92 (= 249– 252))� See also G� Madec, Le spiritualisme 
augustinien à la lumière du De immortalitate animae, in: G� Madec, Petites études 
augustiniennes, Paris 1994, 105– 119�
 74 Porph�, Sent. 1 (ed� L� Brisson et alii, I, Paris 2005, 308)�
 75 Porph�, Sent. 2 (Brisson I, 308)�
 76 Porph�, Sent. 3 (Brisson I, 308)�
 77 Porph�, Plot. 13�10 f�
 78 Plotinus, Ennead 4�9(8),1,5 f�; 4�3(27),20,10– 15� Omnipresence is also analysed in 


























doing, he ascribed the nature of “ideas,” as treated in Plato’s Parmenides,79 
to the soul� However, it seems to be especially difficult to explain how an 
omnipresent soul is connected to a local body� In Plotinus’ opinion, or per-
haps according to his mystical experience, the soul is rooted in the divine 
Intellect,80 acting in the body through its radiation81 or image,82 “as a face 
reflects in many mirrors”�83
The particular difficulty of this doctrine is further attested by the length 
of Plotinus’ treatise on the issue, which Porphyry divided into no less than 
three and edited them as Περὶ ψυχῆς ἀπορίαι (“Difficulties about the Soul 
I– III”, Ennead IV, 3– 5 [27– 29])� It is of interest for our purposes that the 
last part of this exposition (Ennead IV, 5 [29]) deals with sight, just as 
Augustine does (at length) in De quantitate animae� Both authors empha-
size that sight, unlike touch, cannot operate without a certain distance from 
the objects it aims to perceive�84 However, their general purposes in address-
ing the topic are different� While Plotinus, in analysing perception, high-
lights a cosmic sympathy based on the idea of the world qua living being,85 
Augustine explores the nature of sight to demonstrate the (Neoplatonic) 
idea that the soul is not localised in the body it vivifies� His analysis of sense 
perception is the next topic to attract our interest in De quantitate animae�
4.  Sense Perception
According to Augustine’s definition, sense perception (sensus) is “bodily 
experience which of itself does not escape the soul” (passio corporis per 
seipsam non latens animam)�86 The word “experience” translates the Latin 
passio (“suffering”), the category of “being acted upon”, i�e� indicating 
One and the same, everywhere as a whole I– II” (Περὶ τοῦ τὸ ὂν ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ὂν 
ἅμα πανταχοῦ εἶναι ὅλον) by Porphyry� Plotinus speaks repeatedly of the omni-
presence of the incorporeal, not extended and not divided into parts; cf� Ennead 
6�4(22), 2,43– 49� 3,23– 31� 8,1– 9� 12,48– 13,6� 13,14– 19; 6�5(23), 3,19– 30� 4,5– 6� 
9,37– 41� 12,1– 7�
 79 Cf� Pl�, Prm. 131b1– 2.
 80 Cf� Plotinus, Ennead 4�8(6),8,2– 3� 4�1(21),1,12– 13� 4�3(27),12,5�
 81 Plotinus, Ennead 6�4(22),3,1– 23�
 82 Plotinus, Ennead 5�2(11),1,19– 21� 4�5(29),7,44– 52� 6�2(43),22,33– 35�
 83 Plotinus, Ennead 1�1(53),8,17– 18: μένουσα μὲν αὐτή, εἴδωλα δὲ αὐτῆς διδοῦσα, 
ὥσπερ πρόσωπον ἐν πολλοῖς κατόπτροις�
 84 Plotinus, Ennead 4�5(29),2,55– 57� Aug�, Quant� an� 23�43– 44 (CSEL 89, 
184– 186)�
 85 Plotinus, Ennead 4�5(29),3,15– 21�
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that something is the object of an action� The specification “of itself” (per 
seipsam) is added in order to exclude the case in which the soul learns about 
a bodily experience otherwise than via the experience itself, e�g�, when, from 
the increasing length of fingernails, it deduces that they must have grown 
without its knowledge�87 The wording “not escape the soul” (non latens ani-
mam) does not necessarily connote rational knowledge, given that animals, 
lacking reason, still possess sensation�88
In addition, Augustine’s definition implies that the body is the sole locus 
of sensory experience, while the soul is only ever aware of it� A very similar 
formulation can be found in Plotinus’ treatise Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας (“On Well- 
Being”, Ennead I, 4[46]), where he states: “if they mean by sensation that 
experience does not escape (τὸ πάθος μὴ λανθάνειν) [the soul]���”89 It is, to 
be sure, an account of someone else’s opinion,90 but Plotinus does say that 
the soul’s perceptive part “perceives the experiences in the body by its own 
agency”�91 Thus, the soul is not acted upon� It does not “suffer” anything, 
but rather acquires, through its own initiative, the images impressed upon 
the sensory organs:
We say that sense perceptions are not affections but activities and judgments con-
cerned with affections; affections belong to something else, say, for instance, to the 
body qualified in a particular way, but the judgment belongs to the soul, and the 
judgment is not affection�92
Physical objects, to be sure, cannot affect the incorporeal soul, but only the 
sensory organs that transmit information to the soul in the form of incor-
poreal images�93 Sensation is hence a judgment and activity concerning 
these images; the soul is not acted upon, but acts, even when processing 
 87 Aug�, Quant� an� 25�48 (CSEL 89, 192 f�)�
 88 Aug�, Quant� an� 30�58 (CSEL 89, 205)�
 89 Plotinus, Ennead 1�4(46),2,3– 4: εἰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο λέγουσι, τὸ τὸ 
πάθος μὴ λανθάνειν���
 90 Unfortunately, it is not quite clear which opponents Plotinus has in mind here, 
but probably the Aristotelians or Epicureans� Nor is it evident whether or not the 
definition of sense perception should be considered a part of the rejected position� 
See A� Linguiti, La felicità nel tempo. Plotino, Enneadi, I 4 – I 5, Milano 2000, 
101 f�, n� 9�
 91 Plotinus, Ennead 5�3(49),2,6: τῶν γὰρ ἐν τῷ σώματι παθημάτων ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ 
αἰσθάνεται�
 92 Plotinus, Ennead 3�6(26),1,1– 4: Τὰς αἰσθήσεις οὐ πάθη λέγοντες εἶναι, ἐνεργείας δὲ 
περὶ παθήματα καὶ κρίσεις, τῶν μὲν παθῶν περὶ ἄλλο γινομένων, οἷον τὸ σῶμα φέρε 
τὸ τοιόνδε, τῆς δὲ κρίσεως περὶ τὴν ψυχήν, οὐ τῆς κρίσεως πάθους οὔσης��� English 
translation by A� H� Armstrong, Enneads, III, Cambridge 1980, 211�
















information coming “from the outside”�94 In order to manage these images, 
the soul makes use of internal structures, preserved as traces from the 
Intellect (probably recollections thereof)�95
An impact of Plotinus’ idea can also be found in one of Augustine’s later 
dialogues, De musica, where these images are described as Pythagorean 
numbers, structures, or rhythms (numeri)�96 In this dialogue it is denied 
that the soul is affected by the body as matter by an artificer (fabricatori 
corpori materiam quoquo modo animam subdere)�97 The soul is aware of 
the motions and/ or troubles of the body because it actively pays attention 
(intentio or attentio), not because it is passively exposed to them�98 The soul 
 94 Plotinus, Ennead 4�3(27),26,1– 9: “If, then, the composite living thing is involved 
in actual sense perceptions, perception must be something like boring holes and 
weaving – that is why it is called ‘common’ – in order that the soul may be in the 
position of the workman in perceiving and the body in that of the tool; the body 
experiences and serves, and the soul receives the impression made on the body, 
or the impression which comes through the body, or the judgment which it made 
as a result of the experience of the body�” (Εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ζῷον τὸ συναμφότερόν 
ἐστιν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι ταῖς κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, δεῖ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοιοῦτον εἶναι— διὸ 
καὶ κοινὸν λέγεται— οἷον τὸ τρυπᾶν καὶ τὸ ὑφαίνειν, ἵνα κατὰ μὲν τὸν τεχνίτην ἡ 
ψυχὴ ᾖ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ὄργανον τὸ σῶμα, τοῦ μὲν σώματος πάσχοντος 
καὶ ὑπηρετοῦντος, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς παραδεχομένης τὴν τύπωσιν τὴν τοῦ σώματος, ἢ 
τὴν διὰ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν ἐποιήσατο ἐκ τοῦ παθήματος τοῦ σώματος)� 
English translation by A� H� Armstrong, Enneads, IV, Cambridge 1984, 115– 
117� Cf� also Ennead 4�3(27),23; 4�4(28),23; 4�5(29); 2�8(35); 4�6(41),1– 2� 
On Plotinus’ theory of sense perception, see G� H� Clark, Plotinus’ Theory of 
Sensation, in: The Philosophical Review 51 (1942), 357– 382; H� J� Blumenthal, 
Plotinus’ Psychology. His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul, The Hague 1971, 67– 
79; H� J� Blumenthal, Plotinus’ Adaptation of Aristotle’s Psychology: Sensation, 
Imagination and Memory, in: R� Baine Harris (ed�), The Signification of 
Neoplatonism, Norfolk 1976, 41– 58 (reprinted in: H� J� Blumenthal, Soul and 
Intellect. Studies in Plotinus and Later Neoplatonism, Aldershot 1993, No VII) 
(45– 51); E� K� Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense- Perception: A Philosophical Study, 
Cambridge 1988, 184– 190; R� Chiaradonna, Plotinus’ Account of the Cognitive 
Powers of the Soul: Sense Perception and Discursive Thought, in: Topoi (on- line 
20�11� 2011), part 1– 2�
 95 Plotinus, Ennead 5�3(49),2,2– 14�
 96 Aug�, Mus. 6�5,8 (BA 7, 376– 378)�
 97 Aug�, Mus. 6�5,8 (BA 7, 376)�
 98 Aug�, Mus. 6�5,9 (BA 7, 380)� A possible inspiration of this idea is supposed to 
be Plotinus’ treatise “On sense- perception and memory”, cf� Ennead 4�6(41),2,2– 
9: “This is a matter of power, not of being affected in some way but of being 
capable of and doing the work to which it has been assigned� This is the way, 
I think, in which a distinction is made by the soul between what is seen and what 
is heard, not if both are impressions, but if they are not by nature impressions or 
affections, but activities concerned with that which approaches [the soul]� But we 
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animates the body by its “intention”, and therefore no disruption of its oper-
ations is unknown to the soul�99
In De quantitate animae, we hear about different kinds of attention: that 
paid by the mind to difficulties100; to objects in the world;101 and even the 
attention Augustine’s reflections require of Evodius�102 Sense perception 
(especially touch) is also, we learn, made possible by the intention of the 
soul (intendit se)�103 In analyzing vision, however, Augustine does not speak 
of attention� He rather borrows the Stoic image of sight stemming from the 
its object unless it is struck by it, and make it be affected by the object near it 
instead of coming to know it, though it has been appointed to master it, not to 
be mastered by it�”(τοῦτο γὰρ δυνάμεως, οὐ τὸ παθεῖν τι, ἀλλὰ τὸ δυνηθῆναι καὶ ἐφ’ 
ᾧ τέτακται ἐργάσασθαι� Οὕτως γὰρ ἄν, οἶμαι, καὶ διακριθείη τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν 
καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, οὐκ εἰ τύποι ἄμφω, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ τύποι μηδὲ πείσεις, ἀλλ’ ἐνέργειαι 
περὶ ὃ ἔπεισι πεφύκασιν� ῾Ημεῖς δὲ ἀπιστοῦντες, μὴ οὐ δύνηται, ἐὰν μὴ πληγῇ, τὸ 
αὑτῆς γινώσκειν δύναμις ἑκάστη, πάσχειν, ἀλλ’ οὐ γινώσκειν τὸ ἐγγὺς ποιοῦμεν, οὗ 
κρατεῖν δέδοται, ἀλλ’ οὐ κρατεῖσθαι�) English translation by Armstrong, 1984, 
325� See S� Vanni Rovighi, La fenomenologia della sensazione in Sant’Agostino, 
in: Rivista di filosofia neo- scolastica 54 (1962), 18– 32 (21); C� Di Martino, Il 
ruolo della intentio nell’evoluzione della psicologia di Agostino: dal De libero 
arbitrio al De Trinitate, in: REAug 46 (2000), 173– 197 (183 f)� For Augustine’s 
theory of sense perception, cf� also G� O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 
London 1987, 80– 105; M� A� I� Gannon, The Active Theory of Sensation in 
St. Augustine, in: The New Scholasticism 30 (1956), 154– 180; M� R� Miles, 
Augustine on the Body, Missoula, Montana 1979, 9– 39� For his idea of inten-
tionality, see U� Pizzani, Intentio ed escatologia nel sesto libro del De musica di 
S. Agostino, in: L� Alici (ed�), Interiorità e intenzionalità in S. Agostino. Atti del 
Io e IIo Seminario internazionale del Centro di studi agostiniani di Perugia, Roma 
1990, 35– 57 (43– 45� 49); V� Caston, Connecting Traditions: Augustine and the 
Greeks on Intentionality, in: D� Perler (ed�), Ancient and Medieval Theories of 
Intentionality, Leiden 2001, 23– 48 (40 f)�
 99 Aug�, Mus. 6�5,10:… videtur mihi anima cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo 
aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere, et has actiones sive faciles 
propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam latere: et 
hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur. ... Cum autem adhibentur ea quae nonnulla, ut 
ita dicam, alteritate corpus afficiunt; exserit attentiores actiones, suis quibusque 
locis atque instrumentis accommodatas: tunc videre, vel audire, vel olfacere, vel 
gustare, vel tangendo sentire dicitur. (BA 7, 382)�
 100 Aug�, Quant� an. 35�79 (CSEL 89, 228)�
 101 Aug�, Quant� an. 27�53 (CSEL 89, 199)�
 102 Aug�, Quant� an. 22�40: ... totus intendo (CSEL 89, 181). Cf� also 33�71 (CSEL 
89, 219)�











eye, in the form of a stick, to reach the objects of its perception�104 According 
to the Stoic idea, adapted from Plato’s Timaeus,105 a ray of sight (a “visual 
pneuma”)106 is shot forth from the eye� Upon striking an external object, this 
ray generates a cone of air, which, in turn, pushes back against the pupil�107
For the Stoics, the pressure of the air called συνέντασις or intentio was 
material,108 but Augustine modulates it into the “intention” or “attention” 
of the soul, thus favoring the Neoplatonic conception� Accordingly, when 
it comes to sensation, the soul is not acted upon but rather acts� Vision is 
defined as the soul perceiving, by means of a ray of sight, objects located 
elsewhere than the immediate vicinity of the eye� Contrary to the Stoics, 
Augustine does not imagine the “stick” of sight as a pressure exercised by 
a cone of air upon the eye— in this form, the Stoic theory had already been 
rejected by Plotinus109— but rather as an activity of the soul� As mentioned 
 104 Aug�, Quant� an. 23�43 (CSEL 89, 185)� Cf� Gal�, De plac� 7�7,20,1– 2: Μὴ τοίνυν 
ὡς διὰ βακτηρίας τοῦ πέριξ ἀέρος ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς οἱ Στωϊκοὶ λεγέτωσαν� (ed� Ph� De Lacy, 
Corpus medicorum Graecorum, V,4,1,2, Berlin 22005, 474,8 f)�
 105 Pl�, Ti. 45b– d� 67c– 68a� The process of seeing is explained here as the coalescing 
of the inner fire emanating from an eye together with the external light into a 
homogenous beam that transfers the motion of the objects it collides with into 
the very soul�
 106 SVF 2�866 (from Aëtius)�
 107 Alex� Aphr�, De anima mantissa: Εἰσὶν δέ τινες, οἳ διὰ τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος συνεντάσεως 
τὸ ὁρᾶν φασι γίνεσθαι� νυττόμενον γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ὄψεως τὸν συνάπτοντα τῇ κόρῃ ἀέρα 
σχηματίζεσθαι εἰς κῶνον� τούτου δὲ οἷον τυπουμένου κατὰ τὴν βάσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ὁρατῶν 
τὴν αἴσθησιν γίνεσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ τῇ ἁφῇ διὰ βακτηρίας� (Bruns 130,14– 17 = SVF 
2�864)�
 108 Cf�, e�g�, SVF 2�871 (from Aulius Gellius): Stoici causas esse videndi dicunt 
radiorum ex oculis in ea, quae videri queunt, emissionem aerisque simul inten-
tionem. SVF 2�863 (from Calcidius): Stoici vero videndi causam in nativi spiritus 
intentione constituunt, cuius effigiem coni similem volunt. Hoc quippe progresso 
ex oculorum penetrali, quod appellatur pupula, et ab exordio tenui, quo magis 
porrigitur, in soliditatem optimato exordio, penes id quod videtur locatam 
fundi omnifariam dilatarique visus inlustrationem. Cf� R� B� Todd, Συνέντασις 
and the Stoic Theory of Perception, in: Grazer Beiträge 2 (1974), 251– 61; 
H� G� Ingenkamp, Zur stoischen Lehre vom Sehen, in: Rheinisches Museum für 
Philologie 114, (1971), 240– 246� On Augustine’s spiritualising the Stoic doctrine, 
see J� Rohmer, L’intentionnalité des sensations chez Augustin, in: Augustinus 
Magister. Congrès international augustinien, I, Paris 1954, 491– 498 (493)�
 109 Plotinus, Ennead 4�5(29),4,38– 46: “But if the soul stays in its own place, but 
needs light like a stick to reach the object with, then the apprehension would be 
a violent business, with the light stretched out and pushing against the object of 
perception, the colour as colour, itself pressing back: for this is how sensations 
of touch occur through a medium� And [on this hypothesis] the object was for-
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above, only at the end of the dialogue, and in his later writings, will Augustine 
call this activity “intention” or “attention”�110
In De quantitate animae, the “intention” or “attention” of the soul is 
only implied by a negative formulation: it “does not escape the soul”� As we 
know, Augustine’s analysis of sensation is an excursus, which aims at dem-
onstrating the soul’s non- local relation to the body� I am undecided about 
whether or not sight is a pertinent argument for this idea, but, in any case, 
the excursus is surely among the most interesting passages of the dialogue� 
Not only does Augustine present the soul as incorporeal (differently from the 
air, which, in Evodius’ eyes, comes close to it)111 and non- extended (like a 
point among geometrical objects) but further emphasizes that it is not local-
ised in space (unlike a point)�
5.  The Divisibility of the Soul?
In order to explain the strange phenomenon of a dissected centipede, whose 
severed parts continue to move— an example that, in Augustine’s mind, 
appears to jeopardize his theory of the non- localised soul112— he procures a 
parallel example of dissected words�
According to this example, sound (sonus) and its signification (significa-
tio) together make a name (nomen), just as the body and the soul together 
make a living being� Sound can be divided into phones, while signification 
cannot; nor is it contained in the sound locally�113 However, some words con-
tinue to signify even when divided (such as Luci- fer),114 in the same way that 
some animals continue to live, even when dissected�115 The divided sound 
this is the way in which touching through a medium causes knowledge, as if by 
memory and, still more, by a process of reasoning: but as things are [seeing] is 
not like this�” (Εἰ δὲ μένει μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῆς, φωτὸς δὲ δεῖται ὥσπερ βακτηρίας 
πρὸς τὸ φθάσαι, ἔδει τὴν ἀντίληψιν βίαιον καὶ ἀντερείδοντος εἶναι καὶ τεταμένου 
τοῦ φωτός, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, τὸ χρῶμα, ᾗ χρῶμα, ἀντιτυποῦν καὶ αὐτὸ εἶναι· οὕτω 
γὰρ διὰ μέσου αἱ ἁφαί� Εἶτα καὶ πρότερον ἐγγὺς γέγονε μηδενὸς μεταξὺ ὄντος τότε· 
οὕτω γὰρ ὕστερον τὸ διὰ μέσου ἅπτεσθαι ποιεῖ τὴν γνῶσιν, οἷον τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ἔτι 
μᾶλλον συλλογισμῷ· νῦν δὲ οὐχ οὕτως�) English translation by Armstrong, 1984, 
297– 299�
 110 See above, n� 98� Besides Aug�, Mus. 6�5,8– 9 (BA 7, 376– 380), see also Gen� 
imp� 12�20,42: ��� in sede cerebri, unde ipsa dirigitur intentio sentiendi (BA 49, 
398); Trin. 11�2,2 (CCL 50, 334– 336)�
 111 Aug�, Quant� an. 4�6 (CSEL 89, 138)�
 112 Aug�, Quant� an. 31�62– 63 (CSEL 89, 209 f�)�
 113 Aug�, Quant� an. 32�66– 67 (CSEL 89, 213 f�)�
 114 Aug�, Quant� an. 32�67 (CSEL 89, 215)�
 115 Aug�, Quant� an. 31�62 (CSEL 89, 209 f�)� As Augustine explains, this case is still 















does not diminish spatially, but temporally; nor is its significance extended 
in time�116 In this context, Augustine introduces the opinion of some “very 
learned men” (i�e� the Platonists) that “the soul can in no way be divided in 
itself, but only by reason of the body”�117 Thus, the soul operates in different 
ways in different parts of the body, not having any parts in itself�
Since, in the example of divided words, the significance present in these 
words plays the part of the soul, and, moreover, since Augustine understands 
the significance as inter-subjective,118 it can surely be asked whether the soul, 
too, is shared, i�e� present not only in every part of a body but as one in sev-
eral bodies� This idea does not seem completely off kilter, as Augustine actu-
ally continues his analysis by asking the Neoplatonic question of whether 
the soul is one, multiple, or both (the third seeming the most promising):
As to the number of souls, however, – seeing that you thought this relevant to the 
problem in hand – I do not know what answer to give you� I would be more inclined 
to say that the question should not be brought up at all or at least that you should 
postpone it for the time being rather than that I should say that number and multi-
tude have no connection with quantity, or that I am presently equal to the task of 
solving such an involved problem for you� For if I should tell you that there is only 
one soul, you will be at sea because of the fact that in one it is happy, in another 
unhappy; and one and the same thing cannot be both happy and unhappy at the 
same time� If I should say that it is one and many at the same time, you will smile; 
and I would not find it easy to make you suppress your smile� But if I say simply 
that it is many, I shall have to laugh at myself, and it will be harder for me to suffer 
my own disapprobation than yours�119
air, connected to the moist and cold body thanks to the soul, start to leave and 
thus produce jerky movements in the tail, cf� Quant� an. 31�62 (CSEL 89, 208 f�)� 
This last phenomenon is also mentioned by Plotinus, Ennead 4�4(28),29,6– 7� 
On the life of animals that have been cut in two, see also Arist�, de An. 1�4, 
409a9– 10; 1�5, 411b19�27; Lucr�, De rerum natura 3�652– 669, and Tert�, An. 
15�2 (CCL 2, 801)�
 116 Aug�, Quant� an. 32�68 (CSEL 89, 215 f�)�
 117 Aug�, Quant� an. 32�68 (CSEL 89, 216)� Cf� Plotinus, Ennead 4�1(21),1,20– 
22: “For it gives itself to the whole body and is not divided in that it gives 
itself whole to the whole and is divided in that it is present in every part�” (Εἰς 
ὅλον γὰρ τὸ σῶμα δοῦσα αὑτὴν καὶ μὴ μερισθεῖσα τῷ ὅλη εἰς ὅλον τῷ ἐν παντὶ 
εἶναι μεμέρισται�) English translation by Armstrong, 1984, 23� Similarly, Ennead 
6�4(22),1,27– 29� 4,26– 34� IV,2(4),1,69– 76� Porphyry sums this doctrine up in 
Sent. 5�1– 2: The “soul is a sort of intermediary between the indivisible essence 
and the essence which is divided about bodies�” (῾Η μὲν ψυχὴ τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ 
<τῆς> περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστῆς οὐσίας μέσον τι (Brisson I, 308))� English transla-
tion by J� Dillon, in: Brisson II, 796� This idea is based on Pl�, Ti. 35a�
 118 Aug�, Quant� an. 32�66 (CSEL 89, 213)�
 119 Aug�, Quant� an. 32�69: De numero vero animarum, nescio quid tibi respondeam, 
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According to the Neoplatonists, the soul is one and many at the same time; 
neither does its multiplicity come about by reason of the body� The soul(s) 
are already one and many before their incarnation, together creating a spe-
cific unity approaching the unity of parts featured in the divine Intellect�120 
As we can surmise from the queries Evodius puts to Augustine later on in 
their correspondence, the idea of the soul being one and many was not so 
confounding to Evodius as Augustine seems to have feared (although it is 
true that Evodius did not accept it either)�121
6.  The Care for the Soul
The soul, which, in Augustine’s eyes, “brought every art with it” at birth “so 
that what we call learning is nothing else than recalling and remembering”,122 
still requires special care in order to maximally develop its abilities� One 
concrete example of such care is Augustine’s dialectical engagement with 
esse omnino quaerendum aut certe tibi nunc differendum quam vel numerum 
ac multitudinem non pertinere ad quantitatem vel tam involutam quaestionem 
modo a me tibi posse expediri. Si enim dixero unam esse animam, conturbaberis, 
quod in altero beata est, in altero misera nec una res simul et beata et misera 
potest esse. Si unam simul et multas dicam esse, ridebis; nec mihi facile, unde 
tuum risum comprimam, suppetit. Sin multas tantummodo esse dixero, ipse me 
ridebo, minusque me mihi displicentem quam tibi perferam. (CSEL 89, 217)� 
English translation by Colleran, 1950, 97�
 120 On the unity of souls, see Plotinus, Enn. 4�9(8) “If all souls are one”; Enn. 
4�3(27),4,14– 21; Porph�, Sent. 37 (Brisson I, 354– 356)� Cf� on this topic, 
H� Dörrie / M� Baltes, Der Platonismus in der Antike, 6/ 1 (Von der „Seele“ als 
der Ursache aller sinnvollen Abläufe: Bausteine 151– 168: Text, Übersetzung, 
Kommentar), Stuttgart / Bad Cannstatt 2002, 285– 292; M� Andolfo, L’ipostasi 
della „Psyche“ in Plotino. Struttura e fondamenti, Milano 1996, 17– 42; F� Karfík, 
Parts of the Soul in Plotinus, in: K� Corcilius / D� Perler (eds�), Partitioning the 
Soul: Debates from Plato to Leibniz, Berlin 2014, 107– 148 (110– 112)� On the 
other hand, N� Cipriani (Roma 2013, 149) interprets this question as an allusion 
to Tertullian’s doctrine on one (corporeal) soul transmitted in the human race 
from Adam’s soul, cf� Tert�, An� 27�8– 9 (CCL 2, 824); 36�1,4 (CCL 2, 838 f�)� 
See P� Kitzler, Ex uno homine tota haec animarum redundantia. Ursprung, 
Entstehung und Weitergabe der individuellen Seele nach Tertullian, in: VigChr 
64 (2010), 353– 381; above, n� 63�
 121 Cf� Evod�, Ep. 158�5: ... anima effecta ex multis (CSEL 44, 492). From the simile 
of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:22– 26), Evodius surmises that souls differ 
both in their state and place, and that is why they must have a body made of 
very delicate material even after they left the earthly body� Cf� Ep. 158�11 (CSEL 
44, 496)�
 122 Aug�, Quant� an� 20�34: ... omnes artes secum adtulisse videatur nec aliud quic-









Evodius, as he states explicitly at the beginning of De quantitate animae� 
Their discussion opens with Evodius’ remarks about self- knowledge, which 
he deems appropriate to human beings, in contrast to an inappropriate curi-
osity which longs to know things beyond human understanding: “What 
have we to do with what is above us?”123 This sentence, ascribed to Socrates 
(probably as a result of comments by Xenophon124), was known to Eusebius 
of Caesarea and several Latin Christian authors�125 According to Evodius, 
Augustine himself quoted it on several occasions to help steer his friend 
toward self- knowledge and care for the soul�
Augustine returns to the issue later on in De quantitate animae, claiming, 
“if we care about (curae sumus) ourselves, we have to care for (curare) the 
human soul as our only concern”�126 This play on the words curare (“care 
for”) and curae esse (“care about”) is surely an allusion to Socrates’ con-
cern about caring for one’s own soul�127 Augustine, however, includes in 
the care for the soul the idea that souls can be imagined in seven degrees 
(or levels), which, besides three Aristotelean faculties— vegetative, percep-
tive, and rational (animatio, sensus and ars)— also encompass four (perhaps 
Neoplatonic) levels of virtue� These last levels are labeled as “virtue”, “tran-
quility”, “ingression”, and “contemplation” respectively (virtus, tranquil-
litas, ingressio, contemplatio)�128
 123 Aug�, Quant� an� 1�1: Quod supra nos, quid ad nos? (CSEL 89, 132)�
 124 Xenophon, Memorabilia 1�1,11– 12; 4�7,6 (ed� E� C� Marchant, Opera, II, 
Oxford 1901, reprint 1949)�
 125 Cf� Eus�, p� e� 15�62,10: ὅθεν ὀρθῶς εἶπε Σωκράτης καὶ λίαν καλῶς, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων 
τὰ μὲν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς εἴη, τὰ δὲ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς· εἶναι γὰρ τὰ φυσικὰ μὲν ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, τὰ 
δὲ μετὰ τὸν θάνατον οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, μόνα δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα� Stobaeus 
reports on Ariston dividing philosophical questions into those “concerning us” 
(πρὸς ἡμᾶς), i�e� ethics, those “not concerning us” (μηδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς), i�e� dialectics, 
and finally, those “above us” (ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς), i�e� physics; cf� Stobaeus, Anthologium 
2�1,24 (ed� C� Wachsmuth, Berlin 1884, II, 8,12– 18)� In a Latin version (quod 
supra nos, nihil ad nos), this sentence of Socrates is known to Minutius Felix, 
Octavius 13,1 (ed� J� Beaujeu, Paris 1964, 18); Lact�, Inst. 3�20,10 (CSEL 19, 
246); Epit. (32)37,3 (CSEL 19, 708); very similarly also Hier�, Ruf. 3�28 (SC 
303, 290)� However, Tertullian, mistakenly, attributes it to Epicurus; cf� Tert�, 
Nat. 2�4,15 (CCL 1, 47)� For more details, see A� Otto, Die Sprichwörter und 
sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer, Leipzig 1890, 335 (No 1714)�
 126 Aug�, Quant� an. 33�70: ... de humana [scil. anima], quam solam curare debemus, 
si nobismetipsis curae sumus� (CSEL 89, 218)�
 127 Pl�, Ap. 30b1– 2�
 128 Aug�, Quant� an. 33�70– 35�79 (CSEL 89, 218– 228)� On this passage, see 
F� Cayré, La Contemplation augustinienne: Principes de spiritualité et de théolo-
gie, Paris 19542, 69– 75� The Aristotelian (i�e� Varro’s) and Neoplatonic inspira-
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Augustine later admits that the first three degrees are borrowed from 
Varro�129 As for the last four, the inspiration is supposed to be Porphyry’s 
hierarchy of virtues, which likewise includes four levels: (i) civic virtues con-
cerning coexistence in human society; (ii) virtues purifying the soul from 
being bound to the body; (iii) the virtues of those who, as purified, reach 
contemplation; and (iv) the virtues of the divine Intellect itself�130 The last 
level is a kind of model to be imitated by the soul; the second and the third 
are linked together as effort and achievement, where purification is a nega-
tive prerequisite for the rise to contemplation� Porphyry’s exposition on the 
topic, presented in his Sentences 32, finds its inspiration in the treatise I, 2 
(19) Περὶ ἀρετῶν (“On Virtues”) by Plotinus, although the fourfold hier-
archy of virtues seems characteristic of Porphyry alone�131
(see Marinos von Neapolis und die neuplatonischen Tugendgrade, Athens 1928, 
81– 94), followed by other interpreters; see O� du Roy, L’intelligence de la foi en 
la Trinité selon saint Augustin. Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu’en 391, 
Paris 1966, 257– 260; N� Cipriani, L’influsso di Varrone sul pensiero antropo-
logico e morale nei primi scritti di S. Agostino, in: L’etica cristiana nei secoli 
III e IV: eredità e confronti, Roma 1996, 369– 400 (388– 396)� Other possible 
Neoplatonic sources of this passage were considered by O’Daly, 1987, 13– 15; 
B� Neil, Neo- Platonic Influence on Augustine’s Conception of the Ascent of the 
Soul in De quantitate animae, in: P� Allen et alii (eds�), Prayer and Spirituality in 
the Early Church, II, Brisbane 1999, 197– 215� On the impact of the Neoplatonic 
hierarchy of virtues on Augustine’s other writings, see R� Dodaro, Political and 
Theological Virtues in Augustine, Letter 155 to Macedonius, in: Augustiniana, 
54 (2004), 431– 474�
 129 Cf� Aug�, Ciu., 7�23 (CCL 47, 204), where Augustine refers to Varro for three 
degrees (gradus) of both the human soul and the world soul: vivifying (ad viven-
dum valetudo), sense perception (sensus), and mind (animus)�
 130 Porph�, Sent. 32 (Brisson I, 332,1– 5)�
 131 Plotinus does not consider Porphyry’s last degree, i�e� the virtues of the divine 
Intellect� Similarly, Augustine does not mention the virtues of God Himself but 
rather the soul dwelling with God� On Porphyry’s Sentences 32 as the first Platonic 
systematization of virtues in four degrees, see H� D� Saffrey et alii, Introduction, 
in: H� D� Saffrey et alii (eds�), Proclus ou sur le bonheur, Paris 2001, lxix- c (on 
Plotinus and Porphyry, lxxiii- lxxviii); A� Linguiti, The Neoplatonic Doctrine 
of the Grades of Virtue, in: Ch� Pietsch (ed�), Ethik des antiken Platonismus. 
Der platonische Weg zum Glück in Systematik, Entstehung und historischem 
Kontext, Stuttgart 2013, 131– 140 (134 f�)� On the polemic of both Plotinus and 
Porphyry against Stoic ethics and their emphasizing the connection of the soul 
to the Intellect, see L� Brisson, La doctrine des degrés de vertus chez les Néo- 
platoniciens. Une analyse de la Sentence 32 de Porphyre, de ses antécédents et 








It might be this fourfold scale especially that leads interpreters of 
Augustine’s dialogue to consider Porphyry a probable inspiration� As to con-
tent, Augustine develops his seven degrees from the hierarchy of body- soul- 
God, where the last four degrees seem to indicate effort and achievement on 
the level of the soul (the fourth and fifth degree) combined with effort and 
achievement in the contemplation of God (the sixth and the seventh degree)� 
As Augustine explains, the seven degrees are activities (actus) (i) concerning 
the body (i�e� animation), (ii) exercised through the body (i�e� sensation), (iii) 
about the body (i�e� the rational art), (iv) concerning the activity of the soul 
towards itself (i�e� virtue), (v) resting in itself (i�e� tranquility); and (vi) related 
to God (i�e� ingression) and (vii) dwelling with God (i�e� contemplation)�132
Respecting the soul’s self- knowledge, Augustine includes not only the 
soul’s awareness of its aptitude for intellectual insight,133 but also its aware-
ness of the task of animating the body,134 and its dependence on God, 
who, being elevated above the soul, is alone worthy of veneration�135 In 
Augustine’s eyes, to know oneself means to be aware of the entire scale of 
the soul, beginning with its role in the corporeal world and continuing unto 
its “homeland” in God� The six questions concerning the soul, posed by 
Evodius in the dialogue, can thus be understood as a more detailed articula-
tion of Augustine’s personal desire, famously expressed in his Soliloquia: “I 
desire to know God and the soul� And nothing more? Nothing whatever�”136
 132 Aug�, Quant� an. 35�79: de corpore, per corpus, circa corpus, ad seipsam, in 
seipsa, ad deum, apud deum. (CSEL 89, 228)�
 133 The self- knowledge of the soul in a moment of “intellectual insight” is very rare, 
according to Augustine, cf� Quant� an� 14�24: Sed paucis licet ipso animo animum 
cernere, id est, ut ipse se animus videat; videt autem per intellegentiam. (CSEL 
89, 160)�
 134 Aug�, Quant� an. 36�81 (CSEL 89, 230)�
 135 Aug�, Quant� an. 34�77– 78 (CSEL 89, 225– 227)�
 136 Aug�, Solil. 1�2,7: Deum et animam scire cupio. – Nihilne plus? – Nihil omnino. 












Humberto Araújo Quaglio de Souza
Being, Human Being, and Truth 
in Augustine’s De Magistro: A Christian 
“Ontoanthropology” of the Self
Abstract: It is not uncommon to find studies about Aurelius Augustine’s thought that 
strongly emphasize the similarities between his ideas and the doctrines developed in 
the context of the Greek philosophy, especially those inspired by Platonism� Despite 
clear similarities, Augustine’s thought and Platonic philosophy diverge on some very 
important points� This paper intends to demonstrate how the thoughts of Augustine 
of Hippo puts forward a specifically Christian “ontoanthropology,” a conception of 
being human that is clearly distinct from the Platonic model�
1.  Introduction
The present investigation1 will mount a respectful refutation of Pattison’s2 argu-
ments concerning the extent of the Platonic influence over Augustine of Hippo�3 
 1 The ideas developed in this text were firstly presented in- the author’s doctoral 
dissertation (H� Araújo Quaglio de Souza, Tempo, eternidade e verdade: pres-
supostos agostinianos da ideia de Paradoxo Absoluto em Kierkegaard, Juiz 
de Fora 2017) and in the lecture given by the author at Søren Kierkegaard 
Forskningscenteret on Københavns Universitet in May 27th of 2016 and posteri-
orly published as an article (Søren Kierkegaard under the pseudonym Johannes 
Climacus and Aurelius Augustine on Time, Eternity and Truth, in: Filosofia 
Unisinos 9 (2018), 131– 139, available at <http:// revistas�unisinos�br/ index�php/ 
filosofia/ article/ view/ fsu�2018�192�03>)�
 2 G� Pattison, Johannes Climacus and Aurelius Augustinus on Recollecting the 
Truth, in: R� L� Perkins, International Kierkegaard Commentary: Philosophical 
Fragments and Johannes Climacus, Macon 1994, 245– 260�
 3 The argument developed here was inspired by George Pattison’s pioneer work 
on Kierkegaard’s relations to Augustine� In 1994, this important theologian and 
Kierkegaard scholar published a book chapter for the International Kierkegaard 
Commentary referred in the previous note, in which he presents a reflection on 
Kierkegaard and Augustine by comparing two works: Philosophical Fragments, 
written by Kierkegaard under the pseudonym Johannes Climacus, and On the 
Teacher, by Augustine� Pattison is a pioneer in pointing out significant inter-
sections between the problems approached by Kierkegaard and Augustine in 
these two books� Both writings instigate the reader to reflect upon philosophical- 
theological problems such as the truth and the possibility of a specific Christian 
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Pattison, it should be noted, defends a conclusion that is far from unanimous 
among readers and interpreters of Augustine’s work and thought� It relates to 
the theory of knowledge and perpetuates a common, but controversial, assump-
tion in the history of philosophy, i�e�, that Augustine was a “Christianizer” of 
Platonism� This, in turn, is taken to preclude any strong or fundamental distinc-
tion between the Platonic doctrine and Augustine’s own ideas; rather, it is argued, 
his theory of knowledge amounts to a hybrid version of Plato’s philosophy and 
the Christian faith� According to Pattison, the Bishop of Hippo: “[…] is wanting 
to have it both ways: both that the mind “remembers” God in such a way that 
it is able to recognize him when it “finds” him (so that, to say, the moment lacks 
decisive significance) and that God transcends the mind in such a way that only 
he can provide the condition whereby the subject can come to know him�”4
In order to present an antithesis to Pattison’s argument, I will engage in an 
analysis of several of Augustine’s texts, especially De Magistro, with the pur-
pose of upholding the hypothesis that his views on ontology, anthropology, 
and gnoseology are in accordance with a Christian anthropology that is dis-
tinct, in many regards, from the Platonic alternative�
2.  Truth and the Inner Teacher
The Teacher (De magistro) was written around the year 389, just after 
Augustine had returned to his homeland in North Africa, according to 
Retractationes.5 The dialogue was therefore conceived in the period between 
his baptism and priestly ordination� It reproduces a dialogue between 
Augustine and his son Adeodatus� In order to set the stage for our examina-
tion of De Magistro it will be fitting to quote from the Retractationes:
at the same time, I wrote a book whose title is On the Teacher� In this, there is a dis-
cussion, an investigation, and the discovery that there is no teacher who teaches man 
knowledge except God, according to what, in truth, is written in the Gospel: ‘One is 
your Master, the Christ�’ This book begins thus: ‘What do we seem to you to want 
to accomplish when we speak?’6
the most evident gnoseological similarities, both books can also inspire reflec-
tions upon questions in the fields of ontology and anthropology, revealing their 
inseparableness�
 4 Pattison, 1994, 252�
 5 Aug�, Retract� 1�11 (CSEL 36, 56– 57)�
 6 Aug�, Retract� 1�11: per idem tempus scripsi librum, cuius est titulus de magis-
tro. in quo disputatur et quaeritur et inuenitur magistrum non esse, qui docet 
hominem scientiam, nisi deum secundum illud etiam, quod in euangelio scriptum 
est: unus est magister uester Christus. Hic liber sic incipit: Quid tibi uidemur 
efficere uelle, cum loquimur? (CSEL 36, 56– 57)� English translation by M� Inez 
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These few lines are all that Augustine dedicates to De Magistro in 
Retractationes. He records no reservations or rectifications concerning the 
arguments thereof� It would appear that the elderly Bishop of Hippo did not 
see anything wrong with the arguments made by the young Augustine who, 
at the age of thirty- four, had not even received the sacrament of the order� 
We can thus say that De Magistro presents ideas which, by the author’s 
own admission, are in conformity with the entirety of his thought� Such, at 
least, was the verdict of his last recorded self- assessment� These few lines 
also allow us to highlight two important points� One is a theme present 
in De Magistro from its beginning: the role of language� Augustine poses 
a question raising the theme, to which his adolescent son responds: “aut 
docere, aut discere”,7 to teach, or to learn�8 Indeed, the major themes of 
the dialogue are language and scientia, or knowledge� Another important 
point stems from the quotation of Matt 23:10, and this is certainly the 
core of the entire dialogue� Only Christ teaches, only Christ is the Teacher, 
only Christ brings knowledge� Moreover, throughout his dialogue with 
Adeodatus, Augustine constantly associates Christ with truth itself, espe-
cially in the final parts of the text� So, it can be noted from the start that 
the teacher must be truth itself; only such a teacher can effectively bring 
truth to the subject�
But how does Augustine’s dialogue lead the reader to this conclusion? 
His point of departure, as mentioned above, is a question about the act of 
speaking� According to Gareth Matthews, the way Augustine directs the 
dialogue following Adeodatus’ first answer reveals his intention to resolve a 
disjunctive purpose of the “either/ or” kind into a single purpose�9 Augustine 
argues that the act of asking a question is ultimately a way of teaching one’s 
interlocutor that which one wants them to learn� He reduces Adeodatus’ 
“either/ or” to a common denominator: “I think that even then we simply 
want to teach� Now I am inquiring of you whether you ask a question for 
any other reason than to teach the person asked what it is you want to 
know�”10
From this point on, however, Adeodatus begins to present various objec-
tions to the exclusive role that Augustine assigns to language� The first 
 7 Aug�, Mag� 1�1 (CCSL 29, 157)� English translation by R� P� Russell, Augustine 
of Hippo, The Teacher, Washington 2004�
 8 Russell, 2004, 7�
 9 Cf� G� Matthews, Augustine, Oxford 2005, 26�
 10 Aug�, Mag� 1�1: etiam tunc nihil aliud quam docere nos uelle intellego, nam quaero 
abs te, utrum ob aliam causam interroges, nisi ut eum quem interrogas doceas, 
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objection is the fact that when one sings, one does not intend to teach any-
thing� To this objection, Augustine responds that the act of singing can also 
be used to “recall something, whether to others or to ourselves,”11 which, 
in turn, can be placed in the category of teaching� Therefore, from the very 
beginning, the dialogue addresses the idea of recollection, of memory, in 
association with the idea of teaching� But Adeodatus’ next objection estab-
lishes a more difficult problem, presenting the hypothesis that prayer could 
be understood as a way of teaching God, or of evoking some recollection in 
Him, which would be absurd� Augustine, however, explains to his son that 
prayer, even when enacted without “spoken word” or “sonant words”12 but 
in the silence of thought, is formed by words that bring “to mind the realities 
themselves which have words for their signs�”13
Here, several problems are established that will be developed throughout 
the text: words are signs [signa], but can they themselves teach anything per 
se? In other words, is it true that words have the role of teaching? Most of 
the remaining dialogue between Augustine and Adeodatus develops into an 
examination of the role, or the reach, of words and signs in general, in com-
municating knowledge, initiating recollection, and facilitating the process 
of learning� This development progressively reveals the limitations of words 
and signs as means of obtaining knowledge, building toward a drastic con-
clusion that appears to reverse the first lines of the text, namely, that words 
can, of themselves, teach nothing: “by the sound of words, we do not even 
learn the words�”14
Moacyr Novaes approves the division of De Magistro into two main 
parts, in line with previous scholarship� According to this model, part one 
consists of a discussion about language and part two deals with the theme 
of Christ as the inner teacher�15 The first part is the more extensive, and its 
conclusions about the limitations of language are necessary for Augustine to 
present his analysis of how learning and knowledge- acquisition work� While 
the second is more important for my investigation vis- a- vis an Augustinian 
Christian “ontoanthropology,” it is appropriate to dwell on some relevant 
points from the first�
The line of inquiry that follows the initial hypothesis in De Magistro, i�e� 
that the purpose of signs is to teach or evoke recollections, leads Augustine 
and Adeodatus to ponder whether all signs effectively mean something� At 
 11 Aug�, Mag� 1�1: ut commemoremus uel alios uel nos ipsos. (CCSL 29, 157)�
 12 Aug�, Mag� 1�2: sonantibus uerbis� (CCSL 29, 159)�
 13 Aug�, Mag� 1�2: uenire in mentem res ipsas quarum signa sunt verba� (CCSL 
29, 159)�
 14 Aug�, Mag� 11�36: uerbis uero auditis nec uerba discuntur. (CCSL 29, 194)�
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first glance, it seems possible to say that every sign refers to some real thing� 
However, when they examine a verse by Virgil, the interlocutors come across 
terms like “if” [si], “nothing” [nihil] and “from” [ex],16 that apparently fail 
to indicate anything that could be categorized as such, namely as a sort 
of thing� The discussion surrounding these terms is not pursued in further 
depth, but some paths related to the question are revealed, since “noth-
ing” can mean “a certain state of mind when, failing to perceive a reality, 
the mind nevertheless finds, or thinks it finds, that such a reality does not 
exist�”17 The interlocutors thus find themselves confronted with the problem 
of explaining something to someone without making use of the sign(s) that 
refer to that very thing, i�e� the problem of the possibility of teaching some-
thing without making use of another word that has the same meaning�
This difficulty leads Augustine and Adeodatus to what scholars like 
Matthews call “ostensive learning”18 or “ostension”:19 the act of showing 
a thing itself without the use of signs� For example, to point to an object, 
like a wall, with a finger can show someone the thing itself with gestures 
rather than words� These gestures, however, can also be considered signs, 
and Adeodatus, for his part, wonders if this expedient would not be lim-
ited to material things� As the dialogue proceeds, the interlocutors realize 
that gestures can express things beyond the corporeal, since there are many 
examples of people who are capable of communicating and even express-
ing complex narratives and ideas through gesture alone� Yet in some situa-
tions, the thing itself can be shown directly, such as the act of walking when 
someone asks what is indicated by the word “walk”, even if such demon-
strations are not free of difficulties, e�g� distinguishing between the simple act 
of walking and the act of walking fast�
The discussion about the relations between words and signs, between 
signs and things signified, goes deeper, raising several problematic cases 
along the way; for example, signs that refer to the same things (like different 
words in different languages that designate the same thing), synonyms, and 
words that designate other signs (the word “word”, for instance)� Noting 
that it is difficult to imagine the communication or teaching of something 
without the use of signs, Augustine and Adeodatus still cannot avoid the 
conclusion that signs are merely accessory or instrumental to the things they 
signify, even if one can think of situations where a sign is more valuable 
 16 Aug�, Mag� 2�3� (CCSL 29, 161– 162)�
 17 Aug�, Mag� 7�19: ipsam mentis affectionem, cum rem, quam quaerit, non esse 
inuenit. (CCSL 29, 178)�
 18 Matthews, 2005, 29�
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than the thing signified� We see this in the contrast between the word for the 
mud, coenum, and the word for the sky, coelum, which only differ by one 
letter but signify things of vastly different value (after all, words themselves 
are more useful than the mud)� Nevertheless, the word exists as a function of 
the thing signified, and not the contrary: “the latter [sign] exists for the sake 
of the former [the knowledge of the thing], not the former for the sake of 
the latter�”20 When they approach the end of this first, specific section about 
language (and its limits), the interlocutors turn their attention once more to 
the signs “which signify, not other signs, but the things we call signifiable�”21 
If words exist because of things, and not vice versa, some conclusions can 
be derived therefrom� Words or signs, in general, cannot teach when they 
are detached from the things they signify� If a word is spoken to one who 
completely ignores it, or one who has never heard it before, the thing it sig-
nifies must show itself by other means in order for the listener to recognize 
what it refers to� If the explanation of this unknown word is given by other 
words, still the listener must know the things designated by these others� The 
example given by Augustine involves the word sarabare, a kind of ornament 
people would use to cover their heads�22 If the listening subject hears the 
word sarabare for the first time and has no idea of its meaning, he will only 
understand the further explanation if he knows the meaning of the words it 
is contextually related to, like “cover” or “head”:
You may insist that we cannot really know what those head- coverings are except 
by seeing them, since the name is only a sound for us, and that we can know no 
more about the name itself unless we know what the realities are� And yet, we do 
accept as true the story of those boys: how their faith triumphed over the king 
and the flames, how they sang a hymn of praise to God and were found worthy 
to receive honors even from their very enemy� Have we learned all this otherwise 
than by words? I shall reply by noting that we already knew everything that those 
words signified� What is meant by "three boys," "furnace," "fire," "king," and, 
finally, "unharmed by fire," as well as the other things signified by those words, this 
I already knew� On the other hand, the names Ananias, Azarius, and Misael are just 
as much unknown to me as the saraballae� These names did not help me at all to 
know them, nor could they possibly do so�23
 20 Aug�, Mag� 9�26: nisi quia illud propter hanc, non haec propter illud esse conu-
incitur. (CCSL 29, 185)�
 21 Aug�, Mag� 8�22: signis non alia signa significantur, sed ea, quae significabilia 
nominamus� (CCSL 29, 180– 181)�
 22 Aug�, Mag� 10�33� (CCSL 29, 185)�
 23 Aug�, Mag� 11�37: quod si dixeris tegmina quidem illa capitum, quorum nomen 
sono tantum tenemus, non nos posse nisi uisa cognoscere neque nomen ipsum 
plenius nisi ipsis cognitis nosse, quod tamen de ipsis pueris accepimus, ut regem 









Being, Human Being, and Truth in Augustine’s De Magistro 73
At this point, when they realize that words and signs cannot really teach 
anything, part one of the dialogue ends, and part two begins, which will 
culminate in the conclusion that only in interiority can one find the primor-
dial source of all knowledge, that is, the inner Teacher� The inner Teacher, 
the one who genuinely teaches the truth, is truth itself� This quality of being 
truth itself, and so qualitatively and infinitely superior to both the signs that 
designate things and the things themselves, was already established in the 
first part of the dialogue when the limitations of words and signs were still 
being considered� There, Augustine says to his son:
And yet, if I assert that there is a happy life, and one that is everlasting, and that 
I desire that we should be led to it by God, Who is Truth itself, as our Guide, by 
stages adapted to our faltering steps, I fear I may seem ridiculous for having first 
embarked upon so long a course with a consideration of signs rather than of the 
realities they signify� You will pardon me then if I engage in some preliminary play 
with you, not for the sake of playing, but to exercise and sharpen our mental pow-
ers� This will enable us not only to endure, but also to love the warmth and light of 
that region wherein is found the happy life�24
In this passage, Augustine clearly indicates that all the profound reflections 
on language through which he leads his son are ultimately of less importance 
than truth itself� Indeed, the theme of truth is the climax of the argumen-
tation developed in the dialogue� Language, however, is one of the possible 
access ways, one of the entrance doors, so to speak, leading to consider-
ations about truth itself� But words are inferior even to the things they 
represent, and these things, in turn, are qualitatively and infinitely inferior 
to their Creator who, according to Augustine, is “ipsa ueritas�” The dia-
lectical exercise that father and son undertake in De Magistro, as we read 
in the passage above, has an instrumental and preparatory role� It enables 
honores ab ipso etiam inimico meruerint, num aliter haec nisi per uerba didici-
mus? Respondebo cuncta, quae illis uerbis significata sunt in nostra notitia iam 
fuisse. Nam quid sint tres pueri, quid fornax, quid ignis, quid rex, quid denique 
illaesi ab igne ceteraque omnia iam tenebam, quae uerba illa significant. Ananias 
uero et Azarias et Misahel tam mihi ignoti sunt quam illae sarabarae, nec ad eos 
cognoscendos haec me nomina quicquam adiuuerunt aut adiuuare iam potuerunt. 
(CCSL 29, 194– 195)� It is a reference to Dan 3�
 24 Aug�, Mag� 8�21: et tamen, si dicam uitam esse quandam beatam eandemque 
sempiternam, quo nos deo duce id est ipsa ueritate gradibus quibusdam infirmo 
gressui nostro accomodatis perduci cupiam, vereor, ne ridiculus uidear, qui non 
rerum ipsarum, quae significantur, sed signorum consideratione tantam uiam 
ingredi coeperim. Dabis igitur ueniam, si praeludo tecum non ludendi gratia, sed 
exercendi uires et mentis aciem, quibus regionis illius, ubi beata uita est, calorem 
ac lucem non modo sustinere, uerum et amare possimus. (CCSL 29, 180)�
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their initiation into higher considerations about truth itself without being 
blinded or burned by the intellect’s sudden exposition to the light of eternity� 
Augustine’s statements here may sound somehow Platonic in form, since 
the exercise of philosophy, for Plato, has among its features an ascendant 
movement of the mind towards the highest spheres of the Hyperuranion 
with the goal of reaching The Good, the highest level of all reality� However, 
there is nothing exceptional in this observation� Augustine’s mode of doing 
philosophy, or theology, is clearly inspired by Plato’s manner of exposing 
ideas, which the latter had established almost eight centuries earlier� The 
dialogic form, the ascension of the mind starting from the simplest questions 
and proceeding to the most complex ones, these remain valid aspects of 
Augustine’s philosophical method across his corpus, especially in the works 
of his youth� But Augustine does not intend to claim that the human mind 
is capable of reaching and fully encompassing The Good, at least not in the 
sphere of temporal human existence� On the contrary, he readily acknowl-
edges the limited reach of philosophy in this respect�
At the point where, according to the referenced secondary literature, part 
one of the dialogue ends and part two begins, Augustine makes a brief, but 
important reflection concerning the acts of believing, understanding, and 
knowing� Quoting the prophet Isaiah,25 Augustine says:
For the Prophet says: "Unless you believe, you shall not understand," which he 
really could not have said if he thought that there was no difference between the 
two� Hence, what I understand, that I also believe, although I do not also under-
stand everything I believe� Also, everything I understand, I know, though I do not 
know everything I believe� Nor do I for that reason fail to see how useful it is also 
to believe many things which I do not know, including also this account of the three 
boys� Accordingly, while there are a great many things that I am unable to know, 
I do nevertheless know how useful it is to believe them�26
The limitation of human understanding is thus established by the philosopher 
prior to his exposition of the doctrine of the inner Teacher� Augustine realizes 
that he cannot deal with truth at the level of understanding every time� Yes, 
 25 Isa 7:9� The biblical text is slightly different from Augustine’s quotation� The 
Vulgate says: “si non credideritis non permanebitis�” The New Revised Standard 
Version says: “If you do not stand firm in faith, you shall not stand at all�”
 26 Aug�, Mag� 11�37: ait enim propheta: “Nisi credideritis, non intellegetis”, quod 
non dixisset profecto, si nihil distare iudicasset. Quod ergo intellego, id etiam 
credo; at non omne, quod credo, etiam intellego. Omne autem, quod intellego, 
scio; non omne, quod credo, scio. Nec ideo nescio, quam sit utile credere etiam 
multa, quae nescio; cui utilitati hanc quoque adiungo de tribus pueris historiam. 
Quare pleraque rerum, cum scire non possim, quanta tamen utilitate credantur, 
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there are aspects of truth that are accessible to the understanding or intel-
lect and thus knowable; however, just as one cannot look directly at the Sun 
without harming one’s eyes, neither can one grasp the truth entirely with the 
intellect� There are things that human beings (and each human being individ-
ually considered) do not know, but believe, and this is a legitimate epistemo-
logical problem: how is it possible to demarcate the limits between what one 
actually knows and what one believes one knows? When one speaks of belief, 
it is normal to imagine a religious motif� According to Augustine, however, 
belief extends beyond religion� People believe in multiple “truths” that form 
their worldviews: existential perspectives, evaluations of interpersonal rela-
tions (“Does she love me? I believe so���”), political opinions, and so forth� 
All these beliefs play an important role in everyday life, and many decisions 
are taken based on them� Hence, Augustine’s considerations concerning the 
roles of belief and understanding, and the relations of these with knowledge, 
should not be seen as frivolous or less important than the arguments about 
language that he develops during the first part of the dialogue�
The passage that immediately follows the last block quote is one of the 
most important sequences in the whole book� It deserves to be transcribed 
in its entirety here, for its premises undergird Augustine’s argument about 
Christ as the truth and the inner Teacher:
But as for all those things which we "understand," it is not the outward sound of 
the speaker’s words that we consult, but the truth which presides over the mind 
itself from within, though we may have been led to consult it because of the words� 
Now He who is consulted and who is said to “dwell in the inner man,” He it is 
who teaches, namely, Christ, that is to say, "the unchangeable Power of God and 
everlasting wisdom�" This is the Wisdom which every rational soul does indeed 
consult, but it reveals itself to each according to his capacity to grasp it by reason 
of the good or evil dispositions of his will, and if the soul is sometimes mistaken, 
this does not come about because of any defect on the part of the truth it consulted, 
just as it is not through any defect in the light outside us that our bodily eyes are 
often deceived� We acknowledge that it is this light which we consult with regard 
to visible objects so that it may manifest them to us according to our capacity to 
perceive them�27
 27 Aug�, Mag� 11�38: de uniuersis autem, quae intellegimus non loquentem, qui 
personat foris, sed intus ipsi menti praesidentem consulimus ueritatem, uerbis 
fortasse ut consulamus admoniti. Ille autem, qui consulitur, docet, qui in interiore 
homine habitare dictus est Christus, id est incommutabilis dei uirtus atque sempi-
terna sapientia, quam quidem omnis rationalis anima consulit, sed tantum cuique 
panditur, quantum capere propter propriam siue malam siue bonam uoluntatem 
potest. Et si quando fallitur, non fit uitio consultae veritatis, ut neque huius, quae 
foris est, lucis uitium est, quod corporei oculi saepe falluntur, quam lucem de 
rebus uisibilibus consuli fatemur, ut eas nobis, quantum cernere ualemus, ostendat. 
(CCSL 29, 195– 196)�
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The allusions to the virtue of God and the eternal Wisdom derive from 
1 Cor 1:24� In the New Revised Standard Version of the Bible, we find 
“Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God�” It is, however, inter-
esting to note that in the text of the Vulgate it is written “Christum Dei vir-
tutem et Dei sapientiam�” The Latin term virtus can be translated as force 
or strength, but also literally, as virtue, which would seem to equate the 
problem of learning virtue with the problem of learning the truth� This is 
not a simple coincidence or fortuity since the association between the ideas 
of virtue, truth, and power can easily be established� It is also important 
to mention that virtus and vir, the Latin terms for, virtue and man (male) 
respectively, have the same etymological root and that, for Christians, truth 
is a man, God incarnate� It is interesting to notice that Augustine himself 
uses the word virtus28 to illustrate the errors into which words can lead 
listeners, showing how one word can signify multiple things� Nevertheless, 
the several meanings to which this particular word refer, understood in 
Augustinian terms as the product of the inner Teacher, guide the reader 
toward an association between the axiological and anthropological mean-
ings of the term�
As for the inner man that Augustine writes about, this is a reference to 
Eph 3:16, in which the apostle tells of God and “His Spirit in the inner 
man�” Now, in the third chapter of Ephesians, Paul talks about the pos-
sibility of comprehending Christ’s Love, deep, large, high, and extensive, 
a love “that surpasses knowledge�”29 Paul says that this comprehension is 
“rooted and grounded in love”30 and that “Christ may dwell in your hearts 
through faith�”31 The words of Paul, repeated by Augustine, make refer-
ence to faith but can also be seen from an intellectual perspective� If God 
is infinitely superior to the human being, and if God is Christ, a man born 
of woman, the limited understanding of humanity can never encompass the 
totality of this One Who is truth itself� Faith, God’s gift, is a precondition for 
any relationship with the truth, even if the understanding also plays a (lim-
ited) role� This relation between the human being and the truth is, moreover, 
intersubjective� It is a relationship that a human establishes with Christ, 
another subject, the Teacher that Augustine talks about, but simultaneously 
a Teacher who is truth itself and virtue itself�
What relevance do these reflections have for our comprehension of 
Augustine’s arguments about the inner Teacher? Returning to part one of 
 28 Cf� Aug�, Mag� 13�43� (CCSL 29, 200– 201)�
 29 Eph 3:19 (NRSV)�
 30 Eph 3:17 (NRSV)�
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the Augustinian dialogue, one sees that it begins with questions related to 
a theory of language and knowledge, of learning and teaching� However, 
what begins as a purely intellectual and philosophical exercise leads the 
interlocutors, and the reader, to problems whose resolution leads down the 
only possible path for a Christian thinker like Augustine: contemplation of 
the fundamental role played by the One who is accepted and identified as 
knowledge itself, truth itself, and virtue itself� For this reason, one cannot 
separate ontological, axiological, and gnoseological questions at this stage 
of the treatise�
From this point on (the beginning of the second part of the book), one can 
no longer treat the dialogue between Augustine and Adeodatus as an exclu-
sive investigation into the philosophy of language, as many 20th Century 
thinkers have attempted, especially those linked to the analytical tradition 
that “rediscovered” De Magistro� On the contrary, throughout the second 
part, the “childish and trifling questions,” as Augustine himself calls them,32 
related almost exclusively to philosophy of language and theory of knowl-
edge, give place to reflections about theological fundamentals surrounding 
the idea of truth� How, he asks, is it possible for the human being, a being of 
limited understanding, to know and understand truth?
Augustine begins to speak about the distinction between intelligible 
and sensible things, and the different ways we can apprehend them� It is, 
undoubtedly, a theme of strong Platonic “flavor” and the hierarchy between 
sensible and intelligible is preserved� Indeed, Augustine refers to the senses 
as mere “interpreters”33 that serve the mind in the knowledge of material 
things� But ultimately what teaches is always the inner truth� The chief 
action of the mind is the consultation thereof, especially regarding intelli-
gible things: “[…] we use our reason to consult that inner truth for the things 
that we understand�”34 Augustine notes and accepts an equivalence between 
the terms established by the Greek philosophical tradition and the terms 
established by the Christian Scriptures (making reference to the Paulinian 
terminology once again): “For everything we perceive, we perceive either by 
the bodily sense or by the mind� We call the former, sense objects, the latter, 
intelligible objects; or, to appropriate the terminology of our own inspired 
Writers, we call the first carnal, the second, spiritual�”35
 32 Aug�, Mag� 8�21: puerilibus quaestiunculis� (CCSL 29, 180)�
 33 Aug�, Mag� 12�39: sensusque ipsos, quibus tamquam interpretibus ad talia 
noscenda mens utitur. (CCSL 29, 196)�
 34 Aug�, Mag� 12�39: de his autem, quae intelleguntur, interiorem ueritatem ratione 
consulimus� (CCSL 29, 196)�
 35 Aug�, Mag� 12�39: namque omnia, quae percipimus, aut sensu corporis aut mente 
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As the discussion goes on Augustine turns toward the way humans 
recollect sensible, or carnal, things� Impressions caused by sensible things 
are recorded in the mind where the subject is able to contemplate them, 
indeed know them, at a later date via recollection� This is because at some 
moment— in the past— they were perceived and recorded� It is important 
to highlight that, while Augustine speaks about the relevance of recollec-
tion, he is clear that what one recollects has its origin in time, in temporal 
existence, when the senses captured the memorized, recollected thing� 
Augustine says that those things “we see and perceive,”36 exist in the past, 
rather than the present, and, furthermore, a past that is part of time, not 
eternity� As for the intelligible things, with which he deals next, Augustine 
delves deeper into the explanation of what belongs to his well- known 
“Doctrine of Illumination�” It is very important that this part be examined 
with close attention, for it is here that some readers and commentators 
of Augustine sense a closer affinity between his thought and the Platonic 
doctrine of recollection� It is here again convenient to quote the full text 
under scrutiny:
But when it is a question of things which we behold with the mind, namely, with 
our intellect and reason, we give verbal expression to realities which we directly per-
ceive as present in that inner light of truth by which the inner man, as he is called, 
is enlightened and made happy� But, here again, if the one who hears my words sees 
those things himself with that clear and inner eye of the soul, he knows the things 
whereof I speak by contemplating them himself, and not by my words� Therefore, 
even when I say what is true, and he sees what is true, it is not I who teach him� For 
he is being taught, not by my words, but by the realities themselves made manifest 
to him by the enlightening action of God from within� Consequently, he could also 
answer questions about these things if he were asked�37
One can see why many readers associate the thought of Augustine with 
Platonic reminiscence or recollection� There are similarities, indeed; nor are 
 36 Aug�, Mag� 12�39: cum vero non de his, quae coram sentimus, sed de his, quae 
aliquando sensimus, quaeritur, non iam res ipsas, sed imagines ab eis impressas 
memoriaeque mandatas loquimur, quae omnino quomodo uera dicamus, cum falsa 
intueamur, ignoro, nisi quia non nos ea uidere ac sentire, sed uidisse ac sensisse 
narramus. (CCSL 29, 197)�
 37 Aug�, Mag� 12�40: cum vero de his agitur, quae mente conspicimus, id est intellectu 
atque ratione, ea quidem loquimur, quae praesentia contuemur in illa interiore luce 
ueritatis, qua ipse, qui dicitur homo interior, illustratur et fruitur, sed tum quoque 
noster auditor, si et ipse illa secreto ac simplici oculo uidet, nouit quod dico sua 
contemplatione, non uerbis meis. Ergo ne hunc quidem doceo uera dicens uera 
intuentem; docetur enim non uerbis meis, sed ipsis rebus deo intus pandente mani-
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they superficial� However, I would argue, they manifest accidental, rather 
than fundamental, points of Augustinian thought� Firstly, Augustine admits 
that one person cannot teach the truth to another� The things perceived by 
a subject are, indeed, located in his interiority, because it is there that one 
searches “the inner light of truth�” He who enjoys this truth is the “inner 
man�” When one subject speaks to another, the listener learns not by means 
of words, whose limited reach was clearly established in the first part of the 
book, but because the listener consults with his inner light and learns the 
things from “God that reveals them interiorly�” Even so, I maintain, these 
similarities between the Socratic- Platonic and the Christian- Augustinian 
points of view, while evident and clear, refer primarily to accidental fea-
tures� What then is the fundamental aspect that distinguishes the exposition 
made by Augustine from Platonic reminiscence? The most simple and direct 
answer is the statement that the inner light is God himself, who is truth itself, 
and as such cannot be confounded with man� Could such an answer, given 
so lightly, satisfy the reader impressed by the many similarities between De 
Magistro and Platonic doctrine? No, likely not, considering the number of 
people who emphasize precisely these similarities� Keeping this in mind, 
other points of argument in De Magistro must be consulted�
In the paragraph just quoted above, Augustine appears to evoke Socratic 
maieutic� Without mentioning Socrates, he speaks of how one learns by a 
process that includes interrogation, just like Socrates interrogating his inter-
locutors� If the one interrogated “is brought around to this by the words of 
his questioner, the words still do not teach him, but only propose questions 
in a way suited to his capacity to learn from his inner light�”38 Here there is 
a remarkable and undeniable similarity with the Socratic method� No doubt 
about it� But it must always be emphasized that such similarity, however 
remarkable, relates to an accidental aspect of Augustinian philosophy� For 
Augustine, several lines later, makes very clear the role of ‘the Teacher’ in the 
process of learning: “I would have to frame the question in a way suited to 
your capacity to hear that Teacher who teaches from within�”39 The source 
of knowledge is not the subject’s soul itself, but the Teacher who is encoun-
tered in the subject’s interiority� If one were committed to defending the 
position that the Augustinian perspective is Platonic from this point on, it 
could still be argued that since the Teacher inhabits personal interiority, and 
 38 Aug�, Mag� 12�40: quo si uerbis perducitur eius, qui interrogat, non tamen docenti-
bus uerbis, sed eo modo inquirentibus, quo modo est ille, a quo quaeritur, intus 
discere idoneus. (CCSL 29, 198)�
 39 Aug�, Mag� 12�40: quaerere oportuit, ut tuae sese uires habent ad audiendum illum 
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since the Teacher is the truth, then it is ultimately truth that inhabits per-
sonal interiority, just as in the Socratic- Platonic perspective� The trouble 
with this objection is that it does not consider the fact that while truth, from 
a Platonic perspective, is part of the subject himself, is part of his substance 
and essence, this is not the case in the Augustinian perspective� If the inner 
Teacher is God, and if the human being is not composed of the same sub-
stance as God according to Augustine, one must conclude that the truth 
which inhabits our interiority is not composed of the same substance as the 
“inner man” who relates to this truth� The truth is a distinct subject: sub-
stantially and essentially distinct from the subject who intends to learn� And 
here begins the radical and absolute distinction between Platonic anthro-
pology and Augustinian/ Christian anthropology�
3.  The Consistency of Augustine’s Christian Perspective
Until now, the arguments we have considered belong exclusively to the 
text of De Magistro; these become clearer when juxtaposed with other of 
Augustine’s texts that reinforce the points highlighted above, especially those 
concerning the distinction between the divine and the human, and those 
dealing directly with Platonism� But let us stick with De Magistro a while 
longer� Following the arguments we have already examined, Augustine con-
fronts the relative limitation of signs vis- a- vis the illumination by the inner 
Teacher who is truth himself� According to Augustine this limitation is evi-
dent in “those who lie and deceive,”40 who use words to hide their thoughts� 
It is also evident in the case of polysemic words (like the example given 
above of the word virtus), and even words that, when translated from one 
language to another, signify different things for different persons, including 
those who are fluent in both�
At the end of the dialogue, Augustine reaffirms his conclusion that the 
one who teaches humans is not another human being, but God Himself� 
However, Augustine also acknowledges that not every person will realize 
this because many continue to assume that their learning comes from earthly 
teachers:
Do teachers ever claim that it is their own thoughts that are grasped and retained, 
rather than the branches of learning themselves which they purport to transmit by 
their speaking? What foolish curiosity could ever prompt a man to send his child to 
school in order to have him learn what the teacher thinks? But when teachers have 
made use of words to explain all those branches of learning which they profess to 
be teaching, including even those dealing with virtue and wisdom, then those who 
are known as pupils reflect within themselves whether what has been said is true, 
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contemplating, that is, that inner truth according to their capacity� It is then, there-
fore, that they learn� And when they discover within themselves that what has been 
said is true, they praise their teachers, unaware that they are not so much praising 
the teachers as they are praising those who have been taught, provided, however, 
that the teachers also know what they are saying� But men make the mistake of 
calling people "teachers" when they are not that at all, because there is generally no 
interval of time between the moment of speaking and that of knowing, and because 
their coming to learn from within follows quickly upon the suggestive force of the 
speaker’s words, they think that they have learned externally from him who spoke 
those words�41
Yet another connection with Socratic- Platonic thought can be traced across 
these lines� Those who are mere human beings, as mortal as the appren-
tice himself, are erroneously judged to be teachers� In fact, the knowledge 
this apprentice acquires does not come from human tutors, but from the 
inner Teacher� Socrates raised the same point: he claimed to teach noth-
ing, convincing his interlocutors to rather attend to the truth inside them-
selves� So far, then, several conclusions can be established concerning the 
human role in educational dialogue: no one teaches anything to anyone, 
neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor Augustine� In this regard, all of them, the 
two pagans and the Christian, agree� Another point of agreement would be 
the conviction that the search for truth and learning effectively begins when 
one turns inward, towards interiority� This idea can likewise be found in the 
writings of Socrates, Plato, and Augustine�
These similarities, however, obfuscate the fundamental difference between 
Christianity and Socratism- Platonism, leading some readers to devaluate the 
crucial distinction� But one cannot deny at least one clear point of diver-
gence: in the Socratic- Platonic perspective there is no teacher, neither human 
nor divine, for all the truth is already, since eternity, engraved upon the 
subject’s soul, whereas in Christianity there is a Teacher, one Teacher alone, 
and this Teacher is truth itself, of whom Augustine admonishes his readers 
 41 Aug�, Mag� 14�45: num hoc magistri profitentur, ut cogitata eorum ac non ipsae 
disciplinae, quas loquendo se tradere putant, percipiantur atque teneantur? Nam 
quis tam stulte curiosus est, qui filium suum mittat in scolam, ut quid magister 
cogitet discat? At istas omnes disciplinas, quas se docere profitentur, ipsiusque 
uirtutis atque sapientiae cum uerbis explicaverint, tum illi, qui discipuli uocan-
tur, utrum uera dicta sint, apud semetipsos considerant interiorem scilicet illam 
ueritatem pro uiribus intuentes. Tunc ergo discunt, et cum uera dicta esse intus 
inuenerint, laudant nescientes non se doctores potius laudare quam doctos, si 
tamen et illi quod loquuntur sciunt. Falluntur autem homines, ut eos qui non sunt 
magistros uocent, quia plerumque inter tempus locutionis et tempus cognitionis 
nulla mora interponitur; et quoniam post admonitionem sermocinantis cito intus 
discunt, foris se ab eo, qui admonuit, didicisse arbitrantur. (CCSL 29, 202)�
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to become disciples: “But anyone who is able to perceive them is an inward 
disciple of the truth and an outward judge of the speaker, or better, a judge 
of what he is saying�”42 With the assertion “we should not call any man on 
earth a teacher,”43 the Socratic perspective may well agree� But the assertion 
“there is One in heaven who is the Teacher of all”44 would surely sound 
extraordinary to Greek ears� Nor is the role of other human beings in the 
learning of truth despised by Augustine, who says: “What is meant by “in 
heaven” is something that will be taught us by Him who directs us even 
through human agencies and external signs to turn inwardly to Him for 
our instruction�”45 At the end of the dialogue, Adeodatus reaffirms the sec-
ondary, but undeniable, role of the words, signs, and other human beings as 
“stimuli” for learning:
I myself have come to learn through the suggestive power of your words that words 
merely stimulate a man to learn, and that the words of the speaker seldom reveal his 
thoughts to any great extent� But as to the truth of what is said, I have also learned that 
He alone teaches who made use of external words to remind us that He dwells within 
us� With His help, I shall now love Him all the more ardently as I advance in learning�46
One must always emphasize the role of the inner Teacher, Who inspires the 
title of Augustine’s book� This is a role well highlighted by Moacyr Novaes:
We know that the Augustinian philosophy is Christocentric� Already in the dis-
cussion of the creaturely path, the discrepancy with Platonism was precisely the 
importance of the Mediator, unknown to its adherents [scil� the Platonic philoso-
phers]; [���] the Mediator Christ will make all the difference between Platonism and 
Augustinianism� Here, the analysis of language results, after nine chapters, in frus-
tration: signs teach nothing� Who teaches? Only the Christ (mag� XI 38)� [���] this is 
not an abrupt solution, fracturing the unity of the dialogue�47
 42 Aug�, Mag� 13�41: quisquis autem cernere potest, intus est discipulus ueritatis, 
foris iudex loquentis vel potius ipsius locutionis. (CCSL 29, 199)�
 43 Aug�, Mag� 14�46: ne nobis quemquam magistrum dicamus in terris. (CCSL 
29, 202)�
 44 Aug�, Mag� 14�46: quod unus omnium magister in caelis sit. (CCSL 29, 202)�
 45 Aug�, Mag� 14�46: quid sit autem in caelis, docebit ipse, a quo etiam per homines 
signis admonemur foris, ut ad eum intro conuersi erudiamur. (CCSL 29, 202)�
 46 Aug�, Mag� 14�46: ego uero didici admonitione uerborum tuorum nihil aliud uer-
bis quam admoneri hominem, ut discat, et perparum esse, quod per locutionem 
aliquanta cogitatio loquentis apparet; utrum autem uera dicantur, eum docere 
solum, qui se intus habitare, cum foris loqueretur, admonuit; quem iam fauente 
ipso tanto ardentius diligam, quanto ero in discendo prouectior. (CCSL 29, 203)�
 47 Novaes, 2009, 43: “Sabemos que a filosofia Agostiniana é cristocêntrica� Já na 
discussão sobre o itinerário através das criaturas, o ajuste de contas com o pla-
tonismo foi precisamente a importância do Mediador, desconhecida por eles; [���] o 
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Novaes draws attention here to the element of the Mediator, the Christ, 
strange to the Platonics and strange to Platonism� The midwife, Socrates, is 
not for Platonism what Christ is for Augustine or classical Christianity: the 
Word, the λόγος, Truth itself� Socrates is a man, and so mortal� Nor is he 
even a teacher, as Socrates himself acknowledged when speaking at his trial�48 
Nevertheless, Pattison claims the following: “the Augustinian tradition of 
Catholic Christianity (often said to be the most significant intellectual and 
spiritual strand within the complex event known as Western Christianity) 
seems to offer something remarkably akin to the doctrine of recollection�”49
The similarities between the thought of Augustine and Plato, as I have 
underscored several times above, are indeed remarkable� They cannot 
be ignored� But is it possible to draw a limit, a frontier, that Augustine, 
who so often invoked the Greek tradition, did not cross? How far does 
Augustine’s “Platonism” go? Pattison dares to coin a phrase that reveals his 
answer: “Christian doctrine of recollection�”50 Immediately after deploying 
this expression, the British author makes reference to De Magistro, asserting 
that the dialogue is a product of a particular period of Augustine’s life, the 
years between his baptism and his priestly ordination when the then young 
philosopher was still under major influence of Greek philosophy� According 
to Pattison, De Magistro “[���] is the work of an Augustine still strongly 
influenced by the ideals of Platonism yet determinedly ‘Christian’ ”51 (and 
Pattison writes “Christian” within quotation marks)�
Pattison next begins to explain some points of Augustine’s dialogue, accu-
rately presenting the conclusions reached by the philosopher and his son 
concerning the limitations of language: “language, then, as a mean of com-
municating the truth, depends entirely on the possibility of shared realms 
of experience�”52 When he begins to discuss the role of the Teacher in the 
following lines, Pattison makes reference to important points in Augustine’s 
dialogue, e�g� the subject who does not learn from words when he hears them 
but only when he contemplates his own interiority, consulting the Teacher 
who effectively brings knowledge� Pattison, however, comes to the following 
conclusion: “As was the case in […] the Socratic doctrine of recollection, the 
Aqui, a análise da linguagem resulta, depois de nove capítulos, numa frustração: os 
signos nada ensinam� Quem ensina? Apenas o Cristo (mag� XI 38)� [���] essa não 
é uma solução abrupta, estranha à unidade do diálogo�” Translated into English 
by the author�
 48 Cf� Pl�, Ap� 33a�
 49 Pattison, 1994, 246�
 50 Pattison, 1994, 246�
 51 Pattison, 1994, 247�
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teacher thus becomes a mere occasion of the act of learning�”53 In so doing, 
Pattison clearly insinuates that the description of the role of the Teacher in 
Augustine is more similar to the Socratic- Platonic perspective than to the 
Christian perspective, a perspective I have argued is, in this regard, antithet-
ical to the Platonic one� But how can this be? As we saw above, the Teacher 
in Augustine has a decisive and fundamental role� He brings truth to the sub-
ject� There is a moment when the subject goes from ignorance to knowledge, 
and the moment as such has decisive importance� In other words, and in line 
with what has been presented and reasoned above, in the Augustinian per-
spective there is, indeed, a Teacher, and he is indispensable to the process of 
learning� Without him, one cannot learn� In Augustine’s De Magistro, what 
the subject finds inwardly is not the truth as part of his own substance, but 
the truth as another, as a Teacher who inhabits him and gives him the truth 
he did not possess before�
The most visible and relevant similarities between the Platonic doctrine 
and Augustine’s exposition in De Magistro have been laid bare� But can 
Augustine’s perspective truly be judged under the rubric of reminiscence? 
Can Socrates’ arguments about the perfection and unchangeableness of the 
soul coexist with the Christian presupposition of sin, which Augustine him-
self assumed and reflected upon? Is the inner Teacher who Augustine talks 
about equivalent to the search for truth in the soul that Socrates presents in 
Phaedo?
When these elements in De Magistro are isolated and juxtaposed with 
Plato’s Phaedo, one finds striking differences� The Christocentric aspect of 
the Augustinian dialogue that establishes the existence of another, even if 
interior, is clearly contrasting with the idea that the soul, in its extreme simil-
itude with the divine, finds truth in itself alone� But this opposition between 
the Christian thought adopted by Augustine and the Platonic theory of rem-
iniscence becomes even more evident when other of Augustine’s texts are 
examined� Let us observe, for example, what he claims at the beginning of 
his Retractationes when commenting upon the book Contra Academicos, 
written in his youth:
in another place when I was discussing the soul, I said: "It will return the more 
safely into heaven, "but I would have been safer in saying "will go" rather than 
"will return" because of those who think that human souls, having fallen from or 
having been driven out of heaven in punishment for their sins, are thrust into bod-
ies here below� But I did not hesitate to say this because I said "into heaven" just as 
I would say "to God" who is its author and creator� […] Unquestionably, then, the 
original region of the happiness of the soul is God Himself, who did not, indeed, 
 53 Pattison, 1994, 248� 
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beget it from Himself but created it from nothing as He created the body from the 
earth�54
Of course, one might object at this point, saying that the ideas in Retractationes 
are an example of the old Augustine, the Bishop of Hippo, and thus dif-
ferent from the young, unbaptized Augustine who composed Against the 
Academicians in Cassiciacum, or the young author of De Magistro� But an 
attentive interpretation of the text does not yield any trace of substantial 
retraction� The old Bishop of Hippo merely regrets the bad choice of words 
that could lead to a misunderstanding� Nevertheless, he vehemently assever-
ates the creation of the soul from nothing, the Christian doctrine of Creatio 
ex nihilo� There is no reason to think that he would come to disagree with 
this doctrine after his conversion to Christianity, during the time he com-
posed De Magistro� Nothing in the Cassiciacum texts or in De Magistro 
indicates that Augustine ceased to agree, from his conversion on, with the 
doctrine that God created everything, including souls, from nothing�
Another detail worth mentioning: the doubt Augustine carries into his 
old age concerning the moment of the creation of the soul� Enthusiasts of 
the strong association between Augustine and Plato might say that this hints 
at his acceptance of the pre- existence of the soul, a well- known Platonic 
doctrine� Nevertheless, it is clear that Augustine’s doubt refers to the moment 
at which the soul is created� It is created indeed, and created at a moment 
in time� The only admissible pre- existence referred to is the possible exis-
tence of the soul before it enters the body, not, it should be noted, before the 
world and the first human have been created� As Augustine argues in other 
texts like the Confessiones, time itself was created before humans, and con-
sequently, the soul was created after time and in time�
As for the other pillar of Socratic argument in Phaedo, namely, that the 
soul is unchangeable and the body decays, here too Augustine dissents� In his 
polemical text De Natura et Origine Animae, which he wrote in the context 
of his dispute against the Pelagians, Augustine shows that he is vehemently 
against the thesis that the soul is made of God’s own substance, and thus 
unchangeable:
 54 Aug�, Retract� 1�1: alio loco, de animo cum agerem, dixi: securior rediturus in 
caelum. iturus autem quam rediturus dixissem securius propter eos, qui putant 
animos humanos pro meritis peccatorum suorum de caelo lapsos seu deiectos in 
corpora ista detrudi. sed hoc ego propterea non dubitaui dicere, quia ita dixi in 
caelum, tamquam dicerem ad deum, qui eius est auctor et conditor […]. sine con-
trouersia ergo quaedam originalis regio beatitudinis animi deus ipse est, qui eum 
non quidem de se ipso genuit, sed de nulla re alia condidit, sicut condidit corpus 
e terra. (CSEL 36, 15– 16)�
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I will now proceed to point out what things are chiefly to be avoided in his conten-
tious statement� He says that the soul was made, indeed, by God, but that it is not 
a portion of God or of the nature of God — which is an entirely true statement� 
When, however, he refuses to allow that it is made out of nothing, and mentions no 
other created thing out of which it was made; and makes God its author, in such 
a sense that He must be supposed to have made it, neither out of any non- existing 
things, that is, out of nothing, nor out of anything which exists other than God, 
but out of His very self: he is little aware that in the revolution of his thoughts he 
has come back to the position which he thinks he has avoided, even that the soul is 
nothing else than the nature of God; and consequently that there is an actual some-
thing made out of the nature of God by the self- same God, for the making of which 
the material of which He makes it is His own very self who makes it; and that thus 
God’s nature is changeable, and by being changed for the worse the very nature of 
God Himself incurs condemnation at the hands of the self- same God!55
The anthropology Augustine presents here is clearly opposed to Plato’s in 
the Phaedo� It is true that Christian thinking cannot explain how some-
thing can be created from nothing, but the conclusion that temporal things, 
including human beings, were created from nothing, comes from a reductio 
ad absurdum, since an unchangeable, incorruptible, and perfect Creator 
could not create imperfect, changeable, and corrupt things from His own 
substance�
These examples from Augustine would alone suffice to sustain my thesis 
that the Platonic recollection is fundamentally different from the doctrine 
of the inner Teacher in De Magistro, for they attack the very pillars of 
the Socratic arguments presented in the Phaedo: the unchangeableness of 
the soul, its pre- temporal existence, and its transmigration� But other of 
Augustine’s texts could also be consulted as examples of specific and direct 
criticisms of the central Platonic idea of reminiscence/ recollection itself� 
Gareth Matthews, while discoursing on De Magistro, cites a text where 
Augustine criticizes Plato’s Meno:
 55 Aug�, Nat� et or� 1�4: ut enim iam incipiam demonstrare, quae praecipue sint in 
eius disputatione uitanda, ‘animam’ dicit ‘a deo quidem factam nec dei esse partem 
siue naturam’, quod omnino uerum est: sed cum eam non uult ex nihilo factam 
fateri et aliam nullam creaturam unde sit facta commemorat atque ita illi dat 
auctorem deum, ut neque ex nullis exstantibus, id est ex nihilo, neque ex aliqua 
re, quae non est quod deus est, sed ‘de se ipso eam fecisse’ credatur, nescit eo se 
reuolui, quod declinasse se putat, ut scilicet nihil aliud anima quam dei natura 
sit ac sic consequenter et de dei natura fiat aliquid ab eodem deo, cui faciendo 
materia, de qua facit, sit ipse qui facit, ac per hoc et dei sit natura mutabilis et 
mutata in deterius eiusdem ipsius dei ab eodem ipso deo natura damnetur� (CSEL 
60, 305– 306)� English translation from Augustine of Hippo, On the Soul and its 
Origin, P� Holmes / R� E� Wallis (trans) and B� B� Warfield (ed�) Buffalo 1887�
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Actually it is not quite accurate to say that Augustine’s Doctrine of Illumination or his 
idea of “the inner teacher” is Platonic, since Augustine himself tried to distinguish his 
views from Plato’s� In Book 12 of On the Trinity, after making a reference to Plato’s 
story in his dialogue Meno, in which the slave- boy is able to figure out for himself how 
to construct a square with an area twice that of a given square, Augustine says this, 
with, I think, a touch of humor�56
Matthews then quotes the text of De Trinitate in which Augustine, with an 
ironic and even witty style, directly attacks precisely reminiscence, making a 
mockery of the argument presented in Meno and reaffirming the ideas that 
he had previously articulated in De Magistro� It is pertinent here to tran-
scribe a long passage of Augustine’s De Trinitate, since it strongly supports the 
hypothesis that he does in fact perceive a fundamental distinction between the 
Platonic and Christian gnoseology, and between the Platonic and Christian 
anthropology� After a passage dealing with the distinction between knowledge 
and wisdom, wherein he reflects upon how things are learned, Augustine says:
This is why that noble philosopher Plato tried to persuade us that the souls of 
men had lived here even before they wore these bodies, and therefore learning 
things is more a remembering of things already known than a getting to know new 
things� He told the story of some boy asked goodness knows what questions about 
geometry and answering as if he were most learned in that science� He was of course 
interrogated step by step skillfully, and so he saw what was to be seen and said what 
he saw� But if this were recollection of things previously known, not everybody or 
practically everybody would be able to do the same if interrogated in that way; it 
is unlikely that everybody was a geometer in a previous life, seeing that they are 
such a rarity in the human race that it is a job even to find one� The conclusion we 
should rather draw is that the nature of intellectual mind has been so established by 
the disposition of its creator that it is subjoined to intelligible things in the order of 
nature, and so it sees such truths in a kind of non- bodily light that is sui generis, just 
as our eyes of flesh see all these things that lie around us in this bodily light, a light 
they were created to be receptive of and to match� It is not because the eyes already 
knew the difference between black and white before they were created in this flesh, 
that they can tell the difference now without being taught it�57
 56 Matthews, 2005, 60�
 57 Aug�, Trin� 12�15,24: unde Plato ille philosophus nobilis persuadere conatus est 
uixisse hic animas hominum et antequam ista corpora gererent, et hinc esse quod 
ea quae discuntur reminiscuntur potius cognita quam cognoscuntur noua. Retulit 
enim puerum quendam nescio quae de geometrica interrogatum sic respondisse 
tamquam esset illius peritissimus disciplinae. Gradatim quippe atque artificiose 
interrogatus uidebat quod uidendum erat dicebatque quod uiderat. Sed si recor-
datio haec esset rerum antea cognitarum, non utique omnes uel pene omnes cum 
illo modo interrogarentur hoc possent; non enim omnes in priore uita geometrae 
fuerunt cum tam rari sint in genere humano ut uix possit aliquis inueniri. Sed 
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This passage from the book De Trinitate, written after De Magistro, 
addresses several points raised by Augustine in the other mentioned writ-
ings� Here the doctrine of illumination is clearly opposed to reminiscence, 
both in its Platonic and Pythagoric strands�
4.  Conclusion
All these passages from across Augustine’s corpus are useful for illustrating 
an internal coherence to his thought concerning some of the most important 
aspects of Christian doctrine� To say that there is such coherence is neither 
to claim a systematic perspective on Augustine’s thought and work, nor to 
discount those points on which he seems to have changed his mind� What 
I do intend to claim is that there are certain elements in Christianity that 
remain basic premises for all subsequent philosophical and/ or theological 
reflection by Christian intellectuals, such as cannot be put aside by authors 
(like Augustine) if they want to remain Christian per se� Among these 
are: the creation from nothing, the absolute distinction between temporality 
and eternity, and the acceptance of Christ as God who made Himself flesh� 
If Augustine were a genuine proponent of recollection, some fundamental 
points of his own Christian faith would require refutation, but concerning 
these points, Augustine has always been intransigent�
When these elements of Christian faith are taken as premises for philo-
sophical and theological reflection, they condition the course of these reflec-
tions in several aspects� In this essay I have highlighted the anthropological 
aspect, since the problem of learning truth, for both Augustine and Plato, 
leads to enquires into the nature of the subject qua learner and the way they 
are constituted� The question about the possibility of learning the truth leads 
naturally to the question: what is a human being, who is the one who learns?
As we have seen, two different anthropologies emerge from this common 
question� One treats the soul as part of the sphere of the divine, whereas 
the other distinguishes the human soul from the divine in an absolute way� 
Questions regarding the theory of knowledge interweave with anthropo-
logical questions� But both presuppose an ontology because one cannot 
understand the human being, this learner, in isolation from the complete 
frame of creation and being� Augustine equates being with God Himself, 
intellegibilibus naturali ordine disponente conditore subiuncta sic ista uideat in 
quadam luce sui generis incorporea quemadmodum oculus carnis uidet quae in 
hac corporea luce circumadiacent, cuius lucis capax eique congruens est creatus. 
Non enim et ipse ideo sine magistro alba et nigra discernit quia ista iam nouerat 
antequam in hac carne crearetur� (CCSL 50, 377– 378)� English translation from 
Saint Augustine, The Trinity, E� Hill (trans�) and J� E� Rotelle (ed�) New York 2017�
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and God with eternity (“aeternitas, ipsa Dei substantia est”58), making ref-
erence to the text of Exodus�59 So the different anthropologies, Platonic and 
Christian, are inseparable from their correspondent, and mutually exclusive, 
ontological perspectives, Platonic and Christian� We can conclude, then, that 
in Augustine there exists a single Christian “ontoanthropology” of the self, 
which is, in the end, divergent from the Platonic “ontoanthropology”�
 58 Aug�, Psal� 101�2,10 (CCSL 40, 1445)�
 59 Aug�, Psal� 101�2,10 (CCSL 40, 1445)� The Biblical text mentioned by Augustine 
is Ex 3:14� In the New Revised Standard Version: “God said to Moses, ‘I am who 








“Diabolum potius poneret”: Augustine’s 
reception of Origen’s Commentarii 
in Epistulam ad Romanos in Epistle 157
Abstract: This article explores several possible echoes of Origen’s Commentarii in 
Epistulam ad Romanos in Augustine’s Epistle 157 to Hilary of Syracuse from 414� In 
this epistle, Augustine addresses a number of the central anthropological issues which 
were at stake in the Pelagian controversy� The eminent scholar Caroline Hammond 
Bammel has claimed that in Epistle 157 Augustine makes use of elements of exegesis 
from Rufinus’ Latin translation of Origen’s commentary� But Bammel has not pro-
vided substantiation for her claim� This article picks up Bammel’s suggestion and 
presents several possible instances of reception of Origen’s commentary in Epistle 
157� The majority of these instances have to do with the passage Rom 5:12– 21 which 
was of central importance to Augustine’s doctrine of original sin� He thus appears 
to have bolstered his controversial doctrine with arguments drawn from Origen� 
Augustine’s Epistle 157 subsequently came to play the role of an authoritative refu-
tation of Pelagian anthropology in that it was employed as evidence against Pelagius 
at the synods of Jerusalem and Diospolis in 415� Paradoxically, Origen’s exegesis of 
Romans thus came to be used against Pelagius who himself drew much inspiration 
from the Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos�
1.  Introduction
Augustine was hailed by his contemporary Jerome as a “second founder of the 
ancient faith” (Catholici te conditorem antiquae rursum fidei uenerantur1) 
due to his monumental efforts in combating the Pelagian heresy� To be sure, 
the fame of the North African bishop, and his impressive Nachleben in the 
western theological tradition, are unthinkable apart from Augustine’s tireless 
labours in gainsaying the anthropological tenets of Pelagius, Caelestius, and 
their followers� Throughout these heated exchanges, Augustine never ceased 
to stress the utter helplessness of the human will without the aid of divine 
grace� As is well known, Paul’s Epistle to the Romans played a decisive role 
in Augustine’s anti- Pelagian arguments� Indeed, he leans heavily on the fifth 
chapter of the epistle (especially Rom 5:12– 21) to support his doctrine of 
original sin, and the necessity of (infant) baptism for salvation� In this way, 
 1 Hier., Ep. 141 (CSEL 56, 290)� English translation from W� Parsons, Saint 






Augustine’s interpretation of Romans 5 provides an explanatory basis for 
the predicament of human incapacity outlined in Romans 7 (especially Rom 
7:14– 25)�2 Owing to the Fall of Adam, human nature has received a mortal 
wound, by means of which the human will has lost all capacity to achieve 
the good through its own powers�
It is perhaps less well- known that some important aspects of Augustine’s 
anti- Pelagian exegesis of Romans appear to have been inspired by Rufinus’ 
Latin translation of Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos (tradi-
tionally dated to around 406 AD)� It seems that Augustine cherry- picked several 
arguments and exegetical comments from this commentary for the purposes 
of sharpening his anti- Pelagian polemic— albeit, without explicitly naming his 
source of inspiration� While his appropriation of the Commentarii in Epistulam 
ad Romanos is most often generative, at other times he censures Origen’s exe-
getical decisions� This may be due to the fact that Augustine’s opponents in the 
Pelagian controversy were themselves employing this commentary; or perhaps 
the mere threat of such employment was enough to give him pause�
The eminent scholar Caroline Hammond Bammel broke new ground 
with two insightful articles3 addressing Augustine’s reception of Origen’s 
Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos in his early anti- Pelagian treatises De 
peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo paruulorum (411– 12) and 
De spiritu et littera (412– 13), as well as the second sermon on Psalm 31 in 
Enarrationes in Psalmos (dated to 411 by Bammel)�4 Thomas P� Scheck5 has 
continued Bammel’s path of research with his analysis of De fide et operibus 
(412– 13), where he also claims to detect the tacit influence of Origen’s com-
mentary�6 Most recently, Dominic Keech7 has made the case that Augustine 
received at least parts of the Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos much 
earlier than Bammel had suspected, possibly as early as the 390s�8 In the 
 2 R� Morgan, The Letter to the Romans, 413, in: J�H� Hayes, Dictionary of Biblical 
Interpretation: K- Z, Nashville 1999, 411– 422�
 3 C� P� Hammond Bammel, Augustine, Origen and the Exegesis of St. Paul, 
in: Augustinianum 32 (1992), 341– 368; C� P� Hammond Bammel, Justification 
by Faith in Augustine and Origen, in: Journal of Ecclesiastical History 47, no� 2 
(1996), 223– 235�
 4 Hammond Bammel, 1992; Hammond Bammel, 1996�
 5 T�P� Scheck, Origen and the History of Justification: The Legacy of Origen’s 
Commentary on Romans, Indiana, 2008�
 6 Scheck, 2008, 86– 103�
 7 D� Keech, Augustine, Origen, and the Exegesis of Romans 8:3: The Anti- Pelagian 
Christology of Augustine of Hippo, 396– 430, Oxford 2012�
 8 Keech, 2012, 106– 41� It is not my intention to deal with the difficult question of 
when exactly Augustine received Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s Commentarii in 














present article, I will attempt to take the previous research a small step for-
ward by examining Augustine’s Epistle 157 to Hilary of Syracuse (from 414 
AD)� In the conclusion to her 1992 article, Bammel herself kindly suggested 
this epistle as a possible site for further research into Augustine’s reception of 
Origen’s commentary�9 Despite the valuable efforts of the mentioned schol-
ars, there remains a great deal of uncharted territory in Augustine’s anti- 
Pelagian, and other late works, with respect to the question of reception� In 
addition, several of the alleged instances of reception found in the previous 
scholarship could, in my view, benefit from further analysis� In certain cases, 
works other than Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos have 
not been sufficiently considered as potential sources for Augustine, some of 
which would plausibly account for the data�
In the recent reference- work A Companion to Augustine10, Mark Edwards 
questions the conclusiveness of Bammel’s findings by claiming that they do 
not “prove” Augustine was aware of Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam ad 
Romanos�11 Admittedly, it is an extremely difficult (if not outright impos-
sible) task to reach absolute certainty in such a matter� As with most ancient 
authors, Augustine rarely names his sources, and, being the highly indepen-
dent thinker he is, is unlikely to have resorted to outright plagiarism�12 We 
should therefore not expect to find obvious verbal links between Augustine’s 
works and his sources, such as would prove literary dependence� However, 
despite Edwards’ skepticism, and a few caveats of my own, I believe the many 
curious parallels between Augustine’s anti- Pelagian works and Origen’s 
commentary (especially those found by Bammel) demonstrate, beyond rea-
sonable doubt, that Augustine did indeed know and make use of Rufinus’ 
translation in his anti- Pelagian writings� I hope to confirm this hypothesis 
through my examination of Augustine’s Epistle 157�
2.  Background: Hilary’s “Pelagian” Questions for Augustine 
(Epistle 156)
Augustine’s Epistle 157 is a response to a letter sent him by a layman: Hilary 
of Syracuse� Luckily, Hilary’s letter (known as Epistle 156 in the collection 
of Augustine’s letters) has been preserved alongside Augustine’s� With both 
work, while attractive in many ways, does not seem to be supported by sufficient 
evidence�
 9 Hammond Bammel, 1992, 362�
 10 M� Edwards, Augustine and His Christian Predecessors, 225, in: A Companion 
to Augustine, Oxford 2012�
 11 Edwards, 2012, 215– 226�











portions of the correspondence intact, we find ourselves in an ideal posi-
tion to ascertain which questions Augustine is striving to answer in Epistle 
157� After giving Augustine a respectful greeting, Hilary gets straight to 
the point of his epistle, listing a series of propositions concerning Christian 
doctrine held by “certain Christians at Syracuse” (quidam Christiani apud 
Syracusas)�13 Hilary confesses his own ignorance on these points of doctrine, 
and asks Augustine to enlighten him� The propositions are as follows:
 1) “It is possible for man to be sinless and to keep the commandments of 
God, if he wishes�”
 2) “An unbaptized infant cut off by death cannot justly be deprived of 
heaven because it is born without sin�”
 3) “A rich man who continues to live rich cannot enter the kingdom of 
heaven unless he sells all he has, and that it cannot do him any good to 
keep the commandments while keeping his riches�”
 4) “We ought not to swear at all�”
 5) “What is the nature of the Church of which it is written that it has nei-
ther wrinkle nor spot, whether it is the one in which we now gather or 
the one we hope for� Some have made out that it is this Church into 
which we now gather the people and that it cannot be sinless”�14
Hilary is eager to know the extent to which these views ought to be held 
(quatenus sentire debeamus15) by Christians such as himself� In what fol-
lows, I will limit my examination to propositions 1 and 2, since Augustine 
appears to employ Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos exclu-
sively in relation to these two points of dispute�
3.  Augustine’s Response to Hilary (Epistle 157)
Even though Hilary does not reveal the name(s) of those responsible for the 
propositions, Augustine has a very clear hunch with respect to their identity� 
 13 Aug�, Ep. 156 (CSEL 44, 448)�
 14 Aug�, Ep. 156: (…) dicentes posse esse hominem sine peccato et mandata Dei facile 
custodire, si uelit; infantem non baptizatum morte praeuentum non posse perire 
merito, quoniam sine peccato nascitur; diuitem manentem in diuitiis suis regnum 
Dei non posse ingredi, nisi omnia sua uendiderit, nec prodesse eidem posse, si forte 
ex ipsis diuitiis fecerit mandata; non debere iurare omnino; et de ecclesia, quae 
sit, de qua scriptum est non habere rugam neque maculam, utrum haec sit, in qua 
nunc congregamur, an illa, quam speramus; quidam autem posuit ecclesiam hanc 
esse, in qua nunc frequentamus populos, et sine peccato esse non posse. (CSEL 44, 
448– 49)� English translation from W� Parsons, Saint Augustine: Letters Volume 
III (131– 164), Washington 2008, 318– 19�
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He informs Hilary that Caelestius has been convicted by a council of bishops 
in Carthage (held in 411) for teaching just such “heretical” views on infant 
baptism and original sin� Augustine fears that Caelestian disciples, and per-
haps Caelestius himself, have made their way to Syracuse in an attempt to 
“disturb the faith” (uestram fidem perturbare conatur16) of local Christians� 
Here, Augustine makes a somewhat resigned comment about the spread of 
Caelestius’ teachings; while he had hoped that Syracuse might be spared the 
Caelestian heresy, he now recognizes the vanity of this hope given the multi-
tude of Caelestius’ followers�
4.  Augustine’s Answer to Hilary’s First Proposition
4.1  “Danihel sanctus” and the (Im)possibility of Human Sinlessness
In response to the first proposition recorded by Hilary, Augustine provides 
three scriptural arguments against the possibility of obtaining complete sin-
lessness in this earthly life� First of all, he points to 1� John 1:8 according 
to which that person is a liar who claims to have committed no sin� Such 
a person only deceives himself� Secondly, Augustine cites the Lord’s Prayer, 
and specifically the petition “Forgive us our debts as we also forgive our 
debtors,” to show that sin is a continuous reality in the life of a Christian� 
Even the Apostles themselves, “the very rams of the flock” (etiam ipsis ari-
etibus gregis17), as Augustine calls them, were instructed by Christ to pray 
in this manner, which presupposes that even they must have had sins to 
confess� How much more, Augustine argues, will this be the case for later 
generations of Christians� If the latter times had really been able to pro-
duce virtuous and sinless Christians, Christ would surely had foreseen it, 
Augustine says, and taught them a prayer without the unnecessary words 
“forgive us our debts”�18
Augustine’s third scriptural argument against the possibility of sinlessness 
is the most interesting with respect to reception of Origen’s Commentarii 
in Epistulam ad Romanos�19 It concerns the prophet Daniel, and his vicar-
ious confession of the sins of Israel during the Babylonian exile20 Without 
prior explanation, Augustine in Epistle 157, introduces the case of Daniel, 
 16 Aug�, Ep. 157 3�22 (CSEL 44, 471)�
 17 Aug�, Ep� 157 1�2 (CSEL 44, 450)�
 18 Aug�, Ep� 157 1�2�
 19 Bammel mentions the case of Daniel’s confession in a footnote but does not clearly 
state whether she considers Augustine’s comments on the matter a reaction to 
statements in Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romans� Hammond Bammel, 
1992, 360 n� 80�














decrying the idea that Daniel’s confession was a case of “false humility” 
(quasi humilitate fallaci21)� When the prophet made use of the first person 
plural (“we have sinned and done wrong”, etc� (Dan 9:5 ff22)) he did not do so 
as a mere show of solidarity in front of other humans (coram hominibus), all 
the while maintaining his own innocence� On the contrary, Augustine insists 
that the prophet Daniel, no less than his compatriots, was personally guilty 
of sin� His confession was uttered in front of God (coram Deo) and should 
therefore be seen as totally honest and sincere� Augustine uses the example 
of Daniel to rebuke the Christians in Syracuse, who claim that sinlessness 
is attainable in this life� Citing Ezech 28:3 (in the LXX version), Augustine 
asks them a rhetorical question: “Are you then wiser than Daniel?”23 The 
answer is obviously no� These Christians should follow the example of the 
wise prophet and confess that they too have sinned�
It is not immediately obvious why Augustine would use the example of 
Daniel to support his case regarding the impossibility of human sinlessness� 
There are plenty of other characters in the Old Testament who could be 
deduced as examples of righteous sinners� It is clear, however, that Augustine 
considers Noah, Daniel and Job to be men of a special sanctity because of 
the divine testimony given to them in Ezech 14:14�24 If even the supremely 
righteous Daniel could be shown to have sinned, then Augustine’s argument 
would gain considerable heft�25 I suspect, however, that there is an additional 
reason why Augustine chose to employ the example of Daniel� In Rufinus’ 
Latin translation of Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam in Romanos, we find 
an interesting passage discussing the seventh chapter of Romans, wherein 
Paul describes a poignant inner conflict: “For I do not do the good I want, but 
the evil I do not want is what I do” (Rom 7:1926)� Origen explains this pas-
sage with one of his favourite tools of literary analysis; namely, the persona 
or πρόσωπον�27 Using this tool, Origen claims that Paul is not, as one might 
expect, describing a conflict within himself� The Apostle is rather putting on 
a “mask,” and playing the role of a struggling sinner who does not have the 
strength to conquer his vices� In order to argue for this interpretation of the 
 21 Aug�, Ep. 157 1�2 (CSEL 44, 450)�
 22 NRSV�
 23 Ep� 157 1�2� English translation from W� Parsons, 2008, 318– 19� Translation 
modified by the author himself, M� K� Møller�
 24 Cf� Aug�, peccat� merit. 2�12 (CSEL 60, 83)�
 25 Augustine gives a more comprehensive argument for the personal sinfulness of 
Daniel in peccat� merit. 2�13�
 26 NRSV�
 27 For a brief explanation of Origen’s use of the literary tool of persona, see P� Martens, 
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passage, Origen makes reference to the prophet Daniel and his confession on 
behalf of Israel� Origen finds it self- evident that Daniel’s confession refers to 
the sins of his compatriots, rather than himself:
Who can deny that in these words Daniel has taken on the persona of sinners, on 
whose account he seems to say these things as though on his own behalf? Thus it is 
fitting for us, when we read the things said by the saints, when we see something like 
this said by them, to interpret and understand that in themselves they are describing 
our passions and our sins; and the reason they weep is in order that we might be 
invited to shed tears by their weeping�28
Just prior to this passage Origen had argued that Daniel could not possibly 
be referring to his own personal sins, since no sins of his are recorded in the 
Scriptures�29 Origen thus concluded that the prophet must have employed a 
persona in order to demonstrate solidarity with his fellow Israelites� Such 
an interpretation would have been offensive to Augustine who, as we have 
seen, was keen on demonstrating the universality of human sinfulness� If we 
take Origen’s understanding of Daniel’s confession into account, it makes 
good sense that Augustine would use precisely that Old Testament prophet 
to prove his point� In this way he could support his own argument about 
universal sinfulness while, at the same time, correcting what he would have 
perceived as a problematic element in Origen’s exegesis� For Origen’s remark 
about Daniel could easily have been appropriated by Pelagians, and their 
potential sympathizers in Syracuse, who were eager to argue for the reality 
of human sinlessness� By refuting the idea that Daniel had employed a per-
sona and confessed in “false humility,” Augustine would have effectively 
dismantled a potential Pelagian proof- text in Origen’s commentary�
While it seems evident that, in Epistle 157 (as well as in De peccato-
rum meritis), Augustine is reacting to a persona interpretation of Daniel’s 
confession, it is possible that this idea reached him through sources other 
than Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos� In Cyprian’s trea-
tise De lapsis, the Carthaginian bishop provides relevant commentary on 
the Book of Daniel�30 Cyprian presents the three youths, Ananias, Azarias, 
 28 Or�, comm� in Rom. 6�9,15– 16: Quis est qui in his uerbis negare possit personam 
peccatorum a Danihelo esse susceptam pro quibus tamquam pro se ipso haec 
dicere uideatur? Unde conueniens est nos legentes dicta sanctorum cum ab eis tale 
aliquid dici uidemus intellegere et sentire quia nostras in semet ipsis passions nostra 
peccata describunt; et propterea illi haec deflent ut illorum fletibus nos inuitemur 
ad lacrimas. (SC 543, 190)� English translation from T�P� Scheck, Commentary on 
the Epistle to the Romans, Books 6– 10, Washington 2002, 43�
 29 Or�, comm� in Rom. 6�9,15 (SC 543, 188)�
 30 I would like to thank Jakob Engberg for making me aware of this fact during our 








and Misahel— together with Daniel— as examples of righteous people who, 
despite having a “good conscience” (bene sibi licet conscii), do not cease to 
“retain their humility” (humilitatem tamen tenere) by making confession to 
God� Daniel himself is commended for his “innocence” (Daniel quoque post 
fidei adque innocentiae suae multiplicem gratiam), and at one point Cyprian 
directly cites his confession (Dan 9:4– 7)�31 His point is to illustrate the great 
gulf between the “lapsed” Christians of his time, who refuse to offer repen-
tance for their apostasy, and the saints of old (such as Daniel), who did not 
refrain from making confession, notwithstanding their personal innocence� 
We encounter a similar understanding of Daniel’s confession in Jerome’s 
Commentarii in Danielem (from 407 AD), where even the technical term per-
sona is used�32 When commenting on Dan 9:20, Jerome presents the possible 
explanation that Daniel confessed the sins of Israel “out of humility,” even 
though he himself had not committed sin (siue humiliter, cum peccatum ipse 
non fecerit; et se iungit populo peccatori, ut ex humilitate ueniam consequa-
tur)�33 Notably, Jerome mentions that Paul employs the same persona device 
in his Epistle to the Romans (quod et apostolum in Epistola ad Romanos 
facere legimus)�34 Jerome also gives Daniel’s confession as an instance of 
προσωποποιία in his Epistle 121 to Algasia (from 406 AD) when answering 
an exegetical question concerning Rom 7:8�35 The close parallel between 
Jerome’s exegesis and Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos on 
this point probably reveals Jerome’s heavy reliance on Origen in his biblical 
commentaries� It is evident that Jerome used the Greek original of Origen’s 
commentary when composing his answer to Algasia�36
It is therefore difficult to tell whether Augustine’s criticism of the per-
sona interpretation of Daniel’s confession is to be explained as a reaction 
to Origen’s commentary in particular� As we have seen, both Cyprian and 
Jerome provide explanations of the confession in similar terms, and their 
conclusions would prove equally objectionable from Augustine’s point of 
view� It is, of course, perfectly possible that Augustine’s criticism is aimed at 
more than one of these interpreters�
Despite his firm insistence on Daniel’s personal sinfulness (as opposed to sin-
lessness), Augustine makes it very clear that he does not consider this question 
 31 Cypr�, Laps� 31 (CCL 3, l� 618)�
 32 Hier�, Dan. 3�9,5ª (CCL 75A, 861)�
 33 Hier�, Dan. 3�9,20 (CCL 75A, 863)�
 34 Hier�, Dan. 3�9,5ª (CCL 75A, 861)�
 35 Hier�, Ep. 121�
 36 C� P� Hammond Bammel, Philocalia IX, Jerome, Epistle 121, and Origen’s 
Exposition of Romans VII, in: The Journal of Theological Studies XXXII, no� 1 
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to be of ultimate importance� He is willing to accept that fellow Christians 
might think differently than him in claiming that, in addition to “the one saint 
of saints” (unum sanctum sanctorum37), Jesus Christ, there have indeed existed 
righteous men whose lives were free from sin� For Augustine, the more impor-
tant question is the role of divine grace in the process of human salvation� He 
sees grace, rather than will, as being absolutely necessary� In Epistle 157 he 
argues vehemently against those who “claim that man’s free choice is enough 
to enable him to carry out the commandments of the Lord” (dicunt sufficere 
homini liberum arbitrium ad dominica implenda mandata38)� Only with divine 
assistance, which is given through grace, is the Christian enabled to perform 
good works and keep sinful desires in check� In our present state of sin, human 
beings do not enjoy the freedom to achieve such feats through the exercise of 
the “powers of their own will” (uiribus propriae uoluntatis) or their faculty of 
“free choice” (liberum aribitrium)�39 Rather, Augustine maintains that human 
freedom is limited to calling upon God in order to petition divine help�40
5.  Augustine’s answer to Hilary’s second proposition
5.1  The “Devil argument” Against Imitation (Rom 5:12)
The influence of Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos is more 
obvious in Augustine’s discussion of the fate of infants who die prior to 
receiving baptism� According to Hilary, the unnamed Christians in Syracuse 
had claimed that all infants are saved, with or without baptism� Augustine 
attempts to refute this claim by showing that human nature has been so 
injured by the Fall of Adam that every one of his progeny carries the weight 
of his sin, and are thus in need of salvation� Rom 5:12 is of special signifi-
cance for Augustine’s understanding of original sin�41 In order to secure his 
own position, Augustine needs to negate a rival Pelagian reading of Rom 5:12 
that understands the transmission of sin from Adam to his posterity solely 
in terms of “imitation” (imitatio)� As Pelagius writes in his Expositiones 
on Romans, this Pauline verse refers to transmission “by example or by 
pattern” (exemplo uel forma42)� Augustine counters this understanding of 
 37 Aug�, Ep� 157 2�4 (CSEL 44, 451)�
 38 Aug�, Ep� 157 2�4 (CSEL 44, 451)�
 39 Aug�, Ep� 157 2�4– 5 (CSEL 44, 451)�
 40 Aug�, Ep� 157 2�7 (CSEL 44, 453– 54)�
 41 “Therefore, just as sin came into the world through one man, and death came 
through sin, and so death spread to all because all have sinned” (NRSV)�
 42 Pel�, Expositiones in 8 Epistularum Pauli Rom� 5:12: Texts and Studies vol� IX:2, 
45� English translation from T� De Bruyn, Pelagius’s Commentary on St Paul’s 
















Rom 5:12 with an argument that clearly seems to be drawn from Origen’s 
commentary�
In his comments on Rom 5:12, Origen tries to explain why Paul traces the 
origin of sin to Adam and not to Eve or the Devil�43 For the Devil was in fact 
the instigator of human sin, and Eve sinned prior to Adam by succumbing 
to the temptation of the serpent and tasting of the forbidden fruit (cf� Gen 
3:1– 6)� So according to the chronological order of events, it would seem 
more natural for the Apostle to begin his account of sin with “the woman” 
or “the serpent”:
Well then, if the woman sinned before Adam, and the serpent sinned before the 
woman, and in another passage the Apostle says, “Adam was not seduced, but the 
woman was seduced,” (1 Tim� 2:14) how can it seem that sin entered through one 
man and not rather through one woman? For the beginning of sin was from the 
woman, and before the woman from the serpent, or from the devil, of whom it is 
said in the Gospel, “He was a murderer from the beginning (John 8:44)�44
Origen responds to this conundrum by stating that Paul maintains the “order 
of nature” (naturae ordinem) in his description of the origin of human sin� 
According to this order, it is customary to assign “mortal posterity” (mor-
talis posteritas) and “physical descent” (corporalis successio) to the man 
instead of the woman�45 Here, Origen employs Hebr 7:9– 1046 to illustrate 
how sin could be passed on from Adam to his posterity�47 Just as Levi was 
present in the “loins of Abraham” (in lumbis Abrahae48) when the patriarch 
paid tithes to Melchizedek, so too Adam’s descendants were “in him” (in 
ipso) when he was expelled from Paradise:
And all men who were with him [Adam], or rather in him, were expelled from 
Paradise when he was himself driven out from there; and through him the death 
which had come to him from the transgression consequently passed through to 
them as well, who were dwelling in his loins; and therefore the Apostle rightly says, 
 43 Or�, comm� in Rom. 5�1,11 (SC 539, 364)�
 44 Or�, comm� in Rom. 5�1,11: Si ergo ante Adam mulier peccauit, et ante mulierem 
serpens, et in alio loco dicit apostolus quia Adam non est seductus mulier autem 
seducta est; quomodo per unum hominem et non magis per unam mulierem uidebi-
tur introisse peccatum? A muliere enim initium peccati, et ante mulierem a serpente 
siue a diabolo, de quo dicitur in euangelio quia ille ab initio homicida erat. (SC 
539, 364)� English translation from T�P� Scheck, 2001, 310�
 45 Or�, comm in� Rom. 5�1,11 (SC 539, 364)�
 46 “One might even say that Levi himself, who receives tithes, paid tithes through 
Abraham, for he was still in the loins of his ancestor when Melchizedek met him�” 
(NRSV)�
 47 Or�, comm� in Rom. 5�1,12 (SC 539, 364– 66)�
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“For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all will be made alive�” (1 Cor� 15:22) So 
then it is neither from the serpent who had sinned before the woman, nor from the 
woman who had become a transgressor before the man, but through Adam, from 
whom all mortals derive their origin, that sin is said to have entered, and through 
sin, death�49
Origen thus understands Rom 5:12 in terms of the “mystical” solidarity of 
all human beings with Adam in his transgression� Due to the sin of their 
forefather, all of humankind was “expelled from paradise” and incurred 
the punishment of death� Even though the Devil was the first instigator of 
sin, Paul did not trace the origin of sin back to him in Rom 5:12� Instead, 
Origen says, the Apostle wanted to emphasize our solidarity with Adam 
“from whom all mortals derive their origin” (ex quo omnes mortales origi-
nem ducunt)�
In his Epistle 157, Augustine employs a curiously similar idea when 
expounding Rom 5:12� For the sake of argument, he grants that the descen-
dants of Adam inherit sin through their imitation of his bad example� But, 
Augustine reasons, if Paul had taught that transmission of sin takes place 
through imitation, he would have presented the Devil, rather than Adam, as 
the originator of sin:
If, as they say, the Apostle had made this statement to have us understand that sin-
ners are the progeny of the first man because we sin by imitating him, not because 
we inherit sin by being born of him, he should rather have adduced the Devil, who 
was the first sinner, from whom the human race derives no inheritance of substance, 
but whom it has followed solely by imitation�50
Augustine here provides the same exegesis as Origen in order to prove that 
human beings inherit Adam’s sin in a concrete “physical” manner, and not 
 49 Or�, comm� in Rom� 5�1,12: (...) et omnes homines cum ipso uel in ipso expulsi sunt 
de paradiso cum ipse inde depulsus est; et per ipsum mors quae ei ex praeuarica-
tione uenerat consequenter et in eos pertransiit qui in lumbis eius habebantur. Et 
ideo recte apostolus dicit: Sicut enim in Adam omnes moriuntur ita et in Christo 
omnes uiuificabuntur. Neque ergo ex serpente qui ante mulierem peccauerat neque 
ex muliere quae ante uirum in praeuaricatione facta est sed per Adam ex quo 
omnes mortales originem ducunt dicitur introisse peccatum et per peccatum mors. 
(SC 539, 364– 66)� English translation from T�P� Scheck, 2001, 311� Translation 
adjusted by MKM�
 50 Aug�, Ep� 157 3�21: (…) nam si, quem ad modum illi dicunt, propterea ista com-
memorasset apostolus, ut intellegeremus ad primum hominem peccatores ideo 
pertinere, quia non delictum ex illo nascendo traximus, sed eum imitando pecca-
mus, diabolum potius poneret, qui et prior peccauit et de quo nullam substantiae 
propaginem traxit genus humanum, sed eum sola imitatione subsecuta est (…) 






through imitation alone� For, if human sin is merely the result of imitation, 
then Paul would not have traced it back to Adam but “rather have adduced 
the Devil” (diabolum potius poneret) who first incited the human race to 
disobey God� But the Apostle did not begin his lineage of sin with the Devil 
because the “human race derives no inheritance of substance” (de quo nul-
lam substantiae propaginem traxit genus humanum) from him, since he is 
an angelic (or rather demonic) being� Augustine presents this “Devil argu-
ment” for the first time in De peccatorum meritis and uses it again in the 
anti- Pelagian Sermo 294 (from 413 AD)�51 Bammel is probably right in con-
sidering this parallel idea to be an instance of the direct reception of Origen’s 
commentary� The “Devil argument” appears abruptly in Augustine’s exe-
gesis, and at a time when we know for certain that Rufinus’ Latin transla-
tion of the Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos was in circulation� We 
do not find a discussion of the Devil in relation to Rom 5:12 in Augustine’s 
Expositio, his early work on Romans, nor in other sources that may have 
been available to him (such as Ambrosiaster’s Commentarius in Epistulas 
Paulinas)�
While there are no suspicious verbal agreements between Augustine’s for-
mulations of the “Devil argument” and Rufinus’ Latin text, there are other 
indications of reception beyond the parallelism itself� In his original for-
mulation of the argument in De peccatorum meritis, Augustine had cited 
1 Cor 15:2252 and 1 John 3:853 among the scriptural passages that help 
explain Paul’s meaning in Rom 5:12�54 In the Commentarii in Epistulam ad 
Romanos, 1 Cor 15:22 and John 8:44 (which is similar in content to 1 John 
3:8) are of central importance to Origen’s exegesis of the same Pauline verse� 
In Epistle 157, Augustine makes a curious adjustment of his argument in 
that he now replaces 1 John 3:8 with an allusion to John 8:44 (unde dicer-
etur pater impiorum55)� He thus brings his exegesis in even closer alignment 
with Origen’s�
Augustine’s independence as a thinker is apparent from the fact that he 
does not simply copy Origen’s exegesis of Rom 5:12 viz� the question of 
the Devil� Indeed, he appears to have developed the idea even further than 
Origen in the Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos� Augustine draws 
the inference from Paul’s Adam- Christ typology that if damnation comes 
 51 Aug�, Serm� 294 15�15�
 52 “For as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ�” (NRSV)�
 53 “Everyone who commits sin is a child of the devil; for the devil has been sinning 
from the beginning�” (NRSV)�
 54 Aug�, peccat� merit. 1�8,8; 1�9,9�
 55 Aug�, Ep� 157 3�21 (CSEL 44, 470)� We encounter the same adjustment of the 
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through the imitation of Adam, as the Pelagians claim, then salvation would 
come through the imitation of Abel, the first righteous man:
In the next place, if the Apostle mentioned the first man in this passage because he 
was the first sinner among men, and if he meant thereby that all men who are sin-
ners belong to him, why did he not bring in holy Abel, who was the first just man 
among mankind, and claim that all just men belong to him through imitation of his 
justice? But he did bring in Adam, against whom he could set no one but Christ, 
because, as the first man attainted his posterity by his sin, so the God- Man saved 
His inheritance by His own justice; the one brought on corruption of the flesh, 
which the Devil for all his wickedness could not do; the other gave the grace of the 
Spirit, which Abel, the just, could not do�56
Augustine claims that Paul would have presented Abel as an antitype to 
Adam instead of Christ if salvation (and by extension damnation) were a 
result of imitation only� But since the Apostle consistently refers to Christ 
as the antitype of Adam in the passage Rom 5:12– 21, it is clear that the 
Pelagian insistence on imitatio is untenable�
5.2  The Notion of “Law” in Origen’s Commentarii in 
Epistulam ad Romanos (Rom 5:13 and 5:20)
Another credible instance of the reception of Origen’s commentary is found 
in Augustine’s exegesis of Rom 5:1357 and 5:2058� Bammel claims that 
Augustine takes inspiration from Origen’s explanation of the term “law” 
(lex) in these verses�59 Throughout his commentary, Origen displays great 
sophistication in his treatment of Paul’s multifaceted legal grammar� He is 
aware that the Apostle deploys it in a variety of different ways, giving this 
as a reason why Romans is so challenging to interpret�60 Bammel points out 
 56 Aug�, Ep� 157 3�21: Deinde si propter imitationem hoc loco apostolus commemo-
raret primum hominem, quia primus peccator in hominibus fuit, ut ideo ad illum 
omnes homines peccatores diceret pertinere, cur non sanctum Abel posuit, quo-
niam primus in hominibus iustus fuit, ad quem iusti omnes propter imitationem 
iustitiae pertinerent? Sed posuit Adam, contra quem non posuit nisi Christum, 
quia sicut ille homo delicto suo uitiauit posteritatem suam, sic iste Deus homo 
iustitia sua saluauit hereditatem suam, ille traiciendo carnis immunditiam, quod 
non poterat impius diabolus, ille donando spiritus gratiam, quod non poterat Abel 
iustus. (CSEL 44, 470)� English translation from W� Parsons, 2008, 338�
 57 “Sin was indeed in the world before the law, but sin is not reckoned when there 
is no law�” (NRSV)�
 58 “But law came in, with the result that the trespass multiplied; but where sin 
increased, grace abounded all the more�” (NRSV)�
 59 Hammond Bammel, 1992, 360– 61�












that Augustine, in De peccatorum meritis, deviates from his earlier exegesis 
of these verses in that he now allows for the possibility that Paul could be 
referring to the “law of nature” (lex naturalis) in our conscience (instead 
of the Law of Moses)� In a manner typical of Origen, Augustine now gives 
two interpretive possibilities without ultimately deciding between them� We 
find exactly the same approach to Rom 5:13 and 5:20 in Epistle 157� When 
commenting on the latter verse, Augustine is perfectly open to the idea that 
Paul is here referring to the moral law in our conscience:
Clearly, we must understand by it either the natural law which was known in those 
ages among all who had the use of reason, or the written Law which was given 
by Moses, but which could not give life nor set man free “from the law of sin and 
death” (cf� Rom� 8:2) which came down from Adam; rather, it added an increase of 
transgression: “For where there is no law,” says the same Apostle, “neither is there 
transgression�”61 (Rom 4:15)
Augustine apparently understands the “natural law” (lex naturalis) as a 
moral code written on the hearts of all human beings� In his view, this code 
consists in a moral teaching reminiscent of the “Golden Rule,” albeit for-
mulated negatively (ne mali aliquid faciat quisque alteri, quod pati ipse non 
uult62)� All humans transgress this law, invariably adding to the guilt they 
inherit from Adam� The natural law is, moreover, to be found in all persons 
who have attained the age of reason (quae est in usu rationis animae ratio-
nalis in aetate hominis iam ratione utentis63)� Augustine also gives natural 
law as a possible interpretation in his exegesis of Rom 5:13 in Epistle 157�64
It is quite plausible that the alternative exegesis of Rom 5:13 and 5:20 
given in De peccatorum meritis and Epistle 157 was inspired by Augustine’s 
reading of Origen’s commentary� For, indeed, the interpretation of “law” 
in these verses as lex naturalis is ostensibly unique to Origen� While 
Ambrosiaster generally shows great interest in the theme of natural law, he 
does not adopt this interpretation of lex when treating the verses in question; 
rather, he clearly understands the word as a reference to the Mosaic Law�65
 61 Aug�, Ep� 157 3�15: (…) legem quippe siue naturalem intellegamus, quae in eorum 
apparet aetatibus, qui iam ratione uti possunt, siue conscriptum, quae data est per 
Moysen, quia nec ipsa potuit uiuificare et liberare a lege peccati et mortis, quae 
tracta est ex Adam, sed magis addidit praeuaricationis augmenta; ubi enim lex non 
est, ait idem apostolus, nec praeuaricatio (CSEL 44, 462– 63)� English translation 
from W� Parsons, 2008, 331�
 62 Aug�, Ep� 157 3�15 (CSEL 44, 463)�
 63 Aug�, Ep� 157 3�15 (CSEL 44, 463)�
 64 Aug�, Ep� 157 3�18 (CSEL 44, 467)�
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The case for reception of Origen’s commentary is further buttressed by an 
example that Augustine provides in the context of discussing original sin in 
De peccatorum meritis�66 In order to prove that infants are baptized due to 
the inherited contagion of original sin, Augustine is eager to show that they 
are incapable of committing sins of their own� He gives the concrete, and 
memorable, illustration of an infant striking its mother; hardly an instance 
of premeditated evil� According to Augustine, such little ones cannot be 
held accountable for personal sins until they reach the age of discretion, 
when their intellectual faculties have sufficiently developed� But precisely 
this example of a striking infant is used by Origen to prove a similar point in 
his exegesis of Rom 5:13�67 Surely, this is no coincidence� Rather, it reveals 
Augustine’s dependence on Origen’s commentary�68
Bammel has claimed that Augustine, in his earlier work De spiritu et lit-
tera, “rejects Origen’s methods of explaining Paul’s use of the term ‘law’ 
and again reverts to his earlier interpretation of Romans”69� While it is 
correct that in De spiritu et littera Augustine appears to censure Origen’s 
understanding of the term “law” in the context of 2 Cor� 3:6, Epistle 157 
clearly shows that Augustine was content to employ Origen’s exegesis in 
Rom 5:13 and 5:20� This is one small indication that Augustine’s “reaction 
against Origen” in De spiritu et littera is probably not as strong as Bammel 
imagines�70
5.3  Augustine as Textual Critic: The Divergent 
Readings of Rom 5:14
According to Bammel, it is likely that Augustine is also indebted to Origen 
when it comes to his discussion of the variant manuscript readings of Rom 
5:14�71 Augustine is aware that a negation is lacking in the clause “who have 
[not] sinned after the similitude of the transgression of Adam” in some of 
the biblical manuscripts�72 Like Origen, Augustine does not draw a definite 
conclusion as to which reading of the verse should be deemed authentic� It 
is intriguing, however, that (unlike Origen) Augustine— both in De pecca-
torum meritis and again in Epistle 157— treats the presence of the negation 
as preferable�73 The reason might be that this version, more obviously than 
 66 Aug�, peccat� merit. 1�35,66�
 67 Or�, comm� in Rom. 5�1,23 (SC 539, 378– 380)�
 68 Hammond Bammel, 1992, 361�
 69 Ead�
 70 Ead�
 71 Ead�, 361 n� 84�
 72 Aug�, Ep� 157 3�19 (CSEL 44, 468)�



















the other, appears to support Augustine’s notion of original sin� He argues 
that death exercises dominion even over those who did not sin in the same 
manner as Adam, because his sin was inherited by his offspring: ““Death 
hath reigned even over them that have not sinned”— as if to make us know 
why it has reigned over those who have not sinned— “after the similitude of 
the transgression of Adam,” (Rom� 5:14) that is, because there was in their 
members a similitude of the transgression of Adam�”74
Augustine here states that the inherited “similitude” of Adam’s sin was 
handed down to all of his descendants through their “members” (membris)� 
The reading of Rom 5:14 with the negation could be seen as neatly under-
lining the fact that Adam’s descendants are utterly inactive in contracting 
the guilt of their forefather’s sin� Augustine is, unsurprisingly, very eager to 
secure this interpretation of Rom 5:14, seeing as it fits nicely with his under-
standing of original sin� However, he also safeguards himself against the 
potential issue of the variant reading (without the negation), arguing that 
even this reading would not upset his interpretation� If the variant were to 
be adopted instead, Augustine states that he could interpret “over them that 
have sinned after the similitude of the transgression of Adam” as referring to 
the notion that all human beings have actually sinned “in Adam” when their 
forefather committed the first sin� In this way, Augustine arrives at the some-
what surprising conclusion that both readings of Rom 5:14 (despite literally 
contradicting one another) support his theory of original sin�
As for Origen, we find his text- critical comments about Rom 5:14 in the 
fifth book of Rufinus’ translation:
If, on the other hand, as it reads in some manuscripts, “even in those who did not 
sin in the likeness of Adam’s transgression,” (Rom� 5:14) this death, namely that 
which was keeping souls bound in the underworld, is said to exercise dominion, 
then we shall understand it to mean that even the saints had fallen prey to that death 
certainly under the law of dying, even if not under the punishment of sin�75
Apart from this brief comment, Origen primarily discusses the interpretation 
of Rom 5:14 without the negation� The absence of a negation allows him to 
claim that death only exercised dominion over those who sinned in a manner 
 74 Aug�, Ep� 157 3�19: Regnauit mors in eos, qui non peccauerunt, quasi nos moueret, 
quare in eos regnauit, qui non peccauerunt, adderet: In similitudinem praeuarica-
tionis Adae, id est quia inerat in eorum membris similitude praeuaricationis Adae 
(CSEL 44, 467)� English translation from W� Parsons, 2008, 335– 336�
 75 Or�, comm� in Rom. 5�1,36: Si uero, ut in nonnullis exemplaribus habetur, etiam 
in eos qui non peccauerunt in similitudine praeuaricationis Adae mors ista, id est 
quae in inferno animas detinebat, regnasse dicatur, intellegemus et sanctos quosque 
sub ista morte etiam si non poena peccati at certe moriendi lege decidisse (…) (SC 
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similarto Adam� He is therefore able to draw a clear distinction between 
those who were thoroughly dominated by the power of death, i�e� the “real” 
transgressors, and, on the other side, the holy men from the time of the Old 
Covenant, who, because of their virtue, were less grievously impaired by this 
power� These holy men had, according to Origen, only been “grazed with 
a certain light infection” (leui quadam eos contagione perstrinxit76)� Such a 
distinction must have appeared as highly objectionable from the perspective 
of Augustine’s anthropology�
Ambrosiaster also discusses the text- critical problem in Rom 5:14, 
and, furthermore, in greater detail than Origen or Augustine�77 Contrary 
to the latter two commentators, Ambrosiaster takes a clear stand on the 
issue� He decides in favor of what he perceives to be the “Latin” textual 
tradition, which omits the negation� He believes that the “Greek” manu-
scripts that include the negation have been corrupted for polemical rea-
sons� Ambrosiaster instead argues strongly for the “Latin” option, “which 
reason, history and authority all retain” (quando et ratio et historia et auc-
toritas conseruatur78)� It seems probable that Augustine is drawing on both 
Ambrosiaster and Origen with regard to his text- critical comments on Rom 
5:14, while remaining independent in his evaluation of the textual evidence� 
It is striking that Augustine is favorably disposed toward a reading which 
Ambrosiaster clearly rejects, and which Origen treats as a less important 
alternative� This may be yet another example of Augustine’s “exceptional 
independence of thought”�79 Again, his motivation for disagreeing with the 
other commentators could be explained by the fact that his reading of Rom 
5:14 more directly supports the notion of hereditary guilt:
Therefore “death reigned from Adam unto Moses,” in all who were not assisted by 
the grace of Christ, that in them the kingdom of death might be destroyed, “even 
in those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression,” that is, 
who had not yet sinned of their own individual will, as Adam did, but had drawn 
from him original sin (���)�80
 76 Or�, comm� in Rom. 6�32 (SC 539, 390)�
 77 Ambrosiast�, Commentarius in 8 Epistulas Paulinas Rom� 5�14�
 78 Ambrosiast�, Commentarius in 8 Epistulas Paulinas Rom� 5�14 (CSEL 81:1, 177)�
 79 Hammond Bammel, 1992, 363�
 80 Aug�, peccat� merit. 1�11,13: Ergo in omnibus regnauit mors ab Adam usque ad 
Moysen, qui Christi gratia non adiuti sunt, ut in eis regnum mortis destrueretur, 
ergo et in eis qui non peccauerunt in similitudine praeuaricationis Adae, id est 
qui nondum sua et propria uoluntate sicut ille peccauerunt, sed ab illo peccatum 
originale traxerunt (…) (CSEL 60, 14)� English translation from P� Holmes, Saint 












Augustine’s reading of Rom 5:14 with the negation serves to underline the 
fact that Adam’s descendants are utterly inactive in contracting the guilt 
of their forefather’s sin� Of course, this happens to suit the purposes of 
Augustine’s anti- Pelagian polemic very well�
Notably, in the earlier work De peccatorum meritis Augustine openly 
admits that he knows other interpreters of Romans (quod etiam ipsum 
qui ita legunt81) who adopt the reading of Rom 5:14 without the negation� 
According to Augustine, these nameless exegetes understand the import of 
the verse in the same way that he does (ad eundem referunt intellectum82), 
despite their preference for the variant reading� I find it likely that Augustine 
includes Ambrosiaster and Origen among the ita legunt83 interpreters� As 
mentioned above, both authors clearly prefer the reading of Rom 5:14 
without the negation� Furthermore, Augustine’s description of the position 
of the unnamed interpreters (qui in illo peccauerunt, ut ei similes crearentur, 
sicut ex homine homines, ita ex peccatore peccatores, ex morituro mori-
turi damnatoque damnati84) fits quite nicely with statements found in both 
Ambrosiaster’s and Origen’s commentaries� In both sources we can find pas-
sages that could be construed as supporting Augustine’s doctrine of orig-
inal sin� Moreover, Augustine’s open- minded approach to the text- critical 
problem (contra Ambrosiaster’s vehement insistence on his preferred “Latin” 
view) could well be inspired by Origen’s reluctance to decide between the 
two conflicting textual traditions�
5.4  The Baptism of Infants: Origen as an Ally in Augustine’s 
Argument for Original Sin (Rom 6:6 and 8:3)
In Augustine’s view, the ancient practice of infant baptism clearly demon-
strates that we are not born in a state of innocence� For, if this were the case, 
the baptism of infants would prove to be a totally superfluous act� It is quite 
possible that Augustine drew upon Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam ad 
Romanos as inspiration for this argument�85 In Origen’s exegesis of Paul’s 
expression the “body of sin” (corpus peccati) in Rom 6:6, he explains that 
infant baptism has been instituted by the Apostles in order to wash away the 
sinful “defilement” (sordes) that is found even in newborns:
It is on this account as well that the Church has received the tradition from the 
apostles to give baptism even to little children� For they to whom the secrets of 
 81 Aug�, peccat� merit. 1�11,13 (CSEL 60,14)�
 82 Aug�, peccat� merit. 1�11,13 (CSEL 60,14)�
 83 Aug�, peccat� merit. 1�11,13 (CSEL 60,14)�
 84 Aug�, peccat� merit. 1�11,13 (CSEL 60,14)�
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the divine mysteries were committed were aware that in everyone was sin’s innate 
defilement, which needed to be washed away through water and the Spirit�86
In Origen’s commentary, Augustine would also come across a theory about 
the way sin is transmitted from Adam to his descendants� According to 
Origen, human sin is not merely a consequence of following Adam’s bad 
example, as Pelagius would have it� Rather, it is propagated via sexual inter-
course, which invariably stems from the sinful impulse of “concupiscence” 
(concupiscentia)� Paul’s statement in Rom 8:3 that Christ came “in the like-
ness of sinful flesh” (in similitudine carnis peccati87) is explained by Origen 
via his propagation theory� According to Origen, Christ is said to have only 
the “likeness” of the sinful body because of his miraculous conception from 
a virgin�88 Given the fact that Christ’s conception was unaffected by the 
impulse of concupiscence, he did not possess a normal “body of sin” like 
the rest of us� In his Epistle 157, it is possible that Augustine is making use 
of Origen’s exegesis of Rom 8:3 in order to rebut the Pelagian claim that 
unbaptized infants are saved through their innate sinlessness: “Therefore, 
if these men have found an infant not begotten of the concupiscence of that 
first man [i�e� Adam], let them say that it is not subject to damnation and has 
no need of being delivered from that damnation by the grace of Christ�”89
In Augustine’s view, infants are subject to damnation because they have 
been propagated from Adam’s seed, conceived by the impulse of sinful “con-
cupiscence” (concupiscentia)� Infants can only be released from this state 
through the sacrament of baptism�
 86 Or�, comm� in Rom� 5�9,13: Pro hoc et ecclesia ab apostolis traditionem suscepit 
etiam paruulis baptismum dare; sciebant enim illi quibus mysteriorum secreta 
commissa sunt diuinorum quia essent in omnibus genuinae sordes peccati quae 
per aquam et spiritum ablui deberent (…) (SC 539, 498)� English translation from 
T�P� Scheck 2001, 367�
 87 Or�, comm� in Rom. 5�9,10 (SC 539, 496); Or�, comm� in Rom. 6�12,4 (SC 
543, 206)�
 88 For a detailed treatment of Augustine’s anti- Pelagian exegesis of Rom 8:3 and 
its possible roots in Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos, see Keech, 
2012� Keech claims that Augustine’s specific exegesis of Rom 8:3 in terms of concu-
piscentia is inspired by Origen (p� 133)� But he is unsure whether the general theory 
of transmission of sin through sexual propagation was an “idea already nascent 
in Augustine’s thought” even prior to his reception of Origen’s commentary�
 89 Aug�, Ep� 157 3�11: (…) proinde isti, quem forte inuenerint infantem non ex illius 
unius hominis concupiscentia procreatum, ipsum dicant illi damnationi non esse 
obnoxium nec per Christi gratiam ab illa damnatione esse liberandum. (CSEL 44, 










6.  Aftermath: The Role of Epistle 157 in the Pelagian 
Controversy
Augustine’s Epistle 157 to the layman Hilary of Syracuse might have 
remained relatively insignificant if Orosius had not brought it to Palestine�90 
This Spanish priest, who visited Augustine in 415, cited Epistle 157 against 
the disputed teachings of Pelagius during the synod at Jerusalem held in 
July of the same year� In this way, Augustine’s epistle came to be renowned 
as an authoritative refutation of Pelagian theology� Epistle 157 was again 
employed as an anti- Pelagian resource by the bishops Heros and Lazarus 
when they composed their libellus against Pelagius, just prior to the Diospolis 
synod in December of 415�91 We can thus say that the case against Pelagius 
at these important synods was partially inspired by Origen’s Commentarii in 
Epistulam ad Romanos, which, as we have seen, contributed to Augustine’s 
Epistle 157� It is somewhat paradoxical, then, that Pelagius’ interpretation 
of Romans was also informed by his reading of Origen’s commentary�92
7.  Conclusion
As I hope to have shown, the textual evidence corroborates Bammel’s sug-
gestion that Epistle 157 shows “positive contacts with Origen�”93 Indeed, 
there are significant conceptual parallels between Augustine’s Epistle 157, 
and the Latin translation of the Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos� 
The sheer number of these, together with the remarkable overlap between 
certain of them, makes direct reception of the commentary the most plau-
sible explanation� As in his earlier anti- Pelagian writings, De peccatorum 
meritis and De spiritu et littera, Augustine, in his epistle to Hilary from 
414, again uses the commentary as a resource for his polemic against the 
idea of human sinlessness� Since Augustine largely bases his interpretation 
of original sin on Rom 5:12– 21, it is not surprising to find that, when he 
draws upon elements of Origen’s exegesis in Epistle 157, it is mainly in 
relation to these verses. The “Devil argument”; the notion of “law”; and 
the discussion concerning Latin and Greek biblical manuscripts, are all of 
relevance to Rom 5:12– 21� The doctrine of original sin, in turn, forms the 
explanatory basis for Augustine’s understanding of human incapacity� The 
weakness of the human will is ultimately ascribed to the sin of Adam, and 
our physical propagation from him� Augustine’s understanding of Daniel’s 
 90 W�J� Collinge, Saint Augustine: Four Anti- Pelagian Writings, Washington 1992, 94�
 91 Cf� Aug�, De gestis Pelagii 11,23�
 92 Scheck, 2008, 67– 85�











Diabolum potius poneret 111
confession showcases his lack of confidence in the powers of the will� Even 
the most holy prophet is not able to avoid the consequences of his wounded 
human nature and so must confess his sins, together with his people� While 
in Epistle 157 Augustine concedes the theoretical possibility of living a life 
without sin (obviously with the help of divine grace), he clearly believes that 
Christ alone has achieved such an existence�
My examination of Epistle 157 adds another piece to the puzzle of 
Augustine’s reception of Origen’s Commentarii in Epistulam ad Romanos� 
It demonstrates (admittedly on a small scale) that Augustine continued to 
employ the commentary as an anti- Pelagian instrument in the rising contro-
versy� On the other hand, at certain points in Epistle 157 Augustine seems 
to treat the commentary with caution, censuring Origen when his exegesis 
appears to contradict Augustine’s views on Christian anthropology (pro-
vided that Augustine’s criticism of the persona- interpretation of Daniel’s 
confession is indeed aimed at Origen)� In this fashion, Augustine selectively 
appropriates ideas and arguments from the commentary, not hesitating to 
reject those that do not serve his purposes�94
It might strike one as counter- intuitive that Augustine would employ 
Origen’s commentary as a weapon against Pelagius, Caelestius, and their aco-
lytes� Even in Rufinus’ abridged and edited Latin version, the Commentarii 
in Epistulam ad Romanos is far from being an obvious proof- text for the 
anthropological views of the mature Augustine� On the contrary, the Latin 
commentary is full of statements that showcase Origen’s less “pessimistic” 
anthropology, including his customary insistence on human freedom� It is 
therefore a remarkable achievement that Augustine (almost) succeeds in 
making Origen (in the guise given him by Rufinus) a proponent of his own 
doctrine of original sin� The fact that Pelagius also employed the commen-
tary to support his understanding of Christian anthropology well illustrates 
the incredible richness of Origen’s exegetical work, not to mention its inner 
tensions and apparent contradictions� It is curious that both Pelagius and 
Augustine managed to support opposite views of the human condition with 
arguments taken from one and the same source�




Augustine on human freedom and free will
Abstract: Taking its departure in the different phases in Augustine’s theological and 
philosophical thinking this article argues that Augustine after having left Manichean 
determinism argues that human beings are free and have freedom of choice� These 
ideas about human freedom and free will inspired by Platonism were challenged by 
Augustine’s intensive reading of Paul (c� 395) and are developed under influence of 
his conflict with the Pelagians from 410 onwards� During the last 20 years of his life, 
Augustine returns to a deterministic concept of human beings claiming that only those 
who are predestined by God to salvation have freedom and free choice to do good� 
Augustine thus ends where he began – with a deterministic and dualistic anthropology�
1.  Introduction
In the following article, I explore how Augustine’s changing understanding 
of human freedom and free will relates to his theological anthropology� This 
focus means that I will omit other important aspects of Augustine’s theolog-
ical anthropology, such as his understanding of the human body and human 
psychology�
The question of changing phases in Augustine’s theology and philosophy 
has been raised many times, and from many different angles� The answers 
given are likewise diverse� This is a consequence both of different thematic 
foci and different interpretations of Augustine’s various works� One help-
ful way to approach this question is to examine the various historical con-
texts and conflicts in which he was involved� Augustine’s theology, as is 
well known, was largely developed in response to conflicts within himself 
(internal) or with his theological adversaries (external)� Since this trajectory 
is familiar, I will provide just a brief sketch of its development in the first 
section�
To take a step further, we must ask what role the concepts of human 
freedom and free will played during these phases of Augustine’s life and the-
ology� Did his concepts of human freedom and free will remain consistent, 
or did they change? If the latter, then why and how? Admittedly, these ques-
tions have also been asked and answered before, most recently and notice-
ably by Lenka Karfíková in her important book Grace and Will according 
to Augustine� Nevertheless, I find it important to readdress these questions, 




theological anthropology, which he has passed on to future generations of 
theologians� Such, then, will be the main objective of this contribution�
2.  Augustine’s conflicts and contexts
Augustine was an adherent of Manichaeism for a considerable length of 
time— from about 373/ 74 to 383 (cf� Confessions 2– 4)� After his eventual 
break with the Manichaeans, they became his main antagonists, sparking 
a controversy that lasted from Augustine’s conversion to Christianity and 
baptism in 386, until around 400, when a new conflict— this time with 
Donatism— came to the fore� The Donatist controversy, however, was not 
dominated by questions of the origin of evil, free will, and predestination; 
it was rather concerned with the unity of the Church and the use of the 
sacraments� For this reason, Augustine’s anti- Donatist writings do not mark 
an important contribution to the theme of this article� In 411, a new con-
flict broke out with Pelagius and his followers� This conflict lasted until the 
end of Augustine’s life in 430� During this so- called Pelagian controversy, 
Augustine’s ideas about the origin of evil, human freedom, free will, and 
the divine predestination of humans to salvation or damnation found their 
final form� His writings pertaining to the Pelagian controversy are therefore 
of utmost importance for our theme� To this brief sketch of the phases of 
Augustine’s theology, which focusses on his ‘outer enemies,’ we should also 
add the importance of his deep engagement with Pauline theology from 394/ 
395 onwards� This renewed understanding of Pauline theology transformed 
Augustine’s theological understanding of sin, free will, and grace� In fact, 
this is probably the most important background for his strong attacks on all 
forms of ‘Pelagian’ theology� Peter Brown’s book Augustine of Hippo1 has 
been extremely influential in the way most scholars understand these phases 
in Augustine’s life and theology� His book is more or less structured accord-
ing to the phases I have summarized above�2
3.  The break with Manichaeism
Augustine was attracted by the Manichaean answer to the question of the ori-
gins of evil and the relation of evil to humanity� This question is important for 
 1 P� Brown, Augustine of Hippo, London 1967�
 2 I am convinced by Brown’s understanding of the phases in Augustine’s theological, 
philosophical, and personal development, but as this understanding has become 
standard in Augustine research it should be questioned and ‘shaken’ from time to 
time� C� Harrison does this in her book, Rethinking Augustine’s early theology. 
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any account of theological anthropology because the way that evil relates to 
human beings is decisive for how one conceives of human nature� According 
to Manichaeism, evil is an ontologically independent reality existing along-
side God, who is good�3 The perpetual struggle between the good and the 
evil principles takes place in all human beings, who thus become a battlefield 
for these powers� For a long time, these answers satisfied Augustine, but 
after having met and debated with the Manichaean bishop Faustus in 382, 
his doubts about Manichaean theology began to grow� In 383, Augustine 
finally broke with Manichaeism after his arrival in Italy�
His break with Manichaean dualism meant that Augustine could no longer 
locate the source of evil in an independent power, equal and opposite to God� 
The responsibility of evil had to be left with either God or humanity� Nor 
could the source of evil be found in matter or the material body, because 
Augustine, after renouncing Manichaeism, came to regard matter (including 
the human body) as God’s good creation (cf� e�g� On the Free Choice of Will 
1�11,23,79)� The definition of evil had to be reconsidered� Having arrived in 
Milan, where he became the official city rhetor, Augustine received fresh inspi-
ration from several different sources� Most importantly, he began to listen to 
Bishop Ambrose’s sermons, which were grounded in the Old and the New 
Testaments, and in Platonism� Augustine had also received at this time sev-
eral of the Platonists’ manuscripts (Confessions 7�9)� The combined influence 
Ambrose, the Bible, and the Platonic writings led Augustine in the direction 
of a more monistic ontology� Moving in this direction, a Platonic solution to 
the origin of evil presented itself: evil could be understood as a deprivation of 
good, and therefore without positive ontological status� Augustine adopted 
this concept of evil in his criticism of Manichaeism� This can be seen in his On 
Genesis contra the Manichaeans 1�4 where he comments on Genesis 1:3: “God 
said that light should come into being�” This passage leads Augustine to claim 
that darkness, which was overcome by the light, is not something in and of 
itself, but rather the absence of something else, namely, light� Thus, he rejected 
the Manichaean idea of darkness as a substance per se, which encouraged 
them to claim that there is a ‘nation of darkness’ (cf� On Genesis contra the 
Manichaeans 1�4)�4 Inspired by his reading of the Pauline5 letters, especially 
 3 Concerning Augustine’s Manichaean concept of evil, see Aug�, Conf. 5�10,20, 
further H� M� Scerri, Augustine, the Manichaean and the Problem of Evil, 
in: Augustinian Panorama 5– 7 (1988– 1990), 76– 86 (77– 78)�
 4 In Conf� 7�3– 8 Augustine describes his struggle with the question of evil, and in 
Conf� 7�12 and 7�16 he describes his new understanding of evil as the deprivation 
of the good� See further R� Williams, On Augustine, London 2016, 79– 105 where 
he discusses Augustine’s concept of evil�







the Letter to the Romans, Augustine’s thoughts on the theme of evil developed 
still further� He leaned more and more toward the conviction that evil has its 
roots in human withdrawal from God’s law� Human beings used their freedom 
to turn away from this law� Consequently, free will becomes important for the 
question of how evil is introduced into human existence�
In the first book of his On the Free Choice of the Will (387/ 388 – 391/ 
395), Augustine claims that God does not commit evil, but punishes those 
who do� While the humans who suffer these punishments experience them as 
evil, this does not make them so� Indeed, God punishes justly� Therefore, in 
looking for the author of evil, God must be excluded from the start� Instead, 
Augustine points to humans as the true culprits: evil people are the authors 
of their own evildoing, he says (1�1,1,3)� The reason why such people act 
evilly is that they turn away from the good they have learned� Evil is not 
itself something one can learn because it does not exist� It is a lack of good-
ness, for goodness can be unlearned� This is a typically Platonic way of 
explaining evil as an absence or privation of being and goodness� According 
to Augustine, lust makes human beings turn away from the good (1�3,8,21), 
which nevertheless comes from their free will and free choice� Evil is the 
result of human beings’ free will to choose between good and bad�
We have established that what each person elects to pursue and embrace is located 
in the will and that the mind is not thrown down from its stronghold of dominance, 
and from the right order, by anything but the will� It is also clear that when a person 
uses something in an evil manner, the thing should not be blamed, but rather the 
person using it in that evil manner6 (On the Free Choice of the Will 1�16,34,114, cf� 
the passage 1�11,21,76– 1�16,34,114)�
Augustine’s conclusion thus stands in stark opposition to the Manichaeans’� 
He concludes, contra Manichaeism, that human beings possess freedom of 
the will� This free will, in turn, is the source of evil because it willfully turns 
humanity from the good toward its antithesis�
In On Genesis Contra the Manichaeans (388– 390), we find, at least indi-
rectly, the same argument against the ontological status of evil as we saw 
in the first book of On the Free Choice of the Will� On Genesis Contra 
the Manichaeans is an apology for Augustine’s understanding of Genesis 
 6 Aug�, De Libero Arbitrio 1�16,34,114: …satis aperteque distincta sunt, quid autem 
quisque sectandum et amplectendum eligat in uoluntate esse positum constitit nul-
laque re de arce dominandi rectoque ordine mentem depone nisi uoluntate, et est 
manifestum non rem ullam cum eaquisque male utitur, sed ipsum male utentem 
esse arguendum. (CCSL 29, 234)� The English translation is from P� King (ed�), 
Augustine, On the free choice of the will, On grace and free choice, and other 
writings, Cambridge 2010� Cf� the passage 1�11,21,76– 1�16,34,114�
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1– 3 set over against the Manichaeans� As is typical in apologies, it has a 
double addressee; namely, the Manichaeans and the uneducated Catholic 
Christians whom Augustine calls ‘the small ones�’ Given this dual audience, 
Augustine’s arguments are most often quite simple, and, in many passages, 
he simply retells the creation story� Across the two books, he goes through 
Genesis  chapters 1– 3, rejecting Manichaean interpretations and deflecting 
criticism while presenting his own arguments� All of these arguments share a 
single aim: to show that God’s creation is good and, as such, not the source 
or cause of evil� Evil came into the world when Adam and Eve transgressed 
against God’s law� Evil is a matter of transgression, not nature� Not even the 
Devil is intrinsically evil, but only insofar as he is the ultimate transgressor 
(cf� 2:28)� Human beings act out of their own will, not out of God’s will and 
law� Without God, humans are naked (cf� Gen� 3:10– 11)� This state of affairs 
is, according to Augustine, passed down to all generations of humanity after 
Adam (cf� 2:8)� Already here, we find traces of the idea of inherited sin�
4.  New reading of Paul
In his book Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion. The Journey from Platonism 
to Christianity, Brian Dobell claims that Augustine’s conversion in 386 was 
more a conversion to Platonism than to Christianity� At this point Augustine 
became a ‘Porphyrian�’7 It was only his intensive study of Pauline the-
ology from 395 onwards that made him a ‘Christian�’ I put ‘Porphyrian’ 
and ‘Christian’ in quotation marks, because Dobell would not claim that 
Augustine was not a Christian after 386 (probably even also before); rather, 
he believes there was an important shift for Augustine around 395 from 
a Platonic inspired Christianity to a Pauline inspired Christianity� Dobell 
follows Brown’s understanding of Augustine’s theological development, 
namely, that he lost faith in his Platonic inspired conviction of the human 
ability to continuously progress toward spiritual perfection�8 In this state of 
mind Augustine began to lecture for his friends in Carthage on Paul’s Epistle 
to the Romans� Brown writes:
Augustine did not discover Paul at this time� He merely read him differently� 
Previously, he had interpreted Paul as a Platonist: he had seen him as the expo-
nent of a spiritual ascent, of the renewal of the ‘inner’ man, the decay of the ‘outer; 
and, after his baptism, he had shared in Paul’s sense of triumph: ‘Behold all things 
have become new�’ The idea of the spiritual life as a vertical ascent, as a progress 
towards a final, highest stage to be reached in this life, had fascinated Augustine in 
 7 B� Dobell, Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion. The Journey from Platonism to 
Christianity, Cambridge 2012, 228– 236�







the previous years� Now, he will see in Paul nothing but a single unresolved tension 
between ‘flesh’ and ‘spirit’� The only changes he could find were changes in states of 
awareness of this tension: ignorance of its existence ‘before the Law’; helpless real-
ization of the extent of the tension between good and evil ‘under the Law’, a stage 
of utter dependence on a Liberator ‘under grace’� Only after this life would tension 
be resolved, ‘When death is swallowed up in victory�’ It is a flattened landscape: and 
in it, the hope of spiritual progress comes increasingly to depend, for Augustine, on 
the unfathomable will of God�9
In Brown’s interpretation of Augustine’s new understanding of Paul, he cites 
Augustine’s comment on his answer to Simplicianus from Retractiones 2�27 
where Augustine says, quoting Paul: “Who has made you different? What 
have you got that you did not first receive? If you have received all this, why 
glory in it as if you had not been given it?”10
This quote clearly shows that the mature Augustine (writing in 426– 427) 
understood his answer to Simplicianus as a new interpretation of Paul, entail-
ing a new theological anthropology� Augustine seems to have recast human 
nature as fundamentally unfree, contrary to his earlier convictions, and so 
totally dependent on God’s grace� One should remember, however, that this 
is the old Augustine looking back more than 30 years� In between his ear-
lier writings and the Retractiones, which reflect his new understanding of 
Paul, the Pelagian controversy had taken place� This, of course, influenced 
Augustine’s composition of the Retractiones. But, even so, Brown has con-
vincingly demonstrated that this new understanding of sin, grace, free choice 
of the will etc� was not a product of the Pelagian controversy alone, but was 
already guiding Augustine when he wrote his Confessions.11
This Pauline- inspired shift is very important because it forms the basis 
for Augustine’s strong anti- Pelagian theology from 410 onwards, where the 
ideas of inherited sin and predestination become more and more predomi-
nant in his theology and theological anthropology� He had been developing 
his negative anthropology already from 395, but it grew and flourished dur-
ing his conflict with the Pelagians�
 9 Brown, 1967, 151– 152�
 10 Aug�, Retract� 2� 27: Quis enim te discernit? Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? 
Si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non acceperis? (CCSL 57, 90)� English 
translation from P� Brown (ed�), Augustine of Hippo: A Biography, California 
1967, 154�
 11 Cf� Conf. 8,5– 12 where Augustine describe his conversion in Milan� Even if 
Augustine describes his conversion in 386, the conversion is interpreted in the light 
of his experiences from 395 onwards� When he writes Confessiones in 397– 400/ 
401 he looks back on his earlier years, including his conversion, through his new 
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5.  The Donatist conflic
As mentioned above, the Donatist conflict is not especially significant for 
questions concerning the origin of evil, human sin, and human freedom 
because other topics were the main focus of controversy: the unity of the 
church, the right understanding and use of the sacraments, etc�12 Only one 
element in Augustine’s anti- Donatist theology is important for the theme 
of this article, namely, the idea that God predestinates human beings either 
to eternal salvation or to eternal damnation� In his anti- Donatist period, 
Augustine develops this idea as an answer to the Donatists’ claim that the 
one true Church consists of Christians who do not sin� Against this assertion, 
Augustine claimed that all humans are sinners� Among them, God chooses 
some, and only some, to empower by grace to fight sin and who, moreover, 
will be granted eternal life in happiness after the final, universal judgment� 
Who belongs to which group, the saved or the damned, is hidden to people 
in this world� Until the end of the world, the Church must, therefore, be a 
mixed body (corpus permixtum) of sinners and saints, clean and unclean�13 
Later in Augustine’s life, these ideas were further developed, becoming a 
matter of great importance in his theology and anthropology�
6.  The conflict with Pelagius and his followers
The most important context for the latest development of Augustine’s theo-
logical anthropology, including his understanding of the origin of evil, 
human sin, unfreedom, and predestination, is his conflict with the Pelagians� 
The conflict began in 411, when Pelagius and some of his followers arrived 
in North Africa after fleeing from the conquerors of Rome� Even if the ideas 
of Pelagius and his followers were not crystal clear— a situation made even 
more obscure by the subsequent transmission of their ideas and treatises— 
it is evident that they argued for a positive, optimistic concept of human 
nature and believed that one by imitation of Christ could live a holy life 
without sinning�14 This provoked Augustine because, after his Pauline turn 
 12 See however P� I� Kaufman, Augustine, Evil, and Donatism: Sin and Sanctity before 
the Pelagian Controversy, in: TS 51 (1990), 115– 126 (125– 126) who argues that 
Augustine’s struggle with the Donatist claim of being sinless was a precondition 
for his struggles with the Pelagians�
 13 See concerning Augustine’s thoughts about predestination in his anti- Donatist 
period Epistula ad Catholicos (Ep� ad cath�) 9�23; further Brown, 1967, 221; 
235– 236�
 14 Pelag�, Expositio in epistulam Pauli ad Romanos� See especially Pelagius’ com-










and his studies on Romans, he came to fundamentally mistrust the idea that 
human beings can live without sin�
During his conflict with the Pelagians, Augustine developed a number 
of theological ideas to explain the human condition: human beings are, 
he maintained, sinners caught up in the necessity of sinning� This is not 
because human nature is evil, as the Manichaeans suggested, but because 
human beings have inherited their sinfulness from Adam via human procre-
ation� However, some of the Pelagians accused Augustine of having returned 
to Manichaeism because he used expressions which implied that human 
nature was transformed by sin from total good to total evil, a dualistic idea� 
Augustine further argued that the only way to escape the sinful condition 
was by the grace of God offered to humanity through Christ� Only the grace 
of God, through Christ, can heal human nature and make it possible to avoid 
sin and achieve goodness� In addition to the ideas of inherited sin and divine 
grace, Augustine also developed his theory of predestination during his con-
flict with the Pelagians� It was, he argued, God’s election that predestinated 
some human beings to eternal salvation and others to eternal damnation� 
Only those who God elected to salvation would receive divine grace, which, 
in turn, made it possible to fight and overcome inherited sin� These strong 
trajectories in Augustine’s anti- Pelagian theology made a huge impact on 
his concept of human being, including the question of human freedom and 
free will, because they imply that human beings are— in themselves— unfree� 
Only by grace can a human being become free, i�e� if God elects them� In the 
following section, I will analyze some of Augustine’s important anti- Pelagian 
writings to see how he presents these ideas in concrete terms�15
6.1.  Inherited sin
In his important treatise entitled On the Grace of Christ and on Original 
Sin (418), Augustine rejects the theologies of Pelagius and one of his most 
important followers, Caelestius, who seems to have held more radical views 
on sin, freedom, and divine grace, than Pelagius himself� Caelestius had been 
summoned to a council in Carthage, held on 1 May 418, where he was asked 
to defend his theology� In Augustine’s treatise, he refers to the proceedings 
of this council when he describes Caelestius’ points of view� In On the Grace 
of Christ and on Original Sin 2�2 Augustine references Caelestius’ view in 
the following way:
 15 J� M� Rist, Augustine on Free Will and Predestination, in: JTS 20 (1969), 420– 447 
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Caelestius, indeed, maintained this erroneous doctrine with less restraint� To such 
an extent did he push his freedom as actually to refuse, when on trial before the bish-
ops at Carthage, to condemn those who say that Adam’s sin injured only Adam him-
self, and not the human race; and that infants at their birth are in the same state 
that Adam was in before his transgression� In the written statement, too, which 
he presented to the most blessed Pope Zosimus at Rome, he declared with special 
plainness that original sin binds no single infant�16
Caelestius thus rejects the idea that Adam’s sinfulness is transmitted to 
all human beings conceived and born after Adam� There is, according to 
Caelestius, no original sinfulness transmitted from Adam to all subsequent 
human beings� Infants are therefore not born into sin� They are, on the con-
trary, in the same situation as Adam before his transgression (cf� On the 
Grace of Christ and on Original Sin 2�12)� Augustine goes on to claim that 
Pelagius shares Caelestius’ view:
Everything good, and everything evil, on account of which we are either laudable or 
blameworthy, is not born with us but done by us: for we are born not fully devel-
oped but with a capacity for either conduct; and we are procreated as without virtue, 
so also without vice; and previous to the action of our own proper will, that alone is 
in man which God has formed�17 
This short quotation, claimed by Augustine to be from a book on free will 
produced by Pelagius himself and sent to Rome to prove his orthodoxy, con-
tains all the main points of the controversy between Pelagius and Augustine� 
The sinfulness and praiseworthiness of humans are not, according to Pelagius, 
innate, but a result of what individual human beings do� At the time of their 
birth, humans obtain a neutral condition� They can actualize both good and 
evil because their created condition is open to both, having been endowed 
with the freedom of will� All that is innate in newborn human beings comes 
from God, not Adam� Augustine holds exactly the opposite position on these 
 16 Aug�, Grat� Chr� 2�2: Et Caelestius quidem in hoc exstitit errore liberior usque 
adeo, ut neque in episcopali iudicio apud Carthaginem damnare uoluerit eos qui 
dicunt ‘quod peccatum Adae ipsum solum laeserit et non genus humanum et quod 
infants qui nascuntur in eo statu sint, in quo Adam fuit ante praeuaricationem’. 
Et in urbe Roma in libello suo, quem beatissimo papae Zosimo dedit, id asseue-
rauit expressius, ‘quod paruulorum neminem obstringat originale pecccatum’; de 
gestis enim ecclesiasticis Carthaginensibus haec eius uerba descripsimus� (CSEL 
42)� English translation from P� Schaff (ed�), Nicene and Post- Nicene Fathers, First 
Series vol. V, Saint Augustin’s Anti- Pelagian Works, Michigan 1997, 237�
 17 Aug�, Grat� Chr� 2�14: ‘Omne’, inquit, ‘bonum ac malum, quo uel laudabiles uel 
uituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis; capaces enim utri-
usque rei, non pleni nascimur et ut sine uirtute ita et sine uitio procreamur atque 
ante actionem propriae uoluntatis id solum in honime est, quod deus condidit’� 






matters: sinfulness is an innate condition inherited from Adam� When they 
are born, human beings do not, for Augustine, enjoy a neutral condition 
and a God- given free will; nor are they empowered to choose between good 
and evil� On the contrary, human beings are sinful and corrupted at birth 
because they have inherited Adam’s sinfulness� Sinfulness is not, according 
to Augustine, a consequence of individual humans misusing their God- given 
free will to enact evil� It is an inherited condition transmitted to them from 
Adam via sexual procreation (cf� On the Grace of Christ and on Original 
Sin 2�17,19)� The same point is made very clear in Augustine’s Enchiridion 
de fide 42– 52�
In On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin, the arguments against 
Pelagius’ and Caelestius’ position(s) are connected with the question of why 
infants should be baptized, an activity which both parties seem to endorse� 
Pelagius’/ Caelestius’ answer is that God only allows the baptized into his 
Kingdom� Augustine responds in a different way: he claims that infants must 
be baptized because, in baptism, inherited sin is washed away by the grace 
of God in Christ (On the Grace of Christ and on Original Sin 2�5,17,19)� 
This point is clarified in Enchiridion 42– 52 where Augustine, by the help 
of Paul’s Adam- Christ typology, underlines that the sin of Adam can only 
be remitted through Christ� The grace of Christ, he claims, is transferred to 
human beings in the sacrament of baptism� By this process, not only is inher-
ited sin washed away (that sin which is passed down through Adam and his 
progeny), but also those sins committed by the baptized themselves when 
they delay their baptism until later in life� It is thus clear that Augustine, 
by way of his conflict with Pelagius and his followers (from 411 onwards) 
develops and strengthens his idea about inherited sin and the grace of God 
through Christ as the only way to overcome the sinful condition�
6.2.  Predestination
In the very late treatise from 428/ 429, On the Predestination of the Saints, 
Augustine treats the question of predestination� His argument is that faith in 
God and Christ, by which human beings are saved, is a pure gift from God, 
given without any preconditions� Faith and salvation are thus a direct result 
of God’s grace� The logical next question is why God would give this faith 
and grace to only a few� Augustine’s answer is unequivocal: God elects and 
predestinates some human beings to salvation and others to damnation, in 
accordance with his sovereign will� Human beings have no influence over 
this process whatsoever�
The first step in Augustine’s argument is to explain how he reached the 
conclusion that belief in God is a pure gift from God (On the Predestination 
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1�3– 7)� On this theme, Augustine had changed his mind� Previously, he 
argued that humans were responsible for taking the initiative:
It was not thus that the pious and humble teacher thought – I speak of the 
most blessed Cyprian – when he said that we must boast in nothing, since nothing 
is our own� And in order to show this, he appealed to the apostle as a witness, where 
he said, ‘for what have you that you have not received? And if you have received 
it, why do you boast as if you had not received it?’ (1 Corinthians 4:7)� And it was 
chiefly by this testimony that I myself also was convinced when I was in a sim-
ilar error, thinking that faith whereby we believe in God is not God’s gift, but that it 
is in us from ourselves, and that by it we obtain the gifts of God, whereby we may 
live temperately and righteously and piously in this world�18
Thus, Augustine at one point believed that human beings should take the 
first step themselves in believing and receiving the grace of God� However, 
at the beginning of his episcopate (395), he arrived at a different conclu-
sion: faith and grace are God’s pure gifts� In fact, he expressed this insight 
for the first time in his letter to Simplicianus, which dates to the beginning of 
his episcopate (On Predestination 1�8)� He recalls how he desired to argue 
that humans have freedom to choose whether or not to believe, but could 
not harmonize this position with what he found written by Paul in 1 Cor� 
4:7 (cf� the quotation above)� Augustine was forced, by his own admission, 
to conclude that human beings had no freedom of choice in matters of faith:
In the solution of this question I labored indeed on behalf of the free choice of 
the human will, but God’s grace overcame, and I could only reach that point where 
the apostle is perceived to have said with the most evident truth, ‘For who makes 
you to differ? And what have you that you have not received? Now, if you have 
received it, why do you glory as if you received it not?’ (1 Corinthians 4:7) 19
 18 Aug�, Praed. 1�3,7: Non sic pius atque humilis doctor ille sapiebat: Cyprianum 
beatissimum loquor, qui dixit, «In nullo gloriandum, quando nostrum nihil sit» 
(Ad Quirinum, lib. 3, cap. 4). Quod ut ostenderet, adhibuit Apostolum testem 
dicentem, Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? Si autem et accepisti, quid glo-
riaris quasi non acceperis (I Cor. IV, 7)? Quo praecipue testimonio etiam ipse 
convictus sum, cum similiter errarem, putans fidem qua in Deum credimus, non 
esse donum Dei, sed a nobis esse in nobis, et per illam nos impetrari Dei dona 
quibus temperanter et juste et pie vivamus in hoc saeculo� (PL 44)� English trans-
lation from Schaff, 1997, 500�
 19 Aug�, Praed. 1�4,8: In cujus quaestionis solutione laboratum est quidem pro libro 
arbitrio voluntatis humanae; sed vicit Dei gratia: nec nisi ad illud potuit perve-
niri, ut liquidissima veritate dixisse intelligatur Apostolus, Quis enim te discernit? 
Quid autem habes quod non accepisti? Si autem accepisti, quid gloriaris quasi non 
acceperis (I Cor. IV, 7)? (PL 44)� English translation from Schaff, 1997, 502� Cf� 






According to Augustine’s reading, Paul’s aim was to humble human beings 
for the sake of exalting God (cf� On Predestination 1�9)� In 1 Cor� 4:7, Paul 
asks, “who makes thee to differ?” From the context presented in the letter 
itself, it seems as if Paul means to argue that there are no real differences 
between the Corinthians� Augustine takes Paul’s question in another direc-
tion; he thinks that Paul is asking a question about who creates the differ-
ences between the Corinthian Christians and humans in general� His answer 
is God� The capacity to love and have faith is given by nature, but the power 
to actuate love and faith is given by the grace of God alone� From here, he 
moves on to argue that God creates differences between humans by giving 
faith and grace to some but not others (On Predestination 1�10)�
Having established this point, Augustine arrives at the theme of elec-
tion and predestination� God elects certain people by preparing their will to 
believe and receive grace� This is an expression of his mercy� Others are not 
elected� They will therefore not believe, nor receive the grace of God� This 
is an expression of his just judgment� Augustine expresses it in the follow-
ing way:
Many hear the word of truth; but some believe, while others contradict� Therefore, 
the former will to believe; the latter do not will� Who does not know this? Who can 
deny this? But since in some, the will is prepared by the Lord, in others it is not pre-
pared, we must assuredly be able to distinguish what comes from God’s mercy and 
what from His judgment�20
And:
Here is mercy and judgment – mercy towards the election, which has obtained 
the righteousness of God, but judgment to the rest, which have been blinded� 
And yet the former, because they willed, believed; the latter, because they did 
not will, believed not� Therefore, mercy and judgment were manifested in the 
very wills themselves� Certainly, such an election is of grace, not at all of merits�21
Judging by these words it would seem as though Augustine, in the evening 
of his life, has returned to the conviction that human beings possess a free 
 20 Aug�, Praed� 1�6,11: «Multi audiunt verbum veritatis: sed alii credunt, alii con-
tradicunt. Volunt ergo isti credere, nolunt autem illi.» Quis hoc ignoret? quis 
hoc neget? Sed cum aliis praeparetur, aliis non praeparetur voluntas a Domino; 
discernendum est utique quid veniat de misericordia ejus, quid de judicio. (PL 44)� 
English translation from Schaff, 1997, 503�
 21 Aug�, Praed� 1�6,11: Ecce misericordia et judicium: misericordia in electionem quae 
consecuta est justitiam Dei; judicium vero in caeteros qui excaecati sunt: et tamen 
illi quia voluerunt, crediderunt; illi quia noluerunt, non crediderunt. Misericordia 
igitur et judicium in ipsis voluntatibus facta sunt. Electio quippe ista gratiae est, 
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choice of the will— the freedom to choose for, or against, belief� This is true, 
but only with the very important caveat that God, by his grace in Christ, 
prepares the human will for one of these two choices� Thus, humans do 
not decide by themselves whether they will or will not believe� Their will is 
managed/ prepared by the grace of God� According to Augustine, the reason 
why some are predestined to receive God’s grace and salvation is hidden 
from human understanding (cf� On Predestination 1�11,14)� It is not even 
proper for humans to question why some are elected and called to belief, 
while others are not� All men and women are caught up in sin, which they 
have inherited both from Adam and their own parents� For this reason, God 
would be acting justly even if he did not elect any to belief and its attendant 
salvation� However, he does elect and predestinate some humans to salva-
tion� This shows that he is not only just, but also merciful� Augustine’s ideas 
on this are summed up in On Predestination 1�8,16:
Faith, then, as well in its beginning as in its completion, is God’s gift; and let no 
one have any doubt whatever, unless he desires to resist the plainest sacred writings, 
that this gift is given to some, while to some it is not given� But why it is not given 
to all, ought not to disturb the believer, who believes that from one, all have gone 
into a condemnation, which undoubtedly is most righteous; so that even if none 
were delivered therefrom, there would be no just cause for finding fault with God� 
Whence it is plain that it is a great grace for many to be delivered, and to acknowl-
edge in those that are not delivered what would be due to themselves; so that he 
that glories may glory not in his own merits, which he sees to be equaled in those 
that are condemned, but in the Lord� But why He delivers one rather than another – 
‘His judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out’ (Rom� 11:33)� For 
it is better in this case for us to hear or to say, ‘O man, who are you that repliest 
against God?’ (Rom� 9:20) than to dare to speak as if we could know what He has 
chosen to be kept secret� Since, moreover, He could not will anything unrighteous� 22
 22 Aug�, Praed� 1�8,16: Fides igitur, et inchoata, et perfecta, donum Dei est: et hoc 
donum quibusdam dari, quibusdam non dari, omino non dubitet, qui non vult 
manifestissimis sacris Litteris repugnare. Cur autem non omnibus detur, fidelem 
movere non debet, qui credit ex uno omnes isse in condemnationem, sine dubi-
tatione justissimam: ita ut nulla Dei esset justa reprehensio, etiamsi nullus inde 
liberaretur. Unde constat magnam esse gratiam, quod plurimi liberantur, et quid 
sibi deberetur, in eis qui non liberantur agnoscunt: ut qui gloriatur, non in suis 
meritis, quae paria videt esse damnatis, sed in Domino glorietur. Cur autem istum 
potius quam illum liberet, inscrutabilia sunt judicia ejus et investigabiles viae ejus 
(Rom. XI, 33). Melius enim et hic audimus aut dicimus, O homo, tu quis es qui 
respondeas Deo (Rom. IX, 20)? quam dicere audemus, quasi noverimus, quod 
occultum esse voluit, qui tamen aliquid injustum velle non potuit� (PL 44)� English 




The result of being elected and receiving the grace of God is the attainment 
of holiness� It is important for Augustine to clarify that human beings are not 
elected by God to receive grace because they believe or because they live holy 
lives� It is the other way around: those who are elected and receive God’s grace 
will become believers; they will be able to live holy lives because they have 
received God’s grace by election (On Predestination 1�34– 37)�
6.3.  Human freedom and free will
It would be logical to conclude that the more Augustine develops his ideas 
about inherited sin and predestination, the less space he leaves for any ideas 
about human freedom and free will� This indeed seems to be the case in sev-
eral of Augustine’s works from the anti- Pelagian period, and it is obvious that 
this was how the Pelagians understood his position� However, in On Grace 
and Free Will from 426– 427 Augustine forcefully defends the view that nei-
ther inherited sin nor God’s grace exclude the human possibility of choosing 
between good and evil� Augustine points to a multitude of Biblical passages 
where prophets or apostles express divine prescriptions and proscriptions:
Now, wherever it is said, ‘Do not do this,’ and ‘Do not do that,’ and wherever there is 
any requirement in the divine admonitions for the work of the will to do anything, or 
to refrain from doing anything, there is at once a sufficient proof of free will� No man, 
therefore, when he sins, can in his heart blame God for it, but every man must impute 
the fault to himself�23
Such precepts would be worthless if human beings were unable to follow 
them� If human beings could not follow such precepts, it would also elim-
inate their responsibility for breaking them� How can Augustine main-
tain his stance that all humanity is infected with the sin of Adam, and to 
that extent unfree, while— at the same time— holding that we possess the 
freedom to choose to follow God’s precepts and do good? This is possible 
because of the grace given by God� God’s grace heals sinful human beings, 
enabling them to follow his commandments (On Grace and Free Will 1�7)� 
When God’s grace acts upon sinners, both wills (God’s and the sinner’s) 
work together against the sin, thus fulfilling the divine precepts: “And thus, 
 23 Aug�, Grat� 1�2,4: Nempe ubi dicitur, Noli hoc, et noli illud, et ubi ad aliquid 
faciendum vel non faciendum in divinis monitis opus voluntatis exigitur, satis 
liberum demonstratur arbitrium. Nemo ergo Deum causetur in corde suo, sed 
sibi imputet quisque, cum peccat. (PL 44)� English translation from Schaff, 1997, 
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neither was it the grace of God alone, nor was it he himself alone, but it was 
the grace of God with him�”24
It is important for Augustine to avoid the mistaken view that God bestows 
grace upon humans according to their own merits� This is what the Pelagians 
claim� If it were so, however, grace would no longer be grace (cf� On Grace 
and Free Will 1�10– 14)� God’s grace is a pure gift, which Christians never-
theless must pray for (On Grace and Free Will 1�9)� So, even if a Christian 
life, according to the laws of God, is a result of cooperation between God’s 
grace and the human will, the gift of grace comes first and provides/ reacti-
vates the freedom of the will� Everything thus rests on grace, not on human 
merit� Even so, the cooperative element helps explain why the Bible often 
says that salvation and eternal life are the result of good works� This is true, 
but the good works are only possible through God’s preceding grace (On 
Grace and Free Will 1�19– 20)�
According to Augustine, the Pelagians claim that human beings receive 
God’s grace not through Christ alone, but also through human nature and 
divine law (On Grace and Free Will 1�23– 25)� Augustine rejects this:
Well, but if the law is not grace, seeing that in order that the law itself may be kept, 
it is not the law but only grace, which can give help, will not nature at any rate 
be grace? For this, too, the Pelagians have been bold enough to aver, that grace is 
the nature in which we were created, so as to possess a rational mind, by which 
we are enabled to understand – formed as we are in the image of God, so as to 
have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over 
every living thing that creeps upon the earth� This, however, is not the grace which 
the apostle commends to us through the faith of Jesus Christ� For it is certain that 
we possess this nature in common with ungodly men and unbelievers; whereas 
the grace which comes through the faith of Jesus Christ belongs only to them to 
whom the faith itself appertains� ‘For all men have not faith’ (2 Thess� 3:2)25
Concerning the grace given by God through Jesus Christ, the Pelagians claim 
that it only provides for the remission of past sins (On Grace and Free Will 
 24 Aug�, Grat� 1�5,12: Ac per hoc nec gratia Dei sola, nec ipse solus, sed gratia Dei 
cum illo� (PL 44)� English translation from Schaff, 1997, 449�
 25 Aug�, Grat� 1�13,25: Si autem lex non est gratia, quia ut ipsa lex fiat, non potest 
lex adjuvare, sed gratia; numquid natura erit gratia? Nam et hoc Pelagiani ausi 
sunt dicere, gratiam esse naturam, in qua sic creati sumus, ut habeamus mentem 
rationalem, qua intelligere valeamus, facti ad imaginem Dei, ut dominemur pisci-
bus maris, et volucribus coeli, et omnibus pecoribus quae repunt super terram. Sed 
non haec est gratia, quam commendat Apostolus per fidem Jesu Christi. Hanc enim 
naturam etiam cum impiis et infidelibus certum est nobis esse communem: gratia 
vero per fidem Jesu Christi eorum tantummodo est, quorum est ipsa fides. Non 







1�26)� Having received by grace the forgiveness of these sins, humans are 
able— by nature and obedience to the law— to avoid sin and obtain good-
ness� Again, this perspective is rejected by Augustine� The grace given by 
Christ not only heals past transgressions, but also empowers us to avoid 
future sins and obtain future goodness� Grace is involved every step of the 
way� After the fall of Adam, human beings will never, in this life, be able to 
live according to God’s will without the endowment of his grace:
For it is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is 
prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him for such a force of will as suffices to 
make us act by the willing� It is certain that it is we that will when we will, but it is 
He who makes us will what is good, of whom it is said (as he has just now expressed 
it), ‘The will is prepared by the Lord’ (Proverbs 8:35)26
According to Augustine, human beings are captured and imprisoned by the 
sin they inherit from their ancestors— beginning with Adam— and by God’s 
predetermination of each and every human destiny� This has left Western 
theological tradition in a troublesome situation, whose effect is still felt 
today� Here, at the end of this article, I will try to explain the substance of 
these troubles:
7.  The theological consequences of Augustine’s changing 
understanding of human freedom and free will
Augustine’s theology inaugurated something new in the Western theological 
tradition: the idea of total discontinuity between created and fallen humanity� 
The Fall, according to Augustine, effaces the positivity of the image of God 
and annihilates the freedom of the will� There is nothing intrinsically good 
and positive left in human nature following Adam’s transgression� Augustine 
wants to underline that human beings cannot do anything good, such as 
would secure salvation, without God’s grace through Christ� He paints the 
human condition as something extremely negative in order to draw our 
attention to the necessity of God’s grace� The consequence of this, however, 
is that human beings are left with no influence whatsoever over the process 
of their own salvation� Only God’s grace in Christ can reestablish fallen 
human beings�
 26 Aug�, Grat� 1�16,32: Certum est enim nos mandata servare, si volumus: sed quia 
praeparatur voluntas a Domino, ab illo petendum est ut tantum velimus, quantum 
sufficit ut volendo faciamus. Certum est nos velle, cum volumus: sed ille facit ut 
velimus bonum, de quo dictum est, quod paulo ante posui, praeparatur voluntas 
a Domino (Prov. VIII, sec. LXX). (PL 44)� English translation from Schaff, 1997, 
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This dichotomy between created and fallen humanity, on the one 
hand, and the insistence on a portion saved by God’s grace in Christ, on 
the other, combine to single out Christians as possessing a unique ‘second 
nature,’ established by grace� Christians are a new creation� This leaves 
the rest of humanity behind as corrupted and dehumanized� It paves the 
way for Christians to behave in different ways towards non- Christians (or 
Christians of a ‘wrong’ opinion or life style): the first would be to consider 
non- Christians as objects for mission� This is a classical Christian approach 
to non- Christians, which can be practiced out of genuine love of the non- 
Christian neighbor, but can also devolve into violent coercion as history 
has shown� However, Augustine’s idea of predestination makes such an 
approach impossible, because God— from eternity— has predestined some 
to salvation and others to damnation� It does not therefore make sense to 
try and convert non- Christians to Christianity� That said, an Augustinian 
counterargument would likely be that those whom God has predestined to 
salvation will fulfill their calling through the process of conversion� Another 
approach would be to construe non- Christians as non- human, or severely 
corrupted� This raises major ethical problems, of which Christian history is 
also rife� It also makes it impossible to consider Christian anthropology as 
the basis of a universal anthropology, or the foundation of universal human 
rights� In this case, Christian anthropology, which is based on Augustine’s 
ideas of inherited sin and predestination, excludes non- Christians�
Furthermore, as a consequence of the idea of inherited sin, human beings 
cannot properly be held accountable for their individual sins� We are sin-
ful because our ancestor, Adam, transgressed God’s law� This would seem 
to make us passive in relation to God and other creatures, including fel-
low humans� It can also contribute to the ethical torpor mentioned above, 
because one can, with some justification, claim that they are unable to seek 
the good due to their fallen state� This passivity created by the fall and inher-
ited sin might have been counter- balanced by the idea of grace, if Augustine 
had claimed that God bestowed his freedom- reviving grace to all, but the 
passivity of human beings in the process of salvation is accentuated by his 
theory of irresistible divine predestination� This leaves those who are predes-
tinated to salvation without influence on the process of their salvation, and it 
leaves those predestinated to damnation without influence on theirs� And it 
leaves all without any theological reason to do good towards their neighbor�
The combination of these ideas leads not only to a very negative and par-
alyzing conception of human nature, but also to a very one- sided, or one- 
dimensional, understanding of God’s acts of salvation through Christ and 
the Holy Spirit� The focus of salvation is restricted to Christ as the mediator 
of God’s grace, which, in turn, delivers humans from the inherited sin� Other 
images of Christ’s salvific work from previous traditions are marginalized, 
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such as images of Christ as a model for imitation, Christ as a pedagogue, 
Christ as a teacher, Christ as a healer, etc�
Finally, Augustine’s concept of God is also one- sided and problematic 
because the idea of predestination unto either salvation or damnation 
depicts God as being good and evil at the same time� The consequences of 
Augustine’s theories on the concept of God are, however, not the theme of 
this presentation�
It should be clear by now that the new theological anthropology that 
Augustine developed as a concequence of his reading of Paul and of his con-
flict with the Pelagians led him and the theological tradition that followed 
in his footsteps into servere problems: human existence was conceived as 
depraved and unfree�
Eva Elisabeth Houth Vrangbæk
The Fall of the Will: An Investigation of the 
Will of Man Before and After the Fall in De 
civitate Dei
Abstract: This paper examines Augustine’s account of the will of man before and 
after the Fall in De civitate Dei� The aim is to illuminate Augustine’s perspective 
on the human will and, more specifically, the coexistence of God’s omnipotent will 
and the conditional will of man� The investigation will also explore how Augustine 
describes the pagan worldview, especially the pagan understanding of time, as a form 
of captivity, and how he overturns Cicero’s idea of conflict between an all- knowing 
God and a self- willed humanity� It is concluded that, according to Augustine, the 
only reason it is possible to talk about ‘free will’ at all is due to God’s omnipotence 
and absolute freedom� For Augustine, God is the only viable starting point� Only if 
God is completely free to create something new, it is possible for him to create a free 
humanity� The human being is created with a free will only insofar as it is created in 
the image of God� Though free before the Fall, when the human being chose to dis-
sent from God its will became enslaved and its freedom was lost� True freedom of the 
will— the will that cannot sin— will be given in the world beyond: in the city of God�
1.  Introduction
I do not find any better name for the Lord’s ‘heaven of heaven’ than your House� 
There your delight is contemplated without any failure or wandering away to 
something else� The pure heart enjoys absolute concord and unity in the unshake-
able peace of holy spirits, the citizens of your city in the heavens above the visible 
heavens.1
In this quote from Confessiones, Augustine praises the heavens, which he 
also describes as God’s ‘house’ and ‘city�’ But, we should note, this heaven 
is not, for Augustine, just a blessed location; it is a living community of holy 
angels and redeemed human beings� In the Confessiones, this theme is barely 
mentioned, but in De civitate Dei, despite multiple digressions and detours, 
 1 Aug�, Conf� 12�11: Nec inuenio, quid libentius appellandum existimem caelum 
caeli domino quam domum tuam contemplantem delectationem tuam sine ullo 
defectu egrediendi in aliud, mentem puram concordissime unam stabilimento pacis 
sanctorum spirituum, ciuium ciuitatis tuae in caelestibus super ista caelestia� (CSEL 
33, 318)� English translation is from H� Chadwick, Saint Augustine: Confessions. 
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it determines the primary structure of the book� In De civitate Dei Augustine 
forges a close link between the idea of two cities and the notion of two 
wills� The citizens who dwell in the civitas Dei possess a single, unified will 
directed towards God, whereas the several wills of the citizens of the civitas 
terrena are directed towards themselves�
The structuring theme of the two cities in De civitate Dei has led some to 
conclude that Augustine grafted his Manichaean past into his later Christian 
thinking� It is likely that the provenance of describing the heavenly kingdom 
and the community of the lost souls as two cities or communities does 
indeed derive from the dualism of Manichaean thinking, as Van Oort has 
argued�2 But here it is crucial to keep in mind that, in Augustine’s thinking, 
the dualism between the heavenly and the earthly city is what we might call 
superficial, or earthly� The dualism between the two communities is not a 
cosmic dualism� In Augustine’s thinking, there is no such thing as two equal 
and opposite ontological principles, as the Manichaeans taught, because, 
strictly speaking, evil does not exist� There is, for Augustine, only the good 
God and his good creation� Ultimately, there is no dualism in what exists, 
but only in the opposing choices of rational creatures� Dualism does not 
lie in what exists, for God created everything good, but rather in the will 
(‘voluntas’) of his creation� The choice that belongs to creatures, both angels 
and human beings, is the choice between the city of God, which will remain 
eternally, and the earthly city, which will be destroyed on the Final Day�3
In my analysis of the will, I will make use of three central and mutually 
dependent concepts, which are nevertheless distinct from one another: will, 
choice, and freedom (‘voluntas’, ‘arbitrio’, ‘libertas’)� In secondary litera-
ture, and certain translations, these are often treated almost interchange-
ably� But in Augustine’s thinking, especially concerning De civitate Dei, it 
is important to keep an eye on the different aspects these words signify� For 
Augustine, freedom of will is not synonymous with power of will, i�e� having 
the power to enact what the will wants� Freedom is not the same as having 
something to choose between, i�e� having a choice� To have a choice is not 
the same as having a free will� And again, freedom does not necessarily mean 
the freedom to do evil�
The purpose of this paper is to investigate Augustine’s view on the con-
dition of the will before and after the Fall in De civitate Dei. The main 
 2 Most prominently J� van Oort, Jerusalem and Babylon - a study into Augustine’s 
City of God and the sources of his doctrine of the two cities, Leiden 1991; See 
also J� van Oort, Civitas dei- terrena civitas: the concept of the two antithetical 
cities and its sources, in: C� Horn, Augustinus De civitate Dei, Berlin 1997�
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question I am asking is this: how does Augustine understand the connection 
between the human and the omnipotent divine will? In the first half of the 
paper, I will analyse Augustine’s view on the condition of the will before and 
after the Fall� In the second half, I will discuss Augustine’s attempt to har-
monize the relations between the human will, the possibility of choice, the 
will of God, and divine omniscience� I will also examine his account of the 
shortcomings of freedom in the heathen world view�
2.  Deed and Will
According to Augustine, Genesis 3, where the first humans offend God by 
eating the forbidden fruit, records the first evil deed of humankind� The story 
contains several circumstances and actors, which he proceeds to interpret and 
expound upon� He emphasizes, first and foremost, the devil— the first of the 
angels— who in pride turned away from God� Generally, the angels play an 
important role for Augustine� He sees them as having their own creation and 
Fall, and, like human beings, counts them among God’s rational creatures, 
albeit higher in rank� The devil, Augustine claims, lapsed before the first 
human beings were placed in Paradise, and the foundation to the earthly city 
was subsequently laid by him and his legions� In his fallen state the devil was, 
and is, filled with envy towards humankind�4 In his malice, he took the form 
of a snake, and used this form as a tool to seduce the first human couple� The 
devil, in the snake’s slough, played on the credulity of the woman and per-
suaded her to eat of the fruit�5 For Adam it was different� He did not believe 
the woman because of her credulity, but “complied with her wishes because 
of the closeness of the bond between them.”6 Through two different paths, 
both became “captured by sin and entangled in the snares of the devil”7
When dealing with Augustine’s interpretations of such accounts, it is 
important to keep in mind that he does not regard biblical narratives as 
myths or protohistory� While he affirms their spiritual content, Augustine 
also maintains that all biblical stories are rooted in history� This, of course, 
is also the case with the story of the Fall from paradise: “No one, then, 
 4 Aug�, Ciu. 14�11 (CCSL 47– 48, 418)�
 5 Aug�, Ciu. 14�11�
 6 Aug�, Ciu� 14�11: sed sociali necessitudine paruisse (CCSL 47– 48, 433). English 
translation from R� W� Dyson (trans�), The City of God against the Pagans, 
Cambridge 1998; see also W� S� Babcock, The Human and the Angelic Fall: Will 
and Moral Agency in Augustine’s City of God, in: J� McWilliam (ed�), Augustine 
from Rhetor to Theologian, Waterloo 1992, 133– 149 (133)�
 7 Aug�, Ciu� 14�11: peccando tamen ambo sunt capti et diaboli laqueis implicati� 
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forbids us to understand Paradise according to these, and perhaps other, 
more appropriate, allegorical interpretations, while also believing in the 
truth of that story as presented to us in a most faithful narrative of events�”8
For Augustine, Adam and Eve are our ancestors in a strict biological sense, 
which also becomes important to his notion of inherited sin� They physically 
walked around the garden of Eden, ate, drank etc� For this reason, it would 
be completely natural for Augustine to explain the transgression of the first 
human couple with a plausible pattern of human psychological behaviour�9 
Nevertheless, he does not do so� For Augustine, these social patterns cannot 
be the reason for the human Fall� Rather, the evil deed only serves to reveal 
that the Fall had already happened� The scenario described in Genesis is 
only the part of the Fall that Augustine designates the open fall, the evident 
disobedience�10 A good tree does not bear evil fruits� The humans must have 
already been corrupted, otherwise the woman would not have trusted the 
serpent’s word over God’s, and Adam would not have loved the company 
of his wife more than God� It was human will as such that was first cor-
rupted: “For they would not have arrived at the evil act had an evil will not 
preceded it.”11 The Fall is not constituted by the transgression against God, 
but by the free choice of the will to turn away from him�12
3.  The Fall of the Will
Augustine emphasizes in his thinking the absolute distinction between the 
creator, who is eternal and transcendent, and the creation, which is created 
and cannot exist independently of its creator�13 In Augustine’s world view, 
evil does not ‘exist�’ Everything that is, is created by God and therefore 
good� He adopts the Neoplatonic notion of evil as a kind of non- being, or 
privation� God is good and created everything good, but he did not create 
out of his own substance� Rather, he created it out of nothing� Therefore, 
contrary to God, creation is changeable and corruptible�14 The creation can 
 8 Aug�, Ciu� 13�21: Haec et si qua alia commodius dici possunt de intellegendo spiri-
taliter paradiso nemine prohibente dicantur, dum tamen et illius historiae ueritas 
fidelissima rerum gestarum narratione commendata credatur. (CCSL 47– 48, 404)� 
English translation from Dyson, 1998� See also Ciu. 17,3 and Larsen, 2002, 81�
 9 Babcock, 1992, 133– 134 and Aug�, Ciu. 14�12�
 10 Aug�, Ciu. 14�13: malum praecessit in abdito, ut sequeretur hoc malum quod 
perpetratum est in aperto� (CCSL 47– 48, 435)�
 11 Aug�, Ciu. 14�13: Non enim ad malum opus perueniretur, nisi praecessisset uol-
untas mala� (CCSL 47– 48, 434)� English translation from Dyson, 1998�
 12 Aug�, Ciu. 14�13�
 13 Larsen 2002, 75; Aug�, Ciu. 11�26�
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only truly exist in relation to God, who is its creator and maintainer: “To 
that Nature which supremely is, therefore, and by Whom all else that is was 
made, no nature is contrary save that which is not; for that which is con-
trary to what is, is not- being� And so there is no being contrary to God, the 
Supreme Being, and the Author of all beings of whatever kind.”15
The tension is between the God who is and that which is not� In the lapse 
from God, the will turned toward itself, i�e� towards non- being, since noth-
ing exists without God�16 Augustine often writes in dualistic terms, as e�g� 
God versus nothingness, but his underlying system of thought is built upon 
the Platonic idea of a hierarchy of being� Therefore, he can speak of “that 
Nature which supremely is,” as in the quote above� God is, of course, the 
highest level of being— that which is in the highest sense— while the creation 
of God is lower on the great chain of being. But, contrary to Neoplatonism, 
Augustine maintains the absolute distinction between the highest and all 
lower levels, between the creator and the created�
According to Augustine, humans are created as a compound between soul 
and body, whereas God is simple in his essence�17 In the realm of creation, 
human beings are distinguished by their relation to God�18 They were cre-
ated in the image of God and, as such, enjoy a special relation to divine 
love, reflecting the love found in the triune God�19 Human beings were not 
designed as weak-willed beings, vulnerable to corruption by external factors 
like the devil in the serpent’s slough� Rather, human beings were created 
as rational agents, equipped with a will that, at the dawn of creation, was 
turned freely towards God in a bond of love� Humans were created in and 
for this condition, but lacked the certainty of salvation that had been granted 
to the faithful angels�20 Death was a consequence of the Fall� Although it is 
contrary to human nature to die, human beings were not created immortal�21 
In paradise it was in fact possible for human beings to avoid dying (posse 
 15 Aug�, Ciu. 12�2: ac per hoc ei naturae, quae summe est, qua faciente sunt quae-
cumque sunt, contraria natura non est, nisi quae non est. Ei quippe, quod est, 
non esse contrarium est. Et propterea Deo, id est summae essentiae et auctori 
omnium qualiumcumque essentiarum, essentia nulla contraria est� (CCSL 47– 48, 
357)� English translation from Dyson, 1998� See also G� R� Evans, Augustine on 
Evil, Cambridge 1982, 91– 111�
 16 Aug�, Ciu. 14�13�
 17 See Aug�, Ciu. 11�10�
 18 Aug�, Ciu. 12�24�
 19 Aug�, Ciu� 11�28: Quoniam igitur homines sumus ad nostri creatoris imaginem 
creati, cuius est uera aeternitas, aeterna ueritas, aeterna et uera caritas, estque ipse 
aeterna et uera et cara trinitas neque confusa neque separate� (CCSL 47– 48, 348)�
 20 Aug�, Ciu. 11�12� See also Larsen, 2002, 77�
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non mori)22 but, after the Fall, humans could no longer do so (non posse non 
mori)� However, at the end of times, it will no longer be possible to die (non 
posse mori)�23 Human beings chose to sin and turn away from God, and, for 
this reason, human beings were subjected to death and sank into a lower 
level of being than God had initially determined�
Augustine emphasizes that God created both humans and angels with 
a free will; he wanted his rational creatures to love him freely, not under 
compulsion� A host of angels fell when, in their pride, they broke the bond 
of divine love, loving themselves more than their Creator� Another host 
remained faithful and so obtained salvation� By using their wills to love 
themselves, and not God, Adam and Eve plunged themselves and all their 
ancestors into sin� When the freedom of the will was used for self- love rather 
than love of God, the will was disconnected from its source and lost its 
freedom:
This betrayal occurs as an act of free will� For if the will had remained unshaken in 
its love of that higher and immutable Good by Which it bestowed upon it the light 
by which it can see and the fire by which it can love, it would not have turned aside 
from this Good to follow its own pleasure� Consequently, the will would not have 
been so darkened and chilled as to allow the woman to believe that the serpent had 
spoken truly, and the man both to place his wife’s wish above God’s command.24
For Augustine, this voluntary fall betrayed the order of nature� How was 
it possible for the will to become distorted, and thereby self- corruptive? 
Because, Augustine notes, humans were created out of nothing: “Moreover, 
the corruption of that tree came about contrary to nature, because it cer-
tainly could not have happened without a defect in the will, and such a defect 
is against nature� But only a nature created out of nothing could have been 
perverted by a defect.”25 But why, and how, did the will lapse to such a wild 
degree from its order of creation? As we have seen, it was not the serpent, 
who, in a proper sense of the word, corrupted the will of Eve� The serpent 
 22 Larsen, 2002, 82�
 23 Aug�, Ciu. 13�24 and Larsen, 2002, 84�
 24 Aug�, Ciu. 14�13: Spontaneus est autem iste defectus, quoniam, si uoluntas in 
amore superioris immutabilis boni, a quo illustrabatur ut uideret et accendebatur 
ut amaret, stabilis permaneret, non inde ad sibi placendum auerteretur et ex hoc 
tenebresceret et frigesceret, ut uel illa crederet uerum dixisse serpentem, uel ille Dei 
mandato uxoris praeponeret uoluntatem� (CCSL 47– 48, 434)� English translation 
from Dyson, 1998�
 25 Aug�, Ciu. 14�13: Vt autem esset arbor mala, contra naturam factum est, quia nisi 
uitio uoluntatis, quod contra naturam est, non utique fieret. Sed uitio depravari 
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and the deed only unveiled her corruption�26 For Augustine, the origin of the 
wicked will is pure and simple: pride, or superbia� As he says:
Moreover, what but pride can have been the beginning of their evil will? – for ‘pride 
is the beginning of sin’� And what is pride but an appetite for a perverse kind of 
elevation? For it is a perverse kind of elevation indeed to forsake the foundation 
upon which the mind should rest, and to become and remain, as it were, one’s own 
foundation� This occurs when a man is too well- pleased with himself; and he is too 
well pleased with himself when he falls away from that immutable good with which 
he ought rather to have been pleased than with himself�27
This quote provides us with valuable insight into more than one side of 
Augustine’s thinking, but, we should ask, does it give a satisfactory answer 
to why the wicked will is? For what, then, is the source of pride? Augustine, 
at this juncture, declares that evil has no efficient cause, causa efficiens:
Let no one, then, seek an efficient cause of an evil will� For its cause is not efficient, 
but deficient, because the evil will itself is not an effect of something, but a defect� 
For to defect from that which supremely is, to that which has a less perfect degree 
of being: this is what it is to begin to have an evil will� Now to seek the causes of 
these defections, which are, as I have said, not efficient causes, but deficient, is like 
wishing to see darkness or hear silence.28
Augustine here upholds the consequences of his view of evil as privation� As 
several critics have argued, this is, in a way, no explanation at all, but, we 
should note, this is exactly Augustine’s point� Indeed, it is perhaps the only 
possible way to understand Augustine on this particular matter� Evil never 
entered the world� The darkness is not really ‘there,’ there is only more or 
less light� Humans are corruptible and, by misusing their free will, turned 
away from the source of all light� Evil only exists where the good is absent� 
But everything is created by God and thus good� Therefore, evil can only 
 26 Aug�, Ciu. 14�13�
 27 Aug�, Ciu� 14�13: Porro malae uoluntatis initium quae potuit esse nisi superbia? 
Initium enim omnis peccati superbia est. Quid est autem superbia nisi peruersae 
celsitudinis appetitus? Peruersa enim est celsitudo deserto eo, cui debet animus 
inhaerere, principio sibi quodam modo fieri atque esse principium. Hoc fit, cum 
sibi nims placet. Sibi uero ita placet, cum ab illo bono inmutabili deficit, quod ei 
magis placere debuit quam ipse sibi. (CCSL 47– 48, 434)� English translation from 
Dyson, 1998�
 28 Aug�, Ciu� 12�7: Nemo igitur quaerat efficientem causam malae uoluntatis; non 
enim est efficiens sed deficiens, quia nec illa effectio sed defectio. Deficere namque 
ab eo, quod summe est, ad id, quod minus est, hoc est incipere habere uoluntatem 
malam. Causas porro defectionum istarum, cum efficientes non sint, ut dixi, sed 
deficientes, uelle invenire tale est, ac si quisquam uelit uidere tenebras uel audire 
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arise if a creature in possession of rationality and free will decides, by itself, 
to turn away from God, henceforth becoming something lower, i�e� some-
thing with a lesser degree of being� All in all, it remains the case that evil 
cannot derive from God, cannot exist independently, and can therefore only 
be a deficiency that arose after the creation out of nothing� Evil cannot have 
an efficient cause�29
It is paramount for Augustine to emphasize that human beings are cre-
ated with a free will; otherwise, evil in the world, including the Fall, could 
only be explained by compromising the goodness and omnipotence of God� 
Evil only entered the world with the corrupted will of creation, and the will 
of creation had to be free to choose either the good or the bad� If the will 
was not free, only God could be judged responsible for bringing evil into 
the world, an absurdity for Augustine’s Platonic inspired thought� Human 
beings are responsible and rational creatures who, in pride, chose to break 
with God and lower themselves� But the problem for humans remains that it 
is God who is the ultimate source and goal of the free will� The breach with 
God can therefore only result in a loss of freedom: “The choice of the will, 
then, is truly free only when it is not the slave of vices and sins� God gave to 
the will such freedom, and, now that it has been lost through its own fault, 
it cannot be restored save by Him Who could bestow it�”30
4.  The Captivity of the Will
The condition after the Fall is, according to Augustine, completely differ-
ent from the blessedness of paradise� In paradise it was possible for human 
beings to refrain from sin i�e� to maintain a right relation with God, with 
oneself, and with one’s surroundings� This harmony of creation pointed 
towards the eternal salvation at which point the potential of death and sin 
will be extinguished� Unfortunately, human beings fell as a consequence 
of their own free decision, losing the possibility for salvation� In the wake 
of this decision, humanity lost its capacity for anything but sin, and death 
became inevitable� Humans turned away from their proper aim and origin, 
 29 This topic is discussed widely in literature, see e�g� Babcock, 1992 (esp� 138– 141); 
T� D� J� Chappell, Aristotle and Augustine on Freedom – Two Theories of Freedom 
Voluntary Action and Akrasia, New York 1995 (esp� 178– 193); Evans, 1982; 
R�F� Brown, The first evil will must be incomprehensible: A critique of Augustine, 
in: Journal of the American Academy of Religion Vol� 46 (1978), 315– 329�
 30 Aug�, Ciu. 14�11: Arbitrium igitur uoluntatis tunc est uere liberum, cum uitiis 
peccatisque non seruit. Tale datum est a Deo; quod amissum proprio uitio, nisi a 
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God, who is the highest good, and so lost the freedom of the will (since this 
freedom comes from God)�31
The nature of the first human couple suffered a fatal injury after the fall 
of the will� Augustine maintains that their nature was degraded into a lower 
form� Because human beings can only convey their own nature to their off-
spring, this transformation affected the whole human race:
In the first man, therefore, there existed the whole human race which was to pass 
through the woman into her progeny when that conjugal pair received the divine 
sentence of its own damnation� And what man became, not when he was created, 
but when he sinned and was punished: this he propagated, so far as the origin of sin 
and death are concerned.32
All of humanity inherited this corrupted nature, and now lack the freedom 
to choose God� This is the ‘original sin’ which is passed on from generation 
to generation: “And what he himself had become as a result of his fault 
and punishment – that is, subject to sin and death – he reproduced in his 
offspring�”33 All human beings are henceforth caught in the web of evil will 
without any possibility of returning to God� The freedom they possessed in 
paradise, with which they were able to choose, is no more� The whole of 
humankind is bound in sin and death�
According to Augustine, both humans and angels were created by God 
with rationality and free will� For each species, the Fall was a result of the 
free will turning away from God� But angels are crucially different from 
human beings, because, he notes, they were created ‘in one day�’ Their crea-
tion, their choice of bliss or punishment, is like one day, framing their reality 
once and for all� Both angels and human beings received in their creation 
a preliminary bliss, the difference being that the angelic choice was defin-
itive: immediately after their choice the angels were granted either eternal 
salvation or eternal punishment, depending on the direction of this choice�34 
To rephrase, the angels were/ are created into eternity, so it makes no sense 
to number days or to count time as such� It is not possible to change one’s 
opinion in eternity, since ‘now’, ‘past,’ and ‘future’ coexist in the same 
 31 Aug�, Ciu. 14�1�
 32 Aug�, Ciu 13�3: In primo igitur homine per feminam in progeniem transiturum 
uniuersum genus humanum fuit, quando illa coniugum copula divinam sententiam 
suae damnationis excepit; et quod homo factus est, non cum crearetur, sed cum 
peccaret et puniretur, hoc genuit, quantum quidem attinet ad peccati et mortis 
originem� (CCSL 47– 48, 387)� English translation from Dyson, 1998�
 33 Aug�, Ciu� 13�3: atque ita id, quod uitio poenaque factus est, id est obnoxios 
peccato mortique generaret. (CCSL 47– 48, 387)� English translation from 
Dyson, 1998�
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endless moment� Here, there is no time of which to speak� In the case of 
humans, it is different� Human choice is not definitive� Time was created 
simultaneously with the world and so human beings can be said to have 
been created in time� Therefore, it is possible for God to initiate a salvation 
history on behalf of human beings, one which develops over time� The place 
of human beings in the heavenly or the earthly city is not decided until the 
Final Day, i�e� the end of time�
The total loss of freedom that humans experienced after the Fall is, for 
Augustine, perfectly just, but, because of his love for human beings, God 
decided to devise a history of salvation� Humans have not yet lapsed into 
eternal perdition, and, unlike the angels, history provides a possibility for 
humans to repair their relationship with God� But since the free will is lost, 
this can only happen with God’s help�
5.  Man and Woman in Paradise
Augustine believes that Adam and Eve lived a normal physical life in the 
Garden, including eating, drinking, and all activities that belong to human 
nature�35 In Paradise, a harmony prevailed between the humans and their 
surroundings, but, even more importantly, they possessed an interior har-
mony between will and body� In the paradisal state of harmony, the image of 
God, which for Augustine lies in the soul, communicated itself to the body, 
which, in turn, obeyed the will�36 This blissful harmony endured for as long 
as the human will was directed toward the highest good�
As long as the will was directed toward the good, so too were human 
actions good�37 Therefore, Augustine can, contrary to many contemporary 
Christian thinkers, claim that, if they had not fallen, Adam and Eve would, 
as husband and wife, have had intercourse in paradise in order to procreate� 
The command of God to become manifold was issued before the fall, and 
the human couple were created as husband and wife� Augustine says: “If sin 
had not come into being, therefore, marriage, because worthy of the felicity 
of Paradise, would have produced children to be loved, but without the same 
of lust.”38 For that reason, we also see that Augustine, who lived in celibacy 
 35 “Augustine refused to believe that Adam and Eve had fallen from an angelic into 
a physical state�” from P� Brown, The Body & Society - Men, Women & Sexual 
Renunciation in Early Christianity, New York 2008, 405� cf� Aug�, Ciu. 13�23�
 36 Aug�, Ciu. 14�23– 24�
 37 Aug�, Ciu. 14�6�
 38 Aug�, Ciu� 14�23: Et ideo illae nuptiae dignae felicitate paradisi, si peccatum non 
fuisset, et diligendam prolem gignerent et pudendam libidinem non haberent. 
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after his conversion, opposed the ascetical currents of thinkers who looked 
down on marriage as a lower vocation�39
In paradise, matrimonial intercourse would manifest in the same manner 
as the fallen world, i�e� with genitals, which is, after all, why God created 
them� Augustine imagines that in paradise the genitals obeyed the will as 
much as any bodily appendage: “Why, then, with respect to the procreation 
of children, should we not believe that the sexual organs could have been as 
obedient to the will of mankind as the other members are, if there had been 
no lust, which arose in retribution for the sin of disobedience?”40 After the 
fall, the harmony between the will and the body was damaged to such an 
extent that the movement of the genitals fell under the power of incontrol-
lable desire�
According to the American scholar Peter Brown, Augustine is atyp-
ical concerning his ideas on Paradise compared to some of his important 
predecessors:
Marriage, intercourse and Paradise were as incompatible, in their (red� Gregor of 
Nyssa, Ambrosius and Hieronymus) minds, as were Paradise and death� … This 
meant that sexuality, hence marriage and the creation of family, could only have 
followed the Fall of Adam and Eve� They were the result of a sad decline, by which 
Adam and Eve had lapsed from an “angelic” state into physicality, and so into 
death.41
Augustine does not deem sex itself a sinful act, but if the act is carried out by 
one whose will is not directed toward God and his commandments, it will, 
he thinks, invariably become a sinful and brutish phenomenon� Once human 
beings lost their God- given freedom by turning away from the creator, their 
wills began to toil slavishly for their desires� Such brutish and incontrol-
lable desire is God’s punishment, the due consequence, of a disobedient will� 
Augustine maintains that the will is mocked during each act of intercourse 
in the fallen world�42 All conceptions take place under the influence of an 
incontrollable act, and, in this way, original sin is passed down from gener-
ation to generation�
Mary’s conception is exempted from this general rule� Where Ambrose, 
according to Peter Brown regarded Mary’s virginity as pivotal in “that 
 39 Brown, 2008, 397�
 40 Aug�, Ciu. 14�23: et non credimus ad opus generationis filiorum, si libido non 
fuisset, quae peccato inoboedientiae retributa est, oboedienter hominibus ad uol-
untatis nutum similiter ut cetera potuisse illa membra seruire? (CCSL 47– 48, 445)� 
English translation from Dyson, 1998�
 41 Brown, 2008, 399�
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her body had not been entered by a male penis, and that her womb had 
received no alien seed,”43 for Augustine, on the contrary, the decisive 
was not the touching of the genitals as such, but the condition of Mary’s 
will: “Overshadowed by the Holy Spirit, Mary had felt not the slightest 
eddy of uncontrolled feeling at the moment when she conceived Christ� …� 
Mary’s conception of Christ stood rather for an act of undivided obedience� 
It recaptured the ancient harmony of body and soul, in which the will was 
not the maimed thing that it so soon became.”44
6.  The Power of the Devil
All human beings exist under the shadow of the Fall� As such, they are auto-
matically caught in original sin and can only be saved by the redeeming 
action of God� The writing where Augustine most clearly describes how 
this redeeming act takes place is perhaps his other comprehensive work, De 
Trinitate, part of which he wrote during the same timespan as De civitate 
Dei� According to Augustine’s account in De Trinitate XIII the devil has a 
legal claim over humans, each of whom is bound to the sin of Adam, which, 
as we noted, is passed on from generation to generation via the irrational 
sexual desire present at conception� Human beings are caught in vitiated 
carnal concupiscence, but all who believe in Christ shall be born again spiri-
tually by his immaculate grace (“per ipsius immaculatam gratiam spiritalem 
regeneratos”)45 Augustine sums up this state of affairs as follows: “By the 
justice of God the whole human race was delivered into the power of the 
devil, the sin of the first man passing originally into all of both sexes, who 
were born through conjugal union, and the debt of our first parents binding 
all their posterity.”46
The salvation of human beings, then, must consist of a liberation from 
the power of the devil� Evil becomes here more concrete than a shadowy pri-
vation of the good, even if this notion is consistently upheld by Augustine� 
While it appears that he casts the devil as an independent actor, this is only 
true to a certain degree� Augustine does not see the devil as an equal and 
independent power, such as could pose a threat to God� The devil fell by 
 43 Brown, 2008, 407�
 44 Brown, 2008, 407�
 45 Aug�, Trin. 13�16 (CCSL 50, 412)� English translation from G� B� Matthews (ed�), 
On the Trinity: books 8– 15, Cambridge, 2002�
 46 Aug�, Trin� 13�12: Quadam iustitia Dei in potestatem diaboli traditum est genus 
humanum, peccato primi hominis in omnes utriusque sexus commixtione nascen-
tes originaliter transeunte et parentum primorum debito uniuersos posteros obli-
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his own choice and thus became little more than an instrument of God� 
Augustine maintains that God, in his omnipotence, can turn evil into good� 
Death, for example, which was a divine punishment for human disobedi-
ence, is turned into something good through the holy death of the martyrs�47 
What the human being did was evil, but God is so omnipotent that even 
this evil only serves to accentuate his justice and power through the sacrifice 
and resurrection of Christ� Such evil did not arise from God’s will, but it 
can, according to Augustine, be turned into something good through divine 
omnipotence:
For we are here clearly given to understand that there was no other cause of the 
world’s creation than that good things should be made by a good God� If no one in 
this world had sinned, the world would have been adorned and filled with natures 
wholly good� Also, even though sin now exists, all things are not on that account 
full of sin; for by far the greater number of celestial beings are good, and preserve 
the proper order of their nature� And the sinful will, although it refused to preserve 
the order of its own nature, did not on that account escape the laws of the just God 
Who orders all things for good� For just as a picture is enhanced by the proper 
placing within it of dark colours, so, to those able to discern it, the beauty of the 
universe is enhanced, even by sinners, though, considered in themselves, theirs is a 
sorry deformity�48
Augustine thinks that liberation from the power of the devil could be accom-
plished in one of two ways: either by God’s power, potentia, or by God’s 
justice, iustitia� God could, in wielding his power, easily conquer the devil, 
but then the human sin would not manifest distinctly enough� Human beings 
imitate the devil, who loves power and hates justice, and, for this reason, the 
legitimate claim of the devil must be broken through justice�49 Power as such 
is not negative in Augustine’s thought, but he emphasizes good order, where 
justice comes first and power afterwards� The power of God is manifested in 
the resurrection of Christ� Christians are now weak and humble, as was the 
incarnate Christ, but on the Final Day they will receive the power of resur-
rection, just as Christ received it� God’s justice is proven in the death of the 
 47 Aug�, Ciu. 13�4�
 48 Aug�, Ciu� 11�23: nullam aliam causam faciendi mundi intellegi uoluit, nisi ut 
bona fierent a bono Deo. Vbi si nemo peccasset, tantummodo naturis bonis esset 
mundus ornatus et plenus; et quia peccatum est, non ideo cuncta sunt impleta 
peccatis, cum bonorum longe maior numerus in caelestibus suae naturae ordinem 
servet; nec mala uoluntas, quia naturae ordinem seruare noluit, ideo iusti Dei leges 
omnia bene ordinantis effugit; quoniam sicut pictura cum colore nigro loco suo 
posito, ita uniuersitas rerum, si quis possit intueri, etiam cum peccatoribus pulchra 
est, quamuis per se ipsos consideratos sua deformitas turpet� (CCSL 47– 48,342)� 
English translation from Dyson, 1998�
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sole human being who was not born through conjugal union and thus free 
of sin and undeserving of death� This righteous man is nevertheless killed by 
the devil, who therefore loses his legal claim over the Christian people: “So 
great a price did that blood have that he who slew Christ for a time by death 
that was not due should no longer detain anyone who has put on Christ in 
the eternal death that was due.”50
Because Christ allowed himself to be born of a virgin, and because the 
conception occurred through spirit and faith rather than flesh and desire, 
he was able to avoid original sin� For this reason, humankind can be saved 
through him� As Augustine says: “For a man was born, I say, having no sin 
and not to have any sin at all, through whom those who were to be liberated 
from sin and who could not be born without sin would be born again.”51
7.  The Two natures of Christ
The specific details of Augustine’s definition of the two natures of Christ are 
crucial to his soteriology, for it is exactly in the technical combination of 
these two natures, human and divine, in one person, that allows salvation 
through Christ� The incarnation of Christ is a counter- image of our salva-
tion based on an interpretation of John 1,12– 14:“For if the Son of God by 
nature became the son of man out of compassion for the sons of men – this 
is the meaning of ‘the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us’ men – how 
much more credible it is that the sons of man by nature become the sons of 
God by grace and dwell in God�”52
Such counter- images play an important role throughout Augustine’s 
Christology and soteriology� The act of divine salvation is the opposite of 
Adam’s rebellion� Adam was proud, Christ was humble� Immortality is 
bestowed upon humans because Christ made himself mortal� Christ dwelled 
among humans so that humans could dwell in him, etc� Christ is the son of 
God by nature, natura dei filius, and becomes the son of man, hominis filius, 
out of compassion� He does this so humans can believe that, through him, 
 50 Aug�, Trin� 13�16: Tanti ualuit sanguis ille, ut neminem Christo indutum in aeterna 
morte debita detinere debuerit, qui Christum morte indebita uel ad tempus occidit� 
(CCSL 50, 410)� English translation from Matthews, 2002�
 51 Aug�, Trin� 13�18: Nascebatur, inquam, homo nullum habens, nullum habiturus 
omnino peccatum, per quem renascerentur liberandi a peccato, qui nasci non 
possent sine peccato� (CCSL 50, 414)� English translation from Matthews, 2002�
 52 Aug�, Trin. 13�9: Si enim natura dei filius propter filios hominum misericordia 
factus est hominis filius (hoc est enim, uerbum caro factum est et habitauit in 
hominibus), quanto est credibilius natura filios hominis gratia dei filios dei fieri et 
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they too may become sons of God� Only by dwelling in God, as he dwelled 
among humans, it is possible to obtain immortality�
Augustine emphasizes an almost poetic justice in describing how the devil 
was conquered: “The conqueror of the first Adam, and the master of the 
human race, was conquered by the second Adam and lost the Christian 
race.”53 There is, however, a crucial difference between the first and the 
second Adam� The first Adam, who was conquered, was a human being, 
who wanted to be a God� The second Adam, who conquered, was both man 
and God�54 It is by this combination of God and man that humans can regain 
their freedom�55
Besides salvation through, as it were, automatic justice, it is possible to 
trace a parallel current in De trinitate� This current operates by way of what 
we might call a ‘subjective atonement’ whereby Christ, in his absolute obe-
dience unto death, functions as a role model for humans� The reward for 
consistent obedience to the divine will is seen in the resurrection� Pride deters 
humans from clinging to God, but this pride is cured by the humility of 
Christ in his incarnation and death� It reveals to human beings how far they 
have estranged themselves from God, and exposes their need for a medi-
ator� This mediator is of course the God- man, Christ, who is fully God and 
fully man�56
In a polemic against the ‘heathen philosophers,’ Augustine argues that it 
had never been possible, not even for the most competent among them, to 
justify a happy afterlife for the soul and body through the exercise of reason� 
The Christian faith, on the contrary, promises that the whole human being, 
soul and body, will become immortal, and so truly happy� This promise will 
not be realized through human rationalizing, argumentatione humana, but 
by divine authority, divina auctoritate�57 Augustine’s notion is that the pre- 
existent Godson, is in all things like his father, adopted a human nature to 
 53 Aug�, Trin. 13�18: Victor primi Adam et tenens genus humanum, uictus a secundo 
Adam et amittens genus christianum� (CCSL 50, 414)� English translation from 
Matthews, 2002�
 54 Aug�, Trin. 13�18�
 55 Aug�, Trin. 13�18: Haec tanta dei dona … nisi uerbum caro fieret, nulla essent. 
(CCSL 50, 414)�
 56 E� Mühlenberg, Dogma und Lehre im Abendland, (excerpt), II § 2: Die aben-
dländischen Rezeption der ostkirchlichen Dogmen, in: C� Andersen / C� Ritter 
/ A�F� Wessel / K� Mühlenberg / E� Schmidt, Handbuch der Dogmen- und 
Theologiegeschichte; Band 1, Die Lehrentwicklung im Rahmen der Katholizität, 
Göttingen 1982, 476– 483 (478)�
 57 Aug�, Trin. 13�9: et ob hoc uere beatum, non argumentatione humana sed diuina 
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redeem mankind while, at the same time, preserving his divine nature�58 But 
it is important for Augustine to point out that Christ does not take a human 
persona upon himself, for he is himself una persona� It is human nature that 
the Godson adopts, not the life of a human person as such� Otherwise there 
would be four persons in the trinity, one of whom was human� Rather, the 
divine nature of the human Jesus is so potent that he becomes one person 
together with the Godson� Christ thereby becomes a divine person with 
two natures, the divine nature is connected to his divine person, which he 
possesses by nature, while he receives the human nature of grace� The two 
natures are, in this way, kept together by the doctrine of grace�59
8.  The Will of God
The will of God is eternal and unchangeable� His will cannot be altered, nor 
does he change his opinion� Now and then, humans claim to observe changes 
in the will of God as e�g� in the Old Testament� However, Augustine main-
tains that such changes do not take place in God, but rather in our percep-
tion�60 He further argues that it is only because God created the human being 
in his own image that humans possess free will and reason� In Augustine’s 
thinking, the precondition for human freedom, reason, and will, of any kind, 
is that God himself possesses these same attributes� Therefore, knowledge 
of God, including the freedom of God’s will, is of the utmost importance 
for Augustine� If the absolute freedom of God is in any way compromised, 
then the possibility of the human being possessing a free will is likewise 
compromised� It shows how closely theology and anthropology are related 
in Augustine’s thinking�
The human race, however, submitted itself to bondage and became unfree� 
Pride allured the first humans with the promise that they could become like 
God: “That is why Adam was delighted when it was said, ‘Ye shall be as 
gods�’ ”61 Not until it was too late did human beings discover the emptiness 
of this promise� In Augustine’s account, the human beings were not satisfied 
with a relative position vis- a- vis God, but wanted to be self- sufficient and 
independent of creation� Human beings forgot that God is the only absolute 
being, and that their existence is conditional� When human beings no longer 
wanted to be under the will of God, they fell away from freedom, which 
is in God alone, and became really and truly unfree� The free choice that 
 58 Aug�, Trin. 13�17�
 59 Mühlenberg, 1982, 478– 479�
 60 Aug�, Ciu. 22�2�
 61 Aug�, Ciu. 14�13: Hinc enim et delectauit quod dictum est: Eritis sicut dii� (CCSL 
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humans had once possessed consisted in the freedom to choose freedom, 
i�e� to choose God� Here, there was no limitation, only freedom, Augustine 
argues� Because of the choice made, the human race became ‘free’ of God, 
and fell thereby into unfreedom, a condition from which it cannot free itself�
9.  The Foreknowledge of God
In De civitate Dei book 5 Augustine dismisses Cicero’s assertion that the notion 
of a God who has foreseen everything precludes the possibility of human free 
will: “It is not true, then, that, because God foreknew what would be within 
the power of our wills, nothing therefore lies within the power of our wills�”62 
Augustine does not see any conflict between God’s foreknowledge and the real 
freedom of human choices� For Augustine it is necessary that God should know 
everything� Otherwise he would be something less than the almighty and free 
God upon which all else rests� That God foreknows something does not change 
what he knows, Augustine says�
One of Cicero’s arguments, which Augustine repeats, concerns chains of 
causation� As he paraphrases Cicero: “If, however, there is a certain order of 
causes by which everything that happens happens, then, Cicero says, all things 
that happen happen by fate� If this is the case, however, then nothing is in our 
power and there is no free choice of the will; and if we concede that, he says, 
then the whole of human life is undermined.”63 Augustine rejects this by saying 
that human will is one of the factors in the causal chain and therefore every-
thing is not determined by fate� Augustine holds that Cicero, in denying the 
foreknowledge of the divine, de facto abolishes God, and that he is afraid of 
saying it outright�64 Augustine says:
Then clearly something lies within the power of our wills even though God has 
foreknowledge of it� We are, then, in no way compelled either to take away freedom 
of will in order to retain the foreknowledge of God, or (which is blasphemous) 
to deny that He has foreknowledge of things to come in order to retain freedom 
of the will …� Far be it from us, then, to seek freedom of the will by denying the 
foreknowledge of Him by Whose aid we are and shall be free�65
 62 Aug�, Ciu. 5�10: Non ergo propterea nihil est in nostra uoluntate, quia Deus 
praescivit quid futurum esset in nostra uoluntate� (CCSL 47– 48, 141)� English 
translation from Dyson, 1998�
 63 Aug�, Ciu. 5�9: si autem certus est ordo causarum, quo fit omne quod fit, fato, 
inquit, fiunt omnia quae fiunt. Quod si ita est, nihil est in nostra potestate nul-
lumque est arbitrium uoluntatis; quod si concedimus, inquit, omnis humana uita 
subvertitur� (CCSL 47– 48, 137)� English translation from Dyson, 1998�
 64 Aug�, Ciu. 5�9�
 65 Aug�, Ciu. 5�10: profecto et illo praesciente est aliquid in nostra uoluntate. 
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It is not possible to think, as Augustine accuses Cicero of thinking, that 
human freedom is set over and against the freedom of God�66 For Augustine, 
the will and freedom of God are not a threat to the freedom of human 
beings� On the contrary, God is its very source and foundation� Since God 
is free, creation can also be free, but only insofar as it remains in confor-
mity with God, the creator� For some, this might sound like a lamentable 
limitation placed on human freedom� But to Augustine, the starting point of 
freedom is God, who is the one and only absolute being� That human beings 
must cling to God in order to maintain their freedom is not, for Augustine, a 
limitation� It is simply a logical consequence� The crucial point is that there 
exists only one being with absolute freedom, God� Augustine did not believe 
this conception could be found in the pagan worldview, where both gods 
and humans were equally bound by necessity�
10.  Against the Pagans
A considerable part of De civitate Dei is dedicated to a polemic against the 
pagan worldview, which is anticipated in the full title of the book: De civi-
tate Dei contra paganos (On the city of God against the pagans). In relation 
to his understanding of freedom, it is especially important for Augustine to 
distance himself from the conceptions of time and creation presented in the 
stoic and Platonic philosophies of his day� In particular, Augustine resists 
the idea of an eternal universe and a cyclical notion of time, repudiating 
those who would absorb these ideas into Christian thought� The notion of 
an eternal universe will inevitably compromise the idea of God, Augustine 
argues� If the universe is created out of eternal matter, then God cannot be 
its creator and master� Nothing created can have existed for eternity, since 
before its creation it did not exist� God cannot, as in Plato’s Timaios, be 
reduced to a shaper� He is the ultimate creator and, as such, has created 
everything out of nothing� With the creation of the universe, God created 
something new, something which had not existed before�
Augustine reasons that if the universe were everlasting then the eternal 
return would be true, which would, he thinks, be most unfortunate for 
humanity� Even if there existed a salvation from such an endless cycle, 
it could never be a true salvation, because it would not be everlasting� 
Damnation and salvation would replace one another again and again in 
arbitrium aut retento uoluntatis arbitrio Deum (quod nefas est) negare praescium 
futurorum … Vnde absit a nobis eius negare praescientiam, ut libere uelimus, quo 
adiuuante sumus liberi uel erimus� (CCSL 47– 48, 141)� English translation from 
Dyson, 1998�
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an endless circle� “For how can the soul be truly blessed when it has no 
assurance of being so for all eternity.”67 This is eternal repetition without 
end— without any real salvation� There is room only for false hope and the 
endless cycle�68 Augustine believes that, in this scenario, necessity would be 
the prevailing principle� Nothing new could happen, and therefore freedom 
and salvation would be an illusion� He writes: “Who, I say, would listen to 
such things? Who can believe or bear them? If they were true, it would be 
more prudent to remain silent about them� Indeed – and I wish to say this as 
clearly as I can – it would be wiser not to know them at all.”69
For Augustine, freedom in the Christian worldview is only possible 
because of God’s omnipotence and eternality� Only if God has created time 
and the world from nothing is he able to stop the turning of the world, and, 
by his justice, raise humans to the eternal and true salvation� Christ died 
only once for humanity, not many times in an ever- returning cycle:
On their view, for example, just as, during a certain period of time, the philosopher 
Plato taught in a town called Athens in a school called the Academy, so, during 
innumerable past ages, at long but fixed intervals, the same Plato, the same city, the 
same school and the same pupils existed repeatedly, and will exist repeatedly during 
innumerable ages to come� God forbid, I say, that we could believe this� For Christ 
died for our sins once, and ‘being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath 
no more dominion over Him’�70
Augustine states that, as a Christian, one cannot accept the principle of neces-
sity� For it lies within the power of God to create something new� In creation 
he gave free choice to humans and placed them in a linear timeframe, so 
that, in this way, they would know both a beginning and an end� In this con-
text the human race fell� In order to save it, and eventually redeem it entirely, 
God sent Christ to die for the sins of mankind, once and for all� The unique 
 67 Aug�, Ciu. 12�13: Quo modo enim vera beatitudo est, de cuius numquam aeter-
nitate confiditur� (CCSL 47– 48, 367)� English translation from Dyson, 1998�
 68 Aug�, Ciu. 5�8�
 69 Aug�, Ciu. 12�20: Quis haec audiat? quis credat? quis ferat? Quae si vera essent, non 
solum tacerentur prudentius, verum etiam (ut quomodo valeo dicam quod volo) 
doctius nescirentur. (CCSL 47– 48, 375)� English translation from Dyson, 1998�
 70 Aug�, Ciu. 12�13: ut verbi gratia, sicut isto saeculo Plato philosophus in urbe 
Atheniensi et in ea schola, quae Academia dicta est, discipulos docuit, ita per 
innumerabilia retro saecula multum quidem prolixis intervallis, sed tamen certis, 
et idem Plato et eadem civitas et eadem schola idemque discipuli repetiti et per 
innumerabilia deinde saecula repetendi sint. Absit, inquam, ut nos ista credamus. 
Semel enim Christus mortuus est pro peccatis nostris; surgens autem a mortuis 
iam non moritur, et mors ei ultra non dominabitur� (CCSL 47– 48, 367)� English 
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and unrepeatable sacrifice of Christ is, for Augustine, the definitive testi-
mony that humans are not caught in the endless circulations of necessity�71 
This can also be seen, he says, in the promise of Christ’s return on the Final 
day, when time will stop and humanity will be given true and everlasting 
freedom in the New Jerusalem; here everything will be truly new�72
11.  The end of time
In this world, where God’s city and the earthly city are mixed together, 
where death and sin reign, the baptized are not uplifted at once to eternal 
bliss� For this reason, the renewal of humans by grace must occur continu-
ally across the Christian life� Augustine argues that if humans were raised 
to blessedness immediately after their baptism, they would not be tested in 
their faith: “… if the sacrament of regeneration were followed immediately 
by the immortality of the body, faith itself would be weakened� For faith is 
only faith when it waits in hope for what is not yet seen in substance�”73 The 
final part of salvation is elevation to the heaven of heavens, for which Adam 
and Eve themselves were originally destined�
The human race will, on the Final Day, be divided among the two cit-
ies according to their respective convictions, at which point the difference 
between them will stand forth in full clarity� In the state of eternal bliss 
humans will also receive the definitive version of free will, which precludes 
the possibility of sin: “… man should first receive a free will by which he was 
able not to sin, and finally a free will by which he was not able to sin; … but 
because human nature sinned when it had the power to sin, it is redeemed 
by a more abundant gift of grace so that it may be led to the state of freedom 
in which it cannot sin�74
Augustine believes that in eternity humans will become truly free because 
they will become a part of God, and, since God cannot sin, neither will humans 
have any power or desire to sin� This new free will shall be greater than the 
 71 Larsen, 2002, 80�
 72 Rev 21:5; Aug�, Ciu. 20�17: Ecce noua facio omnia (CCSL 47– 48, 727)� English 
translation from Dyson, 1998�
 73 Aug�, Ciu. 13�4: si regenerationis sacramentum continuo sequeretur immortali-
tas corporis, ipsa fides eneruaretur, quae tunc est fides, quando exspectatur in 
spe, quod in re nondum uidetur� (CCSL 47– 48, 388)� English translation from 
Dyson, 1998�
 74 Aug�, Ciu. 22�30: ut primum daretur liberum arbitrium, quo non peccare homo 
posset, nouissimum, quo peccare non posset… Sed quia peccauit ista natura 
cum peccare potuit, largiore gratia liberatur, ut ad eam perducatur libertatem, 
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first, for it will not contain the possibility of lapsing into unfreedom: “But 
this last freedom of will will be greater, in that it will consist in not being able 
to sin.”75 It may sound paradoxical that humans, in Augustine’s thinking, 
are more free when they are unable to do something� Humans become freer 
by not being able to choose evil� For Augustine, however, this is not meant as 
a paradox� In eternity, humans are forever free; never again will they fall or 
be bound� The impossibility of unfreedom is, by Augustine’s logic, a higher 
good than possessing the possibility of choosing sin again�76
12.  Conclusion
There is no doubt that the will forms a cornerstone of Augustine’s thinking 
in De civitate Dei� Without considering the freedom of the will almost noth-
ing else in Augustine’s conception of Christianity would make sense� Only 
by human freedom can the Fall, and thus evil, be explained� If the Fall of 
humans were not self- inflicted, then the sacrifice of Christ as an act of justice 
would be meaningless for Augustine� The Fall did not consist in the eating 
of the apple, but when the human being turned its will away from God� It 
was the corrupted will that inflicted the evil deed, not the other way around�
In Augustine’s system of thought in De civitate Dei humans were created 
as free and rational creatures in the image of God� According to Augustine 
the Fall consisted in the corruption of the will� Human beings desired inde-
pendence from God and creation, to be like God� Nevertheless, a creature 
cannot, in the proper sense, exist without its creator� In like manner humans 
cannot keep their freedom, when they remove themselves from the source of 
freedom: God� Human beings were created to remain with God, and so had 
no original experience of sin or death� Unfortunately, humans freely chose 
to turn their will toward that which was lower than God, becoming unfree� 
After the Fall, humans experienced the destruction of their freedom; their 
wills were twisted, and their inner harmony was destroyed� So Augustine 
 75 Aug�, Ciu. 22�30: hoc autem nouissimum eo potentius erit, quo peccare non pot-
erit; uerum hoc quoque Dei munere, non suae possibilitate naturae. Aliud est enim 
esse Deum, aliud participem Dei. Deus natura peccare non potest: particeps uero 
Dei ab illo accepit, ut peccare non possit. (CCSL 47– 48, 863)� English translation 
from Dyson, 1998�
 76 Aug�, Ciu. 22�30: Ibi uacantes uidebimus quoniam ipse est Deus; quod nobis 
nos ipsi esse uoluimus, quando ab illo cecidimus, audientes a seductore: Eritis 
sicut dii et recedentes a uero Deo, quo faciente dii essemus eius participatione, 
non desertione … A quo refecti et gratia maiore perfecti uacabimus in aeternum, 
uidentes quia ipse est Deus, quo pleni erimus quando ipse erit omnia in omnibus� 
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argues in De civitate Dei� But he also maintains that the omnipotent God 
can turn even the evillest of acts into something good� God sent his son, 
Christ, who, through his sacrifice, grants humans an opportunity for salva-
tion by unjustly dying in our place� Through the incarnation, Christ enables 
the elevation of human beings and opens the path to their reunion with God 
in the eternal salvation, where humans will become truly free�
For Augustine there is nothing in the fact that God possess an omnipotent 
will that compromises human freedom� On the contrary, according to De 
civitate Dei, it is a precondition for the existence of freedom per se� If God 
was not the omnipotent creator who could make all things new, then humans 
and God alike would be caught in an endless cycle� Augustine argues that the 
reality of freedom presupposes an eternal God who has created everything 
out of nothing and who is therefore lord of time� True freedom, wherein the 
possibility of sin is absent, will not be granted to humans until the final sal-
vation� Time, which began with creation, will reach its end on the Final Day 
when all just creatures will be uplifted into the city of God�
Fabio Dalpra
Augustine of Hippo’s Anthropology in The 
Trinity
Abstract: This article reflects on the anthropological ideas expounded in Augustine of 
Hippo’s The Trinity (De trinitate)� Taking into account the creation of humanity after 
the image and likeness of God, it attends to Augustine’s understanding of the human 
mind (mens) as a threefold structure, shedding light on the anthropology that arises 
from the dynamic interplay between memory, intelligence, and will�
1.  Introduction
Augustine’s thought is marked by a concern for anthropology� Throughout 
his corpus he returns, again and again, to the fundamental question of human 
being� Indeed, as he claims in his Soliloquies, he is, above all, interested in 
knowing God and the soul�1 But one cannot speak of the intersection of 
these two realities without addressing what it means to be human� After all, 
Augustine reminds us, the nature of human existence can only be grasped 
once its relation to God has been properly discerned� Over the course of 
many years, and at the cost of many revisions, his work bears witness to a 
tireless anthropological endeavor�
Taking stock of Augustine’s anthropological inclinations, we gain a use-
ful perspective from which to regard one of Augustine’s major works: The 
Trinity� Embedded within a theological- dogmatic discussion, there is a 
thorough investigation of human existence before the Trinitarian mystery� 
In fact, the treatise is much more concerned with the unveiling of human 
interiority, with humanity as the image of God, than it is with the divine 
essence of the Trinity, which Augustine deems unfathomable� Consequently, 
The Trinity is not simply another instance of his anthropological thought, 
but rather a privileged locus: the very culmination of Augustine’s mature 
understanding of human nature� As we hope to demonstrate in this article, 
Augustine discovered, in the image of God theology, and in the subsequent 
analysis of the inner threefold structures of the mind, the keys to an in- depth 
knowledge of human being as such�






2.  The imago Dei Theology
First, it should be noted that the anthropological reflections we find in The 
Trinity are rooted in the idea of human creation after the image and likeness 
of God� Considering Gen 1:26,2 Augustine argues:
‘Let us make man after our image and likeness’� ‘Let us make’ and ‘our’ are said in 
the plural, and ought not to be received except as of relatives� For it was not that 
gods might make to the image and likeness of gods, but that the Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Spirit might make to the image of the Father, the Son, and the Holy 
Spirit, in order that man might subsist as the image of God� But God is the Trinity�3
A number of meaningful anthropological implications stem from the under-
standing of human beings as image- bearers of God� For instance, since God 
is Trinitarian in nature— that is to say, both one and three— we should expect 
to find an analogous pattern in human nature� Augustine makes just such a 
claim at the very start of his thorough analysis in The Trinity�
Augustine intends to reveal the anthropological basis of the imago Dei 
theology by questioning the meaning of the formula imago et similitudo 
dei (image and likeness of God) and, moreover, asking where exactly in the 
human this image and likeness are located� In order to answer these ques-
tions, he fuses together a bipartite and tripartite conception of human being� 
So, as Augustine sees it, in addition to the corporeal aspect of our nature, 
we also possess a spiritual aspect� Moreover, this spiritual aspect includes an 
inferior part (anima), and a superior part, typically referred to as the animus, 
spiritus, or mens� It is important to note that this division does not imply a 
split of the soul in its substance,4 but only a delimitation of its functions�5
The relation between the superior and inferior operations of the soul 
effects the relation between the material and spiritual components of the 
 2 “Then God said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness 
[���]’�” Gen 1:26 (NRSV)�
 3 Aug�, Trin. 7�6,12: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram� Et 
faciamus et nostram pluraliter dictum est et nisi ex relatiuis accipi non oportet, non 
enim ut facerent dii aut ad imaginem et similitudinem deorum, sed ut facerent pater 
et filius et spiritus sanctus ad imaginem ergo patris et filii et spiritus sancti ut subsis-
teret homo imago dei; deus autem trinitas� (CCSL 50, 266)� Here and henceforth, 
the English translation is taken from: Saint Augustine, The Trinity, translated by 
Stephen McKenna, The Fathers of the Church volume 45, Washington 1970�
 4 Augustine claims, “as the mind, therefore, is a whole mind, so it lives as a whole� 
But it knows that it lives� Therefore, it knows itself as a whole�” Trin. 10�4,6: Sicut 
ergo mens tota mens est, sic tota uiuit. Nouit autem uiuere se; totam se igitur nouit� 
(CCSL 50, 319)�
 5 In The Trinity, he mentions the two functions (officia) of the soul twice, cf� Trin. 
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human being; there is a continuity between body and soul concerning the 
knowledge of corporeal and incorporeal things, respectively� As Augustine 
argues, “[���] yet a part of our reasonable attention [rationalis intentionis], 
that is, a part of this same mind must be directed to the using of changeable 
and corporeal things, without which this life does not continue [���]�”6 Thus, 
on the one hand, the soul makes use of the bodily senses to understand cor-
poreal things, while on the other, it employs reason or intelligence to know 
incorporeal realities�
Although this debate concerning the psychological morphology of the 
soul and its relation to the body constitutes an important moment in the dis-
cussion carried on by Augustine in The Trinity, it is reasonable to argue that 
this is only the first step in probing the anthropological question� Hereafter, 
his analysis turns to the understanding of how such debate relates to the the-
ology of the image and likeness of God�
Taking into account the threefold constitution of human being (body, 
soul and spirit/ mind), Augustine argues in book 11 of The Trinity that, “cer-
tainly, not everything in creatures, which is in some way or other similar 
to God, is also to be called His image, but that alone to which He Himself 
alone is superior [���]”�7 In this way, Augustine rejects the hypothesis that 
the image of God amounts to numerical three- in- oneness (tri- unity)� This, in 
turn, leads him to deduce another hypothesis in book 15: “wherefore each 
individual man who is not called the image of God according to everything 
that pertains to his nature, but according to the mind alone, is one person 
and is the image of the Trinity in his mind�”8 If the quotation from book 11 
presents the idea that the divine image must refer to something than which 
naught but God is higher, the quotation from book 15 posits an answer to 
the riddle� The image, Augustine tells us, is in “the mind alone” (solam men-
tem); for it cannot be in the soul (anima) or in the body at all�
It is worth pointing out that, by referring only to image, and omitting 
likeness, the argument here implicitly refers to the distinction between image 
(imago) and trace/ vestige (uestigium)�9 For, while the traces of God are 
 6 Aug�, Trin� 12�13,21: Quiddam uero rationalis intentionis nostrae, hoc est eiusdem 
mentis, in usum mutabilium corporaliumque rerum sine quo haec uita non agitur 
dirigendum, (CCSL 50, 374)�
 7 Aug�, Trin� 11�5,8: Non sane omne quod in creaturis aliquo modo simile est deo 
etiam eius imago dicenda est, sed illa sola qua superior ipse solus est� (CCSL 
50, 344)�
 8 Aug�, Trin� 15�7,11: Quapropter singulus quisque homo qui non secundum omnia 
quae ad naturam pertinent eius sed secundum solam mentem imago dei dicitur 
una persona est et imago est trinitatis in mente� (CCSL 50a, 475)�
 9 Cf� Aug�, Trin. 6�10,12 (CCSL 50, 242); 12�5,5 (CCSL 50, 360)� In two other 










present in all creatures— which is why it is possible to say that all of them 
bear, to some extent, a likeness to God— only the highest point of creation, 
that is, the human mind, can be described as an image of God (as explicitly 
claimed in the passage from book 15�)
The comparison between image and trace yields still another potent idea 
for the argument worked out in The Trinity� According to Augustine, in 
order to strengthen the mind one should begin by considering those traces 
of the Trinity scattered throughout creation; having done so, one may begin 
to apprehend the image of God that exists in the mind alone�10 As he writes, 
“when in our mind, therefore, we perceive the Creator through the things 
which have been made, we ought to recognize Him as the Trinity of which a 
trace appears, as is fitting, in the creature”�11
If every creature bears a trace of the triune God, it is reasonable to con-
clude that there is no place in Augustine’s argument for an insuperable oppo-
sition between body and soul, such as might give rise to a radical contempt 
for matter�12 Even though he maintains that the uppermost activity of the 
mind is superior in valor to sensual experience, Augustine still considers the 
body a site of manifest importance� Indeed, not only does the body carry 
vestiges of the Creator within itself, but it also provides, through the senses, 
the means by which to understand material reality; and material reality, as 
(CCSL 50, 333) and 14�3,5 (CCSL 50a, 427)� For a discussion about the corre-
spondence between uestigium and imago, as well as their relation to the concept 
of signum, cf� V� Giraud, Signum et vestigium dans la pensée de Saint Augustin, 
RSPT 95, Paris 2011, 251– 274�
 10 The idea that all visible creatures manifest the invisible attributes of God can be 
ascribed to the enduring influence in Augustine’s thought of Rom 1:20 (“Ever since 
the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they 
are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made� [���]” NRSV)�
 11 Aug�, Trin� 6�10,12: Oportet igitur ut creatorem per ea quae facta sunt intel-
lecta conspicientes trinitatem intellegamus cuius in creatura quomodo dignum est 
apparet uestigium� (CCSL 50, 242)� Cf� also, “pour lui [Agostinho], les invisibilia 
Dei sont les Idées de Dieu, de sorte que connaître Dieu à partir du sensible, c’est 
remonter des choses à leurs Idées; [���] l’itinéraire normal d’une preuve augusti-
nienne va donc du monde à l’âme et de l’âme à Dieu,” É� Gilson, Introduction à 
l’étude de Saint Augustin, Paris 1943, 22�
 12 In The Trinity, Augustine frequently refers to the body in a positive context� For 
example, in book 15, he affirms: “but even if we so define man as to say: ‘Man is 
a rational substance consisting of soul and body’, there is no doubt that man has 
a soul which is not body, and a body which is not soul [���]” Trin. 15�7,11: Quod 
si etiam sic definiamus hominem, ut dicamus: ‘Homo est substantia rationalis 
constans ex anima et corpore,’ non est dubium hominem habere animam quae 
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we have seen, provides the training (exercitatio) that gives humans strength 
to attain knowledge of more complex realities�13
Altogether, it can be said that, for Augustine, the tangled relation between 
body and soul/ spirit implies an anthropological unity (body and soul com-
bine to make a single human being); a substantial distinction (neither the 
soul nor the body is reducible to the other); and a functional continuity 
(their different functions are epistemologically complementary)� In addition, 
it is worth underlining Augustine’s assertion that the mind constitutes the 
core of human being since it is the very image of God� The human being is 
the summit of creation because of that image, even if it does not capture the 
entirety of what it means to be human�
3.  The Threefold Structure of the Mind
In order to identify the basis of the anthropology developed in The Trinity, it 
is necessary to dig deeper into two questions that sprout from the prior dis-
cussion: (1) what is the content of the image of God in the mind? (2) how does 
the relation of the imago Dei to the Trinity contribute to our understanding 
 13 There are two important passages in The Trinity with regards to the subject of 
exercitatio� In book 13, he claims, “I wished, therefore, to ascend as it were by 
steps, and to seek in the inner man a trinity of its own kind, both in science and 
wisdom, as we previously sought it in the outer man, in order that we might 
come with a mind more developed by exercise in these lower things to the con-
templation of that Trinity which is God, according to our own modest capacity, 
if we can do even this, at least in an obscure manner and through a mirror” Trin� 
13�20,26: Placuit quippe uelut gradatim ascendentibus in utraque requirere apud 
interiorem hominem quandam sui cuiusque generis trinitatem sicut prius apud 
exteriorem quaesiuimus ut ad illam trinitatem quae deus est pro nostro modulo, 
si tamen uel hoc possumus, saltem in aenigmate et per speculum contuendam 
exercitatiore in his inferioribus rebus mente ueniamus� (CCSL 50a, 418)� In book 
9, “we are now endeavoring in one way or another to investigate this question in 
the human mind; and after the inferior image has responded as it were to our inter-
rogation in language, with which our human nature itself is more familiar, we may 
be able to direct a better- trained mental vision from the illuminated creature to the 
unchangeable light [���]” Trin� 9�12,17: Quod nunc in mente humana utcumque 
uestigare conamur ut ex inferiore imagine in qua nobis familiarius natura ipsa 
nostra quasi interrogata respondet exercitatiorem mentis aciem ab inluminata 
creatura ad lumen incommutabile dirigamus; (CCSL 50, 308)� In general terms, 
it is possible to claim that such idea comes from Plato (cf� Pl�, Sop� 218c- d) and 
surely reached into the Patristic period through Neoplatonism� For a further dis-
cussion on the theme, cf� L� Ayres, The Christological Context of Augustine’s De 
Trinitate XIII: Toward Relocating Books VIII- XV, Augustin� Stud� 29 (1998), 





of human being in The Trinity? Let us proceed to examine these questions 
in order�
According to Augustine, whereas the image of God is located in the most 
eminent part of the soul— i�e� the mind— our primary task is to comprehend 
the mind’s self- knowledge� It is, first of all, within the mind that humans 
perceive their existence as autonomous; irreducible to either the world, or 
the creatures around them� The mind must be present to itself so as to under-
stand the uniqueness of its existence and the extension of its intellective 
capacity� This is the statement of an anthropological principle inasmuch as, 
among all creatures, only human beings enjoy this privilege�
As noted above, while the senses are necessary for coming to know corpo-
real things, only the mind can apprehend incorporeal realities� So, according 
to Augustine, “as the mind itself, therefore, gathers the knowledge of cor-
poreal things through the bodily senses, so it gains the knowledge of incor-
poreal things through itself since it is incorporeal�”14 In this case, the mind 
achieves self- knowledge through an entirely inward process�
From the cognitive bending of the mind unto itself we are immediately 
able to distinguish two realities: (1) the mind, and (2) the knowledge (or self- 
awareness/ notitia) it has of itself� For Augustine, this self- reflexive bending 
also signals an intensification of the love that the mind has for itself, which 
grows in direct proportion to self- awareness� Therefore, the mind’s reflec-
tion upon itself involves both self- directed knowledge and self- directed love� 
Three realities— mind, knowledge, and love (mens, notitia, amor)— inhabit 
a single nature�
In addition to the immediate apprehension of its own reality, the mind’s 
inner activity is responsible, in a second moment, for differentiating itself from 
both other minds15 and the world at large� Augustine expresses the mind’s 
transition from internal to external apprehension by connecting one mental 
triad— mind, knowledge, love (mens, notitia, amor)— to another: memory, 
intelligence, will (memoria, intellegentia, uoluntas)� When the mind’s atten-
tion is directed toward a thing outside itself, the first three realities (mind, 
knowledge, love) are extended to that thing in the form of memory, intel-
ligence, and will� As Augustine says, “and furthermore, even in this point, 
there is a great difference, so that whether we speak of the mind in man 
and of its knowledge and love, or of the memory, understanding, and will, 
 14 Aug�, Trin� 9�3,3: Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus 
corporis colligit sic incorporearum per semetipsam. Ergo et se ipsam per se ipsam 
nouit quoniam est incorporea� (CCSL 50, 296)�
 15 On the problem of other minds in The Trinity, cf� G� Matthews, Augustine, Oxford 
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we remember nothing of the mind except through the memory, nor under-
stand except through the understanding, nor love except through the will�”16 
In other words, the self- centered knowledge and love of the mind sets in 
motion the subsequent activity of memory, intelligence, and will, which are 
ultimately responsible for directing it toward the most transcendent (and 
innermost) reality: God�17
The threefold structure of the mind assumes, at this point, two complemen-
tary processes: the coordination of its internal activities; and the continuity 
between an inward and an upward movement� Thus, it is possible to see how 
an anthropological model is formed through the activities of both the will and 
understanding, which are first turned inward, to face themselves, and then 
upward, to God�
Were the mind restricted to the immediacy of its self- reflexive knowledge 
and love, human beings would find themselves trapped in the realm of their 
own mental activity� Consequently, they would not grasp the vestiges of God 
spread throughout the world; nor would they share their existence with other 
creatures who might offer deeper meaning to their lives� Worst of all, they 
would be deprived of openness to God�
From here, Augustine turns to the focal point of his anthropological dis-
cussion: the transition from memory, intelligence, and love of self (memoria, 
intelligentia et amor sui) to memory, intelligence, and love of God (memoria, 
intelligentia et amor dei)� As he claims:
hence, this trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the 
mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself, but because it can also 
remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made� And when it does so, 
it becomes wise; but if it does not, even though it remembers itself, knows itself, and 
loves itself, it is foolish� Let it, then, remember its God, to whose image it has been 
made, and understand Him and love Him�18
 16 Aug�, Trin� 15�7,12: Itemque in hoc magna distantia est quod siue mentem dica-
mus in homine eiusque notitiam et dilectionem, siue memoriam, intellegentiam, 
uoluntatem, nihil mentis meminimus nisi per memoriam nec intellegimus nisi per 
intellegentiam nec amamus nisi per uoluntatem� (CCSL 50a, 475)�
 17 Such reflection finds an important development in Trin. 14�8,11 (CCSL 50a, 
436) where Augustine refers to the mind as capable of God (capax dei)� Human 
being is capable of God insofar as the shift from the triad mens, notitia, amor to 
memoria, intelligentia, uoluntas allows for overcoming the sort of solipsism of 
the self- awareness (notitia) of the mind�
 18 Aug�, Trin� 14�12,15: Haec igitur trinitas mentis non propterea dei est imago 
quia sui meminit mens et intellegit ac diligit se, sed quia potest etiam meminisse 
et intellegere et amare a quo facta est. Quod cum facit sapiens ipsa fit. Si autem 








As this quotation indicates, the volitional and cognitive activities of the mind 
are realized, firstly, in self- directed memory, intelligence, and love� However, 
the process of realization will not be complete until the mind arrives at the 
memory, intelligence, and love of God� It follows that the strengthening 
of the Trinitarian image is not restricted to the self- repose of the mind in 
remembering, knowing, and loving itself; rather, it is possible for the mind 
to transcend its own limitations, reaching toward the innermost presence of 
God� Nevertheless, it should be noted that Augustine assumes the necessity 
of divine assistance in ordering and perfecting the mind so as to straighten 
the will and purify the understanding�19 It is only in this way that the human 
being will come to desire what it ought to desire, and know what must be 
known above all�
Augustine emphasizes the role of the interior master, Christ, in the pro-
cess which begins with a movement from exterior to interior (ab exterioribus 
ad interiora) and then goes on from inferior to superior (ab inferioribus ad 
superiora)� Through the reference to the mediation of Christ, it is possible to 
see how this encompasses an intellectual and religious movement whose aim 
of self- awareness develops into a bridging relationship with the Triune God�
Thus, the transition from mind to God (expressed in Latin by the use of 
the pronoun sui and the genitive dei) implies a crucial decision that takes 
place in the own interiority of human being� As Augustine affirms, a dual 
possibility unfolds therefrom: one can move by likeness to God (ad deum), 
or by unlikeness away from God (ab deo)�20 The two prepositions (ad and 
ab) manifest the dynamic character of his anthropology� It is from that 
choice (whether to move toward or away from the likeness of God) that 
human beings grant, or fail to grant, reality to their existence�
In short, the anthropological sign of The Trinity relates to dynamic crea-
turely existence� Human beings are defined by movement, by the act of going 
beyond themselves�21 Consequently, there is no way, according to Augustine, 
that the existence and self- knowledge of the mind do not raise ipse facto 
a question concerning God� The Trinity links this self- knowledge to the 
increased understanding of our likeness to God� For that reason, it is not 
possible to dissociate the anthropological from the Trinitarian debate�
Let us move on, then, to the second question� As we have seen, it is pos-
sible to say that the human likeness to God is established through an interior 
itaque dei sui ad cuius imaginem facta est eumque intellegat atque diligat� (CCSL 
50a, 442– 443)�
 19 Cf� L� Ayres, Augustine and the Trinity, Cambridge 2010, 305�
 20 Cf� Aug�, Trin� 7�6,12 (CCSL 50, 266)�
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image; an “Imperfect image, which is an image nevertheless,” as Augustine 
puts it�22 In assuming the image of God as the formal principle of his anthro-
pology, Augustine is obliged to deal with the complex combination of theo-
logical and philosophical issues that derive therefrom; for this principle 
stands at the very crossroads of the Greek and Christian traditions�
The threefold structure of the mind is seen by Augustine as a fact from which 
it is possible to resolve the logical contradiction of being one, and three, at the 
same time� He argues that the human mind can be used to prove that triune 
realities in principle exist— for the reality of the mind must be triune insofar as 
it is the image of a triune God� The more we turn our attention and training 
toward understanding the threefold structure of the mind, the more we are 
able to perceive something of the Holy Trinity, albeit in a weak, mirrored state� 
Augustine thereby insists on the necessity of renewing this image— being faint 
and distorted by sin— as much as humanly possible�23
From this state of affairs it is possible to distinguish a dual endeavor: the 
perfecting of existence, and the perfecting of knowledge� These are forged 
into a mental unity inasmuch as perfection implies a total conversion of 
the will toward the source of existence and knowledge� Sensible/ intelligible, 
temporal/ eternal, creature/ Creator, science/ wisdom, finite/ infinite— these 
pairs embody the wide range of potential conversions that take place in the 
mind�24 As a matter of fact, the process relates more to a proper ordering of 
these than a mutually exclusive, either/ or decision� For example, a decision 
in favor of wisdom should not entail the abandonment of science� Rather, 
it presupposes a correct understanding of their relative positions, that is, 
the primacy of wisdom over science� Augustine additionally defends the 
foremost role of the Christian religion in initiating such conversion, which 
 22 Aug�, Trin� 9�2,2: impari imagine attamen imagine, (CCSL 50, 294)� Cf� also, Trin� 
7�6,12 (CCSL 50, 266– 267)�
 23 Cf� “for although it is a great nature, yet it could be corrupted because it is not 
the highest, and although it could be corrupted because it is not the highest, yet 
because it is capable of the highest nature and can be a sharer in it, it is a great 
nature” Aug�, Trin� 14�4,6: Quamquam enim magna natura sit, tamen uitiari 
potuit quia summa non est; et quamquam uitiari potuerit quia summa non est, 
tamen quia summae naturae capax est et esse particeps potest, magna natura 
est� (CCSL 50a, 429)� For further references cf� Trin� 7�6,12 (CCSL 50, 266) and 
L� Karfíková, Grace and the Will According to Augustine, Leiden 2012, 241– 242�
 24 On Augustine’s conception of conversion, cf� A�- M� Vannier, La conversion, axe 
de l’anthropologie de S. Augustin, CPE 88, Bruyères- le- Châtel 2002, 34– 48� It is 
reasonable to assume that the broadness of the mental conversion referred to by 








depends on an acto fidei, pushing the mind toward the truth that is beyond 
human beings, in their innermost interior thought�25
In light of these observations, Augustine takes into account the unique-
ness of human being vis- a- vis other creatures� Even though this theme is 
reshaped throughout his works from time to time, there is one idea that 
runs consistently through his argumentation; that is, the distinction between 
beings that exist; beings that exist and live; and beings that exist, live, and 
understand� Setting themselves apart from other creatures, human beings 
possess a mind by which they can understand not only themselves, but also 
inferior and, to some extent, superior realities� According to the decisions 
made by the will, the mind will either expand or contract its own existence/ 
knowledge� For this reason it is necessary for the human mind to understand 
its position among creatures, and to will itself toward the source of existence 
and knowledge� Not by chance, Augustine’s proposed mental triads always 
exhibit a combination of cognoscitive and volitive principles; for example, 
mens, notitia, amor (mind, knowledge, and love);26 memoria, intelligentia, 
uoluntas (memory, intelligence, and will);27 memoria, interna visio, uoluntas 
(memory, inner vision, and will);28 memoria, scientia, uoluntas (memory, 
science, and will)�29
The continuity between being and knowing is entirely related to putting 
the proper weight on each one of the possibilities presented before the human 
being� The more the mind rises toward knowledge of eternal and intelligible 
realities, the more it exists according to the reason of its creation� Likewise, 
the more it applies itself to the expanding of its own existence, the more it 
knows what should be known above all� In a passage of book 9, Augustine 
argues: “wherefore, we are like God inasmuch as we know him, but we are 
not like Him to the extent of being His equal, because we do not know Him 
as He Himself knows Himself”�30 It is worth emphasizing the direct pro-
portionality between we know (nouimus) and we are (sumus)— the more 
we know (or the more we want to know), the more we are, always in refer-
ence to God’s being and truth� It expresses the ontological, epistemological 
 25 Cf� H� C� de L� Vaz, Ontologia e história, São Paulo 1968, on how Augustine’s 
anthropological model offers a joining between the homo religiosus and the homo 
philosophicus�
 26 Cf� Aug�, Trin. 9�3,3 (CCSL 50, 296)�
 27 Cf� Aug�, Trin. 10�11,17 (CCSL 50, 329– 330)�
 28 Cf� Aug�, Trin. 11�3,6 (CCSL 50, 340)�
 29 Cf� Aug�, Trin. 12�15,25 (CCSL 50, 379– 380)�
 30 Aug�, Trin� 9�11,16: Quocirca in quantum deum nouimus similes sumus, sed non 
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and volitive articulation that defines the outline of the anthropology in The 
Trinity� It derives— and I would insist on this point— from the fact that all of 
them share the same locus, that is, the human mind or spirit�
So the divine likeness borne by human beings (the mind being an imago 
trinitatis31) allows for the proper recognition of the mind as a threefold 
reality and, moreover, propels it at long last to its final destination: God� In 
this way are self- knowledge and knowledge of God bound together� In short, 
inasmuch as the mind’s comprehension of itself denotes the understanding 
of its image/ condition, human being should eventually steer from memoria, 
intelligentia and amor sui toward memoria, intelligentia and amor dei�
However, this surely does not imply the possibility of a direct and compre-
hensive knowledge of God� Human beings increasingly embrace the triune 
God to the extent that they are able to recognize, through the mind’s self- 
knowledge, the same kind of unity and diversity shared by the Trinitarian 
persons� In other words, it is necessary to keep in mind that such knowl-
edge, as precarious as it is, does not aim at knowledge of the Trinity in itself� 
Even so, it is still worth being pursued since a deeper relation with God may 
thereby be restored�
4.  Conclusion
It remains for us to address the question of how The Trinity fits into the 
context of Augustine’s anthropological thought in general� In short, it is pos-
sible to say that it offers both continuity and rupture vis- a- vis his previous 
efforts� There is continuity, in the sense that Augustine’s understanding of 
human beings as creatures that exist because of, and for, God is upheld� If 
we assume anthropology as a word (logos) about human beings considered 
in their inward existence, The Trinity can be seen as yet another instance of 
Augustine’s famous reliance on finding the source and goal of such existence 
in, above all, a living God�
However, there is more than one possible interpretation of the relation 
between the human and the divine� Augustine’s works manifest a relent-
less endeavor to achieve precision in this matter— sometimes at the cost of 
profound revisions to his prior beliefs� So the question of the distinguishing 
anthropological features in The Trinity can only be faced by considering 
the broader context of his thought� Certainly, it is not a task to be fulfilled 
by a single article� So it is fitting for us, from this point on, to delineate the 
general contours of the issue in The Trinity and to drop some additional 






hints which, with luck, will find other minds and hands to move the debate 
forward�
One of the most important ideas to be emphasized here is the tight relation 
between memory, intelligence, and will� This particular dynamic definitely 
brings something new to the discussion� Although an incipient discourse 
on this topic can be found in other texts, in no place but The Trinity does 
Augustine put such a relation at the center of his anthropological concern 
while, at the same time, providing such an extensive, systematic analysis�32
On top of this, and following the main argument of this article, the anthro-
pology presented in The Trinity articulates the intricate relation between 
memory, intelligence, and will in connection with the imago Dei theology� 
From this perspective, memory, intelligence, and will are seen as equals in 
composing the substance of the human mind� To reduce the mind to any one 
of these terms would lead to ignoring those three which manifest separably, 
but whose operation is inseparable,33 making of them a true imago trinitatis� 
No activity of the mind prevails over the others� As Augustine argues:
 32 For example, in On the free will (cf� Lib� 2�19,51 (CSEL 74, 85– 86)), Augustine 
refers to memory (memoria), reason (ratio), and will (uoluntas) in an apparently 
similar frame to The Trinity� As he claims, memory remembers itself through 
itself, reason understands itself through itself and will serves itself through itself� 
However, insofar as they work through themselves separately, there is no further 
elaboration on their mutual coordination� Rather, memory and reason are only 
brought to light under the reference of the will, which is assumed as the core of 
human life� The other mental activities are depicted, so to say, as subordinate 
realities� In Confessions (cf� Conf� 13�11,12 (CSEL 33, 352– 353)), in turn, he 
mentions three things within the mind – to be (esse), to know (nosse) and to will 
(uelle) – whose inseparableness holds indeed some similarities to the structure of 
anthropology in The Trinity� Nevertheless, he refers to esse, nosse and uelle as 
activities through which the mind could exercise, examine and perceive how dif-
ferent (longe) from the Trinity it actually is� Besides, in spite of being possible to 
find in the text a couple of references to the imago Dei theme (cf� Conf� 3�7,12; 
6�3,4; 13�22,32 (CSEL 33, 54; 117– 118; 370– 371)), in no place it is juxtaposed 
with those three activities� Considering its confirmation of the absolute incompre-
hensibility of God, with no attendant reference to human interiority as a threefold 
structure similar to the triune God, it can scarcely be said to prefigure the debate 
in The Trinity�
 33 Cf� Aug�, Trin� 1�4,7 (CCSL 50, 35– 36); 1�5,8 (CCSL 50, 36); 4�21,30 (CCSL 
50, 202)� Cf� Sermon 52 for a further discussion on that formula and its varia-
tions: separabiliter proferantur, inseparabiliter operentur (s� 52�15 (CCSL 41a, 
70)); separabiliter demonstrari, et inseparabiliter operari (cf� s� 52�17 ; 18; 19; 20; 
23 (CCSL 41a, 71; 73– 74; 75; 79)); separabiliter pronuntientur, inseparabiliter 
operentur (cf� s� 52�17 (CCSL 41a, 73)) ; separatim pronuntiari, inseparabiliter 
operari (s� 52�19 (CCSL 41a, 76)); separatim pronuntiaui, inseparabiliter cogitaui 
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whatever else they are called in respect to themselves, they are called together, not 
in the plural but in the singular� But they are three in that they are mutually referred 
to each other� And if they were not equal, not only each one to each one, but each 
one to all, they would certainly not comprehend each other� For not only is each 
one comprehended by each one, but all are also comprehended by each one� For 
I remember that I have memory, understanding, and will; and I understand that 
I understand, will, and remember; and I will that I will, remember, and understand; 
and at the same time I remember my whole memory, understanding, and will� 34
In conclusion, it is worth mentioning that the anthropological discussion in 
The Trinity can provide a fresh perspective on the faith/ reason debate� For, 
while the mind is technically able to understand its threefold structure by its 
own effort, it is only faith, supported by the authority of the Christian tradi-
tion, which can properly mediate the mind’s relation with the Trinity, whose 
image and likeness it represents� In other words, the relation between the 
image of God in the mind and the Trinity is indeed structured by the activ-
ities of memory, intelligence, and will, but it is up to faith to renew35 this 
image, assuring us of our likeness to God� In this way, Augustine defends the 
religious ground of his anthropology in The Trinity�
 34 Aug�, Trin. 10�11,18: Et quidquid aliud ad se ipsa singula dicuntur etiam simul, 
non pluraliter sed singulariter dicuntur. Eo uero tria quo ad se inuicem referun-
tur. Quae si aequalia non essent non solum singula singulis sed etiam omnibus 
singula, non utique se inuicem caperent. Neque enim tantum a singulis singula, 
uerum etiam a singulis omnia capiuntur. Memini enim me habere memoriam et 
intellegentiam et uoluntatem, et intellego me intellegere et uelle atque meminisse, 
et uolo me uelle et meminisse et intellegere, totamque meam memoriam et intel-
legentiam et uoluntatem simul memini� (CCSL 50, 331)�
 35 Cf� Aug�, Trin� 12�7,12 (CCSL 50, 366– 367)� On the Christological accent of the 
discussion regarding the renovation of the image of God in the mind, cf� L� Ayres, 
1998� Cf� also, O� Roy, L’intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon Saint Augustin, 







Augustine’s Anthropology in tractatus 
in Iohannem 15
Abstract: In tract� eu� Io� 15,1 Augustine — who wrote no formal treatises on anthro-
pology2 — treats the encounter of Jesus and the Samaritan woman at Jacob’s well 
(John 4:1– 42), reflecting on human nature in the process� He presents human beings 
as basically weak, albeit in strong relation to God, and strengthened by the incarna-
tion� For the sake of human flourishing he prescribes the abandonment of lust, the 
cultivation of intellect, and the grounding of action in knowledge of God�
1.  Setting of tract. eu. Io. 15
Augustine, as we know, preached on the entire Gospel of John� There are 
124 tractates (i�e� homilies3) extant, of which tract� eu� Io� 20– 22 are prob-
ably later additions,4 meaning 121 are attributable to Augustine himself� 
While it is debated whether all were preached during church services, tract� 
eu� Io� 15 shows clear signs of an ecclesial setting�5 Indeed, we have records 
of writers jotting down notes while Augustine preached�6 The Gospel of John 
was probably read as lectio continua, setting it apart from Augustine’s other 
 1 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15 (CCL 36)� The English translation of tract� eu� Io� 
is taken from E� Hill, Augustine, Homilies on the Gospel of John 1– 40, A� D� 
Fitzgerald (ed�), The works of Saint Augustine III/ 12, New York 2009� The 
English translation of homily 15 is cited as tract� eu� Io� 15 (Hill, 275– 296)� 
Cf� M� Klöckener, Die Frau am Jakobsbrunnen in altkirchlicher Johannesexegese. 
Erkenntnis, Pädagogik und Spiritualität bei Origenes, Johannes Chrysostomos 
und Augustinus, Adamantiana 19, Münster 2021�
 2 Cf� E� Feldmann, Das augustinische Menschenbild, in: G� Lange (ed�), Was ist der 
Mensch? Aktuelle Fragen der Theologischen Anthropologie. Die Vorlesungen des 
Kontaktstudiums der Katholisch- Theologischen Fakultät der Ruhr- Universität Bochum 
im Wintersemester 1992/ 93, Theologie im Kontakt 1, Bochum 1993, 49– 72 (49)�
 3 Cf� M�- F� Berrouard, Introduction aux homélies de Saint Augustin sur l’Évangile 
de Saint Jean, CEAug� Série Antiquité 170, Paris 2004, 22; G�W� Doyle, St. 
Augustine’s Tractates on the Gospel of John compared with the Rhetorical Theory 
of De Doctrina Christiana, Chapel Hill 1975, 2 f�
 4 Cf� D�F� Wright, The Manuscripts of St. Augustine’s Tractatus in Euangelium Iohannis: A 
Preliminary Survey and Check- List, in: RechAug 8 (1972), 55– 143 (88– 95)�
 5 Cf� H� Müller, Iohannis euangelium tractatus CXXIV (In – ), in: AugL 3 (2004– 
2010), 704– 730 (714)�
















homilies�7 Tractates 1– 16 were preached in Hippo in the years 406– 407, 
and tractatus 15 between May 23rd and June 13th 407�8 Here, Augustine 
addresses the passages read in advance of his homilies�9 These passages and, 
indeed, his homilies, are organized according to thematic sections of John’s 
gospel� Generally, Augustine first cites the verse he wants to expound upon, 
and then proceeds to interpret it� His interpretations vary in length, and are 
characterized by vivid rhetoric� He is in active contact with his audience 
and addresses them again and again�10 The audience, we should note, was 
likely composed of both men and women, baptised and catechumens,11 poor 
and rich; the poor, however, were probably not destitute, and perhaps even 
owned small estates�12
For Augustine’s exegesis, the difference between carnal/ literal and spiri-
tual is very important: the biblical text, in his view, involves both�13 His aim 
is to draw out the spiritual, and, by so doing, facilitate access to the mysteries 
that strengthen the souls of human beings�14 This is why he chooses to inter-
pret the gospel allegorically� Reading the scripture carnally would mean 
reading it literally, excluding the intention of the Holy Spirit�15
 7 Cf� Müller, 2004– 2010, 716; A� Zwinggi, Die fortlaufende Schriftlesung im 
Gottesdienst bei Augustinus, in: ALW 12 (1970), 85– 129 (129); M� Margoni- 
Kögler, Die Perikopen im Gottesdienst bei Augustinus. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung 
der liturgischen Schriftlesung in der frühen Kirche, SÖAW�PH 810 = VKCLK 29, 
Vienna 2010, 581 f� 621�
 8 Cf� Margoni- Kögler, 2010, 586 f�; Berrouard, 2004, 26; Müller, 2004– 2010, 704– 
706 dates tract� eu� Io� 15 to Lent�
 9 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�1�
 10 Augustine addresses them as “fratres” in tract� eu� Io� 15�7 f�; 15�18 f� He addresses 
each of them (“you”) in tract� eu� Io� 15�4 (CCL 36, 151 f�); 15�6 f� (CCL 36, 
152 f�); 15�9 (CCL 36, 153 f�); 15�12 (CCL 36, 154 f�); 15�16 (CCL 36, 156); 
15�19 f� (CCL 36, 157 f�); 15�25 f� (CCL 36, 161)� Cf� P�T� Sanlon, Augustine’s 
Theology of Preaching, Minneapolis 2014, 13; Doyle, 1975, 158�
 11 Cf� V�H� Drecoll, Liturgie bei Augustin, in: id� (ed�), Augustin Handbuch, 
Theologen- Handbücher, Tübingen 2007, 224– 232 (226)�
 12 Cf� Berrouard, 2004, 27 f�; Sanlon, 2014, 14 f�; R� MacMullen, The Preacher’s 
Audience (AD 350– 400), in: JThs� NS 40,1 (1989), 503– 511 (509)�
 13 E�g� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�6 or tract� eu� Io� 15�19�
 14 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�1�
 15 Cf� T� Toom, Augustine’s hermeneutics: the science of the divinely given signs, 
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2.  Augustine’s Anthropology in tract. eu. Io. 15
Augustine begins his tract� eu� Io� 15 by speaking about John, the evangelist� 
We can assume that Augustine’s audience would already be familiar with him, 
and at least part of his gospel�16 Next, Augustine exhorts his audience to listen 
well because the evangelist speaks of “great mysteries and figures of great real-
ities”17 that feed the hungry and refresh the wearied soul�18 Augustine wants to 
explain these mysteries in his homily�
2.1  The incarnation as strengthening mystery for human beings
After his introduction, Augustine proposes to talk about the strengthening 
mystery of the incarnation but does not address it immediately� He cites John 
4:6, noting that it is here where the mysteries begin� These mysteries, we learn, 
lie in a textual meaning below the surface of the pure literal meaning�19 As 
Augustine emphasizes:
It is not for nothing that Jesus is tired, not for nothing that the strength of God is 
weary; not for nothing that the one by whom the weary are re- made is tired; not 
for nothing that the one whose absence wears us out, whose presence makes us 
steadfast, is weary� Still, Jesus is tired; he is tired from the journey and he sits down, 
and he sits down by the well, and it is at the sixth hour that, weary, he sits down� 
All these details are hinting at something, they want to suggest something; they are 
making us alert, they are encouraging us to knock� Therefore, may the one who 
was good enough to encourage us by saying, Knock, and it will be opened to you 
(Mt 7:7), open the door both to me and to you� For you was Jesus weary from the 
journey� We find a strong Jesus and we find a weak Jesus; Jesus is weak and strong 
[…]� The strength of Christ created you, the weakness of Christ recreated you� The 
strength of Christ caused that which was not to be; the weakness of Christ caused 
that which already was not to perish�20
 16 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�1�
 17 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�1 (Hill, 275)�
 18 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�1: Dicta enim ibi sunt magna mysteria, et magnarum 
similitudines rerum; pascentes animam esurientem, reficientes languentem� (CCL 
36, 151)�
 19 Cf� F� van der Meer, Augustinus der Seelsorger. Leben und Wirken eines 
Kirchenvaters, N� Greitemann (trans�), Cologne 31951, 465�
 20 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�6: Iam incipiunt mysteria. Non enim frustra fatigatur Iesus; 
non enim frustra fatigatur uirtus Dei; non enim frustra fatigatur, per quem fatigati 
recreantur; non enim frustra fatigatur, quo deserente fatigamur, quo praesente 
firmamur. Fatigatur tamen Iesus, et fatigatur ab itinere, et sedet, et iuxta puteum 
sedet, et hora sexta fatigatus sedet. Omnia ista innuunt aliquid, indicare uolunt 
aliquid; intentos nos faciunt, ut pulsemus hortantur. Ipse ergo aperiat et nobis et 
uobis [...]. Tibi fatigatus est ab itinere Iesus. Inuenimus fortem Iesum, et inueni-













Augustine structures his language rhetorically to sharpen his focus� He 
repeats four times that nothing in the narrative happens without a pur-
pose; indeed, does not happen ‘for nothing’� In so doing, he underlines the 
mysteries below the literal meaning� He repeats three times that Jesus sits 
down, is weary,21 weak, and strong� He equates Jesus and the strength of 
God when he twice forms a near identical sentence, supplanting “Jesus” with 
the “strength of God”� He also uses contrast: Jesus’ absence wearies us out; 
his presence makes us steadfast� The strength of Christ creates; his weakness 
recreates the listener� Augustine addresses his audience personally, including 
them in the biblical proceedings� He revisits the strength and weakness of 
Christ in the next sentence and again changes the second part, replacing 
“created you” and “recreated you” with “caused that which was not to be” 
and “caused that which already was not to perish”� Consequently, he refor-
mulates how Christ creates and recreates, viz� through his weak and strong 
aspects� In this formulation is a hidden mystery�22
Augustine compares Jesus to a mother hen nourishing her chicks�23 One 
sees, when looking at the hen, that she has children to feed, and is, to that 
extent, weakened in her natural powers� Like this hen, Augustine presents 
Jesus as wearied from the journey of incarnation; that is to say, wearied in 
the flesh�24 Augustine draws a parallel between “weary from the journey” 
and “weary in the flesh”, showing that journey and flesh are interchange-
able in the structure of his sentence� He explains this interpretation, again 
rhetorically, by noting that one cannot properly speak of Jesus ‘journeying’ 
somewhere if he is everywhere� He could only come to humankind by taking 
on the form of visible, space- bound flesh�25 Ergo, one of the strengthening 
mysteries that Augustine spoke of at the beginning, and now explains, is 
infirmitas Christi te recreauit. Fortitudo Christi fecit ut quod non erat esset; infir-
mitas Christi fecit ut quod erat non periret (CCL 36, 152; Hill, 277 f�)�
 21 Cf� F�J� Weismann, Cristo, verbo creador y redentor, en la controversia antidona-
tista de los ‘Tractatus in Iohannis Evangelium’ I- XVI de S. Agustin, in: Strom� 42 
(1986), 301– 328 (322)�
 22 P� Agaësse, L’anthropologie chrétienne selon Saint Augustin� Image, liberté, péché 
et grâce, Paris 1986, 116 remarks that Augustine’s anthropology, in presenting 
the redemptive incarnation, valorises at the same time divinity and humanity of 
Christ�
 23 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�7�
 24 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�7: Sic ergo infirmus Iesus, fatigatus ab itinere. Iter ipsius 
est caro pro nobis adsumpta. […] Ideo fatigatus ab itinere quid est aliud, quam 
fatigatus in carne? (CCL 36, 153)�
 25 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�7: Quomodo enim iter habet qui ubique est, qui nusquam 
deest? Quo it, aut unde it, nisi quia non ad nos ueniret, nisi formam uisibilis carnis 
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Jesus’ live- renewing incarnation, and its effect on weakened humanity�26 We 
now see that Augustine stressed Jesus’ strength and weakness because they 
represent his divinity and humanity� Augustine next exhorts his audience to 
be strong in Jesus’ weakness rather than wallowing in their own�27 He does 
not explain what he means by being weak or strong as a human, but he 
must have some corresponding action in mind, or he could not admonish his 
listeners to act on this knowledge�
2.2  The water from the fountain and the 
living water read allegorically
Jesus promises living water (John 4:14)� Augustine interprets this allegor-
ically� He says, that “the water in the well is worldly pleasure in the dark 
depths”, wherefrom people “draw it […] with the bucket of their lusts�”28 
Augustine then describes human want in detailed observations29 that humans 
“submit to lust so that they may attain the pleasure drawn up from the 
depths and may enjoy the pleasure which was preceded by the lust sent 
down to us”�30 According to Augustine, in order to obtain pleasure, human 
beings need first to dispatch lust�31 He refers his interpretation to the biblical 
text and explains what he tacitly presupposed: “So then, take the bucket as 
being lust, the water from the depths as being pleasure; when anyone attains 
the pleasure of this world […] will he not get thirsty again? So, then, Jesus 
says Whoever drinks of this water will get thirsty again; but if he accepts 
 26 Cf� N� Baumann, Die Demut als Grundlage aller Tugenden bei Augustinus, Pat� 
21, Frankfurt 2009, 59� 70�
 27 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�7: sed noli tu infirmari; in illius infirmitate tu fortis esto 
(CCL 36, 153)�
 28 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�16: etenim aqua in puteo, uoluptas saeculi est in profun-
ditate tenebrosa; hinc eam hauriunt homines hydria cupiditatum (CCL 36, 156; 
Hill, 283)�
 29 Cf� H� Karpp, Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie. Biblische Anthropologie 
und philosophische Psychologie bei den Kirchenvätern des dritten Jahrhunderts, 
BFChTh 44,3, Gütersloh 1950, 247 f�
 30 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�16: Cupiditatem quippe proni submittunt, ut ad uoluptatem 
haustam de profundo perueniant; et fruuntur uoluptate, praecedente et praem-
issa cupiditate. Nam qui non praemiserit cupiditatem, peruenire non potest ad 
uoluptatem (CCL 36, 156; Hill, 283)� C� Mayer, Prinzipien der Anthropologie 
Augustins, in: id� (ed�), Würde und Rolle der Frau in der Spätantike. Beiträge des 
II. Würzburger Augustinus- Studientages am 3. Juli 2004, Cass� 39,3 = ResSig 
3, Würzburg 2007, 15– 29 (27) indicates the congruence between Augustine’s 
anthropology and his biography� Cf� id�, Homo, in: AugL 3 (2004– 2010), 381– 
416 (407)�















water from me, he will never get thirsty again�”32 As possible pleasures of 
this world, Augustine lists drink, bath, show, and amour� In contrast to these 
worldly pleasures, which cause human beings to thirst again,33 he elevates 
Jesus’ water, which satisfies forever�
As Augustine often uses other biblical passages to reinforce his state-
ments,34 he here cites from the Psalms: “We shall be satisfied, says the 
Psalmist, by the good things of your house” (Ps 64:5 LXX)�35 He then asks 
what God will give if not the water of which it is said “For with you is 
the fountain of life” (Ps 35:10 LXX)? He concludes with a rhetorical ques-
tion: “How, after all, will those ever get thirsty who shall be made drunk on 
the abundance of your house”36 (Ps 35:9 LXX)? Augustine links the water 
that satisfies thirst forever to God, the fountain of life, and those who shall 
be made drunk on the abundance of your house to water in abundance� 
With this allegorical reading, Augustine presents a detailed picture of human 
want: whoever has wanted something once will want it again and again ad 
infinitum� Worldly pleasure is impermanent; only the water of God, inter-
preted as the Holy Spirit,37 can quench future longing�
The interpretation of lust and pleasure as negatives is typical of Augustine’s 
exegesis, as one can see when comparing his to Origen’s� Origen’s exegesis is 
also allegorical, but doesn’t describe the water from the well as a pure nega-
tive, and refers the biblical situation not to lust and pleasure, but knowledge� 
Origen wrote his 13th book of the Commentary on the Gospel according to 
John in the 230s, perhaps 236, in Caesarea38 with the aim of combatting the 
gnostic Heracleon�39 For Origen, the water in the well represents uncertain 
 32 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�16: Pone ergo hydria, cupiditatem, et aquam de profundo, 
uoluptatem; cum peruenerit quisque ad uoluptatem saeculi huius, […] numquid 
non iterum sitiet? Ergo de hac aqua qui biberit, iterum, inquit, sitiet; si autem 
acceperit a me aquam not sitiet in aeternum (CCL 36, 156; Hill, 283)�
 33 Cf� S�J� Duffy, Anthropologie, in: A� Fitzgerald (ed�), Encyclopédie. Saint Augustin. 
La Méditerranée et l’Europe. IVe – XXIe siècle, Edition française de M�- A� Vannier, 
Paris 2005, 45– 57 (52)�
 34 Cf� Berrouard, 2004, 169– 175; K� Froehlich, “Take Up and Read”. Basics of 
Augustine’s Biblical Interpretation, in: Interp� 58,1 (2004), 5– 16 (10)�
 35 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�16 (Hill, 283)�
 36 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�16: Satiabimus, inquit, in bonis domus tuae. De qua ergo 
aqua daturus est, nisi de illa de qua dictum est: Apud te est fons vitae? Nam quo-
modo sitient qui inebriabuntur ab ubertate domus tuae? (CCL 36, 156; Hill, 284)�
 37 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�17�
 38 Cf� R�E� Heine, Introduction, in: id�, Origen, Commentary on the Gospel accord-
ing to John 1. Books 1– 10, FaCh 80, Washington 1989, 3– 28 (15)�
 39 Cf� Chr� Markschies, Valentin/ Valentinianer, in: TRE 34 (2002), 495– 500 (495); 
A� Wucherpfennig, Heracleon Philologus. Gnostische Johannesexegese im zweiten 
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teaching that does not bring real knowledge,40 while Jesus’ water repre-
sents a teaching that lifts one into eternal life� Jesus offers a teaching (ἔχο 
λόγον)41 that acts as a spring toward eternity, carrying humans and their 
understanding (διάνοια)42 up to a higher, eternal life� Origen also thinks it is 
good to first drink from the well in order to thirst, because only those long-
ing for water can be saturated�43 If it were not useful to drink water from 
the well, Origen says, Jesus would not have come to the well and would not 
have asked the woman to give him water therefrom�44 Origen then equates 
drinking water from the well with reading the Scriptures�45 So, reading the 
Scriptures is good, but Scripture does not contain all the mysteries of God�46 
The water that Jesus gives signifies all that is beyond Scripture (τὸ “ὑπὲρ ἃ 
γέγραπται”)�47 For Origen, everything revolves around knowledge and its 
acquisition� In his favored interpretation, he cannot describe the water in 
the fountain as negative, because this would mean reading the Scriptures is 
negative� In Augustine’s interpretation, we find the topics he is well known 
for, and which have left their indelible mark on history: the incessant longing 
of humans, lust, and the negative connotations of these�
 40 Cf� Or�, Commentarii in euangelium Iohannis 13�16 (GCS 10, 228)� Greek edi-
tion: E� Preuschen, Origenes Werke. Der Johanneskommentar, GCS 10, Leipzig 
1903, cited as Or�, Commentarii in euangelium Iohannis 13 (GCS 10, 226– 297)� 
The English translation from the Commentary on the Gospel according to John 
is taken from R�E� Heine, Origen, Commentary on the Gospel according to John 
2. Books 13– 32, FaCh 89, Washington 1993� The English translation of book 13 
is cited as Commentary on the Gospel according to John 13 (Heine, 69– 165)�
 41 Cf� Or�, Commentarii in euangelium Iohannis 13�16 (GCS 10, 228)�
 42 Cf� Or�, Commentarii in euangelium Iohannis 13�16 (GCS 10, 228)�
 43 Cf� Or�, Commentarii in euangelium Iohannis 13�23�
 44 Cf� Or�, Commentarii in euangelium Iohannis 13�24�
 45 Cf� Or�, Commentarii in euangelium Iohannis 13�31: ἡ μὲν πηγὴ τοῦ ’Ιακώβ […] ἡ 
πᾶσα εἶναι γραφή (GCS 10, 230)�
 46 Cf� Or�, Commentarii in euangelium Iohannis 13�27�
 47 Cf� Or�, Commentarii in euangelium Iohannis 13�31 (GCS 10, 230); S�J� Spangler, 
“The Firstfruits of Our Activities”: “Examination of the Gospel” and the 
Pedagogical Functions of Scripture in Origen’s Prologue to the Commentary on 
the Gospel according to John, in: C� Heidl / R� Somos (eds�), Origeniana Nona. 
Origen and the Religious Practice of his Time. Papers of the 9th Internatinal 
Origen Congress. Pécs, Hungary, 29 August – 2 September 2005, BETL CCXX-
VIII, Leuven 2009, 337– 344 (342): “Jesus has also a pedagogic function: “leading 
to a ‘spiritual’, ‘more mystical’ kind of knowledge� The gospel points beyond itself 


















2.3  The woman’s husband as the ruling intellect enlightened by God
Augustine next raises questions about the intellect that should rule the soul 
and bodily senses once human beings become capable of reason� The intel-
lect is enlightened by God and Christ�48 If the intellect does not assume its 
proper place, error will reign, leading humans astray�49
Jesus asks the woman at the well to go call her husband, and then return 
(John 4:16)� Augustine interprets this passage as follows: the woman cannot 
understand Jesus because she hears according to the flesh, while he speaks 
according to the Spirit� Again, Augustine works with repetitions (carnem – 
carnem, loquor – alloquor) and contrasts (dono Dei – carnem, carnem – 
spiritum) when he says: “de dono Dei tibi loquor, tu autem carnem cogitas; 
secundum carnem sitire non uis, ego spiritum alloquor”�50 In the first part of 
the sentence, he begins with the gift of God and ends with the flesh; in the 
second part, he turns it the other way around (chiasmus): beginning with 
the flesh and ending with the spirit� In so doing, he draws a parallel between 
“the gift of God” and “the spirit”� Above, he had said that Jesus promises 
the Holy Spirit when he offers the living water and matched the Holy Spirit 
with the living water�51 When Augustine spoke about the intellect or under-
standing of the woman in the passages above, he used mens or intellectus�52 
Now he uses spiritus�
Just as Augustine wants to reach the minds of his audience, whom he 
exhorts to listen attentively,53 Jesus wants to reach the mind of the woman 
who does not yet understand him� This is why he asks her to call her hus-
band, who Augustine interprets as her intellect, by repeating the biblical 
sentence and exchanging “husband” with “intellect”: “Voca uirum tuum, 
 48 Cf� F� van Fleteren /  Red�, Illuminatio, in: AugL 3 (2004– 2010), 495– 504 (498� 
501); M�- A� Vannier, La conversion, axe de l’anthropologie de S. Augustin, 
in: CPEg 8 (2002), 34– 48 (37); M�T� Clark, Augustine on Person: Divine and 
Human, in: J�T� Lienhard (ed�), Augustine. Presbyter Factus Sum, Augustinian 
Historical Institute, New York 1993, 99– 120 (108)�
 49 Cf� Vannier, 2002, 36: “Seul le maître intérieur est garant de la vérité de la 
connaissance”�
 50 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19 (CCL 36, 157)� Cf� G�J�P� O’Daly, Anima, animus, 
in: AugL 1 (1986– 2004), 315– 340 (316): “ ‘Spiritus’ […] is often identical in mean-
ing with ‘anima’, though it can also be equated with ‘mens’ ”; A�- G� Hamman, 
L’homme, image de Dieu. Essai d’une anthropologie chrétienne dans l’Église des 
cinq premiers siècles, Paris 1987, 252: mens, intellectus, ratio and spiritus “désig-
nent ‘la fine pointe de l’âme’ ”�
 51 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�17�
 52 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�18 f� (CCL 36, 157)�
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praesenta intellectum tuum�”54 Only her husband, her intellect, can help 
the woman grasp what Jesus is saying� Augustine compares humans to ani-
mals: even animals have a soul,55 but only humans have understanding�56 If 
humans do not possess intellect, which for Augustine means do not use their 
intellect, they are reduced to an animal life� He plays again on words when 
he uses non adhibere to explain what non habere means: “intellectum non 
habere, hoc est, non adhibere”�57 He suggests that there is something animal 
in us that needs direction from the intellect,58 which “directs from above the 
motions of the soul”�59 Augustine then explains his interpretation by asking 
whether the directing one, or the directed, should be called husband� With 
this rhetorical question he clearly means to express that the husband is the 
directing principle� Augustine can make this transference because both the 
husband and the intellect direct someone, or something: a husband directs 
his wife, the intellect rules the soul� The Samaritan woman thus becomes an 
image of the soul�60 Augustine says that a life is well ordered when the under-
standing, that is, the intellect, rules the soul�61 Hamman has argued that, 
when it comes to human nature, Augustine is only interested in the soul, 
and in the soul, only the intellect�62 What we see here confirms this: first, 
the intellect is deemed part of the soul, and second, Augustine focusses his 
attention on the intellect�
Augustine compares the intellect, a part of the soul, to the eye, which is 
part of the flesh� The eye, alone among bodily members, can perceive light� 
The eyes are a part of the body and enjoy light for the sake of the body; 
 54 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19 (CCL 36, 157)�
 55 Cf� E� Dinkler, Die Anthropologie Augustins, FKGG 4, Stuttgart 1934, 257; 
Chr� Horn, Anthropologie, in: V�H� Drecoll (ed�), Augustin Handbuch, Theologen- 
Handbücher, Tübingen 2007, 479– 487 (484)�
 56 Cf� Mayer, 2004– 2010, 386�
 57 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19 (CCL 36, 157)� Cf� A�J�H� van Weegen, Preek en 
Dictaat bij Sint Augustinus. Syntactisch- stilistische studie over de tractatus 
in Ioannis Evangelium, Nijmegen 1961, 99 f� for the connection of simplex 
and compositum; for simplicia and composita in the Augustinian sermons 
cf� Chr� Mohrmann, Das Wortspiel in den augustinischen Sermones, in: ead�, 
Études sur le latin des chrétiens, Rome 1959, 323– 349 (338– 340), first published 
in: Mn� 3,3 (1932), 33– 61�
 58 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19: intellectu regendum est (CCL 36, 157)�
 59 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19 (Hill, 285)�
 60 Cf� M� Comeau, Saint Augustin exégète du quatrième évangile, ETH, Paris 
1930, 148�
 61 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19: cum ordinata uita est, intellectus animam regit (CCL 
36, 157)�



















the intellect is the part of the soul that is enlightened by a higher light�63 
This higher light is, according to Augustine, God�64 He proves this state-
ment with a citation from the gospel of John, John 1:9: “Iam superior illa 
lux […] Deus est� Erat enim uerum lumen, quod illuminat omnem hominem 
uenientem in hunc mundum”�65 He then argues that Christ was just such a 
light�66 By using John 1:9, Augustine replaces God, whom he first presented 
as the enlightening light, with Christ, who now enlightens the intellect�67 He 
then takes up the encounter of John 4, inserting the light into the text of the 
gospel: “Talis lux Christus erat, talis lux cum muliere loquebatur.”68 This 
interpretation is possible because he had previously defined Christ, who is 
speaking to the woman, as light�
Augustine repeats that the woman cannot understand Jesus; she cannot 
be enlightened because her intellect is absent� This, Augustine explains, is 
why Jesus asks her to call her husband, i�e� her intellect, by which she is 
taught and directed�69 Here again, he presents an interpretation and elabo-
rates upon it: “think of a soul without intelligence as a woman, of a soul 
which has intelligence as a man”�70 Augustine continues by noting that a 
man needs to be directed from above in order to rule his wife properly, cit-
ing 1 Cor 11:3: “For the head of the woman is the man, while the head of 
the man is Christ”�71 The analogous content is expressed by a syntactic par-
allel in the beginning of the sentences that end with a chiasmus in the word 
uir and mulieris, or Christus, respectively: “Caput enim mulieris uir, caput 
autem uiri Christus.”72 Augustine revisits the encounter at the fountain when 
he says that the head of the man speaks to the woman without being phys-
ically present� In so doing, he reveals a gap in the chain of Christ directing 
the man/ intellect, who directs the woman/ soul� Augustine puts words into 
Jesus’ mouth that illuminate the situation, together with all that may have 
been unclear pertaining to the woman, the husband, the intellect, Christ� He 
 63 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19: illuminatur luce superiore (CCL 36, 157)�
 64 Cf� N� Fischer, Foris – intus, in: AugL 3 (2004– 2010), 37– 45 (37): Since Augustine 
“sich nach der Rückkehr in sein Inneres noch nicht am Ziel wußte, sah er sich 
genötigt, die Innerlichkeit der Seele auf Gott selbst hin zu übersteigen”�
 65 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19 (CCL 36, 157)�
 66 Cf� M� Comeau, La vie intérieure du chrétien, d’après les “Tractatus in Joannem” 
de St Augustin, in: RSR 20 (1930), 5– 25, 125– 149 (20)�
 67 Cf� Mayer, 2004– 2010, 401: “Erkenntnis jedweder Art ist Sache des ‘h� interior’ 
[…]� Sie erfolgt auf dem Weg der ‘illuminatio’ durch die ‘lux interior ueritatis’�”
 68 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19 (CCL 36, 157)�
 69 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19�
 70 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19 (Hill, 286)�
 71 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19 (Hill, 286)�
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says: “It is as if the Lord wanted to say, ‘Bring along your head so that he 
might welcome his head’� So call your husband and come back here means 
‘Be present, be truly with me; […] be present yourself, but not alone; be 
present with your head�’73 Again, he uses many repetitions, underlining the 
demand to be truly present in Christ’s presence� This request is not found in 
the biblical text� In John 4:16, Jesus asks the woman to go, call her husband, 
and come back to the well� Augustine modifies “come back” to “be pre-
sent”� Augustine’s interpretation establishes Christ as the light that desires 
to enlighten the woman� This is only possible if her husband, i�e� her intel-
lect, is present, because Christ and God enlighten the intellect� Therefore, 
Augustine explains why Jesus asks the woman to call her husband; namely, 
to achieve fuller presence�
Since the woman’s husband is not there, she still thinks according to 
the flesh�74 Jesus, the Lord, tracks her thought and speaks in mysteries:75 
he tells the woman that she spoke well in admitting that she has no hus-
band� Augustine explains that the Lord knew she did not have a husband� 
In order to show her that he knew this by divinity, Jesus adds her five prior 
husbands and observes that the one she has now is not, in fact, her hus-
band�76 Augustine maintains that the text compels us to look at the five 
husbands� Some authors, he notes, think these husbands stand for the five 
books of Moses, because the Samaritans accepted these and followed the 
laws thereof� But Augustine deems this interpretation improbable given that 
the husband whom the woman now has is not, according to the text, her 
husband� Therefore, he considers it easier to interpret the five prior hus-
bands – and he adds to the biblical text: the five husbands of the soul – as 
the five senses of the body�77 When one is immature, before one is able to use 
intellect or reason, one is ruled by nothing else than the senses of the flesh�78 
In a little child, the soul follows the senses: it seeks or avoids what it hears, 
sees, smells, tastes, and perceives by touch� It seeks what pleases the five 
senses� It avoids what offends them� Desire pleases the senses� Pain offends 
 73 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19: adesto, praesens esto; […] praesens esto, sed noli sola, 
cum uiro tuo adesto (CCL 36, 158; Hill, 286)�
 74 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�20: adhuc carnem sapit (CCL 36, 158)�
 75 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�20: Dominus sequitur, et mysteria loquitur (CCL 
36, 158)�
 76 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�20�
 77 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�21: uidetur mihi facilius nos posse accipere quinque 
uiros priores animae, quinque sensus corporis esse (CCL 36, 158)�
 78 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�21: antequam uti possit mente atque ratione, non regitur 













them�79 Since the soul is ruled by these five senses, it lives according to their 
dictates�
Augustine next asks why the five senses are called husbands� As we saw, 
he has already explained that the ruling principle is called husband�80 Now 
he says that the senses are named husbands because of their legitimacy� They 
are made by God, who has given them to the soul� Even so, the soul is weak 
insofar as it is ruled by the senses and acts according to their rule� But if, 
when she comes to the years of discretion, the soul accepts the discipline and 
teaching of wisdom, then the five husbands (the senses) will be followed by 
a true and legitimate husband; a better husband who rules to eternity, forms 
to eternity, and instructs to eternity�81 Augustine maintains that the true and 
legitimate husband does not replace the five senses automatically, but only 
if a person has undergone proper formation� He repeats three times that the 
legitimate husband guides the soul to eternity and shows by this that the 
soul’s proper orientation is towards eternity� The five senses, however, do 
not direct towards eternity but rather make us seek/ avoid temporal things�82 
Only the weak soul requires the impressions of the senses, whereas the intel-
lect makes the soul distinguish between just and unjust, good and evil, use-
ful and useless, chastity and unchastity� It instructs the soul to love the first, 
avoid the second, and to seek love rather than hate�83 Hence, the ability 
to differentiate between good and evil intellectually does not only concern 
knowledge� It also has practical consequences: humans are to love good and 
avoid evil; they shall act charitably�
If the intellect does not follow the five senses as ruler when the soul reaches 
rational maturity, error will dominate�84 But, Augustine warns, error does 
not rule in the proper sense� It rather destroys� This is how he analyzes the 
situation of the woman at the well: it was not the intellect that followed her 
five senses as ruler, but error� No legitimate husband, but an adulterer�85 This 
 79 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�21: Hos enim quinque sensus mulcet uoluptas, offendit 
dolor (CCL 36, 158)�
 80 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�19�
 81 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�21: at ubi uenerit ad annos exserendae rationis, si eam 
susceperit optima disciplina et doctrina sapientiae, quinque illis uiris ad regen-
dum non succedit, nisi uir uerus legitimus et illis melior, et qui melius regat, et 
qui ad aeternitatem regat, ad aeternitatem excolat, ad aeternitatem instruat (CCL 
36, 159)�
 82 Cf� H� Rondet, L’anthropologie religieuse de saint Augustin, in: RSR 29 (1939), 
163– 196 (172 f�); Fischer, 2004– 2010, 41�
 83 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�21; Karpp, 1950, 249�
 84 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�22: error dominatur (CCL 36, 159)�
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is how Augustine explains why Jesus says to the Samaritan woman that the 
man she has now is not her husband�
Augustine has Jesus command the woman to call her husband, rather than 
her adulterer, directing her to trust her intellect rather than her physical senses� 
Augustine explains that the woman erred because she had water in mind while 
the Lord, Jesus, was talking about the Holy Spirit�86 Augustine asks a rhetor-
ical question about the cause of her error: is it not due to the fact that she has 
an adulterer instead of a husband? He has Jesus command the woman to dis-
miss her adulterer and call her husband, to call him and return, for the sake of 
understanding�87
In the course of the conversation, Augustine shows how the woman uses her 
intellect more and more� According to Augustine, we can see that the woman’s 
husband, i�e� the intellect, has begun to arrive – but just begun – when she rec-
ognizes Jesus as a prophet�88 She doesn’t err so much as she did before, having 
begun to call her husband and dismiss the adulterer�89 She asks about the right 
place for adoration, and, in response, Jesus teaches her�90 He says: woman, 
believe me (John 4:21)� Augustine emphasizes that she now hears “woman, 
believe me” because her husband is present� He has Jesus say to the woman: in 
you is the one who believes, because your husband is present�91
A passage follows on the adoration on the Garizim and in Jerusalem, in 
spirit and in truth (John 4:20 f� 24),92 in the temple and in the heart�93 It 
also broaches the themes of (not) knowing what one worships, and salva-
tion from the Jews (John 4:22 f�)�94 The woman, who had deemed Jesus a 
prophet, recognizes his words as surpassing prophecy,95 telling him that she 
knows about the coming Messiah, the Christ, who will announce every-
thing (John 4:25)�96 Augustine concludes that the woman knew in advance 
 86 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�22: Adhuc enim errabat mulier, quae aquam illam cogi-
tabat, cum iam Dominus de Spiritu sancto loqueretur (CCL 36, 159)�
 87 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�22�
 88 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�23�
 89 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�23�
 90 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�23 f�
 91 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�24: Iam enim est in te qui credat, quia praesens est uir 
tuus (CCL 36, 160)�
 92 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�24�
 93 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�25�
 94 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�26�
 95 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�27: uidit talia dicere eum cum quo loquebatur, quae 
iam plus essent ad prophetam (CCL 36, 161)� Hill, 2009, 292, note 21 reads plus 
essent a propheta instead and translates “she saw that the man she was talking to 
was saying the kind of things that would be beyond a prophet”�























who would be able to teach her, and was thus worthy of having Jesus reveal 
himself�97 Augustine cites John 4:25 f� and concludes that the woman has 
called her husband, that he has become her head, and that Jesus has become 
the head of this husband/ intellect�98 The immediate consequence of knowing 
Jesus’ role as Messiah is a turn toward good actions�
2.4  Good action as consequence of knowing God
Augustine connects the knowledge gained about Jesus as Messiah with the 
turn toward good actions in the next part of his tractate: the woman is 
guided by faith to live a good life�99 Having received Christ the Lord in her 
heart, she leaves her water jar at the well, and runs (“ἀπῆλθεν” in John 
4:28) through the town to evangelize (“λέγει” in John 4:28)�100 Augustine 
interprets this as follows: she throws away lust and hurries off in order to 
announce the truth�101 He associates “leave the water jar” with “throw away 
lust”, and “evangelize” with “announce the truth”� In his first parallel, he 
revisits the picture from paragraph 16, where he presented the vessel as lust� 
Augustine presents the woman as a role model by saying that those who 
desire to evangelize must learn to throw away the water jar at the well�102 By 
so doing, he has combined each of the words for leaving the water jar at the 
fountain (dimitteret and proiecit) with the associated nouns (hydriam and 
cupiditatem): first, he says hydriam dimitteret, then proiecit cupiditatem, 
and finally proiciant hydriam� He does not formulate proiciant cupidita-
tem,103 but his parallels reveal his intent� The woman no longer follows the 
corporal senses, but is ruled by her intellect, by the light of God, by Christ, 
whom she preaches successfully�
Not only does the knowledge of Jesus’ role as Messiah have consequences 
for action, but so too the recognition of his prophetic vocation: the woman 
asks Jesus about proper worship once she realizes that he is a prophet (John 
4:19 f�)� Jesus answers that true worshipers will worship the Father in spirit 
and truth because the Father, being spirit, desires such worshipers (John 
 97 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�27�
 98 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�28�
 99 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�28: Iam mulier ordinatur in fide, et regitur bene uictura 
(CCL 36, 162)�
 100 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�30: et receptor in cor Christo Domino, quid faceret 
nisi iam hydriam dimitteret, et euangelizare curreret? (CCL 36, 162)�
 101 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�30: Proiecit cupiditatem, et properauit annuntiare 
ueritatem (CCL 36, 162)�
 102 Cf� Comeau, La vie, 1930, 140 f�
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4:23 f�)� Augustine explains that the mountain and the temple are physical, 
whereas God is not; wherefore, he should be worshiped in spirit and truth�104
In this context, Augustine presents an ideal for human behavior that 
depends on recognizing God’s proximity to the lowly� Augustine supposes 
that his audience may think of God as dwelling on high, observing humanity 
from a lofty place, and so insists that God looks kindly upon the lowly� 
Loving contrasts, Augustine argues in form of a fictional dialogue that God 
is near� He anticipates, and inserts, a possible question from his audience; 
namely, to whom is God near? Does his nearness have to do with personal 
loftiness or physical height?105 Augustine’s answer is a citation from Ps 33:19 
LXX: “He is near to those who have crushed their hearts”�106 Augustine con-
siders it wonderful that God dwells in the heights while, at the same time, 
being near the humble� He cites again from the Psalms (Ps 137:6 LXX): “He 
looks on the lowly, while he knows what is high up from afar”�107 Augustine 
concludes that God sees the proud from afar� He addresses each of his listen-
ers, asking them if they are looking for a mountain, and prompting them to 
descend and dwell with God�108 To justify this interpretation, Augustine cites 
Ps 83:6 f� LXX, noting that the mountains are in the heart, in the valley of 
weeping� Augustine explains that the valley is humility109 or low- lying�110 
Therefore, everything should be done with humility or – depending on the 
translation – inwardness� Inwardness is not an improbable translation,111 
considering how Augustine continues: “So then, do everything within; and 
if perchance you are looking for some high place, some holy place, pre-
sent the temple within you to God”�112 Augustine compares the lofty place 
with a holy place, and a holy place with the temple, based on 1 Cor 3:17� 
Therefore, his conclusion is that those who want to pray in the temple shall 
 104 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�24�
 105 Cf� Comeau, La vie, 1930, 18: “Aller à Dieu ne demande pas de longues recher-
ches, un coûteux déplacement; c’est simplement tourner vers lui l’intelligence�”
 106 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�25 (Hill, 291)�
 107 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�25 (Hill, 291)�
 108 Cf� Baumann, 2009, 275�
 109 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�25: Conuallis humilitatem habet. Ergo intus age totum 
(CCL 36, 161)�
 110 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�25 (Hill, 291)�
 111 Cf� E� Cassidy, Per Christum Hominem ad Christum Deum: Augustine’s 
Homilies on John’s Gospel, in: Th� Finan / V� Twomey (eds�), Studies in Patristic 
Christology, Dublin 1998, 122– 143 (143); M� Comeau, La rhétorique de Saint 
Augustin d’après les Tractatus in Ioannem, Paris 1930, 96; Mayer, 2004– 
2010, 400�
 112 Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�25 (Hill, 291)� Cf� Clark, 1993, 106: In “human interiority 



















pray first in themselves, and that, in so doing, they shall become a temple of 
God, who will surely listen�113
3.  Conclusion: the strong relationship between God and 
human beings
We have uncovered four insights pertaining to Augustine’s anthropolog-
ical vision in tract� eu� Io� 15� First, there are biblical mysteries that lend 
strength to the weak� Augustine focuses on the mystery of Jesus’ incarnation 
(Jesus’ journey represents his incarnation), which renews human nature� In 
Jesus, humans find rest and strength� Without him, they are weak� Second, 
Augustine provides a detailed analysis of human longing and lust� He uses 
the image of the well to signify the dark depths of the world, gathered inces-
santly by the vessel of human lust� In other words, humans let down their 
lust into the depths of the world to obtain pleasure again and again� Only 
the water of God, interpreted as the Holy Spirit, can prevent further longing� 
Third, Augustine takes the five previous husbands, and a sixth adulterer, as 
images of the five senses, and error, respectively� The five senses are the rul-
ing principle of the soul, favoring temporal things insofar as human beings 
have not developed their intellect (due to youth and/ or inexperience)� If/ 
when the intellect does not follow the senses, error, an adulterer, takes its 
place, and leads one astray� Jesus asks the woman to call her husband, which 
in Augustine’s interpretation means to use her intellect, i�e� the part of the 
soul that can conceive the light of God and discern between good and evil� 
Christ himself, being the light of God, rules the intellect� Finally, knowledge 
concerning Jesus as Messiah and the divine essence have consequences for 
one’s actions: the woman is a role model, abandoning lust for the sake of 
evangelization� Augustine suggests that those who desire to preach should 
follow her example� As for knowledge of Jesus as Messiah, it has direct 
consequences for knowledge of the divine essence: because God is spirit, 
he should be worshiped in spirit and truth� Because God is near the lowly, 
Augustine calls his audience to pray within themselves rather than in lofty 
places, for they themselves can be holy temples of God�
All these aspects demonstrate a strong relationship between God and 
humanity: Augustine does not present the incarnation as an abstract datum, 
but rather implicates his listeners in salvation history� Jesus chooses weak-
ness on their behalf� Humans, on their own, are bound to lust; only the Holy 
 113 Cf� Aug�, tract� eu� Io� 15�25; C� Couturier, Sacramentum et mysterium dans 
l’oeuvre de Saint Augustin, in: H� Rondet / M� Le Landais / A� Lauras / 
C� Couturier (eds�), Études Augustiniennes, Theol (P) 28, Paris 1953, 163– 274 
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Spirit can release them� They must turn away from the senses and follow 
the intellect, which, in turn, must be guided by God� Hence, the relationship 
between human beings and God, with its accentuation of the internal, must 
also yield external action� Human beings have their own contribution to 
make (e�g� giving up lust and following the intellect), but they are ultimately 
dependent on God,114 who enlightens their intellect and quenches their thirst�
 114 Cf� A� Solignac, La double tradition augustinienne, in: Anthropologie et huma-




Margrethe Kamille Birkler, Anders- Christian Jacobsen
Augustine on Human Resurrection
Abstract: We begin this article by examining 1 Cor 15 as the starting point of 
Augustine’s argumentation (I)� Several elaborate passages in Augustine’s later writings 
reveal that Paul’s reflections on the essence of the resurrected body in 1 Cor 15 influ-
enced Augustine’s conception of human resurrection� For the purposes of this article, 
we will focus on two such passages; namely, Enchiridion 84– 92 and De Civitate Dei 
22�12– 21� In each of these, 1 Cor 15 plays a significant role� In section II, we will 
identify the opponents of the Christian idea of resurrection who are contradicted by 
Augustine (especially in De Civitate Dei)� Section III delineates the questions about, 
and objections to, the Christian belief in the resurrection of the body (such as are raised 
by these opponents)� The next section (IV) looks closely at Augustine’s responses to 
his opponents, which contain the most significant elements of his resurrection the-
ology� His presentation centers on the destiny of the bodies of the righteous who are 
saved— the saints� However, Augustine claims that the condemned will be resurrected 
as well� The fate of these lost ones will be presented in section V� Section VI links 
Augustine’s ideas concerning the resurrection to his dualistic theology and his well- 
known doctrine of sin and grace� The article ends with a summary and conclusion�
1.  Introduction
This article on Augustine’s understanding of human resurrection is a nat-
ural extension of Prof� Jacobsen’s previous research on the topic, wherein 
he deals primarily with the early Greek theologians�1 In this article, we con-
centrate on Augustine’s treatment of human resurrection in two important 
writings from the latter part of his life: Enchiridion (enchir�) and De Civitate 
Dei (ciu�)�2
 1 Cf� A�- C� Jacobsen, Kødets opstandelse? Mennesket og målet hos Irenæus og 
Origenes, Copenhagen 2002; A�- C� Jacobsen, The nature, function, and destiny of 
the human body – Origen’s interpretation of 1 Cor 15, in: ZAC 23 (2019), 36– 52�
 2 De Civitate Dei was long on its way� Augustine began to write the work in 412 
and finished in 426 or 427� One of the reasons for beginning this work was the fall 
of Rome in 410, which to Augustine and others was understood as a sign of the 
end of this world, cf� J� van Oort, De Ciuitate Dei (Über die Gottesstadt), in: V�H� 
Drecoll, Augustin Handbuch, Tübingen 2007, 347– 360 (349)� The Enchiridion 
was written in 421 at the request of a person named Laurentius� Enchiridion is a 
kind of catechism explaining the most central elements of Christian faith— faith, 









In these later writings, the shift in Augustine’s thoughts on the resurrected 
body is apparent� The view of the resurrected body in the younger Augustine 
is especially pronounced in the writing De Fide et Symbolo from 393, in 
which Augustine writes that in the resurrection there “will no longer be 
flesh and blood, but only body�”3 Building on 1 Cor 15:44, Augustine writes 
that the body in the resurrection will be subjected to the spirit in a way 
fitting for dwelling in heaven, by which all earthly fragility and pollution 
will have been changed and transformed into heavenly purity and stability�4 
Following Michael David Barbezat, this subjection to the spirit should be 
seen in relation to Augustine’s tripartite anthropology according to which 
the human being is divided into three parts: spiritus, anima, and corpus� In 
the perfection, these three parts will be arranged hierarchically, resulting 
in the perfect harmony when corpus is subjected to anima, anima is sub-
jected to spiritus, and spiritus is subjected to God�5 According to Barbezat, 
Augustine here understands 1 Cor 15:52 to mean that not just the rational 
mind will rise at the resurrection but the body as well, however, a body that 
is purged of disorder� Following Barbezat this means, that “this formulation 
takes the body as an indispensable and constant part of personhood�”6 This 
body will, however, according to Augustine in De Fide et Symbolo not be 
made of flesh, because there will be no flesh at all in the heavenly things, but 
instead simple and shining bodies, which by some is called ethereal and by 
Paul spiritual�7 The substance of the ethereal body will be radically different 
from the fallen human body� The human body will go through a process of 
refinement through which the ethereal body will be a corporeal body forged 
from our current bodies� Following Barbezat, this should not be understood 
as a transformation into spirit, but as a imagining of a type of body that 
could be perfect�8 This refinement process originates according to Barbezat 
from book four of Origen’s De principiis and the wheat grain metaphor 
found herein�9
 3 Aug�, fid� et symb., 10�24,30: Non iam caro erit et sanguis, sed tantum corpus� 
(CCSL 41)� The English translation is from E� P� Meijering (trans�), Augustine, De 
Fide et Symbolo, Amsterdam 1987, 150�
 4 Aug�, fid� et symb., 6�13,15– 16�
 5 Aug�, fid� et symb., 10�23�
 6 M� D� Barbezat, Augustine on the flesh of the resurrection body in the De Fide et 
Symbolo: Origen, Manichaeism, and Augustine’s developing thought regarding 
human physical perfection, in: A� M� Scott / M� D� Barbezat (eds�), Fluid Bodies 
and Bodily Fluids in Premodern Europe, Amsterdam 2019, 175– 192 (184)�
 7 Aug�, fid� et symb, 10�24,31�
 8 Barbezat, 2019, 185�
 9 Id�., 186� It should be noted with Tarmo Toom that for Augustine the meta-
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Augustine had, however, become aware of the problematic implications of 
his statements in De Fide et Symbolo when he wrote Retractiones in 426– 427. 
Here, he does not write that he was wrong in his younger years but seeks 
instead to clarify how his earlier statements should be understood� It is how-
ever quite clear, as Barbezat emphasizes as well, that Augustine in Retractiones 
reverses his earlier position and here arguments in favor of the transformation 
of the flesh�10 Augustine writes that one should not misunderstand his earlier 
statements stating that in the resurrection there will only be body, and not 
flesh and blood, as meaning that human beings’ current earthly body will be 
changed into a celestial body, which will have neither its members nor the sub-
stance of the flesh� This he finds supported by the resurrected body of Christ, 
which had the same members and were visible for the eyes and touchable by 
the hands�11 Augustine does, however, still hold that the members and the sub-
stance of the flesh must undergo a necessary refinement process, which we 
also will find in De Civitate Dei� Thus, Augustine here, as Barbezat has noted 
as well, goes beyond Origen who believed that even though e�g� air cannot be 
grasped it is still a body� Augustine on the other hand now believed an aerial 
body to be too abstract and thus not an useable expression as it would repre-
sent a transformation into something that would no longer be human�12
Barbezat is therefore right in concluding, that “the route towards perfec-
tion charted by the young Augustine abstracts or spiritualizes the body to a 
high degree and would prove unacceptable to him in his old age”�13 Thus, 
the characteristics of Augustine’s late theology understandably influenced his 
articulation of human resurrection including Enchiridion and De Civitate 
Dei� This also means, among other things, that the distinction between those 
alongside the material/ formal continuity as mortal bodies rot – a process which 
the resurrected body is free from rather than a victim to� Thus, Augustine pre-
ferred the non- organic metaphors of re- cast statues and rebuilt ships, cf� T� Toom, 
Totus Homo: Augustine on Resurrection, in: K� D� Dyer (ed�), Resurrection and 
Responsibility: Essays on Scripture, Theology, and Ethics in Honor of Thorwald 
Lorenzen, Oregon 2009, 59−75 (69)�
 10 Barbezat, 2019, 186� This view is supported by e�g� D� G� Hunter, Augustine on the 
Body, in: M� Vessey (ed�), A Companion to Augustine, New Jersey 2012, 353– 364 
(361), and M� R� Miles, Sex and the City (of God): Is Sex Forfeited or Fulfilled 
in Augustine’s Resurrection of Body?, in: Journal of the American Academy of 
Religion 73/ 2 (2005), 307– 327 (315)�
 11 Aug�, Retract., 1�17,53� Here, Augustine refers to Luke 24:39 as well�
 12 Babezat, 2019, 187�










who are ‘saved,’ and those who are ‘lost,’ is more pronounced in the late 
writings than in the early ones�14
2.  Augustine’s Point of Departure: 1 Cor 15
In Enchiridion 91, Augustine presents his understanding of the resurrected bod-
ies of the saved— i�e� “the saints” (sanctorum corpora)15— as a paraphrase of, 
and commentary on, central passages in 1 Cor 15� Paul’s epistle is a response 
to those Corinthians who deny the resurrection of the dead� Not only does it 
feature his arguments in defense of resurrection, but also in defense of its cor-
poreal character� Evidently, this is perfectly suited to Augustine’s purposes�
Having introduced the resurrection of the body earlier in the Enchiridion, 
Augustine provides a detailed analysis in Enchiridion 91� The resurrected 
bodies of the saints, we read, will be freed from all defects and deficiencies 
presently associated with the human body� The new bodies will be indestruc-
tible (sine ulla corruptione), and marked by ease (facilitas) and happiness 
(felicitas)� For this reason, they are called spiritual (spiritalia), a phrase found 
also in 1 Cor 15:44� But, as Augustine explains, this does not mean that such 
bodies cease to be really and truly bodies� Their nature is preserved, but also 
transformed� According to Augustine, the resurrected body will shed the 
debilitating features of its carnal nature� Perishability, which causes earthly 
bodies to be heavy (aggrauo), and blemishing (uitia), which sets the flesh 
against the spirit, will no longer tyrannize bodily existence� In defending this 
assertion, Augustine cites 1 Cor 15:50a where Paul says that flesh and blood 
will not inherit the kingdom of God� Augustine interprets this to mean that 
the resurrected bodies of the saints will remain carnal in the sense of being 
fleshly in nature, while, at the same time, rising above the imperfections 
that characterize earthly bodies of flesh and blood�16 Augustine justifies this 
 14 Concerning the question about continuity and discontinuity in Augustine’s the-
ology see C� Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s early theology. An argument for 
continuity, Oxford 2006� Harrison argues for continuity between the younger and 
the older Augustine� Another point of view is presented by B� Dobell in his book 
Augustine’s Intellectual Conversion. The Journey from Platonism to Christianity, 
Cambridge 2009� Dobell’s thesis is, that Augustine’s first conversion in 386 was 
an intellectual conversion to Porphyrian Platonism and only later on, around 395, 
did he convert to Pauline Christianity� Dobell’s point of view is summarized in the 
conclusion of his book (228– 236), entitled ‘Augustine the Porphyrian’�
 15 He turns to the resurrection of the lost in enchir� 92, which we shall also 
examine below�
 16 Aug�, enchir� 91: Quantum autem attinet ad substantiam, etiam tunc caro erit� 








Augustine on Human Resurrection 189
position by pointing out that, after his resurrection, Jesus’ body was on sev-
eral occasions described as being flesh, for example in Luke 24:39�
This distinction between different meanings of the words ‘flesh’ and 
‘carnal’ is not an invention of Augustine� He is rather continuing a dialectic 
rooted in the early Greek patristic tradition� In this tradition, 1 Cor 15:50a 
had been interpreted through a distinction between ‘flesh and blood,’ under-
stood as substances, and ‘flesh and blood,’ understood as qualities�17 This 
distinction made it possible to assert that resurrected bodies will remain 
fleshly, while also rising above the defects, shortcomings, and weaknesses 
associated with the flesh in this life�18 So, it is clear that Augustine is follow-
ing a strong patristic tradition expressed for example by Irenaeus (and even 
stronger and more radically by Origen) when he affirms the resurrection 
of the flesh� Here Augustine’s move from Platonism to Pauline Christianity 
which Dobell described becomes quite clear� In the context of Augustine’s 
notion of the resurrection of the flesh, flesh is something transformed, per-
fected, and liberated from the heaviness of corruptibility� Here we find a 
strong anti- dualistic point, to which we shall return below�
The description of the nature of the resurrected bodies of the saints in 
Enchiridion 91 is more or less reiterated in De Civitate Dei 22�21� In this 
passage, Augustine confirms— by using words and concepts derived from 
1 Cor 15— that all such bodies, in the wake of death, will be restored and 
transformed into spiritual bodies: clothed with immortality and incorrup-
tion�19 In this future state, the spiritual flesh will be subject to the spirit, 
without thereby ceasing to be flesh� This corresponds with Augustine’s 
interpretation in Enchiridion 91; namely, that resurrected bodies will sur-
render their carnal qualities (that is, their corruptibility) while remaining 
essentially carnal� In De Civitate Dei 22�21, Augustine adds the caveat that 
(eds�), Opera, CCSL 47– 48, Turnholt 1955 (De Civitate Dei), and W�M� Green 
(ed�), Opera, CCSL 46, Turnholt 1969 (Enchiridion)�
 17 Cf� Iren�, haer� 5�9– 14 where he— by means of a distinction between flesh under-
stood as substance and quality, respectively— carefully explains that it does not 
follow from Paul’s statements in 1 Cor 15:50a that the body’s carnal substance 
is excluded from salvation� For an interpretation of this passage, see Jacobsen, 
2002, 68– 81�
 18 See further A� Nightingale, Once Out of Nature: Augustine on Time and the Body, 
Chicago 2011, 211– 217, in which Nightingale holds that Augustine in e�g� ciu�, 
14�2 emphasizes that the works of the flesh cannot be identified with the body 
alone, why Augustine is using Paul’s notion of the flesh as a moral category�
 19 Aug�, ciu� 22�21: Restituetur ergo quidquid de corporibus uiuis uel post mortem 
de cadaueribus periit, et simul cum eo, quod in sepulcris remansit, in spiritalis 









all statements concerning the resurrected, spiritual bodies of the saints per-
tain to something that no living person has experienced�20 However, since 
Christians hope for and believe in a bodily resurrection, this circumstance 
should not, in Augustine’s view, prevent us from further discussing the 
subject�
3.  Identifying the critics of the Christian belief in bodily 
resurrection
In Enchiridion, Augustine does not explicitly declare that his description 
of, and arguments for, corporeal resurrection are made in response to non- 
Christian critics thereof� However, in De Civitate Dei he typically refers to 
‘scholars and wise men’21 and, more specifically, Plato and Platonists (ciu� 
22�11– 12) as targets of his critique� Although we will retain Augustine’s 
phrase ‘Platonists’ throughout this article, there can be little doubt that his 
quarrel is not with Plato per se� Nor is he overly concerned with Plato’s 
philosophy being somehow (mis)used by later epigones against the idea 
of Christian resurrection� The problem is with still- later Neo- Platonic 
adaptation(s)� It is such ‘Neoplatonists’ whom Augustine sees as the focal 
point of his criticism� While not overly critical of Plato’s own philosophy 
(which actually had a great influence on him, as he himself admits), Augustine 
did not appreciate Neo- Platonic additions to, and interpretations of, Plato� 
In De Civitate Dei 22�11, he calls the critical Platonists ‘book- keepers,’ or 
‘accountants’ (ratiocinatores), whose teacher (magistro) is Plato� In the con-
text of philosophy, the term ‘accountant’ bears negative connotations� It sug-
gests that, for Augustine, these Platonic accountants, who claim to represent 
Plato’s views, do not have the necessary spiritual or philosophical insight 
to do so correctly� This indicates a development in Augustine’s relation to 
Neo- Platonism since Augustine’s conversion from dualist Manichaeism was 
strongly influenced by Neo- Platonic monism�22
In addition to identifying the critics alluded to in Enchiridion as belonging 
to the general circle of Neo- Platonists, Augustine specifically mentions 
Porphyry in De Civitate Dei� Thus, in De Civitate Dei 10�29 (a brief 
remark on resurrection) Augustine names Porphyry as a critic of corporeal 
 20 Aug�, ciu� 20�21: Quae sit autem et quam magna spiritalis corporis gratia, quon-
iam nondum uenit in experimentum, uereor ne temerarium sit omne, quod de illa 
profertur, eloquium� Augustine also discusses the bodily resurrection in many other 
texts apart from the two above- mentioned pericopes, e�g�, Faust� 11�3; catech� 54; 
fid� et symb� 10; ciu� 23�19– 20�
 21 Aug�, ciu� 22�4: Docti et sapientes�
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resurrection� Porphyry had purportedly claimed that all corporeality should 
be avoided so the soul can achieve eternal happiness with God�23 In response 
to this assertion, Augustine notes that the ‘Platonist philosophers’ following 
Porphyry hold that the universe is a living, animate being, both happy and 
eternal (ciu� 10�29), with reference to Plato (cf� ti� 30 f�)� But, he argues, if 
one holds that the soul must divorce itself from all corporeality to achieve 
perfect happiness, then one must also hold that the soul and body of the uni-
verse should be divorced� This, however, is an impossibility for the Platonist 
‘accountants,’ since they maintain that the universe is eternal� Thus, 
Augustine argues, Porphyry’s idea that the soul must reject corporeality to 
obtain happiness does not match Plato’s own statements on the matter�
Porphyry is mentioned again in connection with the same topic in De 
Civitate Dei 22�26� The starting point for Augustine’s arguments in this pas-
sage is, again, Porphyry’s idea that souls must escape corporeality if they 
want to achieve perfect happiness� He offers another solution, once again 
correcting Porphyry by referencing Plato� Augustine cites Plato’s state-
ment in Timaeus (ti� 41) where he describes how the highest God promised 
immortality to the lesser gods, whom he created� The highest God thereby 
demonstrates his will and ability to act against nature by promising created 
beings (by definition mortal and corruptible) that they should not die and 
dissolve� Thus, for Augustine, it is not, as the Platonic accountants think, 
impossible for God to clothe the souls of the righteous in an indestructible 
body at the resurrection� Accordingly, Porphyry’s claim— that the only way 
for souls to achieve perfect and eternal happiness is to separate themselves 
from any form of corporeality— is incorrect�24
In De Civitate Dei 22�27, Augustine states that Plato and Porphyry would 
have been able to learn from each other had they only met half- way� If 
they had done so, both would have found the truth about the relationship 
between soul and body in the afterlife� Plato claims that even wise souls 
will return to bodies— though after a long time (re- incarnation)25— whereas 
Porphyry claims that a perfect soul will never return to this world of evil, 
once it has returned to God�26 Augustine argues that, if Plato had learned 
 23 According to Augustine, this is stated by Porphyry in a text entitled On the Return 
of the Soul�
 24 In ciu� 13�17– 18, Augustine lists the same references to Plato as arguments against 
the rejection of the idea of resurrection uttered by unnamed Platonists�
 25 In Plato’s view, the souls that are not wise or perfect will always return to bod-
ies; thus, through the process of reincarnation, these souls will continuously 
acquire new bodies until they achieve perfection, cf� Phd� 70c– d; Phdr� 248– 249, 
R� 10�614 f�










from Porphyry that souls do not return to the evil of this world, he would 
have reached a true understanding of the resurrection� Plato would then 
have realized that, even though souls will return to this world— that is, to the 
bodies they had in this world— they will not return to the evil that haunted 
these bodies� On the contrary, souls will return to cleansed and incorrupt-
ible bodies� Porphyry, in turn, could have learned from Plato that souls do 
indeed return to this world, i�e� to their bodies� This comparison between 
Plato and Porphyry is used by Augustine to demonstrate that both are mis-
taken about the relation between souls and bodies in the afterlife� Augustine 
is undoubtedly more critical of Porphyry’s point of view because it involves 
a complete soul/ body dualism� Nonetheless, the Platonic idea concerning the 
soul’s return to the corruptible body is also unacceptable to Augustine, as 
we shall see below�
In this section, we have identified the critics of the Christian idea of res-
urrection against whom Augustine argues both in De Civitate Dei and the 
aforementioned passage of Enchiridion� Even if Augustine does not explic-
itly name his opponents in the latter, he is undoubtedly addressing the same 
opponents as in De Civitate Dei� These critics are Platonists who completely 
reject the Christian idea of resurrection because they assert a sharp dualism 
between body and soul� Against these Platonic ‘accountants,’ who rigor-
ously stick to their principles, Augustine cites their own teacher, Plato� While 
Plato’s views may fall short of the truth, Augustine maintains that they are 
nonetheless on the right track, since Plato allows the creator to act against 
the order of nature in promising created beings eternal life�27
4.  The Platonist criticism of the Christian belief in bodily 
resurrection
As mentioned above, Augustine holds that the Platonic philosophers’ cri-
tique of the Christian belief in corporeal resurrection is based on too stark 
a dualism between soul and body� According to the Platonists, the soul is 
saved from the body by death and, consequently, will not rejoin it at the res-
urrection (as the Christians believe)� In this objection to the Christian belief 
in bodily resurrection, Augustine identifies a number of concrete points of 
criticism, all of which involve the question of how something perishable and 
imperfect can be transformed into something perfect and indestructible� The 
 27 See Dobell, 2009 concerning Augustine’s criticism of these Platonists and specif-
ically Porphyrius� As mentioned above, Dobell’s thesis is that Augustine himself 
was an adherent of Porphyrius’ Platonic philosophy from his philosophical or 
intellectual conversion in 386 until his Pauline conversion in 395� If this is correct, 
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claim of the dualists is precisely that such transformations are impossible� 
In the following, we will further explore these specific criticisms� We will 
focus on De Civitate Dei 22�12 but also include the relevant passages in 
Enchiridion�
In De Civitate Dei 22�12, we learn that the Platonic criticism had some-
thing to do with the form of the perfect resurrected body and the relationship 
between the resurrected and the earthly body� This criticism was expressed 
in the form of several concrete questions:28 what will the form of the resur-
rected bodies be? What size will they have? Will they be tall or short? Thick 
or thin? Will they be similar, or different? It seems likely that the Platonists 
had referred to specific biblical passages, playing them against each other, 
since Augustine refers to a selection of such problematic passages� He cites, 
and sets out to address Luke 21:18 (“Verily, I say to you, not a hair on your 
head shall be lost”), Eph 4:13 (that we will all reach the measure of the full 
age of Christ at the resurrection) and Rom 8:29 (those whom God has pre-
destined will become likened to the image of his Son)�29 To the Platonists, 
such biblical passages cannot be reconciled— How can every resurrected 
body have the same size as Christ’s without anyone having to add or remove 
body mass? If e�g� an aborted fetus is resurrected, it will need a great amount 
of body mass to reach the size of Christ (see enchir� 85– 86)� This is also the 
case for children and thin persons, whereas the tall, or fat, would need to 
diminish in size� How do these facts square with the statement that “not a 
hair of your head will perish”?30 the critics of resurrection asked Augustine� 
And what about all the hair and nails that have been cut off across a life-
time? If these reappear as hair and nails at the resurrection, the resurrected 
bodies will lose their beauty; but if not, many hairs will obviously be lost 
(see enchir� 88– 89)�
Augustine recalls two additional objections that Platonic critics had raised 
against the Christian idea of resurrection� The first concerns the posthumous 
corruption (corruptionibus) and dissolution (dilapsionibus) of the human 
body� How can one think, the critics ask, that flesh— which dissolves after 
 28 This format obviously served to expose the incredulity of the Christian beliefs, but 
it also illustrates the degree to which their dualistic thinking made it difficult for 
them to accept the idea of the body’s transformation, as implied in the Christian 
idea of resurrection and expressed in, e�g�, 1 Cor 15�
 29 Luke 21:18, cited from ciu� 22�12: Amen, dico vobis, capillus capitis uestri non 
peribit; Eph 4:13, cited from ciu� 22�12: [O] ccursuros nos omnes in mensuram 
aetatis plenitudinis Christi – Augustine assumes that Paul authored the Epistle 
to the Ephesians; and Rom 8:29, cited from ciu� 22�12): [Q]uos praedestinauit 
conformes <fieri> imaginis filii sui�








death, evaporates, is eaten by wild animals, consumed by the fire or decays 
in the sea— can be restored as the flesh of a resurrected body? For Augustine, 
this is not the hardest question raised by the Platonists; the most difficult 
rather concerns the resurrection of cannibalized human flesh� To whose 
resurrected body does this digested flesh belong? Cannibalism is indeed a 
pressing problem for the idea of bodily resurrection, because it means that 
flesh from one human body can belong to more than one individual� We 
also know from other writers31 that this was an urgent problem for many 
Christians in the early days of the faith— especially the so- called simpli-
ciores, who understood resurrection quite literally�32 Augustine’s reaction 
to this problem seems ambivalent: on the one hand, he confirms that it is 
indeed the most difficult question raised by critics; on the other, he suspects 
that the question is simply asked in order to ridicule the idea of resurrection� 
Even so, he returns to present his answer in De Civitate Dei 22�20�
As we saw above, the Platonists’ criticism builds, in part, on a very lit-
eral understanding of bodily resurrection as represented in concrete biblical 
passages� But their objections rest on misunderstandings— so Augustine 
claims� Thus, the Platonists had encountered naive ideas about the resur-
rection of the flesh from unlearned Christians, simpliciores, who did not 
take the Pauline expression of the transformation of the body at the res-
urrection into account� The Platonists had then borrowed these ideas in 
their attempts to discredit the Christian idea of resurrection, presenting it 
as absurd� Augustine’s text aims to remedy this error by presenting the cor-
rect understanding of Christian resurrection� During this procedure he also 
answers the Platonists’ concrete questions one by one� Our next step is thus 
to look at Augustine’s response(s) to the Platonists’ criticism�
 31 Cf�, e�g�, Athenag�, res� 4– 9� See further N� Kiel, Ps- Athenagoras De Resurrectione. 
Datierung und Kontextualisierung der dem Apologeten Athenagoras zug-
eschriebenen Auferstehungsschrift, Leiden 2016, 208– 390 who discusses this 
problem in relation to Athenagoras or Ps� Athenagoras treatise on the resurrection�
 32 It is easy to smile at the early Christians’ simplistic and literal interpretation of the 
resurrection, but some modern Christians still use this literal understanding as an 
argument against organ transplantation� See further C� W� Griffin / D� L� Paulsen, 
Augustine and the Corporeality of God, in: Harvard Theological Review 95/ 1 
(2002), 97– 118, who believe the simpliciores who e�g� thought of God corporeally 
and anthropomorphically constituted a large part of the Christians at the time 
of Augustine� This view was expressed by Paulsen as early as in 1990, cf� D� L� 
Paulsen, Early Christian Belief in a Corporeal Deity: Origen and Augustine as 
Reluctant Witnesses, in: Harvard Theological Review 83 (1990) 105– 16, which 
has, however, been contested by Kim Paffenroth, cf� K� Paffenroth, Notes and 
Observations Paulsen on Augustine: An Incorporeal or Nonanthropomorphic 
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5.  Augustine’s response to the Platonic critics
Augustine’s response to the criticism of the Christian belief in bodily resur-
rection, which he signals in De Civitate Dei 22�12, follows in 22�13– 20�33 
In De Civitate Dei 22�13, Augustine presents his view on the resurrection 
of aborted fetuses (abortius fetus): if they have lived and died within their 
mother’s womb, they can indeed, he submits, be resurrected (cf� enchir� 85– 
86)� However, the crucial question in this context is how fetuses, children, 
and others who have perished in a diminutive body size, can be resurrected 
in the perfect shape, i�e�, the size they would have reached had they not 
suffered premature death (ciu� 22�14)� Where does the compensatory body- 
mass come from at the time of resurrection? As the first part of his reply, 
Augustine denies that the statement in Luke 21:18 (“not a hair on your 
heads will be lost”) is an argument against the resurrection of fetuses and 
children� For, even though this passage expresses the continuity of present 
features at the resurrection, it does not follow that God cannot add new 
parts to resurrected bodies� That said, Augustine does not take the easy road 
by claiming that God, in His omnipotence, simply adds to the resurrected 
body whatever is lacking in size� Rather, he draws from a common pool 
of philosophical ideas to make his case� Augustine argues that, while the 
child who dies prematurely may not have reached its full (perfect) body 
size, it nonetheless carries this perfect size within itself as a potential to be 
unfolded� Behind this proposition lies the ancient theories of forms, known 
from Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoic philosophy�
According to Plato and the Platonists, the substance of any given phe-
nomenon is determined by an idea (ἰδέα) or Form (εἶδος) that transcends 
it�34 Aristotle and Plato are in basic agreement on this point, but there is a 
decisive difference: form, according to Aristotle, is intrinsic to phenomena, 
whereas, for Plato, Forms exist independently of phenomena, outside space 
and time� The Stoics, for their part, employed the concept of Logos� In Stoic 
theory, the cosmos consists of an active and a passive principle; the passive 
principle (ὕλη) is formed by the inherent active principle, which the Stoics 
called Logos (λόγος)� This Logos exists as seeds, logoi spermatikoi (λόγoι 
σπερματικόι), disseminated throughout all individual beings and things, 
together with passive matter�35
 33 Aug�, ciu� 22�13: Ad haec ergo, quae ab eorum parte contraria me digerente mihi 
uidentur opposita, misericordia Dei meis nisibus opem ferente respondeam�
 34 Traditionally, only Plato’s Forms are capitalized�
 35 Concerning this forming (or formative) principle in ancient philosophy, see 
Jacobsen, 2002, 236– 241; A�- C� Jacobsen, Origen on body and soul, in: B� Bitton- 










There is no doubt that Augustine draws on these philosophical theories 
when he (in ciu� 22�14) argues for a seminal principle in every substance con-
taining the beginning of every existence� In other words, the perfect human 
being36 is present from conception as a principle that unfolds inherent poten-
tials, including (perfect) size�37 Growth in the womb, as well as the birth and 
future life of the child, are to be understood as the realization of the always 
present form� By building his explanation on such ideas, Augustine substanti-
ates his views vis- a- vis the resurrection of the body in at least two ways� Firstly, 
the idea of a form, or forming principle, allows him to postulate a continuity 
between the earthly body and the resurrected body� The resurrected body is the 
same as the earthly� Secondly, it allows him to emphasize the transformation 
of the body at the resurrection� Although it is the same body, with the same 
inherent form, it undergoes significant changes at the resurrection; namely, the 
change of the form of the body from a state of unrealized potential to a state of 
full realization— or, to use the vocabulary of Paul in Cor� 15, the change from 
an animal body into a spiritual body� Following Miles, this should be related 
to Augustine’s use of the Pauline formula of ‘now…then’ (nunc…tunc), which 
both connects and contrasts the present and future experience� This is especially 
apparent in De Civitate Dei 22 when Augustine emphasizes that while the old 
animal body will be transformed into a new spiritual body, the capacities for 
e�g� pleasure found in the old body will be refined and transformed in the new 
body�38 Augustine thus contradicts the Platonic dualism between soul and body 
by demonstrating that the body can be transformed through the resurrection�
Continuing his arguments, Augustine comes to face (in ciu� 22�15) an 
apparent dilemma in Eph 4:13; namely, that everyone will reach the 
“measure of the full age of Christ�”39 For both Augustine and his opponents, 
there is no doubt that Jesus’ resurrected body remains the same size as his 
 36 By using this expression, it is clear that we do not take account of Augustine’s 
doctrine of original sin, which holds that human beings are always- already tainted 
by sin or errors from the time of conception�
 37 The form, as well as every other trait, comes from the father� Like everyone else 
in antiquity, Augustine assumes that all genes are contained in the sperm since, at 
the time, it was not known that conception is a result of both egg and sperm cells�
 38 Miles, 2005, 315– 316� See furtheremore M� R� Miles, From rape to resurrec-
tion: Sin, sexual difference, and politics, in: J� Wetzel (ed�), Augustine’s City of 
God: A Critical Guide, Cambridge 2012, 75– 92, in which Miles discusses the 
practricing of the integrated wholeness charecteristic of the resurrection in our 
current lives� While Miles here maintaines that Augustine himself would not have 
accepted a colapse of the contrast expressed in the nunc...tunc formula, Miles 
herself believes that we are able to practice the resurrected bodies in the present�
 39 Donec occuramus omnes […] in uirum perfectum, in mensuram aetatis plenitudinis 
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earthly body at its point of death� But if the bodies of all human beings are 
to resemble the measure of the resurrected body of Jesus, many will have 
to shrink, which, according to Luke 21:18 is simply not possible� Further, 
this understanding does not square with Augustine’s own postulate that all 
humans carry the seed of their own perfect size from conception� Therefore, 
we cannot understand Eph 4:13 to mean that all resurrected bodies will have 
the same size as the resurrected body of Christ� And what does ‘the full age 
of Christ’ mean in this context? Augustine finds the solution by proposing 
that, at the resurrection, every individual will assume the physical shape that 
corresponds to the perfect realization of the form inherent to their body� 
The closest a living human can come to the realization of this perfect form 
is the shape he/ she takes at the beginning of adulthood— which, in antiq-
uity, means approximately the age of thirty� So the ‘full age of Christ’ means 
that Jesus died when his vitality and character were at their peak� Similarly, 
everyone will re- appear at this most perfect stage of his/ her life at the resur-
rection� Consequently, those who die as children or in their mother’s womb 
(and therefore had not fully realized their inherent form), and those who die 
at an age above thirty (whose vital powers have therefore decreased), will 
arise as thirty year- olds, i�e�, the ‘full age of Christ�’40
In De Civitate Dei 22�17– 18, Augustine reaches a similar conclusion 
regarding another apparent dilemma: the resurrection of female bodies� 
Some had allegedly raised this question based on the wording of Eph 4:13 
and Rom 8:29, which seems to imply that human beings will be male after 
the resurrection�41 What does this mean for women’s resurrected bodies— 
will they arise as males, as some maintained? Surely not, Augustine assures 
us� Eph 4:13, which states that all shall at last become ‘a perfect man,’ is the 
easiest to deal with� After analyzing the context of the passage, Augustine 
concludes that we should understand both sexes to be included under the 
general term ‘man�’ Rom 8:29 is also a false lead� As Augustine explains, 
the female form is not a mistake, but natural, created by God: women will 
appear as women at the resurrection� That said, sexuality and sin, which 
characterize men and women alike, will be removed from all resurrected 
bodies� Female bodies will retain their body parts, but the ‘female members’ 
will no longer be adapted to the old use, i�e�, sexual activity; nor will they 
as follows: μέχρι καταντήσωμεν οἱ πάντες εἰς […] ἄνδρα τέλειον, εἰς μέτρον ἡλικίας 
τοῦ πληρώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ�
 40 As noted by Hunter, here Augustine is more concerned with the advancement of 
the resurrected body to perfection than with the reversal of the condition of the 
fallen body, cf� Hunter, 2012, 362�







continue to arouse desire in men� According to Augustine, the relationship 
between the sexes will then be perfect, just as before the Fall when the first 
humans walked about naked without enflaming each other’s sexual desires� 
As Miles emphasizes, in Augustine’s conceptual universe the resurrected 
bodies were affirmed more or less as we know them in our current state, 
however, with the sexual desires and acts subtracted� It does thus not make 
sense to ask whether sex is part of the punishment or part of the reward as 
the answer is both and neither� This is caused by Augustine sorting the pre-
sent “punishment” of the human life from the beauty and pleasure that will 
be part of the resurrection “reward”�42 This is yet another demonstration 
that according to Augustine the corporeal transformation is a transforma-
tion unto perfection�
In De Civitate Dei 22�19, Augustine answers the question of what will 
happen to hair and nails removed from the body over a lifetime on earth� 
Since “not a hair of your head will perish”43 resurrected bodies would lose 
their beauty if a life’s worth of hair were restored to its place after the res-
urrection (so too with cut nails)� But this ‘ugliness’ does not comport with 
resurrection life, when, as Augustine has previously argued, all shall be made 
perfect� The solution lies, once again, in his theory of a forming principle� 
It allows him to postulate a continuity between the earthly and resurrected 
bodies, as well as a transformation of the body at the resurrection� Thus, 
while ‘they shall be changed into the same flesh,’ the substantial qualities 
of individual parts will be altered� At the resurrection, body mass will be 
redistributed so that the harmony between limbs is made perfect (see enchir� 
89– 90)� Likewise, neither the malformed, nor the skinny or fat, will inhabit 
a body with these disharmonies, but a body composed of the same mass, 
transformed into a harmonious balance (cf� enchir� 87)� He compares the 
body to a vessel of clay that can be made into a new vessel without leaving 
any part unused: The portion of the clay, which had formed the handle, 
could be used to form the bottom of the new vessel and vice versa, thus 
preserving both the proportions and the material� In similar fashion, the 
substance of the resurrected body will be the same as the substance of the 
earthly body— namely, flesh— but its quality will be changed�
But how will it be possible, during the resurrection, to collect all the 
body mass scattered around, atomized, burned, dissolved in water, evap-
orated and eaten by wild animals— not to mention the human flesh eaten 
by other human beings? Augustine, rather unsuccessfully, tries to answer 
 42 Miles, 2005, 320� It has been noted by Toom as well that beauty is the reason for 
the resurrected body’s sexual characteristics, cf� Toom, 2009, 62�
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this question in De Civitate Dei 22�20 by invoking the omnipotence of the 
Creator (omnipotentia Creatoris)� Resorting to this type of response must 
have frustrated Augustine, as well as the opponents of early Christianity� We 
have reports that non- Christians were quite annoyed when simple- minded 
Christians defended their belief in corporeal resurrection by referring to 
God’s omnipotence�44 It is indeed a sign of weakness to use  God’s omnipo-
tence as an explanation because it reveals the absence of rationally demon-
strable arguments� Even though we are also left with this impression when 
reading De Civitate Dei 22�20, it should be noted that Augustine expresses 
the belief that the creator of the material world is able to bestow eternal exis-
tence on material phenomena, including bodies� Thus, it may be reasonable 
to use such an argument against various forms of ontological dualism that 
deny the Creator those very powers�
Because God is omnipotent, he can collect all the flesh that has evaporated 
into the air and restore it to its rightful owner� When human flesh has been 
eaten by other humans— and this is Augustine’s answer to the difficult ques-
tion of cannibalism— it will be “restored to the man in whom it first became 
human flesh� For it must be looked upon as borrowed by the other person, 
and, like a pecuniary loan, must be returned to the lender�” Augustine con-
tinues De Civitate Dei 22�20 by summarizing his answers to the other ques-
tions (posed in ciu� 22�13) surrounding the resurrection of the body and 
concludes, in De Civitate Dei 22�21, with a brief recap of the characteristics 
of the resurrected body of the saints as spiritual, indestructible, character-
ized by ease and happiness, and freed from all defects�45
Augustine’s reflections in De Civitate Dei 22�12– 20 on the resurrected 
bodies of the righteous might seem simplistic and, in some cases, even 
slightly amusing (e�g� the seriousness with which he discusses the eternal 
future of cropped hair and cut nails)� In our opinion, it is nevertheless clear 
that Augustine is simply continuing a relatively- unbroken, centuries- old tra-
dition of understanding the resurrection quite literally� This understanding 
of the resurrection is conditioned by a distinctly literal interpretation of the 
biblical texts� However, as we noted above, Augustine modifies this inter-
pretation� He emphasizes that, even though the earthly and the resurrected 
bodies are substantially identical, the outer shape of the resurrected body 
will not be identical to that of the earthly body but will be perfected� This 
 44 Cf� Or�, Cels� 5�14�
 45 Following Gerald O’Collins it should be noted here, that Augustine believed that 
the human hunger for happiness only finds its fulfillment in the participitation in 
Christ’s resurrection, which human beings will be able to behold thorugh the light 
provided by the Holy Spirit, cf� G� O’Collins, St Augustine as apologist for the 






softening of the concrete understanding of the resurrection in favor of a 
more figurative interpretation is expressed, e�g�, in Augustine’s interpretation 
of Eph 4:13�
6.  The resurrection of the los
Although Augustine tries to overcome the anthropological dualism between 
soul and body, which he found among the Platonists, he advances another 
dualism in the later part of his life; namely, a dualism between the saved and 
the lost�
We find his reflections on the latter group in both Enchiridion and De 
Civitate Dei� Enchiridion 92 states that those who are not saved from the 
mass of destruction (perditionis massa) must be raised in their own bodies— 
not to be included in eternal salvation, but to undergo eternal punishment 
together with the devil and his angels�46 What will happen to the lost bodies, 
Augustine asks? Will they also be transformed so that their deficiencies and 
deformities disappear? Augustine declares that we cannot know anything 
about it and should not waste time considering such a silly question� What 
he does claim to know, however, is that the condemnation and punishment 
of the lost is eternal� What implications does this have for the question of 
immortality and incorruptibility? On the one hand, the resurrected bodies 
of the condemned must be eternal, i�e�, immortal like the resurrected bodies 
of the saved, since they will be punished for all eternity� On the other hand, 
there cannot be true life (uera uita) and true incorruptibility (uera incor-
ruptio) when bodies are subjected to pain and misfortune� If the misfortune 
of the convicted is unceasing, and their bodies (being immortalized) are not 
allowed to die, it follows that death and corruption will also last forever� 
Borrowing an expression from the Apocalypse of John 20:6�14, Augustine 
calls this state ‘the second death�’47
This understanding brings him into conflict with a key statement in 1 
Cor 15:25– 28, where it is said that “Christ shall be king until God puts all 
 46 Aug�, enchir� 92: Quicumque uero ab illa perditionis massa, quae facta est per 
hominem primum, non liberantur per unum mediatorem dei et hominum, resur-
gent quidem etiam ipsi, unusquisque cum sua carne, sed ut cum diabolo et eius 
angelis puniantur�
 47 Aug�, enchir� 92: Non enim est uera uita nisi ubi feliciter uiuitur, nec uera incor-
ruptio nisi ubi salus nullo dolore corrumpitur. Vbi autem infelix mori non sinitur, 
ut ita dicam, mors ipsa non moritur; et ubi dolor perpetuus non interimit sed 
affligit, ipsa corruptio non finitur. Haec in sanctis scripturis secunda mors dicitur� 
For a further analysis of this second death, see L� Ayres, Augustine on Redemption, 
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enemies under his feet; as the last enemy is death destroyed�”48 This is clearly 
not true of Augustine’ proposed scenario� Moreover, there is a problem when 
1 Cor 15:28 indicates that Christ, after the destruction of all enemies, will 
also be made subject to God so that “God may be all in all�”49 For, when 
God becomes all in all, there will be no room for, or need of, destruction 
and eternal punishment� While Augustine’s formulations in Enchiridion 92 
suggest that he is aware of this discrepancy, he dodges the problem and per-
severes in upholding the eternal punishment of the damned�
Augustine did, however, as Tarmo Toom notes write in Expositio Epistulae 
ad Galatas that Paul in Rom 8:22 did not write totam creaturam but omnem 
creaturam, which Augustine interpreted as referring to the tripartite human 
being and not to the whole of creation�50 Toom believes the reason for this 
interpretation to be Augustine’s approach to eschatology being anthropo-
centric and not cosmocentric� However, as Toom notes as well, Augustine 
did not think of human beings and the cosmos as mutually exclusive catego-
ries, as both are said to await eschatological transformation and not eradia-
tion because both are God’s creation�51 Thus, it is quite clear that Augustine’s 
anthropocentric eschatology did not negate the salvation of the whole of 
creation, which groan for redemption�52
In De Civitate Dei, the question of the punishment of the lost is dealt 
with in more detail— in fact, the entire book 21 is devoted to this issue� 
Yet it is neither possible, nor necessary, to review all the details of this par-
agraph here, since its basic views correspond with the views expressed in 
Enchiridion 92: Augustine argues that the pain of lost ones will be eternal 
(ciu� 21�1– 4�9�11), thus disagreeing with those who claim that the final pun-
ishment will terminate (ciu� 21�11�17�23)�53 He also argues against those 
who believe that punishment has a purgatorial effect, cleansing sin (ciu� 
21�13), and against those who argue for different forms of moderating the 
punishment, e�g�, that it may be mitigated by the mediation of the saints (ciu� 
21�18�24)� Augustine continues to address other dissenting views— wrong 
views, he would say— throughout book 21� Suffice it to say that his reflec-
tions in De Civitate Dei 21 on the eternal punishment of the damned track 
closely with those found in Enchiridion 92�
 48 1 Cor 15:25– 26: δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν βασιλεύειν ἄχρι οὗ θῇ πάντας τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ὑπὸ τοὺς 
πόδας αὐτοῦ� ἔσχατος ἐχθρὸς καταργεῖται ὁ θάνατος�
 49 1 Cor 15: 28 (NRSV)�
 50 Aug�, gal�, 63�5– 7� See Toom, 2009, 73– 75 for a further analysis of this�
 51 See e�g� Aug�, ciu�, 20�14
 52 Toom, 2009, 73– 75�
 53 Augustine accepts some temporary punishments after death (ciu� 21�13), but these 














7.  Augustine’s theological dualism
The dualism between saved and condemned is full- blown in Augustine’s anti- 
Pelagian theology�54 This is likely because several of the biblical texts that 
form his theological basis exhibit such a dualism� However, it truly stands 
out in his conflict with the Pelagians, where he also develops his doctrine of 
sin and grace— an essential part of the theology of dualism between saved 
and lost�55 This doctrine plays a central role in Augustine’s understanding 
of human resurrection: When human beings are saved and resurrected for 
eternal life in a perfected body, the sole reason for this is the sovereign grace 
of God� Likewise, it is solely by the will of God that others do not receive 
this mercy but face eternal punishment at the resurrection�56 In other words, 
God saves whom he wants and condemns whom he wants; the latter group 
being the largest one, according to Augustine (enchir� 97)�
Augustine maintains his sharp dualism between saved and lost even when 
it is abundantly clear from his exposition on the resurrection of the saints, 
who will arise as perfect, that their, and indeed all earthly bodies, are imper-
fect prior to resurrection� This is why he cannot accept the view of the unso-
phisticated Christians, who hold that the material body— insofar as it is 
God’s creation— is essentially good, and will, for this reason, arise in exactly 
its earthly shape� Augustine assures us that the human body is not imperfect 
just because it is underdeveloped� If there were continuous and unbroken 
development of the bodily form unto completion, then fetuses and children 
 54 One might ask whether this dualism between saved and lost, which is ultimately 
due to the will of God for both salvation and perdition, introduces a good vs� 
evil dualism into the very notion of Godhead— i�e�, a dualism that very strongly 
resembles the Gnostic- Manichean dualism between two gods or divine principles�
 55 In the period from 411 until his death in 430, Augustine wrote a large number 
of texts against Pelagius and the Pelagians, e�g� De gestis Pelagii, De Nuptiis et 
Concupiscientia and Contra Julianum� A large part of these writings centered on 
the understanding of sin and grace� This applies to, e�g�, De Natura et Gratia contra 
Pelagium; De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, et de Baptismo Parvulorum; De 
Gratia Christi, et de Peccato Originali contra Pelagium; De Gratia et Libero 
Arbitrio� Regarding the Pelagian heresy and the development of Augustine’s teach-
ing of sin and grace, see also G� Greshake, Gnade als Konkrete Freiheit. Eine 
Untersuchung zur Gnadenlehre des Pelagius, Mainz 1972, especially 47– 157 (on 
Pelagius’ doctrine of grace) and 193– 274 (on Augustine’s doctrine of grace, which 
was constructed as a response to Pelagius); J� Gross, Entstehungsgeschichte des 
Erbsündsdogmas, München 1960, 257– 376 (on Augustine’s doctrine of orig-
inal sin)�
 56 For Augustine’s assertion that God’s grace is the only way to human salvation, see 
enchir� 98�106– 107� See enchir� 95– 97 for his claim that the will of God is the only 
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would not die, old bodies would not decay, and female bodies would not 
ignite male desire� And yet, lack of development is not imperfection in the 
proper sense� According to Augustine, the human body is imperfect on a 
deeper level� But why? How? One might answer, with Augustine’s opponents 
the Platonists (who also regard the human body as imperfect), that corpo-
reality and death are related by nature� In this view, all corporeal beings are 
destined for destruction because they are imperfect and mortal by nature; 
only the soul endures forever� But Augustine rejects this dualism, maintain-
ing that the body is not imperfect by nature� Therefore, he must find another 
reason for the link between imperfection and mortality� Augustine finds this 
in the biblical tradition: the imperfection and mortality of the earthly body 
is a consequence of sin�57 Hence, the successful overcoming of the imperfec-
tion of the earthly body does not consist in the destruction of the body, but 
in the overcoming of sin� Toom is thus right in emphasizing two especially 
important reasons for Augustine’s affirmation of the doctrine of the resur-
rection of the body as a necessary constituent of the resurrection of totus 
homo: that bodily resurrection is necessary for the preserving of personal 
identity, and that the affirmation is a necessary consequence of Augustine’s 
theological anthropology� According to Augustine, it is God’s plan that each 
person in the resurrection will preserve his or her own special features as 
well as a recognizable resemblance to his or her former self�58 However, as 
Toom notes human beings will accordingly to Augustine not merely be res-
urrected with their previous bodily conditions, but will be changed into a 
qualitatively different mode of existence� This is related to Toom’s second 
point – that the affirmation of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body 
as a necessary constituent of the resurrection of totus homo was a necessary 
consequence of Augustine’s theological anthropology – because the totus 
homo according to Augustine is not merely the body nor merely the soul, 
but body as well as soul�59 Even though the soul might be the better part of 
the human being and the body the inferior part,60 the human being is a com-
posite of both� As Toom emphasizes, none of these constituent elements can 
according to Augustine be eliminated without destroying the human being�61 
Augustine’s understanding of the physical resurrection of humanity is thus 
 57 Cf� Gen 3� For Augustine’s understanding of sin, see the pericope enchir� 12– 27 
and especially 25– 27 regarding the consequences of sin for the human body�
 58 Aug�, enchir� 23�90� As Augustine writes in ciu�, 22�19, the Christian martyrs will 
have their scars in the resurrection as well as a badge of honor�
 59 Aug�, ciu�, 13�24�
 60 Aug�, ciu�, 19�3�












an expression of his rejection of the Platonic soul- body dualism in favor of 
a biblical monism�
8.  Summary and conclusion
In this article, we have examined the teaching of Augustine on human resur-
rection, chiefly as expressed in two of his late writings; namely, Enchiridion 
84– 92 and De Civitate Dei 22�12– 21� We illustrated how Augustine’s ideas 
of the resurrection build on the sayings of Paul in 1 Cor 15, while also 
dismissing certain points� After having identified Augustine’s opponents 
as Neo- Platonists pushing Plato’s soul- body dualism too far, we went into 
detail regarding Augustine’s response, including an analysis of his theology 
of the bodily resurrection of saved and lost human beings�
The resurrection theology of Augustine contains two main points of view� 
First, the almighty God can raise imperfect mortal bodies tainted by sin to 
eternal life and perfection, transforming these bodies from earthly into heav-
enly vessels, from animal to spiritual flesh� Second, God does not offer this 
perfection to all humans (although, being almighty, he obviously could if he 
wanted to)— some, even most humans, will be lost, meaning their bodies will 
arise without the gift of healing and perfection� Instead, the resurrected bod-
ies of the lost are subject to eternal torment� This view is in stark contrast 
to the message of Paul, which, however, does not lead Augustine to alter his 
position�
According to Augustine— and he agrees with the Platonists in this 
matter— the earthly human body is imperfect� However, he strongly dis-
agrees with the dualists regarding the consequences of this imperfection (the 
destruction of the body, as the Platonists claim, or a bodily transformation, 
as Augustine argues)� Rejecting the Platonists’ sharp dualism between soul 
and body, and their claim that the body is corrupt by nature, Augustine finds 
another reason for the imperfection and mortality of the earthly body in the 
Bible: sin� Augustine thus fights against one dualism— body vs� soul— while, 
at the same time, advancing another— saved vs� lost� Only the resurrected 
bodies of the saved will undergo a transformation that liberates them from 
the consequences of sin, whereas the bodies of the lost remain subject to 
these� This perpetuates the dualism between saved and lost�
 
Antonio Henrique Campolina Martins
The Influence of Augustine of Hippo on The 
Rule of Benedict’s Anthropology
Abstract: This article explores the influence of Augustine of Hippo’s monastic writings 
on the anthropology of The Rule of Benedict� Augustine’s influence is measured by 
comparing the distinguishing traits of his anthropology with another major inspiration 
for The Rule of Benedict, namely, The Rule of the Master.
1.  Introduction
The definition of anthropology is not unanimous� It is often approached 
from different theoretical angles — psychological, social- cultural, metaphys-
ical, biblical- theological etc� — and aimed at some sort of analysis/ debate/ 
deepening of human existence� Theological texts, for their part, typically 
feature a distinct anthropological terminology, forming an elementary “view 
on human beings”� In Christianity, both Eastern and Western, such termi-
nology has tended toward two main expressions: a Hellenistic one, either 
dichotomic or trichotomic (σῶμα– ψυχή, σῶμα– ψυχή– νοῦς), but always essen-
tialist and steadfast; and a biblical- Semitic one,1 stressing an anthropological 
unity (כחר –כפש) which is at once historical, symbolic, and dynamic�
When it comes to the Church Fathers, it is difficult to pin down a definite 
anthropology insofar as their thought involves complex philosophical and 
theological schemes, developed across a wide spectrum of historical condi-
tions� Ancient monastic rules were written by authors living under diverse 
social, cultural, and ecclesiastical conditions; including bishops, presbyters, 
abbots, eremitic or cenobites monks, laypersons, etc� Moreover, the textual 
genre of monastic rule can be traced to many different times and places, fre-
quently disconnected from one another and featuring unlike traditions and 
observances� This, then, is the context we must face in approaching the main 
subject of this article, The Rule of Benedict (Regula Benedicti)�
 1 The concept biblical- Semitic is understood as the Hebrew unitary anthropological 
structure that sustains identity across time, despite evolving characteristics� The 
view on the human being expressed by the biblical model relates to the anthro-
pological unity implied in expressions such as “flesh full of soul”, “full of life” 
or “heart, tongue, hands and feet”, intrinsically unified and articulated� It primes 
the ontic, psychological and moral integration of human beings as well as their 
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The first testimony of the life of the presumed author of The Rule of Benedict 
(RB) comes from Gregory the Great (d� 604 AD), in the second of the four 
books of his Dialogues (c� 593). There he writes about the life, image, and char-
acter of a certain Benedictus, who had earned special recognition in Italy some 
decades before� The Rule, written at the beginning of the sixth century, is gen-
erally considered the most important of the Latin monastic rules — no other 
writing of Christian Antiquity was transmitted through so many manuscripts� 
It legislates the life of cenobitic monks, i�e�, those monks who live communally, 
as opposed to the eremitic variety� The Rule is at once a spiritual and legislative 
text; it features a prologue and seventy- three chapters, the last being an epi-
logue� The long prologue, and first seven chapters, are composed of many short 
theological- spiritual expositions, mostly of pragmatical nature� Originally, the 
work was left untitled� For this reason, the codices used to refer to it as Regula 
Monachorum or Regula Monasteriorum� Indeed, the text refers to itself using 
simple designations such as Regula or Sancta Regula� However, if the simplicity 
of these references might seem, to some extent, unexpected, the direction of life 
it represents is thoroughly cohesive� Rules and parenesis, theory and praxis, are 
combined by the strength of its biblical- Semitic anthropology�
This article aims to unveil, through the comparative study of its main 
monastic sources, how the author of The Rule of Benedict synthesized the 
preceding anthropological tradition to establish a definitive expression of 
Ancient monasticism� He did so by contrasting the anthropology of The 
Rule of the Master (Regula Magistri)2 with the Augustinian monastic men-
tality expressed mainly in The Rule of Augustine (Regula Augustini)3; this, 
 2 The Rule of the Master (RM) was written by the so- called Master in the region 
of Gaul between 500 and 525 A�D� There is no name to designate the author of 
the document, which was called Regula Magistri by Benedict of Aniane in his 
Concordia Regularum because of the way the author introduces chapters: a ques-
tion made by the disciple followed by an answer of the Lord through the Master� 
It has a prologue and 95 chapters and represents a profoundly significant stage in 
the Western monastic law� It is strongly influenced by the Enneads’ trichotomy as 
well as John Cassian’s Institutes of the Coenobia and The Conferences. It is there-
fore related to the spiritual tradition of hesychasm, based on continuous vigilance, 
strength of patience, and severe, even excessive, asceticism�
 3 The Rule of Augustine (RA) was written in 397 and its very short text is the 
oldest Western monastic rule� Nonetheless, the Augustinian monastic mentality 
transcends the text of his rule and finds expression in several other writings, e�g� 
Letter 221, Sermons 355 and 356, Consortia monachorum, Regula Secunda and 
De vita eremitica ad sororem liber� On Augustine’s monastic mentality and the 
lasting influence of his rule, cf� G� Lawless, Augustine of Hippo and His Monastic 






Augustine of Hippo on The Rule of Benedict’s Anthropology 207
in turn, lead to the genesis of an abbey whose brethren were in complete 
harmony, coherence, and unity, with themselves, and with their God�
2.  Anthropology in The Rule of the Master
Generally, we can say that the anthropology of The Rule of the Master is 
rooted in Egyptian verticality,4 whose account of the divine- human relation 
derives from Plotinus’ trichotomic anthropological model, outlined in Enneads 
IV� This Hellenistic anthropology had a significant influence on Latin monastic 
rules during the first centuries� It upholds the existence of two opposing poles, 
and an intermediate logos binding itself to one or the other� The two poles are 
the body- flesh and the spirit; the soul is the principle of freedom that ultimately 
decides upon one of these� Both the paradigmatic model (Plotinian) and the 
model of The Rule of the Master (corpus- caro, anima, spiritus) articulate an 
anthropology characterized by a principle of freedom, giving subsequent form 
to an ethos� In disregarding that ethos, and so the possibility of the soul’s oscil-
lation between the inferior, degrading element and the superior, sane element, 
one is left with no anthropological model at all�
The Rule of the Master’s trichotomy is not so systematic as Plotinus’� It is 
rather disclosed in a dynamic form� The potential of the soul to bind itself 
to the body- flesh or the spirit is ascertained through the concrete actions of 
the monk, by his actual decisions� The morality5 of The Rule of the Master 
 4 Egyptian verticality is a way of expressing the spirituality and way of life which 
came into being with the dawn of monasticism� In the fourth century, a surprising 
and rapidly expanding social movement arose in Roman Egypt� Many Christians 
moved from cities to the desert due to a radical change in habit� Such a conversatio 
morum represents an inward search for Christian perfection by living out, and 
giving testimony to, baptism� To some extent they intended to follow the path of 
the first Christian martyrs by way of either an eremitic life (accordingly Antony of 
Egypt’s ideal) or a cenobitic life (accordingly Pacomius’ ideal and the first monastic 
rule)� The movement, with its countless spiritual fathers, abbots, monks, all of 
them living in the desert (the desert fathers), produced many writings on vertical 
spirituality, i�e�, the ideal of living solely for God’s sake� It concerns the spirituality 
of the lonely Monk in face of the only God� Under such verticality were organized 
the first Coptic monks; having only God and the abbot  figure – as a representa-
tive father, master and tutor – above them� It is also worth pointing out how the 
spirituality of Egyptian monasticism drew its influence to the West through Abbey 
Lérins’ abbot, in the Roman Gaul, and his acquaintance with Origen’s spirituality� 
Considering the connection between the semipelagianism of the Gaulish monas-
ticism and Origen’s synergism, it is possible to see why so many scholars have 
claimed that The Rule of Benedict would had been written in the south of Gaul�
 5 We assume morality as the relation of man’s free action to a moral norm� The 
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consists in a choice between the spirit and the flesh, the former being encour-
aged� The salvation of the monk, and indeed the whole monastic commu-
nity, depends on that decision, “for what the Lord commands us in the spirit 
is one thing, what the flesh has in mind to force upon us is another�”6
Here, ascesis aids the salvation of the monk in a relentless struggle against 
the body, and in favor of the spirit� Salvation is, in this case, directly opposed 
to damnation/ sin� For this reason, the theme of grappling with sin is present 
throughout the text of The Rule of the Master� The intensity with which its 
author illustrates this struggle derives from a keen awareness of the malefic 
power that the devil exercises in the contest between body and soul�7 In 
every single moment and decision of a monk’s life, the struggle is manifest; 
the devil incessantly strives to persuade him to compromise with the body- 
flesh- sin� The proper moral position therefore amounts to proclaiming open 
and ceaseless warfare against the devil’s wiles�
Since the power of the devil over the body- flesh is a force that constantly 
tempts the soul towards compromise and apostasy, a third external force, 
i�e�, the continuous vigilance of the abbot and his assistants, is justified� 
They must keep watch over the brethren in order to prevent them from 
falling under demonic influences: “by their careful supervision and alert 
vigilance they [scil� the deans] must ward off them [scil� the brethren] the 
devil’s activity�”8 The whole gamut of monastic observances, seen through 
the lens of The Rule of the Master’s trichotomy, has no value in and of 
itself� It is rather a means by which monks can spiritualize, and thus save, 
themselves� So long as this end is served, anything and everything is justi-
fied� The abbot exercises the duplex doctrina (twofold teaching) of the word 
and the example, the practice of domain and vigilance, together with other 
corrective expedients� In other words, the abbot should act “by declaring 
the Lord’s commandments in words to disciples who can understand, but 
to the hard of heart and the simple- minded by demonstrating the divine 
Thus, considering the trichotomy of The Rule of the Master, the indication of 
order and purpose that determines a monk’s action is the binding of the soul, the 
principle of freedom, to the spirit� The moral action must match the form that 
regulates it� So, the binding of the soul to the body or to the spirit has as conse-
quence either a moral or an immoral decision� On the concept of morality, see 
F� Böckle, Grundbegriffe der Moral, Brescia 1977, 49�
 6 RM 1�80: Quia aliud nobis Dominus in spiritus imperat, aliud caro cogit in anima 
(SC 105, 346)� Cf� also RM 81�19� English C� Philippi, The Rule of the Master, 
Kalamazoo 1977�
 7 Cf� RM 90�67– 70�
 8 RM 11�29: Diligent sua obseruantia uel curioso intuitu diaboli ad eis debent actus 
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precepts by what he does�”9 So, one can see how the disciplinary element is 
conscripted into the moral dynamics of the trichotomy�
Another consequence of this trichotomic morality is the idea that the 
body is naught but soil and dust, even sin� It follows that anything com-
posed of physical matter, being corruptible, is not only insignificant but 
also worthy of contempt because it stands against God’s law� The soul will 
be held accountable for any and every compromise with the body at the 
Final Judgment� From this perspective, the act of conversion would set into 
motion a struggle against the body to secure a higher happiness�
Clarifying how the ethos of The Rule of the Master’s trichotomy cor-
responds with its spiritual doctrine, Adalbert de Vogüé writes in the 
Introduction to The Rule of the Master:
Manifestly, the great exposition of spiritual doctrine which fills chapters seven - ten 
does not consist of three independent treatises simply juxtaposed� Although obedi-
ence, taciturnity, and humility are brought up in their turn, these virtues are never-
theless all studied from the same viewpoint of the fight against sin� The last phrase 
of chapter ten sounds the tone which dominates throughout, mundum a peccatis 
et vitiis� From beginning to end, purification of the whole is the subject� Obedience 
puts an end to self- will and carnal desire; custody of the heart, custody of the eyes, 
and taciturnity all put a stop to sin in the most vulnerable faculties of the human 
constitution; humility accomplishes its task both by embracing the other virtues and 
by furnishing a specific remedy for the chief vice, pride�10
If, as A� de Vogüé says, the spiritual doctrine of the three virtues (obedience, 
taciturnity, and humility) is unified in the fight against sin, then it depicts, 
in a consequential, logical, and organic way, what we have so far claimed 
concerning the anthropology in The Rule of the Master�
Such disciplinary imperatives must be accepted inwardly since external 
enforcement is not sufficient� Therefore, the theology of obedience, taci-
turnity, and humility joins forces with the external reinforcements of the 
Master� The ascetic program links up with the punitive program, forming 
one great restraint against sin�11 One can see, then, how parenesis and law 
are complementary� Along with the radical dualism of the disciplinary praxis 
of reprimand, correction, and punishment, there is a theory that inspires and 
props it up, i�e�, the spiritual theology of the three virtues� It undergirds the 
repressive asceticism, which is instituted as a collective rule for monks in the 
context of The Rule of the Master� There is only one goal: to restrain the 
 9 RM 2�12: Intellegentibus discipulis mandata Domini uerbis proponere, duris corde 
ueronet simplicibus factis suis diuina praecepta monstrare (SC 105, 354)�
 10 Philippi, 1977, 48– 49�
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body- flesh- sin for the sake of the spirit� That is the distinguishing mark of 
its anthropology�
3.  Anthropology in The Rule of Augustine
The most important source- text for The Rule of Benedict is, indubitably, 
The Rule of the Master� However, it has another influential predecessor: The 
Rule of Augustine�12 We would add that, although of lesser importance 
than his Rule, other articulations of Augustine’s monastic mentality – i�e�, 
that which appears explicitly in his rules and implicitly in his spiritual writ-
ings, dogmatic speeches, and even the polemic works, sermons and letters – 
inform and inspire the author of The Rule of Benedict� The Augustinian 
influence makes a strong spiritual, anthropological, and moral impact; it is 
not simply a matter of a textual, mechanic, and direct dependency� Although 
some scholars have disagreed about features of Augustine’s influence,13 they 
are unanimous in accepting the presence of his monastic mentality in The 
Rule of Benedict�
In any case, among the Latin fathers, Augustine is the most important 
reference for The Rule of Benedict� This can be seen through a shared bib-
lical antecedent� The Christian community’s ideal, such as described in Acts 
2:11– 45; 4:32– 35, is prototypical for both The Rule of Augustine and The 
Rule of Benedict� Augustine recommends that brethren aspire to unity in 
love, asking them to live unanimously in charity, keeping but one soul and 
heart� Harmony and love are the main precepts� This informs his vision 
of a humble and unified monastic community� So, The Rule of Augustine 
expresses, through its existential imagination, a horizontal communitari-
anism full of goodness, receptivity, and love� It is a biblical anthropological 
unity born of the Semitic tradition� In this respect, the ideal Augustinian 
monastery diverges from that of The Rule of the Master, where the emphasis 
is placed on individual performance, and the vertical, divine- human relation�
 12 Leclerc maintains that, to understand The Rule of Benedict, it is more important to 
read and study The Rule of Augustine than The Rule of the Master, cf� J� Leclerc, 
Autour de la Règle de Saint Benoît, in: CCist 37 (1975), 197– 204�
 13 Mohrmann does not defend the idea that Augustine had directly influenced The 
Rule of Benedict, but rather only through a common source; cf� C� Mohrmann, 
La latinité de Saint Benoît. Étude linguistique sur la tradition manuscrite de la 
Règle, in: Rev� Bénédict� 62 (1952), 108– 139� Colombás, in his commentary on 
The Rule of Benedict, avoids assuming an assertive position regarding the direct 
or indirect influence of The Rule of Augustine; cf� G� Colombás, La regla de San 
Benito, Madrid 1979, 41– 44� Nonetheless, we follow J� Leclerq’s position, as 
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It is worth analyzing The Rule of Augustine’s text so as to identify its 
main anthropological contours� However, as mentioned above, since the 
Augustinian monastic mentality is not governed by the rule alone, being 
rather the result of various ideas spread over different writings, we will take 
the text of The Rule of Benedict as a reference- point; specifically, those pas-
sages where the influence of Augustine’s horizontality is fully present�
Initially, considering RB 72 and RB 64, on the good zeal of monks and 
the election of an abbot respectively, it is possible to detect an anthropology 
based on love among the brethren, just as recommended by Augustine: “the 
Lord grant that you may observe all these precepts in a spirit of charity, as 
lovers of spiritual beauty, and may spread abroad the sweet odor of Christ 
by a good life, not as slaves living under the law but as men and women liv-
ing in freedom under grace�”14
In RB 31, the cellarer is twice instructed to pay heed to those who ask for 
something; if the asker asks unreasonably, he should at least receive a good 
word in exchange�15 In this way, the author of The Rule of Benedict intro-
duces charitable fraternal advice� This parallels Augustine’s exhortation: “if 
you notice in any of your brothers or sisters this wantonness of the eye, of 
which I am speaking, admonish them at once so that the beginning of evil 
will not grow more serious, but will be promptly corrected�”16 The same 
 chapter 31 advises that necessary things be asked of the cellarer at prear-
ranged times so as not to disturb or sadden anyone in the house of God�17 
It is connected with The Rule of Augustine’s principle according to which 
“books are to be requested at a fixed hour each day, and anyone coming 
outside that hour is not to receive them�”18
 14 RA 8�48: Donet Dominus, ut observetis haec omnia cum dilectione, tamquam 
spiritalis pulchritudinis amatores et bono Christi odore de bona conversatione 
flagrantes, non sicut servi sub lege, sed sicut liberi sub gratia constituti (PL 
32,1384)� All of the English translations of RA is from J� Rotelle, Augustine’s 
Rule: A Commentary by Adolar Zumkeller, translated by Matthew J� O’Connell, 
Villanova 1987�
 15 Cf� RB 31�7; 13�
 16 RA 4�25: Et si hanc de qua loquor oculi petulantiam in aliquo vestrum adverteritis, 
statim admonete, ne coepta progrediatur, sed de proximo corrigatur (PL 32, 1381)� 
Cf� also Aug�, Psal� 103�1,19�
 17 Cf� “that nobody be disturbed and nobody embittered in the house of God”� RB 
31�19: Ut nemo perturbetur neque contristetur in domo Dei (PL 66, 536)� All 
of the English translations of RB is from W� K� Lowther Clarke, The Rule of St. 
Benedict, London 1931�
 18 RA 5�39: Codices certa hora singulis diebus petantur; extra horam qui petierit, 
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In  chapter 34 of The Rule of Benedict, a monk’s deprival is justified by 
the example of the early Church� In this case, each brother is to be given 
that which they, in particular, require� There is no flat, equalizing measure� 
He who requires more, receives more; he who requires less, receives less� All 
transactions are to be made in humility so as to keep the charity�19 This is 
closely connected with the content of  chapter 3 of The Rule of Augustine, 
which also deals with the different needs of each person by considering their 
previous standard of life� He recommends that “if those in more delicate 
health from their former way of life are treated differently in the matter of 
food, this should not be a source of annoyance to others or appear unjust in 
the eyes of those who owe their stronger health to different habits of life�”20
The recommendation of peaceable communitarian life can be found in 
other parallel passages of the two rules� Just as Augustine incites brethren to 
“chant only what is prescribed for chant; moreover, let nothing be chanted 
unless it is prescribed,”21 The Rule of Benedict prescribes that “as soon as 
the Work of God is finished let all reverently leave the oratory, in complete 
silence, so that any brother who by chance wishes to pray individually may 
not be hindered by another’s misconduct�”22
In each of these instructions, one can see, explicitly, the Augustinian con-
cern for the maintenance of a communitarian atmosphere vivified by mutual 
charity�23 Moreover, considering the character of the influence of The Rule 
 19 Cf� “as it is written: ‘They used to divide to each singly according as for him there 
was need’: and this we say not in order that there may be acceptance of persons, 
which be far from us, but consideration of infirmities� In the case of one who 
needs but little, let him give thanks to God and not be vexed; but as to him who 
needs rather more, let him be humbled on account of his infirmity and not puffed 
up on account of the consideration shewn him; and thus shall all the members be 
in peace�” RB 34�1– 5: Sicut scriptum est: Dividebatur singulis prout cuique opus 
erat. Ubi non dicimus ut personarum quod absit acceptio sit, sed infirmitatum 
consideratio; ubi qui minus indiget agat Deo gratias et non contristetur, qui vero 
plus indiget humilietur pro infirmitate, non extollatur pro misericordia; et ita 
omnia membra erunt in pace (PL 66, 563– 564)�
 20 RA 3�16: Qui infirmi sunt ex pristina consuetudine, si aliter tractantur in victu, non 
debet aliis molestum esse nec iniustum videri, quos facit alia consuetudo fortiores 
(PL 32, 1380)�
 21 RA 2�13: Et nolite cantare, nisi quod legitis esse cantandum; quod autem non ita 
scriptum est ut cantetur, non cantetur (PL 32, 1379)�
 22 RB 52�1– 3: Oratorium hoc sit quod dicitur, nec ibi quidquam aliud geratur aut 
condatur. Expleto opere Dei, omnes cum summo silentio exeant, et agatur rever-
entia Deo: ut frater qui forte sibi peculiariter vult orare, non impediatur alterius 
improbitate (PL 66, 717)�
 23 This is the reason why, concerning The Rule of Benedict’s anthropology, even 
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of Augustine, we can see why The Rule of Benedict is entirely based on the 
presence of an abbot who is more willing to serve than preside, more inclined 
to hate sin than sinners, and more desirous to be loved than feared�24
4.  The Reception of the Two Anthropological Traditions in 
The Rule of Benedict
As we can draw from the previous discussion, The Rule of Benedict is at the 
crossroads of two traditions� Firstly, The Rule of Augustine and its funda-
mental requirement of the communitarian life: to share goods, distributing 
to each according to their needs, fomenting an indwelling spirit of charity� 
This is a communitarian mentality that aims to establish unity in diversity in 
the most profound sense� Brethren in possession of different characters and 
tempers must come to exhibit a single heart and soul� Secondly, The Rule of 
the Master whose author is not concerned with Augustine’s basic precepts, 
but rather his renouncement of the world� This rule insists upon persever-
ance in ascesis: vertical obedience, humility, and taciturnity�25
From this point on, we will examine the profound effect that Augustinian 
anthropology made upon the text of The Rule of Benedict, setting it apart 
from some of the seminal anthropological precepts of The Rule of the 
Master� In this endeavor, we will compare the terminology of RB 5 and RM 
7, RB 6 and RM 8– 9, RB 7 and RM 10 – parallel passages dealing with the 
three virtues (obedience, taciturnity and humility) – which are responsible 
for establishing the anthropological core of both texts�
RB 5 deals with obedience, i�e�, the external attitude of the monk (the 
internal adherence is naturally presupposed, as already mentioned)� So, the 
rule prescribes: “so that not guiding themselves in life by their own judg-
ment they obey not their own desires and wishes, but walking by the judg-
ment and commands of another, pass their life in community and are more 
than content to have an abbot over them� [���] And with good- will should 
disciples yield it because it is the cheerful giver God loves�”26 In a parallel 
rule — e�g�, Cyprian (d� 258), Jerome (d� 420), and Leo the Great (d� 461), are 
audible — they are not as loud as Augustine�
 24 Cf� RB 64�8; 11; 15; RA 7�46; Aug�, Serm� 340�1; Aug�, Ciu� D� 19�19; Aug�, 
Faust� 22�56�
 25 In one case The Rule of the Master seems to depend on Augustine; that is, when 
the context of taciturnity is used to express the vertical relation between abbot 
and monk, cf� RM 8�37 and Aug�, Serm� 211�5� Apart from this instance, it mostly 
leans toward disciplinary formation based on escape from sin, humility, and obe-
dience to abbot and dean�
 26 RB 5�12; 16: Ut non suo arbitrio, viventes vel desideriis suis et voluptatibus obe-
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passage of The Rule of the Master it is written: “in the monastery their will is 
daily thwarted for the sake of the Lord, and in the spirit of martyrdom they 
patiently endure whatever commands they receive to test them�”27 Thus, it 
is possible to see how the frustration of the will in RM 7 is equivalent to 
martyrdom (bodily death), while in RB 5 the obedience must be practiced 
with goodwill and gladness since it is one of the cornerstones of communi-
tarian life�
RB 6 deals with taciturnity� The chapter is, for this reason, dedicated to 
the word� One must not speak with the purpose of listening to the word:
let us do what the prophet says: ‘I said, I will watch my ways, that I transgress not 
with my tongue� I set a watch upon my mouth, I became dumb and humbled and 
silent from good�’ [���] Wherefore, even though it is always for good and holy con-
verse that tends to edification, let but rare leave to talk be granted to fully trained 
disciples, on account of the importance of silence�28
In this case, the precept seems, at first glance, negative� But it is not; silence 
is emphasized for the sake of the training of disciples� It is necessary to 
see how the entire chapter is related to Ps 38�2– 3� Although dedicated to 
silence, it is linked to the term word in the perspective of the biblical anthro-
pological model; it begins with the word of the Prophet and provides com-
mentary thereon� As a result, RB 6, especially its introduction, is absolutely 
original, lacking any parallel in The Rule of the Master� In turn, RM 8,1– 
38, on which all the theology of taciturnity is based, is strongly negative� 
Accordingly, the term word is omitted� Instead, the argument is constructed 
around the term soul, and its relation with the struggle with the body� In 
short, if RB 6, despite mentioning sin, emphasizes learning, RM 8 makes sin 
the central point�
Finally, RB 7 deals with humility� Taking into account the ascensional 
and gradual process of attaining humility, it says:
for that ladder set up is our life in this world which, when the heart has been hum-
bled by the Lord, is set up to heaven� [���] when then the monk shall have ascended 
all these steps in humility, he will presently arrive at that love of God which, being 
sibi præesse desiderant [...] et cum bono animo a discipulis præberi oportet, quia 
hilarem datorem diligit Deus (PL 66, 349– 350)�
 27 RM 7�59: Amaricatur uoluntati eorum cottidie in monasterio pro Domino, et ad 
probationem quaeque iniuncta fuerint, sustinent uelut in martyrio patienter (SC 
105, 394)�
 28 RB 6�1– 3: Faciamus quod ait Propheta: Dixi, custodiam vias meas, ut non delin-
quam in lingua mea. Posui ori meo custodiam, obmutui, et humiliatus sum, et silui 
a bonis. [...] Ergo quamvis de bonis et sanctis et ædificationum eloquiis, perfectis 
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perfect, puts fear right outside; and by means of which all that formerly he could 
not observe but with much fearfulness he will begin to keep without any difficulty, 
as it were by habit become second nature, no longer through fear of hell, but for 
love of Christ and a certain good habit and delight in virtue, which the Lord will 
deign to manifest by the Holy Spirit to His labourer now cleansed from vices and 
sins�29
In this way, humility is put into relation with the anthropological term heart� 
In fact, to follow each one of the steps of humility – i�e�, to see everything 
that happens in the Monastery with the fear of God, or as a gift of God’s 
love; to be pure in thoughts and feelings; to set aside one’s own will; to 
avoid negligence and indifference; to be patient, obedient, generous, open-
hearted; to respect each brother and each thing, always looking for the last 
place without affectation and with all sincerity; to hate vulgarity, meanness, 
roughness, and arrogance – is the same as having a pure, delicate, clean, 
and transparent heart� So, RB 7 synthesizes RB 5– 6� Within these degrees 
of humility, one can find a proposal for the fulfillment of human existence� 
Tongue, hands, and feet must be completely in tune with the heart� To be 
obedient, to be silent in order to listen, to be natural, to understand the 
most modest situations of our condition, to be transparent, sincere, clean, 
is to be truly human� That is the absolute simplicity, the radical and total 
simplicity that surpasses not only the dualism of the soul’s struggle against 
the body but every single duplicity of intention and action, of conjecture 
and actualization, of hidden thoughts and disguised externalization� In this 
sense, to be and to seem constitute one single reality to the monk since his 
heart, his tongue, his hands, and his feet compose one single reality� The 
monk is depicted in The Rule of Benedict as entirely simple because he is 
entirely one� Therefore, simplicity and transparency must prevail in the heart 
of monks, expressed through respect and profound sensitivity to all people, 
culminating in perfecta illa caritas.
On the other hand, the master claims in RM 10 that
a soul such as this [cleansed from vices and sins], therefore, having gone up these 
rungs will, when life has ended, doubtlessly enter into the reward of the Lord to 
which the apostle refers when he says: ‘what we suffer in this life can never be 
 29 RB 7�8; 67– 70: Scala vero ipsa erecta, nostra est vita in sæculo: quae humiliato 
corde a Domino erigitur ad cælum. [...] Ergo his omnibus humilitatis gradibus 
ascensis, monachus mox ad caritatem Dei perveniet illam, quæ perfecta foris mittit 
timorem: per quam universa, quæ prius non sine formidine observabat, absque 
ullo labore velut naturaliter ex consuetudine incipiet custodire; non jam timore 
gehennæ, sed amore Christi et consuetudine ipsa bona et delectatione virtutum, 
quæ Dominus jam in operarium suum mundum a vitiis et peccatis, Spiritu Sancto 
dignabitur demonstrare (PL 66, 371; 375– 376)�
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compared to the glory, as yet unrevealed, which is waiting for us’� Such souls will 
receive that eternal life which abides in the rapture of everlasting joy and will nev-
ermore know and end�30
According to this quotation, the theology of humility in The Rule of the 
Master arcs towards the incorruptibility of the soul and converges upon a 
sort of spiritualization that can only be attained in the afterlife; that is, when 
the soul is detached from the body� It is quite the opposite of RB 7 and its 
foretaste of perfecta illa caritas brought into reality on Earth�
In short, it is possible to see how the main elements of RB 5– 7 do not find 
a parallel in the anthropological terminology of RM 7– 10� Accordingly, one 
must understand RB 5– 7 not only from the perspective of The Rule of the 
Master but, above all, under the influence of the Augustinian monastic men-
tality� After all, if the constant presence of the trichotomy and its emphasis 
on the struggle against sin in RM 7– 10 cannot be seen in RB 5– 7, it is rea-
sonable to surmise the existence of a disagreement in The Rule of Benedict 
vis- a- vis the anthropology of The Rule of the Master� In this case, it is pos-
sible to interpret the spiritual theology of RB 5– 7 as influenced by the moral 
dimension of the biblical anthropological model drawn from The Rule of 
Augustine�
5.  Conclusion
We set out to argue in this paper that, in The Rule of Benedict, the indi-
vidualistic and pessimistic accent of The Rule of the Master’s anthropology 
was attenuated by the influence of the more communitarian and optimistic 
Augustinian monastic tradition, summed up in The Rule of Augustine� 
Augustine’s Rule is responsible for the transmission of values such as 
humanity and fraternity, directed toward an abbey of embodied brethren� It 
also provides a singular understanding of the sinful condition based on the 
recognition of the moral and psychological weakness of humanity, revealing 
Augustine’s profound theological and historical awareness� As a result of 
his influence, we can also detect the role of grace as a support to the monk’s 
fidelity and attainment of his spiritual goal� All of this is directed toward a 
salubrious communitarian conviviality, paying attention to mutual charity, 
 30 RM 10�92– 93: Quibus ergo perascensis gradibus, post exitum uitae sine dubio talis 
anima ad illam retributionem Domini introitura est, quam demonstrat apostulus, 
dicens: Non sunt condignae passiones huius saeculi as superuenturam gloriam, 
quae reuelabitur in nobis. Illam uitam aeternam tales animae recepturae sunt, 
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fraternal relation, and the value and dignity of human being in all its unity 
and diversity�
I submit that it is, therefore, the sway of the horizontal, communitarian 
Augustinian anthropology, in contrast to the pessimistic and vertical anthro-
pology of The Rule of the Master, that establishes The Rule of Benedict as a 
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